









































of  the 
humanities
this is the third volume in a series that pro­
vides a comprehensive comparative history 
of  the humanities. the book focuses on the 
modern period in the development of  this 
dynamic field (1850-2000). specialists in 
philology, musicology, art history, linguistics, 
archaeology, digital humanities, and literary 
theory examine the intertwining nature of  
these various disciplines. the contributors, 
including the renowned scholars Floris Cohen, 
Lorraine daston, john joseph, glenn most, 
john pickstone, ingrid rowland, abram de 
swaan, and jo tollebeek, reveal how the 
humanities developed in interaction with the 
natural sciences and the social sciences. among 
the new perspectives offered by this book are 
the interaction between disciplines in europe 
and asia and the insights generated by digital 
humanities scholarship. this volume offers a 
wealth of  insights for specialists and students 
alike.
‘originating from a gathering of   predomi­
nantly european specialists in linguistics, 
history, mathematics, science, musicology, 
litera ture, and other disciplines, the essayists 
embrace broad topics and those more narrowly 
defined. tracing the development of  theories, 
some to their origins in the 17th century, each 
selection offers innovative perspectives about the precursors of  prevailing intellectual 
movements in the 19th century, with which the volume is primarily concerned. each of  
the 19 essays assembled by bod, maat, and weststeijn (all, univ. of  amsterdam) deserves 
mention. (…) summing up: highly recommended. graduate students, researchers, and 





‘the book brings to light a very important mo­
ment in the development of  western civilization 
and perhaps one of  its last significant contribu­
tions to world culture. the material is fascinating, 
with numerous implications for the broader fields 
not only of  history and sociology of  science and 
universities, but of  nationalism and civilization 
studies as well. the volume is a real contribution 
to knowledge, extending far beyond the field to 
which it ostensibly belongs of  the history of  the 
humanities.’ – Liah greenfeld, boston university 
on The Making of  the Humanities Vol. II.
rens bod is a professor in digital humanities  
at the university of  amsterdam.
jaap maat is a lecturer in philosophy  
at the university of  amsterdam.
thijs weststeijn is associate professor of  art history 
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The Making of the Modern Humanities
Rens Bod, Jaap MaaT, and Thijs WesTsTeijn
With this third volume of our three-part project on the history of the humani-
ties we have arrived at the modern age. This is the period of discipline formation 
and academic institutionalization, but it is also the period when the humanities 
and sciences drew farther apart. While already foreshadowed by Giambattista 
Vico’s famous eighteenth-century distinction between the ‘science of the human’ 
and ‘science of the natural’, Wilhelm Dilthey’s distinction between Geisteswis-
senschaft and Naturwissenschaft was very influential.1 That is, the humanities are 
deemed to be predicated on understanding (Verstehen), the sciences on explain-
ing (Erklären). The distinction was adopted by philosophers such as Heinrich 
Rickert, Ernst Cassirer, Hans-Georg Gadamer and it was echoed in C.P. Snow’s 
famous Two Cultures debate.2 Although actual practice in the humanities and 
sciences was quite different from the simple dichotomy between understanding 
and explaining (see the chapters in this book), the distinction molded the minds 
of many, and Dilthey’s interpretative approach contributed to the current image 
problem of the humanities. That is, the humanities are no longer seen as the pin-
nacle of intellectual development but as a luxury pastime with little relevance for 
society and even less for economy.
While this image problem has been analyzed and rebutted by many,3 it is often 
forgotten that the very distinction between the humanities and the natural sci-
ences is a relatively recent one, and that practices in the sciences and the humani-
ties point at a continuum rather than at a divide between the interpretative and 
the analytical, and between the subjective and the objective.4 More than that, with 
the current advent of the digital humanities – to which five chapters of this book 
are devoted – the two fields seem to have come together again in the twenty-first 
century. Between these two boundary periods – the early nineteenth and the early 
twenty-first century – there is an immensity of both empirical and interpretative 
humanistic activities: from art history to linguistics, from musicology to histori-
ography, from philology to archeology, from theater studies to media studies, and 
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from literary studies to philosophy. These disciplines deserve an in-depth histori-
cal investigation in all respects, especially from a comparative perspective. This is 
what this book aims to contribute to.
 The history of the humanities comes of age
The current volume is the outcome of the third conference on the history of the 
humanities, ‘The Making of the Humanities III’, held in Rome in 2012. It is also 
the third volume in the series ‘The Making of the Humanities’, which follows 
a chronological order from the studia humanitatis in the early modern period, 
through the birth of the Geisteswissenschaften in the early nineteenth century, to 
the modern humanities in the current era. Thus the first biannual conference on 
the history of the humanities, held in 2008, dealt with the early modern period 
(1400-1750). Proceedings were published in The Making of the Humanities, Vol. 
I: Early Modern Europe (Amsterdam University Press, 2010). The second confer-
ence, held in 2010, focused on the transition of the humanistic disciplines from 
the early modern period to the modern era, which resulted in the book The Mak-
ing of the Humanities, Vol. II: From Early Modern to Modern Disciplines (Amster-
dam University Press, 2012).
The theme of the third conference was thus a natural continuation of the pre-
vious two conferences. But this conference was also different from its predeces-
sors: it included for the first time sessions devoted to the humanities in society 
and to the relation between the humanities and the social sciences. During the 
last few years the comparative history of the humanities has proved to be a gold-
mine: while the history of ‘knowledge-making disciplines’ usually tends to focus 
on the history of science, technology, and medicine, it has become increasingly 
clear how different disciplines in the humanities have set the standard in teaching 
and research for the social and natural sciences – such can be learned from the 
contributions of our keynote speakers: Lorraine Daston, John E. Joseph, Glenn 
Most, John Pickstone, and Jo Tollebeek. Moreover, it has turned out that the hu-
manities had a much more intensive and continuous interaction with the sciences 
than was previously assumed. If there is any common thread emerging from the 
chapters of this book, it is the insight that the history of the humanities is not 
only important as a field of its own, but that it constitutes the missing link in the 
history of science, or even in the history of knowledge.
There are many other common threads: the historical turn in the early nine-
teenth century that affected all of the humanities, the search for proper method-
ologies in the later nineteenth century leading to separate disciplines, the uni-
versalist ambitions in the humanities in the early twentieth century (to write 
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encompassing overviews of world history, world literature, world art), the post-
modern turn in the second half of the twentieth century, and, of course, the turn 
to the digital in the later twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The 2012 con-
ference was also different from the previous ones in that it was the first one with 
parallel sessions. Still, the organizers had to reject almost 70% of the submissions. 
From the 167 submitted abstracts, only 50 could be accepted. On the one hand the 
large number of submissions is a sign that the field is coming of age. On the other 
hand, it also means that the intimate atmosphere of the previous conferences may 
not be maintained in the future, as the conference is likely to continue to grow.
This will probably be the last edited volume on ‘The Making of the Humani-
ties’, not because we have arrived at the contemporary era, but because the num-
ber of papers is becoming too large to be published in a single edited volume. In 
sending out all individual papers for review, we are in practice moving toward a 
journal-like style of publication. For the future, we believe the field will need its 
own journal where publication is not limited to conference attendees only. In the 
current time of hardship for scholarship in the humanities, we believe that bring-
ing together all humanities disciplines in one journal will strengthen the position 
and visibility of the humanities around the globe.
 The papers in this book
Part I dives into the relation between the humanities and sciences. Lorraine Das-
ton argues that the humanities and the sciences – although often framed in terms 
of oppositions – have intertwined histories at the levels of methods, institutions, 
ideas and epistemic virtues. She discusses the shared epistemic virtue of objectiv-
ity which was preceded by the more ancient epistemic virtue of impartiality. Both 
virtues have a history, and Daston shows that the notion of historical objectivity 
became the model for the later scientific objectivity. H. Floris Cohen questions the 
present-day near-consensus that the modern distinction between the humanities 
and the sciences was foreign to scholars in the period of the Scientific Revolution. 
May not such a distinction be found back underneath the surface of at least some 
of their work? To find out in preliminary fashion, he briefly investigates four 
select cases: Pascal appears to maintain precisely such a distinction; Descartes 
appears to posit it in the case of musical theory; Kepler’s and Newton’s work on 
biblical chronology turns out to be subtly yet importantly different from their 
better known work in what we now call the sciences. Laura Meneghello discusses 
the interaction between the humanities and the natural sciences in the second 
half of the nineteenth century by analyzing the attitude of scientific material-
ism – generally considered as one of the most radical movements within positiv-
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ism. By concentrating on the work of Jacob Moleschott (1822-1893), Meneghello 
argues that scientific materialism was particularly inclusive with respect to the 
humanities, resulting in an all-encompassing worldview that expanded its limits 
beyond the sheer divulgation of empirical research. In the last chapter of Part I, 
Virginia Richter gives a case study of Philip Henry Gosse’s (1810-1888) Omphalos 
(1857). She shows how Gosse used rhetorical strategies borrowed from the hu-
manities to make what was for him a scientific argument: just as God had created 
Adam with a navel, he had created the earth with fossils and all, thus giving the 
impression not only of the earth’s great age but of the mutability of species. Rich-
ter argues that Gosse’s Omphalos shows the importance of ‘nonknowledge’ or ‘false 
knowledge’ in the formation of scholarly and scientific inquiry.
Part II addresses a number of issues pertaining to the study of language. John 
E. Joseph analyzes three critical moments in the emergence of modern linguistics: 
the demise of the concept of the ‘genius of a language’ in the nineteenth century, 
the role of sign theory in Saussure’s work, and the development of Meillet’s work, 
which resulted in a narrative about mental evolution. Applying a framework pro-
posed by Bruno Latour, Joseph uses these three cases to show that linguistics has 
never been thoroughly modern, but has always had recourse to various sorts of 
enchantment in order to establish itself as a science. Michiel Leezenberg investi-
gates the link between nationalism and Orientalism in a paper about the notori-
ous Japhetic theory of Nikolai Marr (1865-1934), which played a prominent part 
in Soviet linguistics in the first half of the twentieth century. Leezenberg argues 
that, as the case of Marr’s theory shows, the creation of non-Western nationalist 
theories should not be viewed solely in terms of the colonial exportation of Ger-
man historical-comparative philology; instead, ‘subaltern’ forms of knowledge, 
rooted in local agency, deserve to be explored. László Marácz investigates the 
context in which the grand project of producing an explanatory, comparative, and 
etymological dictionary of the Hungarian language took shape in the nineteenth 
century. Nationalist ambitions were central, as well as Romantic views. In carry-
ing out the work, Gergely Czuczor (1800-1866) and János Fogarasi (1801-1878) 
relied on both foreign and local traditions. Although the dictionary was discred-
ited for its alleged outdated approach soon after it was completed, Marácz argues 
that the dictionary has great merits, and can be used for linguistic research today.
Part III deals with the history of history writing in the modern age. Jo Tolle-
beek sets the stage by showing that in the decades around 1900, the humanities 
went through a process of professionalization and academization. In contrast to 
the natural sciences, however, historians and their colleagues continued to teach 
in ‘lecture rooms’ in their private homes. Tollebeek argues that this homely scien-
tific culture strongly contributed to the social, epistemological, and ethical con-
tent of the humanities. Marita Mathijsen shows how after the French Revolution 
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the writing of history fell into the hands of practitioners of three new kinds: 
editors, literary authors, and professional historians. New, rigorous standards for 
authenticity come up, but also popularization in the sense that the past is now 
opened up to everyone. These two coexisting movements of professionalization 
and of ‘democratization’ become particularly manifest as literary authors turn 
themselves into history writers, all the while historians begin to employ literary 
techniques. Christine Ottner discusses the influence of scholarly periodicals in 
the process of academic professionalization and institutionalization. She exam-
ines three scholarly journals from the middle of the nineteenth century to the 
beginning of the twentieth century showing that these not only reflect develop-
ments within disciplines, but also actively influence these developments by way 
of an editorial policy. As part of the making of the historical discipline scholarly 
periodicals turn out to be very complex elements. Herman Paul examines the 
impact of ideals of scholarly virtue (such as objectivity, honesty, carefulness) on 
the development of humanities disciplines. By a study of methodology manuals 
from history, art history and music history, he argues that these manuals were not 
merely textbooks on historical criticism, but attempts to codify a certain vision 
of the historian’s scholarly vocation, described in terms of goods to be achieved 
and to be avoided. Finally, Bart Karstens discusses the history of the history of 
science. He tries to explain the unstable position of the history of science within 
the current academic system. Karstens argues that this is due to the tight relation 
of the history of science to both philosophy of science and the natural sciences 
themselves. Although alternative models from sociology and anthropology have 
been used to study science, according to Karstens the study of past science is in a 
confused state marked by lack of coherence, theoretical anarchy, and uneven at-
tention to the natural sciences and the humanities.
Part IV is devoted to the intertwined traditions of philology and classical 
scholarship, highlighting how the study of antiquity via its written remnants 
has informed the systematic analysis of texts in the humanities up to the ear-
ly twentieth century; it remains relevant today. Glenn W. Most explains how 
Quellenforschung used to be the basis of explorations of the Greco-Roman world 
a century ago, whereas nowadays it is practiced by relatively few scholars. By the 
mid-nineteenth century, Friedrich August Wolf ’s (1759-1824) philological meth-
od was applied to Greek poetry and its extension to philosophy, historiography, 
and Roman copies of Greek sculptures was the logical next step. Many of the 
findings of Quellenforschung therefore continue to provide an apparently solid 
foundation for studies in a variety of disciplines within classical scholarship and 
beyond, such as historical theology. Eline Scheerlinck addresses the emancipation 
of the history of religions from its basis in philology and theology. She focuses on 
the Belgian classicist Franz Cumont (1868-1947), the first to study a specific re-
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ligion (Mithraicism) from the viewpoint of Altertumswissenschaft as a whole, in-
cluding epigraphical and archeological approaches. He assigned to the Near East 
a seminal role in the moral and religious evolution of the Roman Empire. Annette 
M. Baertschi explores how large-scale research projects, launched by the Prus-
sian Academy in the late nineteenth century, made literary and material sources 
accessible and engendered new forms of organization and collaboration that also 
impacted the natural sciences: classics, in particular, evolved into an authorita-
tive discipline with subdivisions such as Greek and Latin philology, archeology, 
ancient history, epigraphy, and papyrology. This development may prove to be 
analogous to today’s ‘big data’ projects in digital humanities. Jacqueline Klooster 
points out that Lachmann’s philological ideal, aimed at distinguishing the single 
authoritative version of a text, has been questioned in recent years in reference 
to medieval textual transmission. She investigates the evidence for ancient vari-
ant readings and especially their evaluation by ancient Greek scholars in order 
to plead for a historically accurate dismissal of the search for the authoritative 
source. The chapter ties ancient editorial practices and textual transmission to 
New Philology’s observations concerning the status of textual variants. Floris Sol-
leveld, by contrast, focuses on different types of intertextuality to arrive at a new 
way of analyzing developments in scholarly method in the humanities. He argues 
that changing patterns of intertextuality (such as editing, extension, compilation, 
reference, and citation) are revelatory of changing styles of reasoning. Studying 
practical and conceptual shifts through types of intertextuality therefore opens a 
new perspective on the relation between scholarly ideals and practices.
Part V, devoted to twentieth-century literature and drama, highlights funda-
mentally interdisciplinary and transnational approaches. Ingrid D. Rowland fore-
grounds the versatile historian of literature and religion Furio Jesi (1941-1980), 
zooming in on his Cultura di Destra (1979) and its political ideology that harked 
back to colorful thinkers such as Mircea Eliade (1907-1986) and Julius Evola 
(1898-1974). Jesi’s book comments on the Enlightenment and more recent Fascist 
past, while also testifying to the author’s own role in the politicized Italian ‘Years 
of Lead’. It remains relevant to present-day Italian novelists. Ton van Kalmthout 
addresses the attempt to write comprehensive histories of ‘world literature’. He 
explores the development of this historiographical genre in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, identifying two contrary trends: academization and 
popularization. The chapter focuses on examples by scholars from the Neth-
erlands, singling out Jan Walch (1879-1946), former professor at the Sorbonne 
and director of Amsterdam’s Theater School. Chiara Maria Buglioni outlines the 
unique struggle of German theater studies, growing away from literary and his-
torical studies, as well as from ethnology, in the years before the Second World 
War. Its founders, Max Herrmann (1865-1942) and Artur Kutscher (1878-1960), 
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did not define a specific method: Herrmann pointed out the relevance of archeo-
logical investigation while Kutscher focused on literary drama and its irrational 
elements. Many of their problems are still relevant for theater as a multimedial 
object of inquiry.
Part VI is devoted to the history of art and archeology, focusing on the period 
around 1900 when new conceptual clarity and disciplinary ambitions arose. Birgit 
Mersmann associates the making of art history as a universal discipline, based on 
the understanding of mutual cultural influences and historical transfers, with the 
German historian Karl Lamprecht (1856-1915). In his wake, texts by Alois Riegl 
(1898), Oskar Beyer (1923), and Aby Warburg (1923) reached out to disciplines 
such as universal history and cultural history, which resulted in a reconceptu-
alization of art history’s objects, methodology, and geographical framing. This 
approach adumbrates the current ideal of ‘world art studies’. Adi Efal focuses on 
a specific art-historical concept and its wider application in the humanities: the 
term ‘genre’. Following the scholarship of the Vienna School around 1900, this 
classification term was superseded by the concept of style as one of the central 
tools of historicism in the history of art. The chapter argues that genre, as per-
taining to the vocabulary of literary history since Aristotle’s Poetics, is inherently 
related to subject matter. The concept of genre furthermore helps to focus histor-
ical and analytical attention on an artwork’s generation and its diachronic nature. 
José María Lanzarote-Guiral reveals how the polemic following the discovery of 
the prehistoric paintings in Altamira (in northern Spain) in 1878 sparked the rise 
of a discipline. This involved the cross-pollination of the different epistemologi-
cal traditions of natural science, archeology, and especially anthropology, when 
Henri Breuil (1877-1961) and Hugo Obermaier (1877-1946) recognized the cave’s 
authenticity in 1902. The revolutionary insight that ‘primitive’ men possessed so-
phisticated symbolic capacities resulted from scholarly exchange across European 
borders.
Part VII discusses the various attempts of musicologists to incorporate in-
sights from other disciplines, ranging from the natural sciences and psychology to 
art history. Maria Semi points out how before the birth of the cognitive sciences, 
natural philosophy had already furnished aesthetics with fundamental notions. 
She zooms in on Zoonomia (1794-1796), a study of the laws of organic life by 
Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), which contained an attempt to define the pleasure 
received from music in relation to time, repetition, and a melodious succession 
of notes. A new comprehension of the mind and the body engendered a new way 
of thinking about the human reaction to art. Riccardo Martinelli begins with the 
late nineteenth century when comparative musicology became an institutional 
science. Carl Stumpf (1848-1936), founder of the Phonogramm-Archiv (1906) of 
non-Western music, developed an empirically oriented investigation of the per-
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ception of sounds. Physiological studies on the sense of touch suggested that two 
sensations of tone at the same moment tend to mix, which explained the expe-
rience of musical consonance. In Stumpf ’s wake, Erich Hornbostel (1877-1935) 
focused attention on the eventual ‘melting’ of Western and non-Western cultures. 
Alexis Ruccius outlines the history of music iconography as an example of the suc-
cessful transfer of methods from one discipline to another. In the late nineteenth 
century, this approach focused merely on reconstructing musical instruments and 
performance with the aid of images. Only in the 1920s the Warburg School of 
art history inquired after the relation between sound and image as an element of 
the history of ideas, which culminated in Leo Schrade’s (1903-1964) analysis of 
Cluny Abbey.
Part VIII addresses how Western humanities were introduced in Asia and 
how the confrontation with Asian culture and scholarship affected the humani-
ties in the West. Steffi Marung and Katja Naumann explore how Oriental studies 
were established in late-nineteenth-century Europe as a transnational endeavor. 
Around 1900 Russian Oriental studies were internationally in the vanguard. The 
Petersburg Faculty of Oriental Studies (1855), which included East Asians as 
scholars, was initially a mainstay for German, French, and English Orientalists. 
After the 1917 Revolution several leading scholars left the country; some migrat-
ing to the US, where the discipline flourished due to the resulting transatlantic 
networks as exemplified by Serge Elisséeff (1889-1975), who studied in Japan and 
migrated to Paris before coming to Harvard in 1931. Julia Orell explores how the 
consolidation of the historical disciplines in Germany engendered the establish-
ment of East Asian art history. The writings of Karl With (1891-1980) on Japanese 
and Chinese art from the 1920s reveal some of the methodological issues arising 
with this new field. His rejection of the Greek-influenced Gandhara sculptures 
exemplifies how he recognized independent local developments, positing Asia 
as a counterpart to Europe. At the same time, With associated these develop-
ments with the avant-garde art of his own time. Perry Johansson focuses on early-
twentieth-century China as hunting ground for a slew of Western archeological 
expeditions, marked by the difficult interaction between European scholarship 
and Chinese politics. He points out how a reaction against foreign attempts to 
rewrite the Middle Kingdom’s history brought about a politics of heritage and 
history with modern methods. This laid the basis for a reinvention of Chinese 
tradition that remains relevant today.
Part IX goes into the history of information science and digital humanities 
well into the twenty-first century. The first contribution by Charles van den Heu-
vel traces the origins of these disciplines and describes how at the beginning of 
the computer era, scholars were persuaded to follow the rigorous, often exclu-
sive methods of the natural sciences. Only recently have e-humanities researchers 
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pled for the development of holistic methodologies standing in a hermeneutic 
tradition. Van den Heuvel shows how recent ICT developments also try to incor-
porate the complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty of humanities data, methods, 
and practices leading to a new phase in the making of the humanities, described 
as Humanities 3.0. Johanna Sprondel examines the history of the concept of con-
cordance. A concordance shows in how many texts any word (or subject) occurs; 
it may be used to find specific passages, compare different usages, to evaluate rela-
tions between words and terms, etc. Sprondel argues that concordance as a genu-
ine concept of the humanities finds its application in Google and other search 
engines, and that by analyzing these based upon the idea of concordances we can 
become aware of the changing methods and impacts of the digital. Jan Rock goes 
into one of the earliest card-file databases on medieval Dutch texts, the Biblio-
theca Neerlandica Manuscripta (BNM), set up around 1900 by the Belgian phi-
lologist Willem De Vreese (1869-1938) at Ghent. The BNM led to a shift from a 
materialist approach toward the use of data systems in philology (and nationalis-
tic and scientistic narratives) in the Low Countries and abroad. It contributed to 
central data systems in philology throughout the twentieth century. Stef Scagliola 
and Franciska de Jong describe the historiographical development of oral history. 
After a long period of negligence, oral accounts reemerged as ‘reliable’ histori-
cal sources with the invention of the tape recorder. Affordable technology facili-
tated the creation of collections around a theme or social group, and in this way 
supported oral history’s ideological agenda of giving voice to the less powerful. 
Scagliola and De Jong argue that given the multilayered content of audio(visual) 
oral history accounts, the application of present-day digital tools for searching 
content and detecting patterns, holds the promise of rich data for multiple dis-
ciplines. The final paper by Jan-Willem Romeijn discusses some methodological 
issues related to the fast growth of empirical and computational methods in the 
humanities. He argues that confirmation theory – a subdiscipline of philosophy 
of science – provides useful models for critically evaluating these methods, as it 
provides a handle on the new notions of evidence that humanities disciplines will 
need to accommodate. He argues that confirmation theory might thereby help to 
establish a smoother connection of the humanities with the sciences.
Part X contains two papers discussing the relationship between the humani-
ties and philosophy, each focusing on a specific circle of philosophers. Carlo Ierna 
explores the idea of philosophy as science in the philosophy of Franz Brentano 
(1838-1917) and his school. Brentano claimed that the true method of philosophy 
is none other than that of the natural sciences and claimed a specific field of 
enquiry for philosophy: mental phenomena defined as phenomena that contain 
an object intentionally, which are distinct from natural phenomena. This view 
of philosophy was meant to provide a scientific foundation for the humanities 
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independent of the natural sciences, and proved to be a successful research para-
digm itself. David L. Marshall revisits the Weimar origins of political theory, 
and observes hitherto neglected links between Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’, Arendt’s ‘The 
Human Condition’, Warburg’s ‘Denkraum’ and Benjamin’s interest in various sorts 
of actualization-caught-in-the-midst-of-possibility. Marshall thus reveals a rhe-
torical core of what could be a rich humanities interdiscipline, in which philoso-
phy, political theory, art history, and literary criticism might all contribute to the 
analysis of human being as a series of actualizations constituted by possibility.
Part XI is concerned with topics at the interface between the humanities and 
the social sciences. Jeroen Bouterse discusses the views of Max Weber on how 
explanation in the humanities differs from that in the natural sciences. Whereas 
Weber’s predecessors Windelband and Rickert tried to safeguard the humanities 
against the rising scientific psychology by claiming a unique mode of understand-
ing for them, Weber rejected such an approach, arguing that explanation in the 
humanities should be just as rigorously empirical and objective as in any science, 
but that it still differed in that its object, human action, is goal-directed and -ori-
ented on values. Robert Deam Tobin reviews the history of the study of sexual-
ity, focusing on the role attributed to evidence from literary sources in theories 
of sexual identities. Tobin shows that early defenders of male-male love in the 
1830s relied primarily on literary sources, whereas later in the century both eman-
cipationists and sexologists appealed to natural science. In the early twentieth 
century, a group of theorists reverted to literature, defending a view of sexuality 
as fluid and universal, as opposed to the immutable sexual identities supposed 
by earlier theorists. Marinus Ossewaarde sketches the various imageries that have 
been instrumental in the shaping of sociology as a discipline. Asserting that in 
Comtean sociology technomorphic thought patterns were predominant, while 
with Tocqueville sociomorphic imageries prevailed, Ossewaarde next surveys the 
history of the field throughout the twentieth century and discusses the changing 
imageries reflecting the dominant branch of science in a certain period, from nu-
clear physics to neo-Darwinian biology, which served sometimes as a model, and 
currently primarily as the object of antagonism for sociologists. Bram Kempers 
likewise sketches a broad view on the history of sociology, but from the per-
spective of the great diversity of approaches, rival systems of classification, and 
ambiguous relations with other social sciences and with the humanities that have 
characterized the discipline from the beginning. Kempers then traces the devel-
opment of sociology from Comte and Durkheim, through the interdisciplinary 
work of Huizinga and the redefinition of the field by Weber and Elias to the pre-
sent, in which the arts continue to inspire and inform the endeavor to understand 
the human condition. Rather than to diversity of views, Abram de Swaan draws 
attention to a consensus in the human sciences – a rare phenomenon. It concerns 
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the near unanimous conviction among scholars that the perpetrators of genocide 
are not distinguishable from other human beings in terms of personality traits. 
The Eichmann trial in 1961 and the Milgram punishment experiment are typi-
cally used in support of the belief that it is the immediate situation, not a certain 
disposition, that turns people into mass killers. The arguments for this belief are 
analyzed by De Swaan, and dismantled.
Part XII deals with the position of the humanities in society at large. Vincent 
Gengnagel and Julian Hamann describe the constant struggle for autonomy that 
the humanities have been engaged in from the nineteenth century on. Discuss-
ing two case studies that exemplify the balancing acts between autonomy and 
societal as well as academic relevance, they show from a sociological perspective, 
first, how German historians between 1871 and 1945 managed to maintain their 
own research logic while being politically engaged, and second, that the extensive 
reforms and the rise of the social sciences in the period after 1945 did not compro-
mise the historians’ claim for autonomy. Paul Jay investigates the role that post-
structuralist literary, critical, and cultural theory has played in the humanities 
from 1968 onward, arguing that it would be a mistake to maintain that this type 
of theory has undermined and marginalized the humanities. On the contrary, it 
embodies a critical attitude that has always been central to the humanities, and 
that should be valued and used as an essential part of the mission of the humani-
ties, which is to teach a range of skills in critical thinking.
The volume ends with an Epilogue by John V. Pickstone in which he makes 
a plea for bringing the histories of the knowledge-making disciplines together 
– humanities, sciences, medicine, and technology. He shows how the approach 
put forward in his book Ways of Knowing (2000) can include the humanities, in 
particular in describing knowledge practices and knowledge revolutions. Draw-
ing from examples from language, history, and philology, Pickstone argues that 
the common image of humanities disciplines as following the natural sciences 
is misleading. Instead he argues for a historical frame to include all knowledge-
making disciplines.
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1.1 Objectivity and Impartiality
Epistemic Virtues in the Humanities
Lorraine DasTon
 Introduction: Objectivity versus Justice
For over a century, the relationships between the humanities and the sciences 
have been largely defined by opposition: Geistes- versus Naturwissenschaften, 
ideographic versus nomothetic, interpretative versus explanatory, past- versus 
future-oriented. These oppositions were hammered out in the Festreden of 
Dilthey, Windelband, Helmholtz, and other leading lights of bellwether Ger-
man universities and reflected the rising prestige and power of the natural sci-
ences in the final quarter of the nineteenth century. Since then, the history and 
philosophy of science in most European traditions has been dominated by in-
quiries into the natural sciences: a comparable history of the humanities is just 
beginning to be written, and there is as yet no epistemology of the humanities. 
Yet the histories of the humanities and the sciences have been intertwined since 
at least the sixteenth century, at multiple levels: methods, institutions, ideas, and 
also epistemic virtues. Objectivity is one of those shared epistemic virtues. It 
emerged in both the humanities and the sciences in the nineteenth century. But 
in at least some of the humanities, it was preceded by a more ancient epistemic 
virtue: impartiality.
I shall begin with Nietzsche, who put the point of this paper into one lapi-
dary sentence: ‘Objektivität und Gerechtigkeit haben nichts miteinander zu tun’.1 
Impartiality is an ancient, judicial value; objectivity is a quite modern scientific 
value. Nietzsche admired the severity of the just man, who must elevate himself 
above those who would be judged, but he sneered at the pretensions of the objec-
tive historian, ‘der, den ein Moment der Vergangenheit gar nichts angehe [...] das 
nennt man wohl auch “Objektivität!”!’2 I call Nietzsche as my star witness because 
he was at once a sterling product and bitter critic of the new institutions of schol-
arly teaching and research that forged new epistemic virtues like objectivity in the 
humanities.3
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In our own time, the words ‘impartial’ and ‘objective’ are used almost as syno-
nyms, especially by historians. My aim here is to show that these virtues so dear 
to historians themselves have histories, which are distinct and not always har-
monious. During the nineteenth century, when history became a self-consciously 
‘objective’ science, especially in Germanophone Europe, the tensions between im-
partiality and objectivity became acute, as Nietzsche realized. In order to throw 
the differences between the aims of impartiality and objectivity in history into 
relief, I shall begin with a sketch of how impartiality was preached and practiced 
by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century historians, especially in the increasingly 
volatile context of national histories. I then turn to objectivity, arguing that it 
resided primarily in certain techniques applied to, as well as attitudes toward, the 
subject matter of history. Both techniques and attitudes come clearly to the fore 
in the protracted controversy waged among classical philologists and ancient his-
torians over the speeches in Thucydides: did he betray his own methodological 
principles in reconstructing them so freely? In conclusion, I pose the Nietzschean 
question as to how the ascetic religion of objectivity took hold of historians in 
the nineteenth century.
 Impartiality
For the literate eighteenth-century public, the chief utility of history consisted 
in its true narrations of lives and events presented as guides both moral and 
practical for readers. On this rhetorical, humanist model, history schooled both 
judgment and character by exempla. The more ambitious forms of philosophi-
cal history also sought out universal generalizations, especially in the realms of 
politics and human nature. The impartiality of this brand of history was often 
literally meant: not taking the part of any of the parties whose words and deeds 
were chronicled in the history. Tacitus’s motto was often cited: Sine ira et studio 
(without anger or zeal). Impartiality by no means implied value neutrality on the 
part of the historian. On the contrary, the aim of historical impartiality was to 
reach sound conclusions about moral matters as they were played out in the wars 
and political conflicts of the past, much as the aim of judicial impartiality was 
to reach a just verdict in legal matters as presented in criminal and civil cases.4 
Adam Smith went so far as to make impartiality the basis of all morality: ‘We 
endeavor to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial 
spectator would examine it’.5 It is in eighteenth-century writings on history and 
morals that the metaphor of impartiality as perspectival suppleness becomes 
entrenched: Adam Smith’s ethics of impartiality demands that we ‘change our 
position’.6
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There was nothing necessarily relativist about these perspectival metaphors of 
impartiality. So, for example, Edward Gibbon’s The Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire (1776-1788) offered a studiously even-handed portrayal of the mores and 
character of the German barbarians, and much of the liveliness of his descrip-
tions stems from his attempts to see the world from the perspective of the Goths 
and the Vandals, going far beyond the observations provided by Tacitus:
The languid soul, oppressed with its own weight, anxiously required some 
new and powerful sensation; and war and danger were the only amuse-
ments adequate to its fierce temper. The sound that roused the German to 
arms was grateful to his ear. It roused him from his uncomfortable lethargy, 
gave him an active pursuit, and, by strong exercise of the body, and violent 
emotions of the mind, restored him to a more lively sense of his existence.
But Gibbon’s empathic ability to imagine the states of soul of a German warrior 
by no means implied sympathy, nor did it curb the enlightened historian’s judg-
ment on the state of German civilization – or rather, lack thereof:
The Germans, in the age of Tacitus, were unacquainted with the use of letters; 
and the use of letters is the principle circumstance that distinguishes a civi-
lized people from a herd of savages, incapable of knowledge or reflection. [...] 
They passed their lives in a state of ignorance and poverty, which it has pleased 
some declaimers to dignify with the appellation of virtuous simplicity.7
I have chosen a passage on the Germans advisedly. The most fiery nineteenth-
century disputes about historical impartiality involved French and German histo-
rians who accused one another of fighting today’s battles with ammunition from 
yesterday’s history, as often as not encounters between Germanic and Roman 
peoples in ancient and medieval times. Among the most ferocious of these con-
frontations was that between two eminent ancient historians, Numa Denis Fustel 
de Coulanges and Theodor Mommsen, over the nationality of the inhabitants 
of Alsace-Lorraine in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War. Mommsen, in two 
letters addressed to a Milanese newspaper in July-August 1870,8 had argued on 
the basis of language and race that the Alsatians were of German nationality. In 
October 1870 Fustel replied indignantly:
Mais je m’étonne qu’un historien comme vous affecte d’ignorer que ce n’est 
ni la race ni la langue qui fait la nationalité [...]. La patrie, c’est ce qu’on aime. 
Il se peut que l’Alsace soit allemande par la race et par le langage; mais par 
la nationalité et le sentiment de la patrie elle est française.
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Fustel accused Mommsen and the Prussian army of imposing nationality by con-
quest.9 This was a head-to-head collision over a matter that inflamed nationalist 
passions on both sides of the Rhine, but hints of the polemic crept into more rare-
fied historical works on topics apparently quite remote from the Franco-Prussian 
War. In an 1877 note on whether German law in the fifth century AD permitted 
a partition of land between Romans and barbarians, Fustel’s philological analysis 
was meticulous, and his conclusion (that the Burgundians had by no means ceded 
their territories to the invading Germans) hedged with scientific caution. But 
a remark fraught with relevance for Europe in 1872, rather than 472, crept into 
the final paragraph: ‘C’était un système bien commode de dire que les Germains 
étaient venus en vainqueurs, qu’ils avaient confisqué le sol des vaincus et qu’ils 
l’avaient partagé au sort. On ne peut plus se contenter de ces généralités vagues et 
fausses’.10 And in an 1872 review of a book on the origins of the Germanic empire,11 
after upbraiding German historians for their patriotism and French historians 
for their slavish Germanophilia, Fustel noted with satisfaction that the book un-
der review showed that ‘la Germanie, en tant que nation civilisée, est l’oeuvre de 
Rome et de Gaule [...] le progrès intellectuel, social, moral, ne s’est pas opéré dans 
la race germanique par un développement interne, et ne fut jamais le fruit d’un 
travail indigène’.12
Fustel was, of course, aware that such sentiments accorded ill with the vaunted 
impartiality of history, and yearned for ‘ce charme d’impartialité parfaite qui est la 
chasteté de l’histoire’. But in the very next breath he made it clear that impartial 
history, ‘chaste history’, was in his view ‘cette vraie science française d’autrefois, 
cette érudition si calme, si simple, si haute de nos bénédictins, de notre Académie 
des Inscriptions’. And in any case, whatever one thought of the impartiality of the 
Benedictine historians, those pure, tranquil times were gone forever. In a bellicose 
age like his own, even science and learning must don sword and shield. Besides, he 
could not resist adding, the German historians had begun the mischief by writing 
in the sign of the Vaterland. For them the science of history (and Fustel was as 
adamant as his German colleagues in his insistence that it was a science) was not 
an end in itself but a mean toward promoting national interests.
Fustel was not so wide of the mark when he indicted German historians like 
Wilhelm von Giesebrecht for strident patriotism in their works.13 Once the na-
tion-state became the protagonist of historical narratives, portrayal of the past 
in the service of present nationalist interests became a constant temptation. The 
temptation was not irresistible: Leopold von Ranke, for example, had conceived 
of his Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker (1824) in terms of 
‘sechs grosse Nationen’, the French, Spanish, Italian, German, English, and Scan-
dinavian. But he insisted upon their essential unity (despite the fact that they 
were constantly at war with one another during the period in question, 1494-
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1514), and let each nation in turn command center stage in his narrative so long as, 
in the famous phrase, ‘zuweilen die Hand Gottes über ihnen’.14 However, the next 
generation of German historians, although they unanimously embraced the new 
methods with which the names of Niebuhr and Ranke were narrowly associated, 
included figures such as Heinrich von Sybel and Georg Gervinus, who explicitly 
rejected Ranke’s doctrine of impartiality. At his public defense of his doctoral 
dissertation at the Universität Berlin in 1838, Sybel made ‘Cum ira et studio’ his 
motto, and he later criticized his teacher Ranke’s studied neutrality as cold, color-
less, and perhaps even cowardly.15 Gervinus in his history of German literature 
also exhorted the science of history to take hold of life with both hands, and saw 
Machiavelli’s greatness as a historian precisely in his political engagement – a 
position that Ranke criticized as unscientific; Gervinus for his part contended 
that Ranke’s much vaunted impartiality was simply a sign of political impotence.16 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Heinrich von Treitschke had still stronger words for 
what they regarded as the self-imposed eunuchry of the Rankean school in mat-
ters of impartiality. Yet with the notable exception of Nietzsche, to whom I shall 
return, all of them, even the political firebrand Treitschke, believed that historical 
objectivity was essential, one of the glorious achievements of nineteenth-century 
historiography. This is a position that has bewildered and exasperated their suc-
cessors.17 In the next section I shall try to explain how it was conceivable for these 
historians to embrace objectivity even as they jettisoned impartiality.
 Objectivity
It would be highly misleading to claim that nineteenth-century historians agreed 
about the meaning of impartiality or objectivity, much less about the relationships 
between the two. Just because these words as well as the ideals and practices they 
represented were so central to the historian’s ethos, and therefore so unavoidable 
in polemics, they admitted of much stretching and shading. I cannot possibly do 
justice to the spectrum of positions here. Instead, I want to concentrate on core 
meanings of objectivity that were widely accepted among nineteenth-century his-
torians, however, sharply they may have diverged on more penumbral elements. 
At the core of this core meaning were the practices of the new-style scientific 
historian. Although not all – perhaps even none – of these methods was entirely 
new to Ranke and his students (Fustel thought they’d all been invented by the 
Benedictines and Mabillon long before), they were nonetheless perceived by most 
nineteenth-century historians as having finally established their discipline on a 
firm scientific foundation. On the fringes, as it were, of the core sense of objectiv-
ity was the vaguer but nonetheless strongly felt value of scientific restraint, which 
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judged precisely how far the evidence at hand could be pushed and refrained from 
pushing it one whit further.
Gustav Droysen’s position as outlined in his influential Grundriss der Historik 
(1867) is particularly instructive in this context, because he defended historical 
objectivity while rejecting, on the one hand, historical positivism à la Henry Her-
bert Buckle (who sought deterministic laws of history based on statistical data) 
and, on the other hand, historical romance à la Macaulay and Michelet. Droysen 
dismissed the cult of ‘reine Tatsachen’ as superstition, the pursuit of deterministic 
laws in history as wrongheaded, and the faith that history can arrive at unmedi-
ated truths about the past as criminally naive. It was the great achievement of 
‘historische Kritik’ since Niebuhr to have shown that historians can only glimpse 
the past through a glass darkly, through fragmentary sources, every one of which 
had been stamped with its own partial and partisan perspective. Decoding these 
perspectives was the essence of Quellenkritik, as Droysen explained it: first, to 
determine what the sources were about; second, to ascertain with what general 
‘coloring’ they had been impregnated by the reigning conceptions of the time and 
place; and third, to discern the more individual ‘coloring’ added by the individual 
who had written the source. Quellenkritik was the systematic practice of identifi-
cation, contextualization, and criticism. Nothing about a source was self-evident; 
it must be read warily, from all angles, against the grain. Anyone who expected 
historical facts to speak for themselves, or regarded sources as transparent win-
dows upon the past was ipso facto branded a rank amateur – and dangerously 
subjective to boot, since meaning could then only be projected onto the opaque 
sources. Even with the aid of Quellenkritik the risks of subjectivism were great, 
and Droysen recommended further rules to rescue historical interpretation from 
flights of the imagination.18
In the techniques of historical criticism lay the source of historical objectivity. 
Just as mechanical objectivity in the natural sciences fetishized rigid procedures 
and protocols, objectivity in history required disciplined respect for methods. 
The ‘objective’ truth of the past was forever unattainable, but the methods of the 
historian – and above all the historian’s awareness of the limitations of these 
methods – qualified scientific history as nonetheless objective. In contrast to art, 
which must present its subject matter as a smooth, harmonious whole, the em-
pirical sciences, including history, ‘haben keine strengere Pflicht, als die Lücken 
festzustellen, die in den Objekten ihrer Empirie bedingt sind, die Fehler zu kon-
trollieren, die sich aus ihrer Technik ergeben, die Trageweite der Methoden zu 
untersuchen’.
The objective historian must not give in to the temptation to generalize pre-
maturely or to edify or entertain at the expense of the hard-won facts that had 
been dug out of the archives and purified by Quellenkritik. Of course, there was 
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no objection to a fine style per se, but Droysen frowned on the perfervid prose of 
Michelet, who poured his own subjectivity into the past. But such ‘subjektive Auf-
fassen’ had to be straitened by ‘objektive Maße und Kontrollen’. 19 Ranke, whose 
legendary seminar was the cradle of all these ‘objective measures and controls’ 
among the historians, renounced any intention of writing vivid, edifying history: 
that is the context of his famous declaration that all he wanted to do was ‘bloß 
zeigen, wie es eigentlich gewesen’ – even at the price of a narrative that was ‘oft 
hart, abgebrochen, ermüdend’.20
If historical objectivity lay in the methods of historical criticism, it is more 
comprehensible how politically engaged historians like Sybel and Treitschke 
could simultaneously reject impartiality and affirm objectivity. Both categorically 
affirmed their allegiance to these methods: if they were not the whole of history, 
then they were its solid, scientific foundations. Sybel urged the historian to be 
political and artistic as well as scientific, but while the historian qua writer might 
give imagination free reign, the historian qua critical researcher had ‘die Pflicht, 
jede Einwirkung seiner subjektiven Stimmungen zurückzudrängen’. However 
much he might mock the eunuchs of impartiality for their refusal to put history 
at the service of life, Treitschke never doubted but that the exacting standards 
of research in original sources deserved to be called objective, and were the basis 
for all history worthy of the name.21 Ranke’s commitment to understand the past 
in its own terms required literal selflessness, an attempt ‘mein Selbst gleichsam 
auszulöschen’.22 The objective historians who had learned their handiwork in 
Ranke’s seminar struggled to overcome, not indulge, their own subjectivity. This 
severity came at the cost of losing the greater part of at least the German reading 
public, who, Droysen complained, unaccountably ‘wollte lesen, nicht studieren’.23
 Thucydides at the bar
For historians the patron saint of their discipline had always been Thucydides. 
It is therefore particularly instructive to observe how Thucydides himself was 
judged at the bar of objectivity by late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century clas-
sicists and historians. Two questions, both revolving around the celebrated Meth-
odensatz in I.22 of the History of the Peloponnesian War, introduced the discus-
sion of historical objectivity into scholarly work on Thucydides: first, to what 
extent was Thucydides himself consciously aspiring to the standards of objective 
history; and second, did he hold to these standards, especially in the matter of 
reporting speeches? The amount of learned ink spilt over the proper rendering of 
the Methodensatz in modern European languages since c. 1850 makes one chary 
of quoting any of the translations. Since, however, some general idea of what 
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Thucydides said is a precondition for understanding what all the scholarly fuss 
was about, I hesitantly offer the Loeb translation by Charles Foster Smith of I.22 
as a reference point:
As to the speeches that were made by different men, either when they were 
about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has 
been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both 
for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various 
other sources have brought me reports. Therefore the speeches are given 
in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would 
express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting 
the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as pos-
sible to the general sense of what was actually said. But as to the facts of 
the occurrences of the war, I have thought it my duty to give them, not as 
ascertained from any chance informant nor as seemed to me probable, but 
only after investigating with the greatest possible accuracy [akribeia] each 
detail, in the case both of the events in which I myself participated and of 
those regarding which I got my information from others. And the endeavor 
to ascertain these facts was a laborious task, because those who were eye-
witnesses of the several events did not give the same reports about the same 
things, but reports varying according to their championship of one side or 
the other, or according to their recollection.24
It should be kept in mind that the terminology of objectivity and subjectivity that 
came to be regularly applied to this passage were themselves still something of a 
novelty in the mid-nineteenth century, although they became quickly and widely 
entrenched thereafter. In Franz Wolfgang Ullrich’s pioneering work, Beiträge zur 
Erklärung des Thukydides (1846), which advanced the hypothesis that Thucydides 
had composed his history in two parts (breaking at V.25), the words ‘objective’ 
and ‘objectivity’ hardly figure. Ullrich consistently rendered Thucydides’ own 
‘akribeia’ as ‘genaue Sorgfalt’.25 However, in later works on how Thucydides had 
composed his work, and particularly those that treated the question of the au-
thenticity of the speeches he reported, analyses of I.22 were peppered with the 
vocabulary of objectivity and subjectivity.26 Ranke’s ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’ was 
arguably a deliberate echo of Thucydides I.22.27 The wholesale and, for the most 
part, unreflecting importation of these modern termini into the analysis of what 
exactly Thucydides might have meant in I.22 concerning the reporting of deeds 
and speeches is all the more striking against the background of the meticulous 
philological analysis of every single word and grammatical construction in the 
passage. Every semantic shade, every syntactic wrinkle is explored with the pow-
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erful instruments of classical philology by scholars with a princess-and-the-pea 
sensibility for anachronisms and editorial interpolations. But the framework of 
objectivity and subjectivity, barely a century old in 1900, is taken over with hardly 
a murmur.
In these late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century works on Thucydides’ 
historical methods the answer to the first question – To what extent did 
Thucydides aspire to the standards of historical objectivity? – was usually an-
swered in the affirmative, or simply assumed. So Max Pohlenz, writing in 1919, 
credits Thucydides with ‘die erstmalige Festlegung einer objektiven Richtschnur’ 
in the Methodensatz, in welcome contrast to Herodotus’s notorious liberties in 
reporting both deeds and speeches.28 August Grosskinsky, in his 1934 Heidel-
berg dissertation, agreed with this aspect of Pohlenz’s interpretation, if in noth-
ing else: Thucydides opposes himself to the ‘subjektiven Willkür Herodots’, and 
at least in his reporting of deeds (erga) in the Peloponnesian War had striven to-
ward ‘völlige Ausschaltung jeder Subjektivität’.29 Even classicists who sensed un-
easily that Thucydides might not perhaps have subscribed to the modern creed 
of objectivity felt themselves trapped within its vocabulary. Harald Patzer, in his 
1936 Berlin dissertation on what had come to be known as ‘die Thukydideische 
Frage’, complained that ‘die modernen Begriffe “frei” und “subjektiv”’ were respon-
sible for many misunderstandings of Thucydides’ handling of the speeches, but 
he was unable to shake free of the accumulated weight of commentary formu-
lated in terms of the opposition between the objectivity or subjectivity of the 
speeches.30
Indeed, one of the principal reasons why the second question – to what extent 
did Thucydides hold to the standards of historical objectivity, especially in his 
reporting of the speeches – was elevated to ‘die Thukydideische Frage’ was be-
cause the subjective/objective distinction had become ineluctable for historians 
by the turn of the twentieth century. There may have been murmurings already 
in antiquity about Thucydides having put words in the mouth of the speech 
makers,31 but his worth and integrity as a historian was rarely at stake. Nor were 
his methods objects of intense scrutiny by earlier scholars: I.22 seems to have 
become the Methodensatz only in the late nineteenth century. The preoccupation 
with the authenticity of the speeches and the objectivity of his methods – even 
the attribution to Thucydides of a methodology –mirrored the concerns of the 
late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century historians and philologists them-
selves. For my purposes, the answer to the question whether or not Thucydides 
did indeed invent the speeches and if so, how and to what end, is beside the 
point: my interest is in the sudden urgency of the question, and its entanglement 
with the relatively new historical value of objectivity, particularly the objectivity 
of methods. To put the matter very simply, probably too simply: the struggles of 
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the classicists to reconcile Thucydides’ towering reputation as an historian (and 
I have yet to find a single commentator who believed that his reputation was 
undeserved) with what they had come to regard as ‘subjective’ practices shows 
the extent to which objectivity, as opposed to impartiality, dominated the ethos 
of historians.32
 A new religion
The difficulties faced by these and other classical philologists in answering such 
questions mal posées – Did Thucydides try to be objective? Did he succeed? – 
arise from the mismatch between epistemic values that have different meanings 
and dictate different practices. Impartiality may not require exact quotations; 
truth may dispense with Quellenkritik. The mystery of objectivity is how it man-
aged, in a relatively short time, to become so preeminent among the values of the 
historian that it swallowed up all others. Here once again, Nietzsche supplies a 
clue.
What Nietzsche detested most about historical objectivity was its air of pious 
self-deception. His charges of ‘superstition’ and ‘mythology’ echo the charges of 
Protestant reformers against popery, which were turned against religion in gen-
eral by the Enlightenment philosophes. Nietzsche smelled in the cult of historical 
objectivity a false faith:
Was, es gäbe keine herrschende Mythologien mehr? Was, die Religionen 
wären im Aussterben? Seht euch nur die Religion der historischen Macht 
an, gebt acht auf die Priester der Ideen-Mythologie und ihre zerschunde-
nen Knie! Sind nicht sogar alle Tugenden im Gefolge dieses neuen Glau-
bens? Oder ist es nicht Selbstlosigkeit, wenn der historische Mensch sich 
zum objektiven Spiegelglas ausblasen läßt?33
There remains the puzzle of how the new religion of historical objectivity, if reli-
gion it was, won so many converts, and in so short a timespan, since it promised 
the opposite of immortality. It is a truly Nietzschean problem, since the religion 
in question carried with it a distinct odor of asceticism, of clenched self-restraint 
in subordinating eloquence to method and method to the analysis of error. The 
acolytes of this new and decidedly uncomfortable religion of historical objec-
tivity were almost all formed in the new-style research seminar initiated by the 
reformed German universities and imitated widely throughout the learned world 
by the end of the nineteenth century. It was the research seminar that in reality 
disciplined the disciplines. It was the prime mover behind the multiplication of 
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specialist societies and journals. In the seminars students learned that Wissen-
schaftlichkeit meant method, and method in turn meant the mastery of esoteric 
techniques through long, arduous application. Whether the technique in ques-
tion was paleography learned at the Berlin philology seminar or error analysis 
learned at the Königsberg physics seminar, the craft knowledge imparted by close 
contact of professors with students resembled nothing so much as an apprentice-
ship with a master. The glittering noun Wissenschaft spanned associations from 
the character-firming to the culture-making, but the more sober adjective wis-
senschaftlich referred almost invariably to the painstaking, abstruse techniques 
– those very methodical ‘methods of research’ – that certified a piece of work, be 
it an experiment or an edition, as objective.
Diligence, attention to minute detail, devotion to technique, an ethos of re-
sponsibility and exactitude, and the habits of collective discussion united the 
seminar-trained physicist with the seminar-trained philologist. All had ex-
perienced the gradual transition from the repetition of the known (checking 
archival sources, producing a chemical reaction) to the unknown; all would 
have experienced ‘ein gegenseitiges Nehmen und Geben zwischen Lehrer und 
Schülern’, and all would have felt, as the philologist Hermann Diels put it, the 
‘unsichtbare Fäden des Vertrauens zwischen den Teilnehmern eines solchen 
Thiasos’.34 ‘ Thiasos’ has several meanings in ancient Greek, ranging from a Bac-
chic revel to a troop of warriors, and no doubt Diels, virtuoso Hellenist that he 
was, played upon all of these shades of meaning in his evocation of the semi-
nar. The center that holds together all the senses of ‘ Thiasos’ is that of belong-
ing to a group of initiates, especially a religious confraternity, and it was in this 
sense of belonging that one must seek the extraordinary power of the creed of 
historical objectivity. The new creed of historical objectivity was imbibed and 
realized in seminars like Ranke’s when he took up a chair at the University 
of Berlin, which met for decades in his own private study in his Giesebrecht 
apartment, day in, day out, making an exception only for Christmas Eve, when 
‘the assistants ritually rebelled and stayed home with their families, much to 
Ranke’s dismay’.35
 Conclusion: Intensely disinterested
One of the most curious features of the history of scientific curiosity is how the 
most unbridled subjectivity has been transmuted into purest objectivity. Or to 
put it in other terms, intense interest in the objects of scientific research turns 
into disinterest in everything else. Disinterest in one’s nearest and dearest is only 
the most extreme form of a pinpoint focus of interest that excludes the rest of 
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the universe and concentrates all intellect, emotion, and energy like a powerful, 
pencil-thin laser beam on one spot. This indifference to 99.9% of the rest of the 
universe, both human and natural, is often equated with disinterestedness or even 
objectivity.
Distraction, absent-mindedness, and disinterest are the obverse of an inter-
est of laserlike focus and intensity. It is disinterest only because it is eccentric: 
the sage, scholar, and scientist choose to neglect what interests the vast majority 
of other people in favor of their own enthralling preoccupations. Their tran-
quility and incorruptibility with respect to the worldly rewards of fame and 
fortune, to the homely comforts of being firmly situated in time and place, and 
even to the egoism of an individuated self does not stem from temptations met 
and stalwartly resisted – they do not struggle like St. Anthony in the desert 
against the familiar demons of human desire, because their desires have been 
deflected into other channels and their attention diverted to other objects. All 
economies of attention are profoundly moralized. To attend to one thing is ipso 
facto to neglect another. Moreover, attention not only signals value; it creates 
value in its favored objects, which draw their aficionados, amateurs, devotees – 
the etymologies of all these words highly suggestive – deeper and deeper into 
obsession.
Obsession is the least sociable of states. Only in the last hundred years or 
so have monomaniacal scientific pursuits been imagined in the context, rather 
than at the expense of a community. Collective research is a familiar feature of 
laboratory and field sciences, but ‘Big Science’ was pioneered by scholars in the 
humanities, especially in classical philology and history. It was the physicists and 
chemists who self-consciously imitated the seminar model of teaching advanced 
students in philology at Göttingen and Berlin in the early nineteenth century; 
it was the members Physikalish-Mathematische Klasse of the Preussische Aka-
demie der Wissenschaften who in the late nineteenth century envied their col-
leagues in the Philosophisch-Historische Klasse big, collective projects like The-
odor Mommsen’s Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.36
Despite their asocial (if not anti-social) associations, objectivity in both the 
natural and human sciences was instilled and cultivated in the small, face-to-face 
communities of the seminar, the research group, and the conference. The sup-
pression of the self by the self that constitutes scientific objectivity was peculiarly 
well-suited to the rhetoric of self-sacrifice in the name of the community – but 
also to that of ascetic virtuosity that commands admiration and deference. As in 
the case of the early Christian saints, the asceticism of objectivity demanded an 
audience, as Nietzsche recognized all too well.
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1.2 The Natural Sciences and the Humanities 
in the Seventeenth Century
Not Separate Yet Unequal?
H. Floris Cohen
When scientists in our day meddle with the humanities, the outcomes are not 
always uplifting. Sometimes they are, as when art historians and chemists sup-
plement each other’s expertise quite nicely in establishing or disproving the au-
thenticity of some famous painting. In my own discipline, the history of science, 
the contributions scientists make are rarely so productive, unless (as, for instance, 
with Thomas Kuhn) they turn themselves into professional historians. Profes-
sional scientists with a layman’s interest in history certainly tend to display a 
deep-seated emotional involvement in past manifestations of their own present-
day concerns. But the flip side of their praiseworthy engagement is most often a 
rather upsetting naiveté. Armed with a few facts of questionable reliability, even 
the most history-conscious scientists tend to lack even the most elementary idea 
of how historians are for good, long-established reasons wont to deal with past 
facts. Clearly, to them the sciences and the humanities are quite distinct, or even 
insuperably different, areas of scholarship.
So much for science/humanities interactions in my professional experience. 
The remainder of the present chapter is about similar interactions in the past, 
or, more precisely, during the founding period of modern science some three 
to four centuries ago. I shall examine a few cases where certain subjects that 
were later to be reckoned among the humanities were taken up at some depth 
by scholars who at a later age were to count unambiguously as scientists. In 
examining four selected crossover cases, my primary concern is with the rigor-
ous distinction between the sciences and the humanities that we are used to 
maintain at present. Rens Bod, Eric Jorink, and others have taught us that, with 
due reservations even for the present day, it is certainly pointless to make such 
a distinction for any period prior to the late nineteenth century.1 My question 
is: Do my four chosen authors (in chronological order, Johannes Kepler, René 
Descartes, Blaise Pascal, and Isaac Newton) agree with Rens and Eric? Or do 
they perhaps prove these learned gentlemen wrong, in that they do make pre-
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cisely such a distinction, either in principle or, if not that, then at least in their 
actual practice?
What, indeed, about the performance of these four great men of the Scientific 
Revolution in (to them) foreign territory? Do we find Kepler or Newton operat-
ing differently when pursuing their chronological than their astronomical studies, 
or not? And what about the quality of their performance? Do they operate with 
the disdain of professional standards on display with those history-minded scien-
tists of today? Or did the more humanities-focused participants in then current 
debates perceive these apparent intruders as (by and large) their equals? Also, 
how do we, in looking back, judge the quality of their performance? Was New-
ton as great a chronologist as he was in the domains for which we still rightly 
celebrate him?
A clear-cut instance of a positive answer to my first question, about whether or 
not a principal distinction was being made at the time between science-like and 
humanities-like pursuits in the period of the Scientific Revolution, is provided by 
Blaise Pascal. In a programmatic fragment dating from c. 1647 and posthumously 
entitled ‘Préface pour le Traité du Vide’ (‘Preface for the Treatise on the Void’) 
he lists on the one hand the disciplines of history, geography, law, languages, and 
theology. On the other hand you have geometry, arithmetic, music, physics, medi-
cine, and architecture. His enumeration is not meant to be exhaustive in either 
case, yet I am not omitting any of those he does list. Now by what criterion does 
Pascal distinguish the one category from the other? Knowledge in domains of the 
former kind, so he argues, can be attained only by consulting books, whereas the 
latter ‘fall under the senses or under reasoning’.2 If, so he continues, you want to 
know who was the first king of France, or where geographers place the first me-
ridian, you are necessarily bound by authority, in that you must look up writings 
by authors, whereas if you want to find out about, for instance, void spaces you 
cannot fall back upon available writings on the subject – you must make experi-
ments and then reason upon the outcomes thereof.
Consequently (so Pascal keeps arguing) innovation is quite possible and, in-
deed, indispensable in fields of the latter kind, whereas with the former their 
very point is to stick to what we have. Consequently, the Jesuits (Pascal’s arch-
enemies) have it doubly wrong. In theology, they introduce all kinds of innova-
tions where these do not belong, in that they go way beyond the sole repository 
of religious truth, Scripture and the Church Fathers. But these self-same Jesuits 
oppose new, experimental findings about (for instance) the void, as contradict-
ing the received wisdom of the ancients. By way of another consequence that 
Pascal draws from his distinction, the perfection of disciplines of the former, 
humanities-oriented kind lies in the past, whereas the latter can only attain per-
fection in an as yet unknown future. In short, the humanities are unlike the 
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sciences in that only the latter, guided by experimental reasoning, are capable of 
attaining progress.3
It may look surprising that, in his listing of sciences capable of such progress, 
Pascal takes up ‘music’. In this connection he meant not so much the practice of 
music as, rather, the mathematical-physical theorizing that underlies it. Indeed, 
my next case of a humanities/sciences distinction being made during the Sci-
entific Revolution concerns thoughts about musical theory of a thinker Pascal 
abhorred only slightly less than he did the Jesuits, to wit, his older acquaintance 
René Descartes. The grounds for Pascal’s abhorrence (scholarly, not personal) 
reside in what he diagnosed as Descartes’ know-all pretensions, his claim to have 
hit once and for all upon the one indubitably true system of all knowledge that we 
can possibly attain of the natural world and how it operates. Take a typical line 
from Descartes like the following, near the end of Discours de la méthode:
Making my mind pass once again over all objects which at any time have 
presented themselves to my senses, I venture to say that I have never come 
across any thing which I could not explain adequately enough by means of 
the Principles I had found.4
‘Explain’, for sure! Descartes (I am addressing him here in his philosopher’s role, 
not as a highly innovative mathematical scientist) was not out to discover any 
new phenomena.5 His concern was rather to give these their rightful place in his 
grand scheme of things, necessarily true because he had derived it from indubi-
tably secure first principles. Whenever his faithful correspondent back in Paris, 
Marin Mersenne, who was in the business of making empirical discoveries, con-
fronted Descartes with his latest, Descartes’ preponderant, nay, his sole concern 
was to make the new phenomenon fit in with his natural philosophy of particles 
in motion. However, in one exceptional case Descartes did not go along.6 The 
subject, part of the contemporary science of music, was degrees of consonance – a 
concern, not only of Mersenne, but of Galileo, Kepler, Beeckman, and other pio-
neers, too. Most agreed that the phenomenon of consonance (that is, the sweet, 
near-blending quality of certain musical notes sounding together) is due to how 
often the notes that make up a musical interval coincide. Musical sound, so they 
came to realize, is produced by the vibrations of a string put in motion, and each 
musical interval is marked by a specific ratio of vibrational frequency, as 1:2 for 
the octave, 2:3 for the fifth, etc. (in modern terms, standard A is 440 Hertz, 
hence, the A one octave higher is 880 Hertz). In Mersenne’s view it followed that, 
the more often two strings co-vibrate, the more consonant are the intervals thus 
produced. With the octave, vibrations coincide every 1 x 2 = second time, with 
the fifth every 2 x 3 = sixth time, and so on. This yields a neat scale of degrees of 
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consonance, from the unison 1:1 to the minor sixth 5:8. How, then, could it be that 
musical practice fails in several regards to conform to this mathematical-physical 
rule of descending consonance?
Confronted by Mersenne with the scale and with the question, Descartes felt 
comfortable only with one portion thereof – the portion that we would nowadays 
call ‘scientific’. The scale of degrees of consonance that seems to follow inexorably 
from Mersenne’s coincidence account of consonance, so Descartes retorted, is 
indeed right as far as it goes. Only, it does not go very far:
Concerning the sweetness of the consonances two things should be distin-
guished: namely, what renders them simpler and more accordant, and what 
renders them more agreeable to the ear. Now, as to what renders them more 
agreeable, that depends on the places where they are employed; and there 
are places where even diminished fifths and other dissonances are more 
agreeable than consonances, so that one could not determine absolutely 
that one consonance is more agreeable than another. [...] One can say abso-
lutely which consonances are the most simple and the most accordant ones; 
for that depends only on how often their sounds unite, and how closely 
they approach the nature of the unison; so that one can say absolutely that 
the fourth is more accordant than the major third, while ordinarily it is not 
so agreeable, just as the cassia is definitely sweeter than olives, but not so 
agreeable to our taste.7
What we appear to have here, then, is (once again) a clear-cut sciences/humani-
ties dichotomy. Descartes perceptively distinguishes between the ‘science’ aspect 
of musical consonance, which is a matter of ratios of vibrational frequencies, and 
the aspect of artistic analysis, concerned with the actual context of an actual mu-
sical piece in which musical intervals are bound to serve in multiple ways that, at 
the very least, do not correspond in a one-to-one manner with what mathemati-
cal-physical analysis leads us to predict.
To be sure, Descartes was enabled to making the distinction in the first place, 
not out of some a priori urge to distinguish the sciences from the humanities 
so much as, rather, due to the extraordinary feature of his natural philosophy 
just discussed – his emphatic claim to indubitable certainty. The consequence 
of his highly staked claim (of his all-or-nothing style of philosophizing, really), 
was that all those matters he did not feel certain about ought to be banished to 
the outer darkness reserved for topics at the other side of the certainty/uncer-
tainty divide. As in another context he acknowledged himself, he was barely able, 
when listening to a piece of music, to distinguish a fifth from an octave, or judge 
whether someone had correctly sung ut re mi fa sol la, let alone do it himself. In 
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sum, then, Descartes’ urge to distinguish between the sciences and the humani-
ties side of scholarly life coincided with what he felt subjectively certain of, and 
what not.
My final topic concerns the discipline of chronology. What I have picked up on 
the subject I owe (of course) to Anthony Grafton,8 further to Franz Hammer, co-
editor of Johannes Kepler’s Gesammelte Werke,9 and to Isaac Newton’s biographer 
Richard S. Westfall.10 The subject of greatest fascination to Kepler, second only 
to his all-time favorite, the science of the heavens, was the year of nativity – How 
many years before Christ was Jesus actually born? The seemingly obvious answer 
– ‘Well, none at all, of course’ – was by the early seventeenth century greatly in 
doubt, as many students of the matter had already questioned the accuracy of the 
sixth-century monk who created our Christian ‘Anno Domini’ calendar. But by 
how many years had this learned monk been wrong?
At the time when Kepler was drawn into the question by a patron who sought 
his help in fixing dates of Roman history by means of heavenly events like lunar 
and solar eclipses or planetary conjunctions, Joseph Just Scaliger was busily turn-
ing himself into the great authority on this and all other topics that come up in 
what in his hands became the academic discipline of chronology. Kepler quickly 
threw himself into the Europe-wide debates that followed upon the appearance 
of Scaliger’s two big books on the subject. Kepler’s first publication came as an 
appendix to his treatise on the New Star, the nova, of 1604, and it took shape as an 
argument to antedate Jesus’ birth by one more year than Scaliger had established 
for it, to wit, the year 6 rather than 5 BC. Two astronomical considerations guided 
Kepler’s determination. One was a lunar eclipse mentioned by Flavius Josephus 
as occurring on the eve of the death of King Herod (the year of Herod’s demise 
was one important tidbit in the stew of Bible passages, ancient calendar rules, 
passing remarks by the yes or no reliable historian Flavius Josephus, and other 
contemporary facts and factoids that together made up the riddle of the nativity). 
Kepler realized, as Scaliger had, too, that in years around 1 BC not one but two 
lunar eclipses qualified, but on astronomical grounds not considered by Scaliger 
he settled on the one that led to 4 BC for Herod’s death and, hence, to 6 BC for 
Jesus’ birth. Kepler thus left the Magi some 10 months for making up their minds 
upon spotting the Star of Bethlehem finally to set out on their voyage to the crib 
of God’s Son.
Actually, the Star of Bethlehem provided the other piece of evidence for Jesus’ 
birth in 6 BC that Kepler dropped into the current debate. He connected the Star 
to the 1604 nova he was writing about, by means of a series of Saturn-Jupiter con-
junctions that happened to accompany both these spectacular heavenly events. It 
is a very technical argument, such as only an expert astronomer could produce, 
and together with the lunar eclipse just ahead of King Herod’s death it made 
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Kepler settle for good on 6 BC, the year (by the way) still accepted today partly 
on other grounds.
Kepler did more than just drop 6 BC and his arguments for it into an ongoing 
debate – he actually joined it. Expert chronologists of both Catholic and Prot-
estant denominations, some of whom he knew personally, challenged his conclu-
sions, and he met their not so much astronomical as, rather, historical arguments 
on their own ground. For instance, he argued at length for the reliability of Fla-
vius Josephus’s book on Jewish history in view of its consistency both with the 
text itself and with other contemporary Roman authors. In short, Kepler turned 
himself into an expert historian, taking part in the chronological debate with the 
research methods and the criteria for authenticity then current in the field. Thus 
he gained the respect of many among those who, together with Kepler, took the 
late Scaliger’s vast scholarship to heart.
Can we say the same thing about Isaac Newton’s concerns with chronology? 
No, we cannot, as hardly a word of his even more extensive writings on the sub-
ject was published during his lifetime. Nor is this by accident – Newton kept 
quite deliberately silent about the vast scholarship he, too, had amassed in chro-
nology. He came to the subject due to the theological studies he engaged in as a 
consequence of the obligation that rested upon every Fellow of Trinity College at 
Cambridge to be ordained within seven years of appointment to the fellowship. 
A few years ahead of that deadline, so as to acquaint himself with the theologi-
cal background to the solemn oath he would in due time have to swear, Newton 
threw himself with his customary methodical thoroughness into the writings of 
the church fathers – not only Augustine or Eusebius but just about all of them. In 
those hefty tomes he made an unsettling discovery. In course of the debates over 
Christian dogma that had raged all over the fourth to sixth centuries, people had 
been deceived, words had been twisted, texts had been corrupted, so as to peddle 
and eventually get turned into dogma a pernicious, wholly unbiblical notion – 
that of the Trinity. The two Bible verse which proclaim the consubstantial unity 
of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit appeared to Newton 
to be fourth-century forgeries, produced by Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria, 
in his ongoing battle with Arius, priest in the same city. Newton relived these 
millennium-old ecclesiastical battles as if he took part in them, himself. In a sense 
he did. In short order he took the part of Arius, rejected for good the Holy and 
Undivided Trinity on which he was presently to swear an oath in the very college 
of that name. He knew well that if he made his heretical views known he would 
be kicked out of Cambridge University forthwith. He chose not to take the man-
tle of another prophet out to combat corruption, but to keep silent, all his life. 
Somehow he managed to wriggle out of ordination, and he kept pursuing his 
theological studies in private for the rest of his life.
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Chronology was definitely part of those studies. The only books he wrote 
that appeared during his lifetime are, of course, Principia and Opticks, but within 
a year of his death a third, his Chronology of Ancient Kingdoms Amended saw the 
light of day. As Westfall has shown, one should not take this work at face value, 
as Newton had deliberately robbed his entire chronology of its own thrust. The 
true point of this book, which he took great care to keep out of it, is rather to be 
found in a much earlier manuscript of fully heretical, part late-Arian part early 
deist tenor, known after its incipit as ‘Theologiae gentilis origines philosophicae’ 
(‘The Philosophical Origins of Gentile Theology’). 11 There is an original, wholly 
rational religion, with at its center celebration of God’s absolute predominance 
over the cosmos by means of a fire that represents the sun with the planets or-
biting it. This religion, ‘then which nothing can be more rational’, was instituted 
after the Flood by Noah, and spread over the length and breadth of the ancient 
world by Noah’s three sons. Due to the depravities of the human heart, this 
rational religion has found itself corrupted time and again. Ever so often God 
sends a prophet, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, to bring religion back to its pristine 
purity, but then corruption sets in all over again, as in the fourth century with 
Athanasius.
Religion just rational, Christ just a prophet – all this did not just smack of 
heresy, it constituted heresy in Newton’s own time, and he knew it. His private 
time-reckoning in the ‘Origines’ testifies to it, too – in view of the role accorded 
Noah and his sons Newton acquired an interest in curtailing time as much as he 
possibly could. That is why he availed himself, among many other tricks of the 
trade, of a subterfuge that was already around for some time. Facing as Scaliger 
had the inconveniently lengthy chain of pharaohs in Manetho’s authoritative list-
ing, Gerard Vossius departed from Scaliger in shortening the chain by declaring 
without a shred of evidence several early Egyptian dynasties to be not consecutive 
but parallel. Why Newton followed Vossius in this regard, then, becomes clear, 
not from his orthodox-looking book on chronology itself but from his far earlier, 
profoundly heretical ‘Origines’.
It is time to draw from the foregoing some conclusions. There are, of course, 
many more pertinent cases to examine than the four I have just sketched in their 
barest outlines, such as, for instance, Galileo’s literary criticism or Bacon’s Essays 
or (a vast enterprise in itself ) numerous writings by the incredibly versatile Leib-
niz. So whatever responses I shall now give to the questions I announced at the 
start of the present chapter can be no more than very provisional.
Two of our protagonists made a principled distinction. Pascal did so in general 
terms, Descartes in one specific case only. Descartes’ distinction, stemming as it 
did from the ideal of indubitable certainty paramount to all his philosophizing, 
seems to correspond by and large to his famous dualism of res extensa (extended 
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stuff ) and res cogitans (thinking stuff ). Pascal’s distinction, much like the one so 
often maintained at present, is between disciplines that draw on authoritative, 
extant texts, and those that build forth upon experimental reasoning. In contrast, 
neither Kepler nor Newton seems to bother to make any distinction in principle, 
so the question is whether it may nonetheless be found back in their actual prac-
tice. To a large extent the answer is ‘yes’. When doing chronology, both men are 
chronologists with the chronologists. Kepler took a full, well-respected part in 
current debates. So, but inevitably posthumously, did Newton’s thoroughly self-
emasculated views on the subject.
Even so, both men contributed something uniquely their own to the field as 
well, something that derives from their work in domains we now call scientific. 
Kepler’s solution to the problem of nativity, albeit defended in terms of then cur-
rent history writing, resulted from his pursuing in depth questions raised by lu-
nar eclipses and past and present planetary conjunctions. Astronomy was hardly 
foreign to the field of chronology as Scaliger restructured it, only, Kepler was on 
surer ground and thought more deeply about its possible uses. With Newton the 
contribution of his science to his chronology, or more generally speaking to the 
theology which determined the entire thrust of his chronology, is more complex. 
Just like Kepler, he enriched his efforts in chronology with astronomical details 
foreign to other practitioners, such as his usage of the precession of the equi-
noxes for calculating the exact year of the expedition of the Argonauts as a base-
line for Greek history. More importantly, Newton’s conception of human history 
stemmed in the last resort from his personal conception of the Deity, that is, from 
an idea expressed as well in the second edition of his Principia – God’s absolute 
dominion over nature as over human history.
No full-blown distinction between the ‘humanities’ and the ‘science’ side of 
things is called for, then, in either case – in the period of the Scientific Revolu-
tion the two interpenetrate to some extent. This applies a fortiori to both Kepler’s 
and Newton’s working habits. Kepler brought to his chronological investigation 
the same style of enthusiastic outbursts alternated with doggedly pursued exacti-
tude that we encounter in his astronomical work. Newton’s theological efforts are 
just as thoroughly and methodically undertaken, just as much built upon vast, 
carefully accumulated learning as is true of his work on the calculus, on orbital 
motion, and on light and color.
Still, interpenetration goes only so far. Kepler’s unique achievement in the do-
main of planetary theory rests in good part on his willingness to throw the results 
of the most painstaking theorizing and calculating in the wastebasket when a 
timely empirical check showed these results to be wrong within available limits of 
accurate measurement – the rightly famous eight minutes of arc discrepancy be-
tween a parameter theoretically predicted and actually measured. No such will-
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ingness seems to mark Kepler’s work in chronology. He arrives at a well-reasoned 
conclusion, and he sticks to it. Not that, as a rule, the discipline of chronology left 
room for clear-cut empirical refutation – one could always twist the evidence to 
one’s own, always theologically determined advantage. So it is with Newton. In 
Principia, he went out of his way to establish an exact match between abstract or-
bits derived geometrically and planetary orbits observed physically, not hesitating 
along the way to subject ideas dear to him to the strictest scrutiny and if need be 
reject them without more ado. In The Chronology of Ancient Kingdoms Amended 
he availed himself without apparent qualms of Vossius’ gambit at the service of a 
fully preset conclusion – the relatively short amount of time available for Noah’s 
sons in spreading true, rational religion before its first corruption. This conclu-
sion in its turn followed inexorably from his highly personal, deeply felt concep-
tion of what a truly rational religion amounts to.
So a final conclusion to my preliminary investigation seems to be this. At the 
‘science’ side of things, as distinguished along Pascal’s lines from the ‘humanities’ 
side of things, impartiality in the sense of a certain readiness to subject one’s dear-
est conclusions to rigorous testing, albeit difficult always, is easier to attain with 
the former than with the latter. In the humanities, notably, of course, in the theo-
logical concerns always present in all seventeenth-century thinking, values dear 
to the human heart could not, as they still cannot, fail to determine the overall 
setup and course of an investigation to a far larger extent than in the sciences of 
the natural world. By and large, Pascal had it right.
 Notes
1 Rens Bod made the point throughout his De vergeten wetenschappen. Een geschiedenis 
van de humaniora. (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2010), translated since as A New History 
of the Humanities (Oxford University Press, 2013). Eric Jorink did so in his Het Boeck 
der Natuere. Nederlandse geleerden en de wonderen van Gods Schepping 1575-1715 (Leiden: 
Primavera Pers, 2006), translated as: Reading the Book of Nature in the Dutch Golden Age, 
1575-1715 (Leiden: Brill, 2010).
2 Blaise Pascal, ‘Préface pour le Traité du Vide’, first line of the seventh paragraph: ‘des sujets 
qui tombent sous le sens ou sous le raisonnement’.
3 To be sure, Pascal does not literally use the term ‘progress’, but the entire point of his next 
paragraph is the steady advance of the sciences since their inception with the Greeks.
4 René Descartes, Oeuvres 6, 64 (Discours de la méthode: part 6): ‘repassant mon esprit sur 
tous les objets qui s’estoient jamais presentez a mes sens, i’ose bien dire que ie n’y ay remar-
qué aucune chose que ie ne peusse assez commodement expliquer par les Principes que 
i’avois trouvez’.
5 In my How Modern Science Came into the World: Four Civilizations, One 17th-Century 
Breakthrough (Amsterdam University Press, 2010), I take great pains to maintain this 
distinction, which was quite in keeping with the (up to mid-seventeenth-century) tradi-
52 H. Floris Cohen
tional, almost watertight separation between mathematical science and natural philoso-
phy in the sense of a closed system of speculative thought.
6 I have treated the matter at some length in my Quantifying Music: The Science of Music at 
the First Stage of the Scientific Revolution, 1580-1650 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984), 169-172.
7 René Descartes to Marin Mersenne, October 1631: ‘Touchant la douceur des consonan-
ces, il y a deus choses a distinguer: a sçavoir, ce qui les rend plus simples et accordantes, & 
ce qui les rend plus agreables a l’oreille. Or, pour ce qui les rend plus agreables, cela depend 
des lieus ou elles sont employées; & il se trouve des lieus ou mesme les fausses quintes 
& autres dissonances sont plus agreables que les consonances, de sorte qu’on ne sçauroit 
determiner absolument qu’une consonance soit plus agreable que l’autre. [...] Mais on 
peut dire absolument quelles consonances sont les plus simples & plus accordantes; car 
cela ne depent que de ce que leurs sons s’unissent davantage l’un avec l’autre, & qu’elles ap-
prochent plus de la nature de l’unison; en sorte qu’on peut dire absolument que la quarte 
est plus accordante que la tierce maieur[e], encore que pour l’ordinaire elle ne soit pas 
si agreable, comme la casse est bien plus douce que les olives, mais non pas si agreable a 
nostre gout’.
8 Anthony Grafton, ‘Joseph Scaliger and Historical Chronology: The Rise and Fall of a 
Discipline’, History and Theory 14.2 (1975), 156-185.
9 Franz Hammer’s extensive ‘Nachberichte’ in volumes 1 and 5 of Johannes Kepler’s Gesam-
melte Werke. 
10 Richard S. Westfall, Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac Newton (Cambridge University 
Press, 1980).
11 This is the one work by Newton on which Westfall developed views that go substantially 
beyond Never at Rest. See R.S. Westfall, ‘Isaac Newton’s Theologiae Gentilis Origines 
Philosophicae’, in W.W. Wagar (ed.), The Secular Mind: Transformations of Faith in Mod-
ern Europe (New York/London: Holmes & Meier, 1982), 15-34.
1.3 The Interaction between Sciences and Humanities 
in Nineteenth-Century Scientific Materialism
A Case Study on Jacob Moleschott’s Popularizing 
Work and Political Activity1
Laura Meneghello
Positivism is normally understood as favoring separation of the humanities and 
the natural sciences, rather than interaction between them. This is because, 
around the 1850s, the modern scientific method seemed to provoke a progressive 
demarcation between the exact sciences and other disciplines. I would like to 
question this assumption by analyzing the attitude of Jacob Moleschott’s scien-
tific materialism – which has typically been interpreted as one of the most radical 
movements within Positivism – vis-à-vis the humanities.
Moleschott was born in ’s-Hertogenbosch in 1822 and died in Rome in 1893. 
He had a very international, that is to say, European career: he studied medicine 
in Heidelberg and was Privatdozent at the University of Heidelberg, later taught 
at the University of Zürich and was finally appointed Professor of Physiology at 
the University of Turin in 1861. He became Senator of the newly established Ital-
ian Kingdom in 1876 and Professor at ‘La Sapienza’ in Rome in 1878.
Together with Carl Vogt (1817-1895) and Ludwig Büchner (1824-1899), Mole-
schott is considered to be one of the most representative materialist scientists in 
the nineteenth century. However, Moleschott’s engagement in cultural politics 
was unique among the materialists: in fact, he was the only one who sketched the 
position of the sciences and the humanities in the context of a national educa-
tional system in such an extensive manner. It is interesting to observe that, in the 
debates on public education at the Italian Senate in the 1880s, the most convinced 
supporters of the project of a ‘Philosophical Faculty’ embracing the sciences and 
the humanities were a physiologist (Moleschott) and a mathematician (Luigi 
Cremona [1830-1903]).
Moleschott’s conception of science aimed at including, rather than excluding, 
ethical, religious and broader cultural and philosophical issues. Via Moleschott, 
materialism can be interpreted as focusing neither on a rigid demarcation be-
tween the natural sciences and the other disciplines, nor on the definition of 
a strict criterion for ‘scientificity’ to which every discipline must conform, but 
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rather on the absorption of the humanities within the framework of materialist 
science.
The figure and the work of Jacob Moleschott are excellent models for exam-
ining the construction of the modern conceptions of both the sciences and the 
humanities in the second half of the nineteenth century. Even though his thought 
has been mostly interpreted as reductionist and strongly empiricist,2 not yet stud-
ied source material shows that, rather than strictly separating the domain of the 
natural sciences from any other domain, Moleschott’s materialism constituted an 
all-encompassing worldview that sought to expand the influence of materialism 
beyond the sheer divulgation of empirical research. Having been a member of the 
Senate and an important personality in both the public and cultural life of his 
times, Moleschott is an illuminating example of the ‘inclusiveness’ of scientific 
materialism: he contributed both in theory and in practice to the convergence of 
the sciences and humanities.
In order to examine the relation between the empirical sciences and the other 
disciplines (in particular, between the natural sciences and the humanities), let 
us turn to a number of speeches by Moleschott: the first is a speech delivered at 
the University of Turin in 1867 for the beginning of his sixth course on experi-
mental physiology at that university, entitled ‘Della causalità nella biologia’. The 
others were held at the Senate between November 29, 1886, and February 5, 1887, 
on the occasion of a discussion about the national educational system, as well as 
one held on June 21, 1884, about the procedure for appointing new professors. 
These Senate speeches give a clear example of the intertwinement between epis-
temological and socio-political issues in materialism; moreover, they are unique 
in sketching and explaining precisely how the ‘unity of science’ – a key concept 
in Moleschott’s thought3 – would function in the concrete context of national 
institutions.
 The interaction between arts and sciences: 
The idea of  ‘humanity’ and the role of history
That history should not be opposed but should rather be strictly related to nature 
is one of the central concepts of the introductory lecture Moleschott gave for his 
course in experimental physiology at the University of Turin in 1867, called ‘On 
Causality in Biology’. Here the relation between materialist science and the hu-
manities is explicitly declared to be one of nonexclusion, since it is clearly stated 
that ‘poetry does not exclude positivism, in the same way as the latter one is not 
opposed to the former’.4 As a whole, this speech approaches the theme of the 
interaction between various disciplines not just abstractly, but also in the form 
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of the concrete collaboration between natural scientists (‘naturalists’) and rep-
resentatives of what we would call ‘humanities’ (a term which is, however, never 
mentioned in this speech nor elsewhere in Moleschott’s work) and ‘arts’: ‘poets’ 
and ‘naturalists’ are said to have helped each other in the understanding of the 
necessary laws governing knowledge, so that now scholars of ‘moral disciplines, 
linguistics, history, [and] social sciences agree with scientists in the application of 
that method, which is necessarily required by the natural, i.e., necessary, develop-
ment of every thing’.5
Continuous exchange between ‘nature and history’, that is, in our contempo-
rary terminology, between the sciences and the humanities, or between nature 
and culture, is presented as the fundamental element for that ‘sublime’ and ‘most 
noble’ human aspiration which is the ‘unity of science’.6
Moleschott observes that, if the diversity of the respective methods has 
brought about the formation of two categories, namely that of ‘philosophers’ and 
that of ‘scientists’, the methods now tend toward unification: ‘linguistics is for a 
great part becoming a branch of physiology, following the footprints of natural 
sciences’,7 where physiologists and philologists ‘join their efforts to cultivate it’. At 
the same time, ‘modern historical methods’ are said to be the very same methods 
that ‘have been dominant for a long time in the natural sciences’, while ‘the univer-
sal laws of history necessarily emanate from nature’.8
Even the essence of Darwin’s theory seems to be the introduction of a dynam-
ic, diachronic and therefore historical dimension in the study of nature, as Mole-
schott describes in both the commemoration of Charles Darwin held in Rome 
in 1882 and the discourse he pronounced at La Sapienza in 1892.9 Moleschott 
transfers Darwin’s conception of evolutionary theory beyond natural science and 
toward history as a discipline, an idea that is rarely found among historians at 
that time, but was becoming popular among natural scientists and sociologists.10
 One of the major features of Moleschott’s conception of science, above and 
beyond his ideas about educational politics, was therefore to stress the role of his-
tory in the system of knowledge and, consequently, in the concrete organization 
of the sciences. On the level of epistemology (intended as justification of a claim 
to knowledge and foundation of a scientific discipline), Moleschott conceives 
the great revolutions in physics and biology (Mayer’s and Darwin’s theories) as 
founding natural science on the study of diachronic development instead of con-
centrating on its static forms (classification)11; at the same time, in all of his open-
ing lectures at the university Moleschott justifies and explains physiology and 
biology as disciplinary fields by referring to their own history. On the level of the 
structuring of the educational system, history occupies a special place: it is pre-
cisely the historical approach that, referring to empirical objects such as sources, 
guarantees the ‘scientificity’ of a discipline. This is why Moleschott cares so much 
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about a transformation of theology into history of religion – a particularly im-
portant task in the Kingdom of Italy, which was constituted both territorially and 
ideologically in opposition to the Catholic Church (represented by the Vatican 
and by the Habsburg Monarchy).
‘Embracing nature and history’,12 which is described by Moleschott as the ideal 
task of systematization that leads to the unity of science, also leads to a transfor-
mation of both the task and the conception of philosophy: ‘a philosopher cannot 
consider his work as being juxtaposed to that of natural scientists’, since ‘any phi-
losophy worthy of its name embraces the quintessence of the tree of science’, and 
is even its ‘ripest fruit’, to cite a recurrent image in Moleschott’s representation of 
the systematization of science. ‘It is precisely philosophy, permeated by the unity 
of the law of necessity, which is itself induced by both natural and historical facts, 
that has to sublimate them in that universal organism which will be the adequate 
and therefore beautiful expression of science. This kind of philosophy will demon-
strate the natural conditions of historical events, [and] the historical conditions 
of natural phenomena, always through one and the same method, that is, the 
experimental and inductive method’.13
The unifying task of philosophy would still be one of the essential elements of 
Moleschott’s thought twenty-one years later, when, having become a member of 
the Senate, he would propose a reform of higher education that would take into 
account the role of philosophy as synthesizing science into an organic unity. That 
this unity is considered to be beautiful because it is adequate is a clear reference 
to Hegelianism. However, the ‘Philosophical Faculty’ as conceived by Moleschott 
in his Senate speeches does not refer to that ‘experimental and inductive method’ 
which, according to the abovementioned university lecture, should be adopted 
by philosophy; therefore, Moleschott’s view in the 1880s seems to be even more 
flexible and tolerant vis-à-vis nonempirical sciences.14 The system of science as 
a universal organism is significant if one considers the similarity to the organic 
conception of nature: Moleschott tried to find a ‘natural’ system of the sciences, 
as is also evident from the statement that it is ‘the law of necessity’ that informs 
philosophy, giving it unity and beauty.
On the biographical level, we can find the idea of a synthesis of science and 
what he calls ‘humanity’ as an ideal in Moleschott’s correspondence with the 
Swiss geologist Edouard Desor. The theme appears quite often in his letters, in 
particular with reference to the theologian Theodore Parker; Parker is said to 
uniquely combine science and humanity, thereby unifying them15 – where it is 
clear that ‘Humanität’ does not indicate general moral principles, but a precise 
idea of humanistic culture. ‘Humanity’ as a value thus appears to be a central re-
quirement for scientific research: something that pertains to the natural scientist 
no less than it pertains to other scholars.
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In other letters, Moleschott refers to Parker’s work on the history of religion 
and to its importance for his own project of writing a book on anthropology, 
which he never finished. Substituting theology with the history of religion was 
one of the points of Moleschott’s program for a reform of higher education: his-
tory, considered ‘in its broadest sense’, had been presented in the Senate speeches 
held in 1886-1887 as an essential subject in the Philosophical Faculty. Such a ‘fac-
ulty’ was conceived as being propaedeutic to further studies, including the natu-
ral sciences and technical subjects, on the model of the German Philosophische 
Fakultät. It would also have among its tasks a serious examination and discussion 
of religious issues (again, ‘intended in the broadest sense and not as dogmatism’), 
which constituted an important mission for the government after the suppression 
of theological faculties, as Moleschott himself observed:
History, which should be taught in those Faculties in the broadest sense, 
will be required to examine religious issues minutely and conscientiously. 
According to me, as the Senate knows, this does not mean dogmatic issues, 
but religion as it is present in the human heart, which everyone wants, in 
one’s own way, to be seriously examined and discussed, according to one’s 
own beliefs or philosophical opinions.16
On the political level, this implies a secularization of education; on the episte-
mological level, it indicates a task that the natural sciences and humanities have 
in common, namely including the historical perspective while taking into con-
sideration either their object of study (theology becomes history of religion) or 
the discipline itself (the history and prehistory of physiology and biology is con-
stantly referred to in all of Moleschott’s opening lectures). The humanities are 
thus characterized by Moleschott as sciences having their object of study in the 
empirical world.
 The ‘Philosophical Faculty’ and the ‘Unity of Science’
Moleschott’s Senate discourse on higher education dating from 1887 is structured 
around the form and function of that ‘ground’ which unifies all disciplines – or 
‘the whole of knowledge’, as Moleschott says when he directly asks his colleagues 
at the Senate to judge for themselves about their own fields of knowledge. The 
latter expression clearly indicates a holistic view of knowledge (which we might 
compare with his organicist view of nature), while the word ‘ground’ assumes a 
very concrete meaning, once we think of it as a necessary presupposition for the 
growth of vegetation. In fact, Moleschott affirms that the juries for a competition 
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in higher education, as well as their respective disciplines, cannot be pigeonholed 
(literally, ‘closed in a box’), since the branches of knowledge are connected and in-
terwoven with each other, and all disciplines, all branches have a common ‘trunk’:
Knowledge becomes fertile through all disciplines, it develops branches 
through them, it is interwoven with all of them; every discipline needs the 
other disciplines in order to refer to them, to develop, to be applied to and 
through them; in conclusion all disciplines, all branches of the knowable 
have a common trunk. 17
The image of the tree, another topos of science-systematization around 1850-
1900,18 here stands for the unity in the complexity which characterizes the ‘unity 
of science’ and its concrete actualization, at least as Moleschott maintains it in 
this discourse on the ‘Philosophical Faculty’.
In accordance with the taxonomic aim of the speech, all single disciplines find 
their place in the scale of knowledge. Physiology is taken as an example in or-
der to explain the all-encompassing nature of knowledge, so that a physiologist, 
according to Moleschott, must take into consideration also physics, chemistry, 
natural history, anatomy, as well as pathology (including clinical pathology) and, 
last but not least, philosophy. In order to indicate the synthesis of disciplines that 
characterizes materialist science and, in particular, physiology (Moleschott’s own 
special field), he states that a physiologist ‘would cease to be a physiologist from 
that day, in which he forgot that he must be an anthropologist’.19
This particular discourse, then, far from being merely political, is also of fun-
damental importance in order to comprehend why Moleschott decided to write a 
work entitled ‘Anthropologie’. Moleschott’s Anthropologie represents exactly this 
all-encompassing sphere described above, in which all disciplines are bound to-
gether and put into relation – gaining universality, but not losing their own speci-
ficity. This is evident not only from its structure, but also from its programmatic 
introduction, where the continuity between organic and inorganic substances is 
underlined.20 In this respect, continuity with Schelling’s idea of unity is notice-
able:21 the materialists did not give up the ideal of unification and of the creation 
of a system of science; on the contrary, they conceived establishing relations be-
tween disciplines and domains as one of the core tasks of science. Furthermore, 
the interrelation between domains is no longer derived from abstract thought, but 
presented as a result of the most recent scientific research in the fields of biol-
ogy, physiology and psychology. It is precisely this set of relations connecting all 
different disciplines (or, better, all different fields of knowledge) that guarantees 
the ‘unity of science’: unity as relation, then, as interconnected structure provid-
ing every scientist with a ‘general view’, a broad perspective on the whole field of 
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knowledge. This is the feature, according to Moleschott’s speech, of all the ‘masters 
from whom knowledge and power derive’; among these, he mentions Helmholtz, 
Golgi, Wilhelm Wundt, and his disciple Angelo Mosso.22 Significantly, the work 
of all of these scientists has indeed dealt with a mode of research in which rela-
tions between the physical and the psychical are established. Golgi’s studies on 
the nervous system, Helmholtz’s experiments on sense-perception, and Wundt as 
experimental psychologist proposing an integrative approach between mind and 
body: they all allow for physical and psychical interactions to emerge and therefore 
also for connection between disciplines, especially physiology with psychology.
 Classical culture and the roots of the Tree of Knowledge
Classical culture was so important to Moleschott that, in the abovementioned 
Senate speeches, he complains about a lack of ‘style’ in the writings of students 
(in the Italian language and, even more, in Latin and ancient Greek) – something 
which may seem uncommon for a materialist to do. Above all, he complains about 
the fact that students (at high school, as well as at the university) do not study for 
the sake of science, but just because they are afraid of not passing the examina-
tions.23 For Moleschott, if students are not educated according to what one would 
call a ‘classical’ model, they will never be mature enough for science (the military 
metaphor literally meaning that they will never be ‘general officers’ but just ‘sol-
diers’ or in the best case ‘corporals’).24
It should be noted that technical faculties are also explicitly included in this 
setting of higher education at university level, with the Philosophical Faculty as 
their background, since only the contact with ‘pure science’ like philosophy fosters 
the progress of all disciplines, including the applied sciences.25 The study of clas-
sical culture, however, means neither dogmatism nor the absence of experimental 
method: on the contrary, more time should be dedicated to experimentation in 
the laboratories and there should be space for self-reflection and critical thinking:
Constantly worried about the nightmare of examinations, the student does 
not even keep a short half of an hour, during the lecture-period, for his 
favorite studies, or – which would be even better – to reflect by himself and 
take some research initiative. It is not just about the psychological harm the 
student has to undergo because he has to think the whole year long about 
the examinations he will have to go through at the end of the course. We 
oblige him to a sterile and servile study, with which, apart from few and 
rare exceptions, he makes nothing of his own [ideas]. He cannot find any 
time to go to the laboratories, he cannot find any time to learn how to do 
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research. And yet it is one’s own research, carried out under the direction of 
a good teacher, with a rigorous method, during the time of university stud-
ies, which will be valuable his whole life long.26
The Philosophical Faculty is not seen here as a domain of the humanities in 
opposition to the natural sciences, but rather as literally ‘embracing’ all the sub-
jects and giving them a basis, including ‘moral sciences, history, literature in its 
broadest sense, philosophy, including also speculative philosophy, mathematics, 
all positive sciences, [and] all natural sciences’.27
The image of ‘classical’ culture as an all-encompassing theoretical framework 
for scientific development is constantly present in the speeches about higher ed-
ucation held in 1886-1887. For instance, Moleschott’s use of the tree metaphor 
continues to underline the function of the Philosophical Faculty as ‘roots’ for the 
other disciplines:
Now, I will briefly tell you my intention. If you have such a Philosophical 
Faculty joining all pure science one can find in higher education, then you 
will have what is usually called alma mater studiorum. In such a Faculty, all 
roots of knowledge would be accessible to everyone who seriously wanted 
to deepen their field of study. The one who found his first lymph there is 
prepared to choose to go in the direction of law or medicine, or to become 
an engineer; but all three of them will continuously have to think, again and 
again, of the root they found in that great Philosophical Faculty.28
If the roots of the tree representing the system of knowledge are contained in the 
Philosophical Faculty, we should ask what the fruits of this tree are. According 
to Moleschott, ‘ethical progress’ is ‘not less worthy than scientific progress’, it is in 
fact its ‘ripest fruit’:
Gentlemen of the Senate, I see many ‘complete men’ in Italy, who join deep 
knowledge with artistic feeling; scientific meditation has not destroyed the 
energy of action in them, and there is a discrete number of people who have 
not left apart the ‘cult of the ideal’ within their ‘positive studies’. Without 
this, there cannot be any high aspiration, nor guarantee of ethical progress, 
which is no less worthy than scientific progress, being in fact its ripest and 
most delicious fruit.29
During another discussion at the Senate a couple of weeks later (December 14, 
1886), Moleschott expresses the idea that one should study natural science and 
do scientific research for the sake of it, because otherwise there cannot be any 
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progress; only if one does not aim at any direct application, do great discoveries 
occur.30 After having mentioned a few scientific discoveries such as the telegraph 
and electricity, which he presents not as products of goal-oriented specific re-
search, but rather as results of profound, general, pure research, he arrives at the 
point of enumerating among the discoveries led by disinterested research even 
‘the discovery of man’, which he attributes to Socrates as initiator, followed by 
Spinoza, and finally Renan. Without this discovery, mankind would have never 
achieved its ‘most ideal progresses’ and, again, it is the Philosophical Faculty, ‘rich-
ly nourished’ as Moleschott would like it to be, that is presented as the condition 
of possibility for such ‘deep studies’, for ‘the purest, most general, most profound 
of scientific studies’ leading to these important discoveries, such as that of the 
mechanical equivalent of heat.31
On the basis provided by the Philosophical Faculty, Moleschott thinks that 
‘the most complete, broadest, richest and widest University in the world’32 could 
originate and grow, and would have as a result the establishment of a secure 
ground for science to develop in contact with the arts, for technical faculties to 
be in relation with ‘beauty’.33 What Aeschylus’s Prometheus calls the ‘pantechnic’ 
flame (‘παντέχνου πυρὸς σέλας’, a quote from line 7 of Aeschylus’s tragedy) is 
what would embrace the whole of science, knowing how to reach its source and 
how to spread it throughout the world.34
Interestingly, the relationship of Moleschott’s materialism to metaphysics is 
an ambiguous one: metaphysics appears to be not completely excluded, but at the 
same time is refused as far as its nonempirical objects and methods are concerned, 
and maintained with respect to its ultimate scopes (as a unifying theory of both 
science and reality). One of Moleschott’s comments regarding his setting of mate-
rialist science within the framework of a ‘humanistic’ tradition, which can only be 
continued and guaranteed by the Philosophical Faculty, is particularly significant 
in the context of this discussion. Although some of his colleagues35 disagreed with 
how the Philosophical Faculty should be comprised of so many different disci-
plines, Moleschott presents this as an advantage, suggesting that it makes pos-
sible for each discipline to recognize their own limits. He goes on to write about 
a physicist and a metaphysician, where he argues that the physicist would ‘absorb’ 
a great part of metaphysics, and that this would likely lead to positive results for 
both sciences.36 It has to be noticed that Moleschott literally uses the verb ‘to ab-
sorb’, which both supports and confirms our interpretation of materialism as an 
‘inclusive’ worldview. It is precisely this absorption and inclusiveness of scientific 
materialism vis-à-vis nonscientific domains that characterizes the relation be-
tween natural sciences and the humanities in late-nineteenth-century positivism.
Natural science thus stands in a reciprocal exchange with nonempirical sub-
jects such as ethics and metaphysics. At the same time, as Moleschott himself 
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observed in the abovementioned speech at the University of Turin, during the 
second half of the nineteenth century an increasing number of disciplines, also in 
the field of the humanities, started to make claims as to their appropriation and 
utilization of empirical methods. Moleschott’s conception of the system of science 
appears to be an attempt to connect disciplines and domains in a broader, more 
comprehensive system, where the relation between materialism and the humani-
ties appears to be open rather than demarcating. The fact that Moleschott aimed 
at securing an educational structure – which would constitute concretely what he 
called ‘the unity of science’, a unity that would be represented by a ‘Philosophical 
Faculty’ founded on classical (ancient) culture and philosophy – suggests that 
materialism was not the rigid, reductionist system that it is often thought to be. 
Instead, it significantly contributed to assign the humanities a crucial role in the 
context of Italian higher education.
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1.4 The Best Story of the World




In the first half of the nineteenth century, philological readings of the Scriptures 
and new approaches in geology – set down, most importantly, in Charles Lyell’s 
Principles of Geology (1830-1833) – uncovered the various strata of the Book of 
Books and the Book of Nature, respectively. The result of applying the historical-
critical method to the Scriptures was precisely the discovery of its historicity: as 
philologists and – mainly Protestant – theologians such as Friedrich Schleier-
macher and David Friedrich Strauss – whose The Life of Jesus, Critically Exam-
ined (1835-1836) was disseminated in Britain in George Eliot’s influential transla-
tion (1849) – could show, the various books of the Bible had been composed at 
different points in time and by different authors.1 The empirical study of geologi-
cal formations resulted not only in the realization that the age of the earth by far 
surpassed the six thousand years allotted by the Bible, but also that geological 
processes were dynamic albeit often infinitesimally slow.2 As Lyell stated, ‘this 
planet’ could no longer be regarded ‘as having remained unaltered since its crea-
tion’, since modern geologists had ‘proved that it had been the theater of reiterated 
change, and was still the subject of slow but never ending fluctuations’.3 Neither 
the earth nor the Scriptures were static, neither had emerged through a single 
act of creation or revelation; rather, both were the result of slow processes of loss 
(erosion, textual corruption) and accretion (sedimentation in a geological as well 
as a philological sense). In a parallel process in the humanities and the sciences, 
divine authority was undermined by the emergence of new methodologies: the 
Book of Nature was found to be author-less; natural phenomena emerged un-
der the influence of secondary causes; any reference to a first mover had become 
dispensable. The authorship of the Book of Books, conversely, now appeared as 
decentered, not revealed by the Holy Spirit, but composed by various human 
authors.
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This story of the emergence of the modern disciplines has been told, for ex-
ample, by Lyell himself, as a linear history of progress:
By degrees, many of the enigmas of the moral and physical world are ex-
plained, and, instead of being due to extrinsic and irregular causes, they 
are found to depend on fixed and invariable laws. The philosopher at last 
becomes convinced of the undeviating uniformity of secondary causes, 
and, guided by his faith in this principle, he determines the probability of 
accounts transmitted to him of former occurrences, and often rejects the 
fabulous tales of former ages, on the ground of their being irreconcilable 
with the experience of more enlightened ages.4
One of the aims of this paper is to show that the emergence of new methodolo-
gies, new epistemic virtues and institutionalized disciplines as we still know them 
is more complex and contradictory than Lyell’s statement suggests. Not only was 
the relationship between the natural sciences and the humanities much more dia-
logic than a retrospective construction of the ‘two cultures’ implies; additionally, 
the notion of a continuous, progressive advancement of knowledge was challenged 
by competing efforts to tell a different story about the natural world, a story based 
on the apparently repudiated view of an unchanging creation. Nineteenth-cen-
tury historicism was thus questioned by an alternative temporal concept which 
suggested breaks – caused by divine intervention – in the unidirectional flow of 
time.5 While in retrospect, the ‘victors’ of this epistemological debate – Charles 
Lyell, Charles Darwin, Thomas Henry Huxley – can be identified with a high 
degree of confidence, for their contemporaries the differentiation between ‘true’ 
and spurious science was by no means always clear. And even if it was, as in the 
case of Philip Henry Gosse’s theory of ‘prochronic creation’ discussed below, such 
interventions were not without effect. At the very least, they forced their oppo-
nents to strive for ever better foundations of what they tried to establish as the 
only valid scientific stance.6
Drawing on the work of historians and theorists of knowledge sometimes 
subsumed under the label New or Comparative Epistemology,7 a more heteroge-
neous, dynamic and recursive picture emerges than the story of linear progress. 
Ludwik Fleck, one of the founding fathers of this school of thought, describes sci-
ence as a social practice in terms of a complex web constantly undergoing subtle 
transformations, in contrast to a view of the history of science in terms of sci-
entific revolutions and epistemic breaks, as suggested by Thomas S. Kuhn and 
Michel Foucault. What is understood as knowledge in a given historical period 
and culture, according to Fleck, is not grounded in ‘objective facts’ or qualities in-
herent in natural phenomena, but is the result of shared preconceptions and prac-
67Theology, Geology, and Philip Henry Gosse’s Omphalos
tices within a community or, in Fleck’s term, a ‘thought collective’ (Denkkollektiv); 
in other words, scientific knowledge is socially produced and, in consequence, 
inseparable from a prevalent ‘thought style’ (Denkstil).8 Crucially, this means that 
from an internal point of view, from within a thought collective, its own ‘knowl-
edge’ cannot be discerned as invalid: what knowledge is depends on the particu-
larities of a given thought style. Conversely, other, incompatible thought styles 
are perceived as ‘mysticism’: ‘Der fremde Gedankenstil mutet als Mystik an, die 
von ihm verworfenen Fragen werden oft als eben die wichtigsten betrachtet, die 
Erklärungen als nicht beweisend oder danebengreifend, die Probleme oft als un-
wichtige oder sinnlose Spielerei’.9
Applied to the nineteenth-century debates on geology, the question of divine 
agency bracketed off by Lyell, and finally laid to rest by Huxley’s introduction of 
‘agnosticism’ as the only acceptable stance of the scientist disregarding his per-
sonal beliefs,10 remains crucial for theologians such as Darwin’s critic Samuel 
Wilberforce. In Fleck’s epistemological model, the collective systems of knowl-
edge are relatively stable. They are gradually transformed through intercollective 
transactions, due to the fact that individuals never belong to only one collec-
tive, and through the generative function of language which not only reproduces 
knowledge but transforms it through processes of transmission and misrecog-
nition; the word serves as ‘an intercollective means of transport’ (interkollektives 
Verkehrsgut).11 According to Fleck, the transformation of knowledge is neither 
linear nor directed; it is socially produced and to a degree contingent. Finally, 
this concept allows us to perceive a-synchronicities within a historical period and 
culture: while one thought style (for instance, ‘mechanical objectivity’) will be 
dominant, and synchronous exchanges between specific thought collectives (for 
instance, philology and geology) do occur and produce something like a coherent 
albeit not monolithic epistēmē of a period, a-synchronic pockets of seemingly ob-
solete thought styles (such as the ‘delusion as to the age of the world’, the biblical 
six thousand years, denounced by Lyell12) can persist and unfold discursive effi-
cacy. For some participants in the debates on modern geology and, later, evolution 
theory, the belief in the validity of the Scriptures as an explicative framework for 
natural history continued to persist and was even hitched to a self-declared mod-
ern and enlightened notion of proper scientific knowledge. My main example, 
Philip Henry Gosse’s Omphalos (1857), shows the relevance of such a-synchronic 
pockets in the negotiations of authority, epistemological validity and the discur-
sive rules of scientific communities.
In sum, a notion of knowledge production based on Ludwik Fleck’s epistemolo-
gy allows us to perceive contemporaneous but contradictory narratives as the man-
ifestations of the continuous discursive and pragmatic interactions within the his-
tory of knowledge, rather than as a progressive overcoming of obsolete approaches 
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by more modern, more scientific ones. Fleck developed his epistemological model 
on the basis of his own microbiological and medical research. However, as Barbara 
Hernstein Smith has pointed out, his emphasis on ‘conceptual-discursive systems 
that both enable and constrain the process of cognition’,13 that is, systems embed-
ded in and effective through language, renders Fleck’s model pertinent for a his-
tory of knowledge that encompasses the humanities as well as the sciences. In 
particular, the constitution of the modern disciplines in the nineteenth century is 
the result of epistemological negotiations across various fields, of the competition 
to tell the best story about the emergence of the world and the creatures inhabit-
ing it. Importantly, this debate did not take place exclusively within the confines of 
the natural sciences – which emerged in the modern sense only as a result of this 
process of intra- and intercollective exchange – but at the intersection between 
natural history/science, the humanities and individual concerns about faith.
The difference between ‘knowledge’ and ‘mysticism’ emerges as the result of 
an ongoing and often contradictory, nonsynchronous process of practices and 
negotiations, a process increasingly studied in comparative epistemology. How-
ever, from the point of view of the humanities, there remain several desiderata: 
the history of knowledge is still centered on the natural sciences; the lab is the 
primary setting of studies in the wake of Fleck, Kuhn and Latour. Other sites 
of knowledge production – such as the discussion-based seminar, instituted at 
German universities after Wilhelm von Humboldt’s reform of higher education, 
and soon adopted by American universities – would yield a different picture 
regarding academic filiation and the formation of thought styles. In addition, 
reciprocal methodological exchanges between the sciences and the humanities 
require greater attention. To such an exchange, the humanities can contribute 
their hermeneutic and philological competence, specifically analytic skills such 
as the study of metaphors, of rhetorical devices and of linguistic modes, which 
has already been fruitfully applied to Darwin’s works.14 It is not by chance that 
Darwin’s style of writing – personal and engaging, narrative and metaphorical, 
and, as Beer and Levine have shown, deeply influenced by literary patterns – has 
attracted the attention of literary scholars. Similar studies need to be extended to 
less accommodating figures, and to fields that lend themselves less easily to nar-
rativization. Last but not least, the history of knowledge needs to become truly 
comparative. While studies on, for instance, Louis Pasteur have yielded impor-
tant insights into the workings of science as a network of diverse forces and inter-
ests,15 the implied concepts of knowledge production and implementation would 
gain in complexity from a consideration of the humanities. Fleck’s ‘intercollective 
means of transport’, language, forges connections between these different fields 
of enquiry. Ultimately, the making of the sciences cannot be separated from the 
making of the humanities.
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 II
In the early nineteenth century, the readings of the Book of Books and the Book 
of Nature are compatible; in both, God’s presence is revealed.16 A prime example 
of this, then still unproblematic harmony between theology and science is Wil-
liam Paley’s widely read Natural Theology (1802).17 Paley’s leading metaphor is 
the watch found in a country lane from which the existence of a watchmaker is 
necessarily deduced: without an artificer, there would not, could not be a watch. 
By analogy, the world and human beings, these intricate artifacts, could not exist 
without a creator. The hypothetical discovery that the watch contains a reproduc-
tive mechanism, in analogy to living organisms, would further heighten our belief 
in and admiration of the artificer:
The conclusion which the first examination of the watch, of its works, con-
struction, and movement suggested, was, that it must have had, for the 
cause and author of that construction, an artificer, who understood its 
mechanism, and designed its use. This conclusion is invincible. A second 
examination presents us with a new discovery. The watch is found, in the 
course of its movement, to produce another watch, similar to itself [...]. 
What effect would this discovery have, or ought to have, upon the former 
inference? What, as hath already been said, but to increase, beyond mea-
sure, our admiration of the skill, which had been employed in the forma-
tion of such a machine? Or shall it, instead of this, all turn us round to an 
opposite conclusion, viz. that no art or skill whatever has been concerned 
in the business, although all other evidences of art and skill remain as they 
were, and this last and supreme piece of art be now added to the rest? Can 
this be maintained without absurdity? Yet this is atheism.18
Within the thought style represented by Paley, it is not absurd to equate the mech-
anism of a watch with organic nature. Further, it is not absurd to imagine a watch 
that is capable of giving birth to baby watches. But it is absurd to imagine a world 
without a creator. The complexity, harmony and productivity of nature impera-
tively point to a higher intelligence, a creator and a plan of creation without which 
there would be only disorder and chaos. The postulate of purely naturalistic expla-
nations of the phenomena, put forward shortly after by Lyell, is for Paley unthink-
able. A world without a primary act of creation and without a telos is unthinkable. 
Atheism is not only wrong but also absurd, or, in Fleck’s term, it is ‘mysticism’.
This self-evident frame of reference was soon to be challenged by the histori-
cal criticism of the Bible on the one hand, and by the empirical-inductive meth-
odology in the sciences on the other. Lyell begins the Principles of Geology with 
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an overview of the history of his discipline, presented as a directed movement 
from speculation to the systematic collecting of empirical facts, from ‘vision’ to 
consistent method: ‘By acting up to these principles with consistency, they in a 
few years disarmed all prejudice, and rescued the science from the imputation 
of being a dangerous, or at best a visionary pursuit’.19 In consequence, geology 
was established as the leading science, opening up – quite against Lyell’s original 
intention – the temporal and methodological framework for Darwin’s transmu-
tation hypothesis. The emergence of a new geology constituted the move from 
the fantastic to the scientific, from the fabulous tales of medieval travelers to the 
exact observation of the Enlightenment – or again, from mysticism to true sci-
ence. What is now rejected as fabulous includes not only stories of unicorns, cy-
nocephali and other unlikely creatures, but also, for example, the story of Noah’s 
flood, shortly before cited as an explanation for the fossils of extinct species. In 
a relatively short time, the epistemological foundations of the study of the earth 
and the organisms living on its surface, and preserved as fossils in the different 
geological strata, had undergone a fundamental change.20 However, this does not 
mean that the transition from natural history, in which the Book of Nature and 
the Book of Books revealed God’s authorship, to natural science, in which these 
two ways of reading became systematically divorced, went uncontested. One of 
the most strenuous efforts to keep together what other scientists had put asunder, 
to reconcile Paley with Lyell, was made by Philip Henry Gosse.
In the 1840s and 1850s, Gosse was a respected naturalist specializing on litto-
ral flora and fauna, well-known for his books addressed to a popular as well as a 
learned audience, but also a devout Christian, a member of the particularly strict 
Plymouth Brethren – a position that was only tenable within the framework of 
natural theology which justified the study of nature as a way of discovering and 
praising the harmony of God’s creation.21 He saw the propositions of Lyellian 
geology as a contradiction to the superordinate teachings of the Bible: ‘the dicta, 
which its [geology’s] votaries rest on as certitudes, are at variance with the simple 
literal sense of the words of God’.22 In the late 1850s, Gosse belonged to a circle 
of naturalists who were discretely consulted about Darwin’s as yet unpublished 
hypothesis of evolution through natural selection. This confrontation with evolu-
tion theory triggered a deep spiritual crisis. As a way to reconcile the now sudden-
ly incompatible positions that constituted his identity as a Christian and a natu-
ralist, Gosse proposed his theory of ‘prochrony’ according to which there exist 
two temporal orders in creation. In diachronic creation, signs of maturation and 
aging, such as the growth rings of a tree or the wrinkles on a human face, develop 
in time; they are reliable indicators of the age of an organism or other natural 
object. Within the diachronic framework, geological formations that require long 
stretches of time to build up equally reliably point to the age of the earth; here, 
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Lyell’s principles of uniformitarianism, actualism and the steady-state earth – 
the constant and uninterrupted workings of natural laws – apply. Gosse devotes 
a sizable chunk of his book (pp. 30-101) to a detailed description of the recent 
advances in geology. It is not his aim to dispute the validity of these observations 
– he even explicitly confirms that the antediluvian theory is no longer tenable – 
but to offer an alternative hypothesis that would render science again compatible 
with the ‘simple literal sense of the words of God’.
This hypothesis is prochrony, a temporal order in which natural laws are sus-
pended: signs of maturation come into being at the moment of creation, just as Adam 
had been created as a grown man on the sixth day of creation. Not born of a woman 
but formed from clay, Adam still has a navel, the omphalos of Gosse’s title. The idea 
of prochrony is based on an alternative model of time, challenging the prevalent 
nineteenth-century notion of time as linear and directed, moving uniformly and in-
cessantly from the past to the future. By contrast, life to Gosse is cyclical, and God is 
free to start the cycle of life at whatever point he chooses; He can create the chick or 
the egg, and consequently, the existence of a full-grown hen is no proof for the prior 
existence of an egg. In geology, the material evidence that seemingly points to a long 
prehistory, and incidentally, the fossil evidence that supports the idea of transmuta-
tion, is subject to the law of prochrony: Just as He created Adam as an adult, God 
may have created an ‘old earth’, with signs of erosion, fossils and all.
As no direct empirical proof of prochrony is possible, Gosse uses a juridical 
metaphor to validate his thought experiment. In an imaginary trial, witnesses 
on both sides are examined; but, of course, there are no living witnesses for the 
evolutionary party, only circumstantial evidence:
No witness has deposed to actual observation of the processes above enu-
merated; no one has appeared in court who declares he actually saw the 
living Pterodactyls flying about, or heard the winds sighing in the tops of the 
Lepidodendra. [...] Strong as is the evidence, it is not quite so strong as if you 
had actually seen the living things, and had been conscious of the passing 
of time while you saw them live. It is only by a process of reasoning that you 
infer they lived at all.23
Gosse indirectly points to an epistemological weakness in Charles Darwin’s argu-
mentation that would not escape his critics on the publication of On the Origin of 
Species two years later. Darwin uses cumulative circumstantial evidence that, ac-
cording to Gosse and other critics, only suggests that there exists empirical proof of 
evolution. The actual transition of one species into another could not be conclusively 
proven until the discovery of the Archaeopteryx and similar intermediary fossils.24 
The emerging disciplines of paleoarcheology and comparative anatomy drew their 
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conclusions on the basis of a fossil record that Darwin himself referred to as in-
complete and barely readable: ‘the natural geological record’ is ‘a history of the world 
imperfectly kept, and written in a changing dialect’.25 Darwin here takes up the an-
cient topos of the Book of Nature, but disputes its readability. The study of nature 
shows how geological and biological ‘dialects’ are transformed over time. In analogy 
to the linguistic study of the Indo-European languages, the fossils first discovered 
in Europe and the Americas, including dinosaurs, cumulatively suggest that extant 
species had similar but extinct ancestors, and that some species died out without 
leaving behind similarly formed relatives.26 The fossils thus tell a different story than 
the Bible, a contradiction that is acknowledged by Gosse: ‘the records which seem 
legibly written on His created works do flatly contradict the statements which seem 
to be plainly expressed in His word’.27 However, as Gosse argues, two principles are 
axiomatic: that matter was created, i.e., that ‘the Eternal God [...] called the universe 
into being out of nothing’,28 and that the species were created immutable. Conse-
quently, the conclusions drawn from fossils must be a fallacy. The only interpretation 
which allows us to overcome the discrepancy between the ‘stone book’29 and the re-
vealed word is precisely the law of prochrony. Taking into account God’s unlimited 
creative power, the unquestioned primary condition of Gosse’s argument, fossils do 
not point to antecedent species; bones are no proof of previous life:
If I could show, to your satisfaction, that a skeleton might have existed; still 
more, that a skeleton must have existed; still more, if I could prove that myr-
iads of skeletons, precisely like this, must have existed, without ever having 
formed parts of antecedent living bodies; you would yourself acknowledge 
that your conclusions were untenable.30
Having formulated this hypothesis which is mainly based on the petitioning of 
the very principles under negotiation (creation and the absence of evolution), 
Gosse takes us, his readers, by the hand and leads us through the classes of the 
plants, invertebrates, vertebrata and finally man – who forms a class, and gets 
a chapter, of his own. Gosse asks the readers to imagine a full-grown exemplar 
from various species – a sturdy oak, a majestic stag, an adult man – and then, 
further to imagine that this apparently mature organism has been created on this 
very day. The oak’s year rings, the stag’s antlers, the man’s wrinkles and grizzled 
hair, all the signs of growth and aging are prochronic, they have come into being 
at the moment of creation, on this very day. Unlike the circumstantial evidence 
of the fossils, these acts of prochronic creation are confirmed by, albeit fictitious, 
eye-witnesses. We, his implied readers, have seen them with our mind’s eye. Bet-
ter than that, the most eminent witness imaginable, God himself, has deposed 
His evidence in writing, in the story told in Genesis.
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The rhetorical structure of Gosse’s argument consists in an apparently sys-
tematic accumulation of hypothetical statements, which through reiteration ac-
quire empirical weight, or so the author hopes. This rhetoric is not dissimilar to 
Darwin’s, who also relies heavily on anecdotal evidence, analogy and seriality. In 
Darwin’s writing, the piling up of examples creates an aura of empiricism without 
always constituting an impeccable chain of evidence. However, the grammatical 
trajectory appears to be reversed in the two authors. In Gosse’s presentation of 
arguments we find a constant slippage from the subjunctive to the affirmative, 
from might to must, as in the example above. Whereas Darwin stresses the tenta-
tive and often preliminary nature of his theory formation, but uses this epistemic 
modesty as a strategy of self-authorization, as can be seen in the opening para-
graphs of On the Origin of Species, Gosse strings together his imagined scenes of 
creation to form declarative statements that finally flow into rhetorical questions:
Who will say that the suggestion, that the strata of the surface of the earth, 
with their fossil floras and faunas, may possibly belong to a prochronic develop-
ment of the mighty plan of the life-history of this world – who will dare to say 
that such a suggestion is a self-evident absurdity?31
Of course, everyone dared to say this. Gosse’s suggestive declaratives and rhetori-
cal questions failed to convince both his lay readers and his fellow scientists. With 
the publication of Omphalos, Gosse took up an a-synchronic position in relation 
to the dominant epistemic virtues of his time, and thus effectively isolated him-
self from the scientific community of which he had been a respected member, as 
his son Edmund Gosse describes in his memoirs:
In the course of that dismal winter, as the post began to bring in private let-
ters, few and chilly, and public reviews, many and scornful, my Father looked 
in vain for the approval of the churches, and in vain for the acquiescence of 
the scientific societies, and in vain for the gratitude of those ‘thousands of 
thinking persons’, which he had rashly assured himself of receiving.32
The thought collective that had gathered around Lyell, Darwin, Huxley and the 
botanist Joseph Hooker from the 1840s onward, while internally divided on the 
question of evolution theory,33 were clearly in agreement on the discursive rules 
that facilitated the distinction between true science and mere speculation. The 
principle rule, as Huxley was to stipulate later, consisted in the epistemological 
privileging of naturalism – the observance of natural laws – against received au-
thority including the Bible; in consequence, ‘the assertion which outstrips evidence 
is not only a blunder but a crime’.34 On the basis of this rule, writers indulging in 
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insufficiently founded scientific speculation such as Gosse, Robert Chambers, the 
author of the evolutionary Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844), or Al-
fred Russel Wallace, the codiscoverer of natural selection but in his later life an ad-
herent of spiritualism, were excluded from the circle of leading British scientists.
 III
Debates in the 1850s and 1860s about the best story in science, the most plausible 
explanation of the natural world and man’s position in it, hinged on what Lor-
raine Daston and Peter Galison have called ‘a distinct code of epistemic virtue’,35 a 
code which had changed significantly since the days of natural theology. In order 
to be perceived as valid, a scientific theory had to adhere to this code, and its 
author had to position himself accordingly to gain acceptance by the dominant 
thought collective. If he failed to do so, criticism of his work was correspondingly 
devastating. In the following review, the author is criticized harshly for his faulty 
methodology: his theory is fantastic, fabulous, a relapse into the unenlightened 
times before the rise of modern science. According to the reviewer, the anecdotal 
procedure and the deviation from established principles of scientific enquiry lead 
the author straight back into the times of miracles and wonders:
Under such influences man soon goes back to the marvelling stare of child-
hood at the centaurs and hippogriffs of fancy [...]. The whole world of nature 
is laid for such a man under a fantastic law of glamour, and he becomes ca-
pable of believing anything: to him it is just as probable that Dr. Livingstone 
will find the next tribe of negroes with their heads growing under their arms 
as fixed on the summit of the cervical vertebrae; and he is able, with a con-
tinually growing neglect of all the facts around him, with equal confidence 
and equal delusion, to look back to any past and to look on to any future.36
This, of course, is not taken from a review of Gosse’s Omphalos but of Darwin’s 
Origin of Species, written by one of the most vociferous opponents of evolution 
theory, Samuel Wilberforce. This quotation is not meant to suggest that the 
scientific validity of Gosse’s theory of prochrony and Darwin’s evolution theory 
is interchangeable. What I have tried to show throughout this paper, however, 
is that the delimitation between the iterable and the absurd in the history of 
knowledge depends on a situated logic which is co-emergent with the discursive 
acts themselves. For Paley, the absurd is something else than for Lyell; for Gosse, 
it is something else than for Darwin; for Wilberforce, something else than for 
Huxley.
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From today’s perspective, Gosse’s theory of prochrony appears as a clear-cut 
case of bad science. However, as this case study has tried to show, Gosse made 
every effort to adapt his proposition to the discursive strategies and epistemic 
virtues of his time: he laid the basis for his argument by recapitulating extensively 
the findings of geology and paleoarcheology, and by admitting, up to a point, their 
validity. It is not so much his way of reasoning that departs from the thought style 
of the Lyell-Darwin-Huxley-Hooker nexus, but his axiomatic premise – God 
created the world and every living creature as stated in Genesis – and hence, his 
deduction – God also created the fossils, as fossils – that resulted in the general 
rejection of his theory. Gosse’s attempt to reconcile science with revealed religion 
was doomed to fail not only because the scientific part of his argument was so 
outrageous, but because his theology was old-fashioned, or too radical, by the 
standards of mainstream theologians of his day. By ignoring the philological turn 
in Bible studies and insisting on a literal reading of the word of God, he broke 
the connection with the dominant thought collectives in both fields, theology as 
well as natural science. By insisting that God still matters in scientific theories, 
Gosse repudiated the agnostic and naturalistic stance proposed by Huxley as the 
best, and only, stance within the emerging framework of modern disciplines. As 
a result of his infringement of epistemic codes that had only recently been estab-
lished, and still believing himself on firm epistemic ground, Gosse positioned 
himself beyond the pale of ‘true science’ and was discarded like one of the fossils 
he had studied on England’s beaches.
 Notes
1 On the rise of philology and comparative religious studies in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, see Hans G. Kippenberg, Die Entdeckung der Religionsgeschichte. Reli-
gionswissenschaft und Moderne (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1997), esp. 60-79; Sascha Müller, Die 
historisch-kritische Methode in den Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften (Würzburg: Echter, 
2010), esp. 45-58; and Joep Leerssen, ‘The Rise of Philology: The Comparative Method, the 
Historicist Turn and the Surreptitious Influence of Giambattista Vico’, in Rens Bod, Jaap 
Maat, and Thijs Weststeijn (eds.), The Making of the Humanities, vol. II, 23-35.
2 See Peter Schnyder, ‘Die Dynamisierung des Statischen. Geologisches Wissen bei Goethe 
und Stifter’, Zeitschrift für Germanistik. Neue Folge 19 (2009), 540-555.
3 Charles Lyell, Principles of Geology: An Attempt to Explain the Former Changes of the 
Earth’s Surface, by Reference to Causes Now in Operation (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2009 [orig. 1830]), vol. 1, 73.
4 Ibid., 76.
5 Nineteenth-century concepts of linear and cyclical time, and Lyell’s position which is 
more complex than can be sketched here, are discussed in Stephen Jay Gould, Time’s 
Arrow, Time’s Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time (Cambridge, 
MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), esp. 115-178.
76 Virginia Richter
6 As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have shown in Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 
2007), the dominant scientific stance of the late nineteenth century was ‘mechanical ob-
jectivity’. However, in genres of science writing other than the atlases analyzed by Daston 
and Galison, a much more personalized and even emotional embodiment of the scientist, 
and less regulated patterns of scientific practice, can be perceived. This is not least true of 
Charles Darwin, who combined an empirical scientific style with self-authorization on 
the grounds of personal credibility; see my analysis of Darwin’s appellative style in On 
the Origins of Species: Virginia Richter, ‘Anschauung des Unsichtbaren. Rhetoriken des 
Nicht-Wissens im Umfeld des Darwinismus’, in Michael Bies and Michael Gamper (eds.), 
Literatur und Nicht-Wissen. Historische Konstellationen in Literatur und Wissenschaft, 1750-
1930 (Berlin: Diaphanes, 2012), 359-377. Darwin’s ‘literariness’, a style of writing that en-
tails a stance different from the objectivity postulated by Daston and Galison, has been 
analyzed by: George Levine, Darwin: The Writer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
7 This has become a vast field that cannot be surveyed in full here. Some of the most im-
portant contributions to New Epistemology include: Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been 
Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993 [French original 1991]); Bar-
bara Herrnstein Smith, Scandalous Knowledge: Science, Truth and the Human (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Isabelle Stengers, The Invention of Modern Science 
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000 [French original 1993]).
8 Ludwik Fleck, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. Einführung in 
die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv, intro. by Lothar Schäfer and Thomas Schnelle 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1980), esp. 52-70. Fleck was a Polish microbiologist special-
ising in infectology. He published his epistemological writings in German; Entstehung 
und Entwicklung was first published in 1935 in Basel. To this day, his work has remained 
little known in the English-speaking word (the first English translation of his book was 
published in 1979), but his influence on Thomas S. Kuhn’s concept of scientific commu-
nities has been acknowledged, rather in passing, by the latter in the preface to The Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions, 4th ed. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
2012), xli. For a fuller discussion, see Babette E. Babich, ‘Kuhn’s Paradigm as a Parable 
for the Cold War: Incommensurability and Its Discontents from Fuller’s Tale of Harvard 
to Fleck’s Unsung Lvov’, Social Epistemology 17.2-3 (2003), 99-109. Fleck’s ‘thought styles’ 
are linked to sociologically clearly demarcated ‘thought collectives’, and in this, they dif-
fer from A.C. Crombie’s similarly sounding ‘styles of scientific thinking’, which are more 
broadly defined methods of scientific inquiry and argumentation within European natu-
ral philosophy and related fields. See A.C. Crombie, Styles of Scientific Thinking in the Eu-
ropean Tradition: The History of Argument and Explanation Especially in the Mathematical 
and Biomedical Sciences and Arts, 3 vols. (London: Duckworth, 1994).
9 Fleck, Entstehung und Entwicklung, 143. 
10 Thomas Henry Huxley, ‘Agnosticism’ (1889), in The Major Prose of Thomas Henry Hux-
ley, ed. Alan Barr (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 253-282.
11 Fleck, Entstehung und Entwicklung, 143.
12 Lyell, Principles of Geology, 76.
13 Smith, Scandalous Knowledge, 5.
14 Since Gillian Beer’s seminal study Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, 
George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), literary Darwin studies have developed into a vibrant field. Recent book-
length publications include George Levine, Darwin and the Novelists: Patterns of Science 
in Victorian Fiction (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991); David Amigoni, Colonies, 
77Theology, Geology, and Philip Henry Gosse’s Omphalos
Cults and Evolution: Literature, Science and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Writing (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Gowan Dawson, Darwin, Literature and Vic-
torian Respectability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Virginia Richter, 
Literature after Darwin: Human Beasts in Western Fiction, 1859-1939 (New York and Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
15 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
16 Peter Harrison analyses the long history of interdependence between these two readings 
of Nature and the Bible, and in particular the catalytic effect of Protestant biblical schol-
arship on the study of the natural world; see Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the 
Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
17 For a contextualization of Paley within the history of natural theology, and in relation 
to the emerging evolutionary concepts of the nineteenth century, see Stuart Peterfreund, 
Turning Points in Natural Theology from Bacon to Darwin: The Way of the Argument from 
Design (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
18 William Paley, Natural Theology, or Evidence of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, 
Collected from the Appearances of Nature, ed. Matthew D. Eddy and David Knight (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15. Emphasis in the original.
19 Lyell, Principles of Geology, 71-72.
20 On the controversies about Lyellian geology, in particular in relation to the then prevalent 
catastrophism, see Michael Ruse, The Darwinian Revolution: Science Red in Tooth and 
Claw, 2nd ed. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 36-48.
21 On Gosse as a littoral biologist and a representative of natural theology, see Jonathan 
Smith, Charles Darwin and Victorian Visual Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), esp. 79-84.
22 Philip Henry Gosse, Omphalos: An Attempt to Untie the Geological Knot (London: John 
Van Voorst; Paternoster Row, 1857; repr. Milton Keynes: Nabu, 2010), 4.
23 Ibid., 103-104.
24 The Archaeopteryx was found in 1861; see Paul Chambers, Bones of Contention: The Ar-
chaeopteryx Scandals (London: Murray, 2002).
25 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, ed. Gillian Beer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 251.
26 On the relevance of fossil discoveries for evolution theory, see Donald A. Prothero, Evo-
lution: What the Fossils Say and Why It Matters (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007), esp. 50-90; on Gosse’s Omphalos, Ibid., 8-10.




31 Ibid., 347, emphasis in the original.
32 Edmund Gosse, Father and Son (1907), ed. Michael Newton (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 64.
33 See Ruse, The Dawinian Evolution, 137-142 and 202-228.
34 Thomas Henry Huxley, ‘Science and Culture’ (1889), in The Major Prose of Thomas Henry 
Huxley, ed. Alan Barr (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 224-238, 233.
35 Daston and Galison, Objectivity, 18.
36 William Wilberforce, ‘Review [of On the Origin of Species]’ (1860), in L.S.B. Leakey, Jack 
Prost, and Stephanie Prost (eds.), Adam and Ape: A Sourcebook of Discoveries About Early 






2.1 The Wolf in Itself
The Uses of Enchantment in the Development of 
Modern Linguistics
John E. Joseph
 Weber’s antimodernism and Latour’s symmetrical 
anthropology
In the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences in which I work, 
the philosophers have no doubt that they are part of the humanities. The psy-
chologists know that they are not; the borderline that matters for them is be-
tween the social sciences and medicine. We linguists straddle the humanities 
and social sciences. A few of us are comfortable on the fence, while others place 
themselves firmly on this side or that, and generally try to hide their contempt 
for those on the other.
This may be inevitable, given that language is itself so central both to hu-
manistic studies and to social life. Or the seeming inevitability could be just an 
ex post facto rationalization. Either way, it is worth zeroing in on some key early 
moments when the study of language shifted from being firmly rooted in the 
humanities to staking a claim to be a science, first a natural science, then a social 
one – and in both cases, a modern one.
In 1917, Max Weber (1864-1920) lamented ‘the fate of our times, with their 
rationalization, intellectualization and above all, disenchantment of the world’.1 
This indictment of the modern condition was implicitly echoed 75 years later by 
Bruno Latour:
The antimoderns firmly believe that the West has rationalized and disen-
chanted the world, [...] that it has definitively transformed the premodern 
cosmos into a mechanical interaction of pure matters. But instead of see-
ing these processes as the modernizers do – as glorious, albeit painful, 
conquests – the antimoderns see the situation as an unparalleled catas-
trophe.
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He adds that ‘The postmoderns, always perverse, accept the idea that the situ-
ation is indeed catastrophic, but they maintain that it is to be acclaimed rather 
than bemoaned!’.2
Latour argues that modernism, antimodernism and postmodernism are all 
equally grounded in a ‘Constitution’ which took shape in the seventeenth century, 
whereby Nature and Society were separated, then gradually made into irrecon-
cilable opposites. By the early nineteenth century this Constitution had become 
impervious to criticism. It undid the premodern incapacity to tamper with either 
nature or society, each being conceived as inexorably bound to the other at every 
point, under the authority of God. But the new ‘humanism’ gave rise to an ‘asym-
metry’, which Latour considers the true mark of the modern, and the source of its 
ultimately fatal contradictions. It is asymmetrical because
It overlooks the simultaneous birth of ‘nonhumanity’ – things, or objects, 
or beasts – and the equally strange beginning of a crossed-out God, rel-
egated to the sidelines. Modernity arises first from the conjoined creation 
of those three entities, and then from the masking of the conjoined birth 
and the separate treatment of the three communities while, underneath, 
hybrids continue to multiply as an effect of this separate treatment.3
Latour designates the ‘human’ pole as Subject/Society, as though these were con-
flatable, and repays his reader’s willing suspension of disbelief with a grand narra-
tive of modernism as the proliferation of ‘hybrids’ which mediate between Nature 
and Subject/Society [Fig. 1].
The Constitution denies the existence, even the possibility, of such hybrids, 
being committed instead to ‘purifying’ the split. Yet this artificial split has to be 
mediated. So the Constitution ends up surreptitiously demanding the prolifera-
tion of those hybrids it claims to forbid. Such contradictions, far from weakening 
the Constitution, positioned the moderns as ‘invincible’:
If you criticize them by saying that Nature is a world constructed by human 
hands, they will show you that it is transcendent, that science is a mere in-
termediary allowing access to Nature, and that they keep their hands off. If 
you tell them that we are free and that our destiny is in our own hands, they 
will tell you that Society is transcendent and its laws infinitely surpass us.4
Because we have never practiced the absolute separation which is preached, La-
tour says that we have never been modern. Hence the idea of a ‘postmodernism’ 
is as absurd as the thought of returning to premodernism. His prescription for 
a nonmodernism has had less impact than his diagnosis. I’ll return to it, but my 
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central aim is to apply his framework to a set of possibly related critical moments 
in the emergence of modern linguistics:
• The demise over the course of the nineteenth century of the ‘genius of a lan-
guage’, a concept that had arisen two centuries earlier
• How sign theory relates to the linguistic system in the work of Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1857-1913)
• Why and how the ‘social’ analysis of language failed to take off for decades 
after the early work of Saussure’s student Antoine Meillet (1866-1936)
 The ‘genius of a language’ as natural and irrational
Applying Latour’s analysis to the post-Renaissance history of linguistics, we have 
little trouble finding dichotomies that mirror the polarization between Nature 
and Subject/Society.5 One powerful manifestation of the Nature pole was the 
‘genius of a language’, a concept which arose precisely on schedule in the seven-
teenth century, in a discourse by Dominique Bouhours (1628-1702).6 But it was 
never confined to the Nature pole. Gambarota has chronicled how the genius of 
a language became a prominent trope in tandem with the modern conception of 
nationhood, and points to the ‘democratizing’ impact of this genius, in which all 
speakers of the language have a share.7 Until recent times only a small minority 
of any European country’s population spoke the ‘national language’; but just its 
presence as a written language, and an ideal hovering over dialect usage, drew 
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together everyone, not just the elite, into a shared national mind, its defining 
features matching those of the genius of its language.
It is a classic Latourian example of a superficially modern ‘natural’ concept 
that in fact is equally bound up with society and politics. Genius cannot be seen 
or heard – one can only proclaim particular textual manifestations as being its 
products. In being only indirectly accessible it is like the ‘language system’ as we 
have understood it since Saussure. What differentiates the genius of a language 
from a prototypical product of Nature is its mediation, not so much with Sub-
ject/Society, since all of Latour’s ‘nonhumans’ mediate between the two, as with 
the enchanted.
The naturalizing of the genius of a language was a crucial first step in estab-
lishing what we call ‘linguistics’, as opposed to the study of language that preceded 
it. Linguistics begins historically with the erasing of speaking-writing subjects 
and their willful utterances. The texts with which linguistics worked, and works, 
are mainly, and ideally, anonymous; if an author is named, we may still use the 
text, taking it as an expression of the genius of the race that speaks it. That some-
how becomes easier the deeper we go into the past, perhaps because a name like 
Homer or Moses or Panini or Ossian seems as likely to be symbolic of a collective 
process – a community of practice – as denoting an individual like ourselves.
Language functions as rationality’s codification and embodiment, but also its 
vehicle, and the principal index for judging how rational a given individual is. In 
our culture, we judge no one as irrational for using language in an unschooled, 
natural way, except in a social context that demands that it be used in a standard, 
schooled way. Education is ‘prescriptivist’ about language, and prescriptivism is 
counternatural;8 it occupies the Society pole in Latour’s dichotomy, the Nature 
pole being that of the spontaneous speech that is more ‘native’ to us.
Modern linguistics has always refused to engage in prescriptive discourse. It 
anchors linguistic behavior to natural, physical causes which are always at present 
only partially understood, but ultimately certain to yield up their secrets. Why 
physical forces? Because modern views of rationality rest not just on the dyad 
of Nature and Society but also that of Body and Mind. Put them together, and 
the body becomes the locus of Nature, the mind that of Rational Subject–So-
ciety–God. The ‘mind’ of linguistics is not the mind of agentive choices, but of 
the genius of the language, the immutable Saussurean system, the Durkheimian 
collective consciousness, the Freudian unconscious, the Chomskyan mind/brain 
where the mind is (merely) what the brain does.
The commitment to forces that cannot (yet) be directly observed, just inferred 
from what are interpreted as their effects, is a matter of faith. As with religion, 
some people will say that to base one’s actions and commitments on faith rather 
than on what is directly observable is irrational; others that it is the only rational 
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course. Either way, the promise of unseen forces that pose puzzles for us, in the 
solving of which we will come to uncover those deep, mysterious forces, provides 
the enchantment of modern linguistics. Call it an enchanted rationality or irra-
tionality: no matter. Enchantment and disenchantment are many-sided concepts. 
As a translation of Weber’s Entzauberung, disenchantment means ‘un-magicking’, 
demystifying. Enchantment, however, does not have to mean mystifying, and it 
has its uses, as shown by another Bruno – not Latour, but Bettelheim.9
Outside linguistics, language has its own powers to enchant, but they tend not 
to be ones linguists want to deal with. They steer clear of anything ‘literary’; they 
keep rhetoric out of bounds; they are even nervous of investigating too deeply 
into what causes some words and structures to be perceived as good and others 
as poor. These are just the things that matter in the general cultural discourse 
about language, which locates rationality in agentive choices based on analytic 
understanding. In order to have the status of a science, linguists seem to think 
they must construct the opposite, mirror-image version of rationality from the 
culture at large. They must become counterrational, refusing to deal with agen-
tive choices, and instead trying to expose heretofore unobservable natural forces 
and the hidden rationality they project. That gives it a sort of cultishness that 
enhances its enchantment.
 Linguistics and the Nature vs. Subject/Society polarization
The 1860s saw a prominent debate between the Oxford scholar Friedrich Max Mül-
ler (1823-1900) and the American William Dwight Whitney (1827-1894) over the 
question of whether linguistics was a natural science or a historical one, a classic 
version of Latour’s polarization.10 For Müller, seeing language as a natural phenom-
enon was the breakthrough that positioned linguistics at the center of the academic 
universe. As understanding of language grew, it would provide the keys to unlock-
ing the secrets of the human mind and its evolution. A language was a living thing, 
an organism, that grew following the same laws as other organisms, such as plants.
For Whitney, on the contrary, languages were human ‘institutions’. Language 
had not grown organically out of the evolution of the vocal apparatus, as Mül-
ler thought; rather, the vocal apparatus was chosen, by a combination of chance 
and convenience – sign language could have developed equally well – and all 
languages contain elements created by haphazard accident, and ratified through 
an implicit democratic process among those in the community, who determine 
which creations will be rejected and which retained.
The naturalist position of Max Müller had been formed through what Latour 
calls a ‘purification’, in an attempt to position linguistics among the hard sciences 
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as their prestige was suddenly outstripping that of the law, theology and medi-
cine faculties that had traditionally ruled the roost in universities. Whitney, in 
response, was undertaking a ‘hybridization’, not denying that language has natural 
aspects, but rather denying that the natural aspects are primary, and the institu-
tional ones secondary, instead of the reverse.
Saussure wrote that he ‘revered’ Whitney, whom he first read as a student of 
Neogrammarian historical linguistics at the University of Leipzig.11 Yet it gradu-
ally became clear to Saussure that Whitney’s characterization of a language as an 
‘institution’ had a flaw. Institutions are planned, designed, changed through deci-
sions taken by powerful individuals, none of which is true of a language. On the 
Nature–Subject/Society scale, Saussure was a bit to the left of Whitney, though 
much closer to him than to Müller.
Whitney’s institutional conception of language was appealing because of its 
modernity, as it rejected the irrational dimension of linguistic naturalism. And 
yet, in a period when science had been constitutionally soldered to the Nature 
pole, and was increasingly dominant in terms of academic prestige, the claim of 
linguistics to be a science meant that its precise position was a delicate matter in-
deed. The Neogrammarians’ claim to scientific status was tied to their conception 
of sound change as mechanical, which is not the same as natural, but somewhere 
between it and the other end of the spectrum, where the Social clearly mitigates 
between it and the individual Subject.
By the last decades of the nineteenth century the Enlightenment of a hundred 
years earlier, while respected, was viewed not as enduring but surpassed. The 
problem with its approach to language according to Michel Bréal (1832-1915) in 
his Essai de sémantique (1897), is that
Our forefathers of the school of Condillac, those ideologists who for fifty 
years served as target to a certain school of criticism, were less far from the 
truth when they said, in simple and honest fashion, that words are signs. 
Where they went wrong was when they referred everything to a reasoning 
reason.12
Bréal’s condescension toward these ‘forefathers’ is thick. Their ‘reasoning reason’ 
(raison raisonnante) seems a redundant phrase, but is not, for a reason that has 
to do with the Subject/Society division. There is a reason, a logic, behind every 
language, but not the reasoning of a willful Subject. It is a social reason, a shared 
choice that is not chosen but emerges.
That is Saussure’s view as well. But Saussure had something in his Genevese 
educational formation that his French colleagues did not: the grammaire générale 
tradition. Dating from the seventeenth century, it had, on account of historical 
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accidents, endured in Geneva down to the early 1870s, forty years longer than in 
France itself. Saussure had been in one of the last cohorts to have been taught by 
old men whose courses in logic included general grammar, part of which was the 
theory of the linguistic sign as the linkage of sound and thought. In the wake of a 
two-hundred-year discourse about the genius of a language, they were no longer 
distinguishing sharply between a ‘general’ grammar and ‘particular’ grammars, nor 
were they inclined to assume that universal rationality was equally well embodied 
in all languages. They did though continue to take language itself as inseparable 
from rationality.13
Reason, genius and related concepts were hybrids in Latour’s terms. Saussure 
could not accept the naturalists’ conception of language because of the purifica-
tion it represented. Linguistics would, for him, have to be a double science, in or-
der to take account of what was in so many respects the dual nature of language: 
langue and parole, synchrony and diachrony, absolute and relative arbitrariness, 
mutability and immutability. Neogrammarian doctrine held that phonetic laws 
operate blindly, with analogy the only explanation permitted for any seeming ex-
ceptions. Analogy is a form of reasoning, and it imposes itself on the automatic, 
instinctive operation of the vocal organs by which sound change is introduced. 
Those operations are either irrational or rational in a different way from the pro-
cess of analogy – which itself is still not what Bréal called ‘reasoning reason’, the 
rationality of an agentive Subject.
In some of Saussure’s last lectures on general linguistics in 1911, he addressed 
this dual nature head-on. Languages, he said, appear to offer their users a choice, 
but it is like a forced card, la carte forcée.14 This is a conjuror’s trick, you fan out a 
deck of cards and tell an audience member to choose one. As his fingers approach 
you push out the card you, the conjuror, want chosen, the tiniest fraction of a cen-
timeter, imperceptibly to the audience member’s awareness, which you distract by 
a movement of your free hand. Nearly always the forced card is chosen, though 
the audience member thinks he has chosen freely.
Conjuring is an interesting form of entertainment. It is a reintroduction of 
 enchantment into our modern rational world, where its reception is different 
from what it would be in a premodern setting. It reassures us that all enchant-
ment is not in fact vanished, that it is possible even for arch-materialists to experi-
ence an amazement akin to a religious experience. Saussure’s lectures were – are 
– themselves enchanting, not least because of the way in which he presents us 
with paradoxes that are left unresolved, and occasionally an image as powerful as 
that of the forced card.
That image comes in a discussion of what he terms ‘immutability’. On the one 
hand, language is pervasively mutable, in the sense that all its elements are con-
stantly subject to change. On the other hand, a language is immutable, in that no 
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individual can dictate any change to it. Every change begins with an innovation by 
an individual within speech (parole), but most such innovations are not taken up 
by the community. Only a very few are socially sanctioned, and it is that sanction 
that allows a change from parole into the langue – though, since every element of 
the language system derives its value from its difference vis-à-vis all the other ele-
ments, any such change actually brings about a wholly new langue.
 The evolution of Meillet
There is here a force beyond not only human control, but beyond reason. It is 
not natural, since the elements of language are themselves not naturally deter-
mined, but arbitrary. Saussure falls back on the explanation that ‘language is a 
social fact’ – quoting an article by his former student, Meillet, in the 1904/1905 
volume of the Année sociologique, founded and edited by Émile Durkheim (1858-
1917).15 In this period we find Meillet taking pains to stay in line with Durkheim’s 
sociology.
In the same lectures in which he talked about immutability and the forced 
card, Saussure revisited the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, introduced in an 
earlier lecture, to point out that such arbitrariness was in fact limited.16 He noted 
that the evolution from Latin to French saw ‘an enormous shift toward the unmo-
tivated’. For example, ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ in Latin were the transparently related 
amicus and inimicus; but the French counterparts ami and ennemi are not per-
ceived as related by French speakers. Ennemi ‘has gone back to being absolutely 
arbitrary’. Saussure takes the strong view that ‘The whole process of evolution in 
a language can be represented as a fluctuation in the overall balance between what 
is entirely unmotivated and what is relatively motivated’.
Meillet picked up on this idea in an article of the following year, 1912. ‘The 
Evolution of Grammatical Forms’ is remembered particularly for having intro-
duced the term ‘grammaticalization’. Meillet gives examples comparable to Saus-
sure’s, which not everyone today would recognize as a case of grammaticalization; 
for example, proto-Germanic hiu tagu ‘this day’ grammaticalizing to become Old 
High German hiutu and Modern German heute ‘today’. English today is itself an 
example of this type.17
From the perspective both of the analysis of the linguistic signs, and of speak-
ers of German, a more semantically transparent hiu tagu has given way to a heute 
that cannot be analyzed into component parts. There is no absolute logical rea-
son why the one is more ‘rational’ than the other, but since Condillac the analyz-
able character of language has been used to explain the development of rational 
thought – why it has happened in all human groups, and in no nonhuman ones. 
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Note again how Saussure said that French ennemi has gone back to being abso-
lutely arbitrary. How does such a ‘reversion’ happen?
Meillet offers an answer. His first example of ‘the passage of autonomous 
words to the role of grammatical agents’,18 that is, grammaticalization, is French 
suis ‘am’. It is, he says, autonomous in je suis celui qui suis (I am that I am), and still 
retains a certain autonomy in je suis chez moi (I am at home). But it ‘has almost 
ceased to be anything other than a grammatical element in je suis malade (I am 
sick), je suis maudit (I am accursed), and is only a grammatical element in je suis 
parti (I’ve departed), je suis allé (I’ve gone), je me suis promené (I’ve taken a walk)’.19
His choice of words – ‘still retains’, ‘ceased to be’ – clearly implies that original-
ly ‘autonomous’ elements have over time lost their autonomy and become ‘merely’ 
grammatical. Grammaticalization thus meant loss of self-governance, becoming 
dependent on another element. This involved an intermediate stage in which 
words become clichés, ‘habitual’ collocations, on their way to grammaticaliza-
tion. A word is bleached of its semantic content, becoming functional rather than 
‘meaningful’: more mechanical than rational. Meillet, in exposing irrationality not 
in the use of language, but within the language system itself, diagnoses a condition 
that perhaps cannot be eliminated, but can be controlled, through the power of a 
modern linguistic science that, by facing up to it, does not remain under its power. 
Exposing this adds to the enchantment of language, with the irrationality it en-
compasses, and of linguistics, with its power to expose and control the irrational, 
just as a conjuror appears to do.
A third phase in Meillet’s thought begins around 1920 in a shift likely prompt-
ed by his reading of Saussure’s Cours.20 Saussure notes that English gives a more 
prominent place to the unmotivated than German does, since German indicates 
grammatical relations through the inflections on nouns and verbs, whereas Eng-
lish does it through position and the use of auxiliaries and prepositions. In this 
sense, German is more ‘grammatical’ and inclined toward the motivated, while 
English is more ‘lexical’ and inclined toward the radically arbitrary.21 This be-
comes a leading idea in Meillet’s later thought. In a coda (dated May 5, 1920) 
which he added to his 1909 paper ‘On the Disappearance of the Simple Preterite 
Forms’ for its republication in 1921, he contrasts Latin with modern English and 
French:
The essential feature of the morphological structure of Indo-European, 
and still of Latin, is that the word does not exist independently of the 
grammatical form: there is no word meaning ‘horse’, there is a nominative 
singular equus, a genitive singular equi, an accusative plural equos, etc. and 
no element signifying ‘horse’ can be isolated independently of the endings. 
On the contrary, in the modern type represented by English and, a bit less 
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well by French, the word tends to exist independently of any ‘morpheme’: 
whatever role it plays in the sentence, in English one says dog and in French 
chien, where Latin had a series of forms depending on the cases.22
Soon he will depart radically from Durkheim and discuss the psychological de-
velopment of the Indo-European peoples from an early ‘concrete’ to a more ad-
vanced ‘abstract’ stage. In a paper to the Société de Psychologie in 1922, Meillet 
stated that
French has an invariable word loup ‘wolf ’, the form of which is always the 
same, whatever the sentence it appears in, however one envisages the ani-
mal [...]. In Latin, on the contrary, there is not really any word that signifies 
wolf; if you want to say that the wolf has come you would use the form lupus; 
if you see wolves: lupos [...], etc. No one of these forms can be considered as 
being the name of the wolf any more than the others.23
He goes on to say that ‘a Roman was not capable of naming “the wolf in itself ”’, 
and on the basis of this evidence he makes the very broad extrapolation that ‘The 
universal tendency of language, in the course of civilization, has been to give the 
noun a character more and more independent of all its particular uses’.24 In the 
discussion following the paper, Meillet insists further that the development of 
languages must go from the concrete toward the abstract, and that, consequently, 
‘The mentality of an Indo-European differs completely from a modern’.25
In other words, an Indo-European – indeed, a Roman, much closer to us his-
torically – was not rational in the way that we moderns are. If Romans could 
not name the wolf in itself, could they think it? From a Saussurean point of view, 
nothing compels us to answer no; thought is not limited to linguistic signifieds. 
The notion that the structure of one’s language actually limits what one can think 
is one which modern linguists generally reject as bordering on racism; yet, sur-
prisingly, that appears to be Meillet’s answer in this late phase, when he ties the 
presence or absence of a case-neutral form directly to ‘mentality’.
Meillet’s 1922 paper to the psychologists would have been very different in 
1904. Then he would have upbraided them for not following objective sociologi-
cal method. Of course, psychoanalysis had a broad cultural effect starting in the 
1920s, that ultimately made it futile to try to keep scientific research pure of un-
observables such as the ‘mind’. The first French textbook in psychoanalysis, by 
Raymond de Saussure (1894-1971), son of Ferdinand, with an introduction by 
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) also dates to 1922.26 Established scientists were, for 
the most part, immune to the enchantment of Freud, which was massive. It took 
another generation to grow up immersed in it as part of everyday discourse and 
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popular culture, to bring it into the mainstream,27 though its place within aca-
demic psychology has been tenuous.
Linguistics was a ‘dry’ subject in need of some enchantment in order to gar-
ner public interest and institutional support. That makes it less surprising when 
we find Meillet in 1922 constructing a grand narrative about mental evolution, 
or Edward Sapir (1884-1939) beginning to write about the influence of language 
upon thought the following year. The ‘Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’ suggests that we 
are none of us so rational as we think, that our rationality is a cultural product, 
transmitted surreptitiously through our language. Sapir projected synchronically, 
into the ‘primitive’, the same nexus of irrationality, enchantment and exoticism 
as did his fellow anthropologists Margaret Mead (1901-1978) and Ruth Benedict 
(1887-1948). Meillet projected it diachronically, into the past.
 Conclusion
Modern linguistics has never been modern. There was a gradual shrinkage in 
the space allotted to rationality in linguistics, from the eighteenth century, when 
the field itself has not been defined, to the mid-nineteenth, when it has already 
become generally associated with language as a ‘natural’ phenomenon. In reaction 
Whitney tries to restore the Subject/Society dimension, though never in a way 
that is contradictory with the Neogrammarian approach, to which he was sym-
pathetic. Even so, he went a step too far for Saussure, who redressed the balance 
differently, reinstating eighteenth-century sign theory at the heart of a linguistic 
system that nevertheless escapes the control of any individual Subject. The idea 
of language as a ‘social fact’ became a mantra for Meillet and Saussure. By 1912 
Meillet was moving away from social analysis toward ‘grammaticalization’, a ‘natu-
ral’ process of words and other linguistic elements losing their ‘rational’ content to 
become functional. The following decade sees him move still further toward psy-
chological accounts that effectively reinvent the idea of the genius of a language, 
to show how people’s way of thinking evolves over time.
To return finally to Latour, his path forward from modernism would reject the 
Nature-Society polarization, while retaining the networks of actors, human and 
nonhuman, which always covertly underlay that polarization. Indeed, he credits 
the modern Constitution with enabling an unprecedented lengthening of net-
works and a belief in experimentation, which are among the modern legacies he 
would retain. He would, however, discard the modern Great Divide between hu-
mans and nonhumans, and bring the clandestine practices of mediation into the 
open. He would keep the postmoderns’ reflexivity, constructivism and denatu-
ralization, but not their ironic reflexivity, critical deconstruction or anachronism. 
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Above all he would reject the postmodern belief that modernism had actually 
ever existed in the form which it claimed for itself.
As for antimoderns such as Max Weber, Latour sees ‘nothing worth saving’ in 
them.28 They too ‘consistently believed what the moderns said about themselves’, 
and were for the moderns ‘always, in effect, the best of stooges’.29 This is not en-
tirely fair. The enchantment whose loss modernism seemed to entail, and that 
Weber lamented, was the spiritual dimension that seemed to give more meaning 
to premodern than to modern existence. While Latour rejects the premodern 
obligation always to link the social and natural orders, he agrees with those who 
attribute the crisis of meaning in modern life to their purified separation in the 
so-called free-floating sign. Perhaps. But what would that point toward as the 
essential task of a nonmodern linguistics? Would it aim at realizing Socrates’ 
dream, recounted in the Cratylus, of seeing how signs link to things? This would 
represent the perfecting of human thought by Entzauberung, the ultimate unmag-
icking, replacing our individual interpretations of signs with their ‘true’ meanings. 
Actually, that has been the aim of much of linguistics throughout the modern 
period: it has always been nonmodern and premodern at the same time. For some 
of us, though, eliminating the element of interpretation, which gives rise to ambi-
guity and misunderstanding, would not bring the perfection of humankind, but 
its undoing, replacing us with what are in effect intelligent machines. Misunder-
standing and ambiguity are what make us human, and the vision of a world with-
out them may have been Socrates’ dream; but then, if Meillet was right, given the 
similar structure of the Greek and Latin noun systems, Socrates would have been 
no more able than a Roman to name the wolf in itself, to envisage the creature 
whose essence is to devour everyone around it.
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2.2 Soviet Orientalism and Subaltern Linguistics
The Rise and Fall of Marr’s Japhetic Theory
Michiel Leezenberg
One of the attractions of the park surrounding the Villa Borghese in Rome is a 
group of statues of national poets. Included among them are such obvious ex-
amples as the Persian Abulqasim Firdowsi, author of the Shahnâmeh or Book of 
Kings; the Georgian Shota Rustaveli, who wrote The Man in the Panther Skin 
(Vepkhistqaosani); and the Montenegran Petar Njegos, writer of The Mountain 
Wreath (Gorski Vijenac). More surprising, however, is the presence of a statue, 
unveiled in 2012, of the ‘Azerbaijani poet’ Nizami Genjewi. Nizami composed all 
of his poems in Persian, but now he is claimed as the national poet of a country 
that cultivates an Azeri Turkish rather than a Persian identity. This nationalist 
reappropriation of a classical poet points to some of the questions to be treated 
in the present paper: the rise of nationalist ideas in non-European contexts, in 
this case, the Soviet Caucasus; and the role of the humanities in the creation of 
these new nationalisms. As will appear below, it was a Georgian-born scholar, the 
famous linguist and archeologist Nikolaj Marr, who first claimed Nizami as an 
Azerbaijani poet. Marr will loom large in the following pages, not only in connec-
tion with his notorious Japhetic theory, but also in connection with early Soviet 
nationality policies.
 The universalization of the philological humanities
It has long been claimed that there is an intimate link between the modern hu-
manities and modern nationalism. These modern notions are generally traced to 
philosophers like Herder and Fichte, linguists and folklore scholars like Wilhelm 
von Humboldt and the Grimm brothers, and historians like Ranke.1 Another 
line of argumentation, famously introduced by Edward Said, argues that modern 
Western Orientalism, i.e., modern philological knowledge of the non-Western 
world, is a function of the colonizing projects of imperialist Western states.2 In 
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short, the modern humanities are claimed to be implicated not only in the rise 
of nationalism or the nation-state, but also in imperialism and modern empires. 
Here, my main intention is not to appraise or criticize these two theses, but to 
explore an important if underinvestigated link between them.
To all appearances, the categories of Romantic nationalism and of the philo-
logical humanities (like those of the nation and national identity, and the con-
cepts of language and culture, tradition and history in terms of which they are 
articulated) appear to have gained a virtually worldwide currency. One question 
to be discussed below is exactly how this vocabulary spread beyond its initial lin-
guistic and cultural confines. For the natural sciences, some plausible suggestions 
have recently been made: famously, authors like Latour and Shapin and Scheffer 
have argued that the universalization of the modern Western natural sciences 
crucially involved the exportation of new instruments like the vacuum pump, 
and of new facilities like the laboratory. For the modern humanities, however, 
a similar argument can hardly be given: these generally worked without instru-
ments or laboratory equipment. It can be, and has been, argued that novel forms 
of education like the seminar and novel spaces like the seminar room – both 
pioneered by Ranke – contributed to the expansion of modern ways of practicing 
the humanities across Europe (cf. Jo Tollebeek in this volume, Chapter 3.1); but 
such accounts do not yet explain how and why modern humanities knowledge 
reached areas outside Europe, where modern institutions like state-led schools 
and universities – let alone seminar rooms – were rather slower to materialize.
It is tempting but, as I hope to show, misguided to see the spread of the Ro-
mantic-nationalist vocabulary of the philological humanities in terms of the 
creation of an ideological hegemony of Western concepts; in doing so, one risks 
ignoring or downplaying both non-Western forms of agency and resistance, and 
alternative or subaltern forms of Western knowledge. Many accounts of the 
worldwide effects of the philological humanities, in particular, those standing 
in the tradition of Said’s Orientalism, do in fact proceed from an implicitly or 
explicitly Gramscian notion of Western ideological or discursive hegemony over 
non-Western actors; but in doing so, they risk reducing non-Western actors to 
mere passive recipients of Western ideologies, and thus depriving them of all 
agency.3 Further, they fail to explore the exact processes or mechanisms by which 
particular Western notions acquired this allegedly hegemonic status.
The intimate if not inherent link between the modern philological humanities 
and Romantic nationalism is by now well known in the literature; but the link 
between nationalism and Orientalism has not been explored in comparable de-
tail. As will become clear below, however, the themes of nationalism and empire, 
and of philology and Orientalism, merge in the case of non-Western national 
movements. Recently, Stathis Gourgouris and Marc Nichanian have explored 
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what they call a hegemonic national and colonial modernity from a Said-inspired 
postcolonial perspective. As is well known, Said’s original thesis of an intimate 
link between Orientalist knowledge and the colonizing projects of Western states 
fails to account adequately for German Orientalism, which for most of the nine-
teenth century developed – and spread abroad – in the absence of any coloniz-
ing projects on the part of the German, or rather Prussian, state.4 Instead, one 
might argue that these German orientalist categories were shaped by nationalism 
rather than colonialism. A question to be pursued further would then be if there 
are any systematic links between the philological constitution of national selves 
and the Orientalist constitution of colonial others. Gourgouris and Nichanian 
address the question of the relation between Orientalism and nationalism for 
non-Western European national movements (respectively, the modern Greek 
movement emerging in the Ottoman Empire, and Armenian nationalism arising 
in both the Ottoman Empire and imperial Russia).5 Such an extension of Said’s 
claims requires, first, that modern German philological Orientalism – despite 
initial appearances – actually does involve a form of colonialism, and second, that 
non-Western nationalisms rest on an internalization of these allegedly hege-
monic and allegedly colonial categories. Both these claims can in fact be found in 
these authors. Thus, according to Gourgouris, Wilhelm von Humboldt’s famous 
notion of Bildung, which is traditionally said to instrumentalize classical Greek 
educational and civilizational ideals for German nationalist purposes, involves 
not simply the appropriation but also the sublimation of classical Greek ideals. 
As such, he continues, ‘classical Bildung is no less than an explicit and program-
matic colonization of the ideal’.6 Unfortunately, however, Gourgouris largely fails 
to back this provocative but tantalizingly condensed argument with detailed ref-
erences or quotations, leaving the impression that the ‘colonization’ he claims to 
have found in Humboldt’s writings is at best implicit, and rests on a rhetorical 
association between – or identification of – the notions of appropriation, subli-
mation and colonization rather than on a detailed textual analysis. Gourgouris’ 
second claim, that the nationalist project of the modern Greeks emerging in-
volved the internalization of this alleged German colonialist sublimation, receives 
a hardly more elaborate argumentation.
A more detailed development, which applies of Gourgouris’s claims, to the 
creation of a modern Armenian literature and national identity appears in Marc 
Nichanian’s Le deuil de la philologie. Earlier, Nichanian had traced the rise of a 
modern Armenian literature written in the spoken vernacular, or Ashkharhabar, 
as opposed both to the written classical language or Grabar which until the early 
nineteenth century had been the dominant medium for works of literature and 
learning, and to what he calls the ‘civil language’, a supraregional variant spoken 
by eighteenth-century Armenian merchants and, on occasion, printed by the 
100 Michiel Leezenberg
 Mekhitarist monks in Venice. In his later work, he claims that this linguistic 
change, and more generally the rise of Armenian nationalism, involves the Orien-
talist creation of the Armenians as a ‘native people’, and, as such, an ‘internalized 
Orientalism’.7 Extending an argument first made by Foucault, Nichanian argues 
not only that the invention of the category of literature in the nineteenth century 
is coeval with the emergence of modern philology, but also that the deployment of 
modern philology is accompanied by the emergence of the nation as an imaginary 
form of collective perception, that is, an imagined community in Benedict An-
derson’s sense.8 This claim implies that the process of becoming a nation is less a 
political than an aesthetic process, as it crucially involves the creation of a modern, 
national literature. Nichanian adds to this general point that the nationalization of 
non-European peoples like the Armenians involves the internalization of the cat-
egories of European Orientalist philology, in particular that of the native.9 Thus, 
both Gourgouris and Nichanian argue that nationalism among peoples living out-
side of Western Europe, like the Neohellenism pioneered by Adamantios Korais 
and the Armenian neo-archeology created by Khatchatur Abovian and Karekin 
Servantsdiants, involves the interiorization of an ‘Orientalist gaze’: they involve a 
perception of the self as ‘native’, that is, in terms of primitive or primordial (pagan) 
cultures or traditions that are more typically applied to an Oriental other.
Gourgouris and Nichanian certainly formulate a radical extension of Said’s 
original argument: they wind up virtually identifying Orientalism with philology, 
and the German national educational ideal of Bildung with a colonizing project. 
At first blush, this may seem like a reductio ad absurdum of Said’s – already con-
tentious – main thesis: taken to its logical conclusions, it would imply that Hum-
boldt is a colonizing imperialist as much as a nationalist, and that the Grimm 
brothers, in their attempts at recovering and transcribing their own native Ger-
man culture, were in fact engaged in a colonial project. This claim, however, 
though extreme, is less far-fetched than it seems: it raises questions concerning 
the precise relation between nation and empire, and concerning the universali-
zation of (German) Romantic nationalist categories and the role of the various 
philological disciplines in this process. More specifically, it forces us to look more 
closely at the relation between the philological construction of a national self and 
the Orientalist construction of a colonial or domestic other.
 Russian and Soviet Orientalism: Marr and Trubetzkoy
Russia forms a particularly complex case for the nationalism-Orientalism the-
matic as commonly known. Even in so far as one can qualify the nineteenth-cen-
tury Russian Empire as imperialist, it complicates the Saidian thesis because of 
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the rise of a new Russian self-perception as in important respects non-Western 
(and thus ‘Oriental’) during this period; and the Soviet Union that replaced it 
was explicitly committed to the emancipation of the peoples living in its terri-
tories, and supported anti-colonial struggles worldwide. Obviously, I cannot do 
justice to this vast theme; here, I will only discuss whether and to what extent 
the philological theories produced in imperial and Soviet times reproduced he-
gemonic Western categories or can be called an alternative or ‘subaltern’ form of 
knowledge.
It is well known that the Soviet humanities claimed to reject the categories of 
Western ‘bourgeois’ scholarship; it is less well known, however, that similar criti-
cisms were already voiced well before the 1917 revolution, by authors who hardly 
qualify as bolshevists. Thus, Vera Tolz has argued that already in imperial Rus-
sia, one can find a critique of Eurocentrism and of the nexus between Orientalist 
knowledge and imperial power that antedates Edward Said’s far more famous 
Orientalism (1978) by half a century. Tolz adds that Said’s work is in fact indi-
rectly indebted to this critique, especially through Soviet-educated intellectuals 
like the Egyptian Anouar Abdel-Malek.10 Russian intellectual life already wit-
nessed important reactions against German cultural influence in the nineteenth 
century, and more explicitly during the so-called Silver Age (spanning, roughly, 
the first two decades of the twentieth century); more importantly for the present 
discussion, this culturally anti-German and Russian nationalist attitude was ex-
plicitly linked to a methodological critique of the philological methods that un-
derpinned historical-comparative linguistics as originating in German academia. 
We find such methodological critiques in two of the most influential linguists of 
late imperial Russia, Nikolai Trubetzkoy (1890-1938) and Nikolai Jakowlewitch 
Marr (1865-1934). Surprisingly, these criticisms are not discussed by Nichanian, 
who generally presents a picture of a smooth and largely uncontested German 
Romantic-cum-Orientalist hegemony over Armenian national self-awareness; 
but Marr’s work is crucial not only for the Russian and more specifically Soviet 
experience, but also for the Armenian case: thus, he conducted excavations on the 
Armenian site of Ani, and published an Old Armenian grammar in 1903.
Trubetzkoy has, of course, become famous as the founder of modern phonol-
ogy and areal linguistics; but it is less well known that he was also one of the main 
propagators of Eurasianism, i.e., the idea that Russia occupies a unique cultural 
space between East and West, and can be reduced to neither. Thus, in ‘Europe and 
Mankind’, published in 1920 but already written before World War I and the Rus-
sian Revolution, he criticizes Western European or, as he calls it, ‘Romano-Ger-
man’ chauvinism, for presenting its cultural particularities as features of universal 
civilization.11 This kind of criticism may seem primitive or outdated in comparison 
with Trubetzkoy’s sophisticated linguistic work, but one wonders to what extent 
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the notion of a vast nonnational Eurasian space of common cultural experience 
has shaped Trubetzkoy’s more famous ideas about linguistic Sprachbund or areal 
convergence, which suggest that two geographically adjacent languages may come 
to share structural features over time. There are indications that these linguistic 
doctrines have indeed been shaped and informed by a critique of the German 
chauvinism Trubetzkoy sees implicit in historical-comparative linguistics. Thus, 
he argues that the hypothetical Proto-Indo-European Ur-language should be 
treated as a purely linguistic construct, and should not be extrapolated to ethnic 
or racial developments, as is all too easily done by many of his contemporaries 
(and, in fact, by many a later author) working on historical comparative linguistics. 
Moreover, he argues that one should not treat the Indo-European languages in 
exclusively genetic terms: over time, he argues, languages may start sharing impor-
tant structural features and thus become members of the same language family.12
Marr is as notorious as Trubetzkoy is famous, in particular because of his 
so-called Japhetic theory, which argues that all of the languages of the Cauca-
sus, whether or not Indo-European, share traces of a distinct family of languages 
called ‘Japhetic’.13 Marr’s linguistic doctrines are usually dismissed as crackpot sci-
ence, or as a linguistic equivalent of Lysenko’s attempts to create a truly material-
istic genetics, with equally disastrous results. But it would be too easy merely to 
reject Marr’s work as pseudo-scientific, or as just a political abuse of scholarship. 
Not only should we not project back standards of scientific truth and objectivity 
that at the time were fiercely contested, it also closes off more radical questions 
concerning the constitutive role of the philological humanities in the shaping of 
modern nationalism and the – possibly inherently political category of such ap-
parently neutral analytical concepts like ‘language’, ‘culture’, or ‘tradition’. Some of 
Marr’s criticisms of German philology were in fact founded. Famously, on his first 
visit to Europe in 1894, Marr met – and soon quarreled with – one of the most 
famous German scholars of Armenian, Heinrich Hübschmann.14 The details of 
their argument are not known, but it is tempting to see in this confrontation be-
tween a German scholar and an unknown native from the fringes of the Russian 
Empire a clash between a hegemonic German learning and a subaltern non-West-
ern knowledge; in any case, Marr soon after started raising increasingly vocal criti-
cisms of the German chauvinist arrogance and even racism that he found hidden 
in historical-comparative linguistics. He certainly had a point: as Trubetzkoy had 
argued independently, late-nineteenth-century German philologists projected lin-
guistic findings onto speculations about the migrations and conquests of an Indo-
Germanic Herrenvolk and about the supremacy of the Aryan race.15
But there were equally cogent theoretical reasons for criticism. Marr devel-
oped his Japhetic theory especially on the basis of research into the Georgian and 
Armenian languages, both of which were problem cases for comparative linguis-
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tics. Thus, the historical-comparative linguistic classification of Armenian as a 
separate branch of the Indo-European languages left many questions open, and 
many etymologies unexplained. As an alternative explanation, Marr had argued 
in his 1903 grammar that the very core of the Armenian language, which arose 
‘on the soil of historical Armenia’, is mixed or, as he calls it, ‘bigenetic’.16 Further, 
he argued, anticipating his later claims as to the class character of language, that 
already in classical times, Armenian was divided into a written form used by the 
(religious) elites and a ‘secular’, spoken vernacular, and that the modern written 
language (Askharhabar) was just as old and venerable as the classical Grabar.17
Marr’s criticism of comparative linguists’ tendency to identify languages with 
nations, and language families with races, certainly makes sense; but as a com-
parison with Trubetzkoy’s Eurasianist and areal views suggests, such criticisms 
are not necessarily more ‘objective’ but may themselves presuppose rival ideolo-
gies. An open question for further research is to what extent these linguistic and 
philological theories (including the allegedly neutral and theory-independent 
‘facts’ uncovered by them) were shaped by changing ideologies and practices of 
language. Trubetzkoy’s and Marr’s critique of the categories of German-based 
historical comparative linguistics appears to be driven by an anti-Western Eura-
sian or Japhetic (and more specifically, anti-German) ideology.
But it was not just, or not simply, anti-comparativist or anti-German con-
siderations that led Marr to develop his Japhetic theory. Basing himself on his 
archeological excavations as much as on his linguistic research, he criticized the 
work of more nationalistically inclined Georgian and Armenian scholars, who 
tended to depict the medieval history of the Caucasus as a purely Christian affair, 
depriving the contributions of the Muslim presence in the region. Already by the 
1890s, he had adopted the slogan ‘struggle for nationality and against national-
ism’18; later, in a series of 1924 lectures delivered in Baku, Marr argued not only for 
a greater attention for the Muslim contributions to the history and cultures of the 
Caucasus, and against the near-exclusive focus on its Christian past by Armenian 
and Georgian scholars; also, and more specifically, he recommended the study of 
Nizami as an Azerbaijani rather than a Persian poet: not only was Nizami born 
in the Azerbaijani city of Genje, he argued, but his Persian-language poetry is 
also shot through with ‘Azerbaijanisms’ (azerbaijdzhanizmy); his work therefore 
merits study as part of the Azerbaijani national heritage.19
Despite their ideological affinity, however, the methodological differences be-
tween Marr and Trubetzkoy could hardly be greater. Trubetzkoy did not mince 
his words about Marr: in a letter dated November 6, 1924, he writes that ‘a critical 
review of [Marr’s latest] article ought to be done, not by a linguist but by a psychia-
trist’.20 Moreover, he categorically denies that Marr’s doctrines mark any methodo-
logical innovation, writing that they actually block scientific and social progress:
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[Marr’s] ‘new linguistic doctrine’ is not a bit different from so-called bour-
geois linguistics. [...] As a result, Soviet linguistics [...] has lost touch with 
genuinely progressive and revolutionary trends that are fighting for recog-
nition in Europe and America.21
This leaves us with the question to what extent Marr’s theories, regardless of 
their apparent rejection of the concepts and methods of German comparative 
linguistics, in fact achieve a paradigmatic break with the latter. In its early stages, 
Marr’s Japhetic theory could still be seen as parasitic on German philology, in 
that it presupposed some of its concepts or etymological methods. It was not un-
til after the October Revolution that Marr explicitly and systematically rejected 
the identification of languages with ethnic groups, and the explanation of linguis-
tic change in terms of migrations and conquests by peoples. In the same period, 
he equally discarded the historical-comparative notions of language families and 
of reconstructed protolanguages. It may be questioned, however, whether even 
these more radical claims really mark a break with existing philological methods: 
as noted above, other authors, most notably Trubetzkoy, also argued against the 
identification of (reconstructed) languages with peoples. Even Marr’s apparently 
novel concepts, or imagery, of ‘layers’ and ‘sediments’ bears a close similarity to the 
more familiar historical-comparative notion of substrates or substrata.
The main problem with Marrian linguistics, and the main difference with, e.g., 
Trubetzkoy’s views on language contact, is that Marr appears to push back all 
language mixture and pluralism to a hypothetical stage of linguistic origins (wit-
ness his view of Armenian as an originally hybrid language), and thus downplays 
all change in historic times –, a rather odd move for a theory that presents itself 
as wholly in agreement with the main tenets of historical materialism. In fact, 
most of Marr’s Marxist ideas, e.g., his conviction that language is a merely su-
perstructural phenomenon, are only late and nonessential additions, rather than 
supporting members, of his Japhetic theories.
 Marr and early Soviet nationality policies
Marr’s linguistic theories gained prominence against the background of early 
Bolshevik nationality policies. These policies centered on what was called kore-
nizatsiia, or ‘nativization’, i.e., they aimed at creating new political and cultural 
elites from among the local populations.22 As such, they systematically supported 
the emancipation of the ‘smaller nations’ of the Soviet Union, i.e., the communi-
ties speaking languages that did not have a long-standing literary civilization. 
Korenizatsiia policies were directed not only against any Russian chauvinism dis-
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guised as bolshevism, but also against any local chauvinism on the part of the 
existing elites of the constituent Soviet republics. As such, they directly reflected 
Stalin’s early writings on nationalism. In his famous ‘Marxism and the National 
Question’ (1913), Stalin defines nations as requiring, most importantly, a com-
mon language, a common territory and a common life.23 The mere possession 
of a common ‘philosophical make-up’, ‘national character’ or Volksgeist, he argues 
against the Romantic-idealist definition of nationhood, is not enough for a group 
of people to constitute a nation; specifically and explicitly, it is the Jews he has in 
mind here. He then raises the question of whether one should, or even could, cre-
ate or ‘organize’ nations, as some social democrats have proposed. In his opinion, 
national autonomy should not be based on ‘bourgeois’ principles of national iden-
tity, which he sees as leading to national segregation, and thus as undermining 
the international unity of the labor movement. Rather, following Lenin, Stalin 
upholds the right to self-determination as distinct from bourgeois ‘national au-
tonomy’; this right, he assumes rather than argues, does not undermine the unity 
of workers, and will not lead to separatism.
Next, Stalin specifically addresses the nationality question in the Caucasus. 
The cultural-national autonomy claimed for this region, he argues, presumes de-
veloped nationalities with a developed culture and (presumably, written) litera-
ture; but how then, should this cultural-national autonomy apply to the smaller 
nationalities of the Caucasus, like the Mingrelians, the Abkhazians, and the Ad-
jarians, who, as he writes, possess a ‘primitive culture’ and have no literature of 
their own? Against the social-democratic propagation of the bourgeois project of 
national autonomy, he then proposes what he calls the only genuinely progressive 
solution to the nationality question in the Caucasus: equal rights for all nations 
regarding schooling and communication, and the prohibition of all national privi-
leges; these, however, can only be achieved by the complete democratization of 
the country.
In proposing this solution, Stalin not only crucially relies on state power to 
solve the nationality question; he also explicitly reframes the nationality ques-
tion within a bolshevist mission civilisatrice. Regional autonomy, he claims, will 
draw the ‘belated nations’ into ‘the common cultural development’ and by allow-
ing them the benefits of ‘higher culture’, and helps them to avoid small-nation in-
sularity. Note that Stalin employs both ‘cultural development’ and ‘higher culture’ 
in the singular here, apparently assuming that neither has a specifically national, 
local or otherwise particular character, and tacitly identifying them with a univer-
salist notion of ‘civilization’ or ‘modernity’.
The contradictory character of these views on nationality has often been not-
ed; even more striking, however, is Stalin’s relapsing into an idealist vocabulary 
of ‘cultural development’ and ‘higher culture’. But whatever its intellectual merits, 
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Stalin’s solution to the nationality question cannot be brushed aside, not only 
because of its enormous influence on (post)colonial third world nationalisms, 
but also, and especially, because Stalin got the chance to implement and institu-
tionalize his views in the Soviet Union of the 1920s and 1930s, once Lenin had 
appointed him People’s Commissar for Nationalities Affairs.
Thus, early Soviet korenizatsiia policies tied in well with Marr’s struggle for 
nationality and against nationalism; but were they actually shaped by it? There 
is no evidence that Stalin was familiar with the theories of his fellow Georgian 
Marr before the 1920s; but the resemblance with Marr’s attitude to nationalism, 
and the concern with the smaller, non-Christian nationalities of the Caucasus, 
is striking. Conversely, as noted, it was only in the 1920s that Marr rephrased 
his theories in explicitly dialectical terms of class struggle, base and superstruc-
ture; but even before this reformulation, Marr’s theories had been germane to the 
emancipation, or creation, of the smaller Muslim nations of the Caucasus, such as 
the Abkhaz, the Chechens, the Kurds, and to some extent even the Azeris, against 
the locally dominant Christian Armenian and Georgian nationalities (which, it 
should be kept in mind, were themselves relatively recent formations shaped in 
interaction with the rise of Russian nationalism in the nineteenth century).
Marr was certainly not alone in his efforts to create a genuinely Marxist lin-
guistics. Despite the violent power struggle between the bolshevists and their 
opponents, both the arts and the humanities – not yet as constrained by state 
power as they would become in subsequent decades – showed a creative outburst 
during the 1920s, with exciting and provocative new ideas developed by both 
scholars and artists, witness students of literature and folklore like Bakhtin and 
Propp, and modernist dramaturges, poets and filmmakers like Meyerhold, Maya-
kovsky and Eisenstein. In linguistics, the 1920s saw a significant paradigmatic 
shift from more historically oriented approaches to language inspired by authors 
like Wilhelm von Humboldt to the synchronic, structural approach proposed by, 
in particular, Ferdinand de Saussure; at the same time, various authors started 
the search for a Marxist alternative to such ‘bourgeois’ approaches to the study 
of language. Thus, one Soviet scholar, V.N. Voloshinov, developed a framework 
that emphasized the materiality of the sign and its priority over consciousness, 
and formulated a concept of language as class-bound and dialectical in character. 
Another talented linguist, E.D. Polivanov, called for the creation of a Marxist 
linguistics that studied language as a collective work activity rather than an in-
dividual possession, parallel to (and possibly reducible to) processes of material 
production. And in a way, the early writings of Volosinov’s friend and colleague 
Mikhail Bakhtin also reflect this wider search for a new account of language and 
literature that escapes the confines of both German idealism and French struc-
turalism.24 In the acerbic polemics of the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, 
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claims to Marxist orthodoxy already started to overshadow questions of meth-
odology or empirical adequacy. Thus, for example, Polivanov’s cogent, if rather 
condescending, criticisms of Marr’s work were largely ignored.
These increasingly violent debates in linguistics coincided with an acerbic 
phase of Soviet agrarian policies. In Armenia as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, 
the collectivization of agriculture met with fierce resistance, and could only be 
imposed after the forcible intervention of the Red Army. Paired with the koreni-
zatsiia policy, it involved a redefinition of the regional population as a collective 
of workers and peasants distinguished by ‘national cultures’, conceived of in terms 
of primarily oral folkloric traditions. One of the smaller ‘folkloric’ nations thus 
created in the 1920s was that of the Kurds, in particular in Soviet Armenia. In 
the 1920s, the Soviet Kurds were briefly granted an autonomous region called 
‘Red Kurdistan’ (Kurdistana Sor) in the Laçîn region between Armenia and Azer-
baijan; but this region was abolished in 1929. In the same year, a systematic, and 
quickly successful, alphabetization campaign was mounted among the Kurds of 
Soviet Armenia, for which a new alphabet was specifically created using the Latin 
script, and new Kurdish-language textbooks for adult education and elementary 
schools were published at an astonishing pace, thanks primarily to the indefatiga-
ble efforts of the local Kurdish scholar Haciyê Cindî.
Soviet nativization and folklorization policies largely disregarded the earlier 
literate traditions that some of these peoples knew. Thus, as part of Kurdish na-
tivization, local religious traditions of learning as they had been cultivated in 
Kurdish medreses were attacked as backward, and the classical Kurdish poetic 
tradition was largely ignored in the creation of a new, progressive national litera-
ture. Considerations of space preclude a fuller discussion, but early Soviet studies 
of the Kurds clearly aimed at the emancipation, and in a sense even the creation, 
of the Kurds as a distinct nation defined by its proper language and folkloric 
traditions.25 It is difficult to gauge the actual influence of Marr’s doctrines on the 
shaping of an early Soviet Kurdish national identity; but his ideas fit in well with 
official policies, and in the 1930s became an obligatory feature of scholarly work 
on Kurdish language and folklore carried out in Leningrad and Moscow.26
Thus, early efforts at the nativization of the Soviet Kurds quickly yielded re-
sults. The mid-1930s, however, saw major shifts in Soviet nationality policies, 
which coincided with the start of the Great Terror. Tragically, precisely the loyal 
party members who had been active in realizing the korenizatsiia policies at the 
local level were now accused of ‘bourgeois chauvinist sentiments’, or even of es-
pionage for foreign powers. Thus, in Soviet Armenia, cultural activists like the 
two pioneers of Kurdish alphabetization, Ereb Shemo and Haciyê Cindî, were 
imprisoned or deported; elsewhere, Polivanov was arrested and subsequently ex-
ecuted on charges of spying for Japan.
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But although the policy of encouraging smaller nations was replaced by a new 
Russian-chauvinist policy, Marr’s theories maintained their officially sanctioned 
status. In the 1930s and 1940s, few if any criticisms of Marr’s Japhetic theories 
were heard, until Josef Stalin personally intervened in the matter in 1950.27 Sta-
lin’s famous – or notorious – ‘Marxism and Problems of Linguistics’ may or may 
not have been written by Stalin himself, but it certainly is not a substantial in-
tervention at the level of linguistic theorizing: it merely offers a number of lay 
observations about the postrevolutionary Russian language. Remarkably, Stalin’s 
view on language boils down to a form of bourgeois common sense: not only is it 
idealist, in wholly downplaying or ignoring any material aspects of the linguistic 
sign; it is also decidedly nondialectical, emphasizing the idea of harmonious lan-
guage communities over class conflict. Thus, these  views actually mark a signifi-
cant step back with respect to the more innovative Marxist authors of the 1920s, 
like Voloshinov and Polivanov. However, given the personality cult surrounding 
Stalin and the renewed campaign of intimidation and persecution of artists and 
intellectuals, which had regained pace after World War II, Stalin’s remarks were 
hailed as a major breakthrough in both the popular and the academic media of 
the Soviet Union. Countless scholars working in linguistics, ethnography, and 
archeology joined in the chorus against Marr. The fact that such criticism con-
tinued well after Stalin’s death in 1953, however, suggests that they did not simply 
write out of fear of, or political loyalty to, the Soviet leaders.28
 Some Gramscian conclusions
The above discussion of Marr’s anti-philological theories and of the Soviet na-
tivization of the Kurds considerably complicate Gourgouris’s and Nichanian’s 
identification of philology and Orientalism, as well as their claim that the crea-
tion of non-Western native peoples involves an internalized Orientalism. At the 
very least, it forces us to explore ‘subaltern’ forms of knowledge like Marr’s and 
Trubetzkoy’s theories alongside the allegedly hegemonic German historical-com-
parative philology, and to focus on local agency and resistance rather than on the 
passive ‘internalization’ of Orientalist ideologies. Thus, the case of the Russian 
and Soviet humanities – which merits a far more extended and systematic de-
scriptive treatment than I could give here – also raises issues of a more general 
theoretical interest.
First, it forces us to ask exactly how and why particular categories and theories 
gained a dominant or hegemonic status. To get an answer to such questions, one 
should also look at ‘subaltern’ doctrines like Marr’s and at the reasons for their 
success or failure. Intriguingly, despite its vocal rejection of the main tenets of 
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German philological scholarship, Marr himself reproduced crucial conceptual 
and methodological assumptions of German philology; conversely and ironically, 
later critics of Marr’s work, even when rejecting his Japhetic theories as nonsensi-
cal or at best purely speculative, tend to praise his philological work on the gram-
mar of languages like Georgian and Armenian, as well as his archeological work 
in the Ani area, as valuable and largely correct, and as untainted by his linguistic 
speculations. In doing so, they tend to reproduce the philological assumption of a 
foundational and theory-free level of factuality that should precisely be an object 
of investigation. It is here that arguments like those of Foucault, Gourgouris and 
Nichanian, if used with caution, can perform valuable services.
Second, it raises questions about language, nationalism, and hegemony. Pri-
marily, of course, the capricious development of Soviet linguistics and Oriental-
ism reflects the destructive – and often murderous – vagaries of Stalin’s policies; 
but theoretically one is led to the deeper problems of the precise role of language 
in the rise of Soviet and other nationalisms, and of the theoretical status of lan-
guage in Marxist theory. Regarding the former, one may venture the hypothesis 
that the public use of vernacular languages, as seen in early Soviet educational 
campaigns and broadcasting policies, may itself be partly constitutive of national 
identities. Regarding the latter, one may ask anew exactly where language fits 
in within Marxist theory: should it be relegated to either the material base or 
the ideological superstructure, or does it require a more radical reformulation of 
Marxist cultural theory?
Third, in this context of language, linguistic theory and nationalism, Gramsci’s 
writings on hegemony gain an unexpected relevance. Not only was Gramsci one 
of the first authors to suggest that a closer attention to cultural factors may force 
us to rethink the classical Marxist distinction between base and superstructure; 
but it is also worth recalling that his concept of hegemony is, in origin, inspired 
by specifically linguistic phenomena: thus, the creation of a hegemonic national 
language, i.e., a linguistic standard accepted by the population at large, reduces 
the spoken dialects to a substandard, or subaltern, status.29
The above not only suggests that a greater attention to language will affect the 
Marxist opposition between base and superstructure; it also invites a linguistic 
turn, so to speak, to questions of ideological hegemony, especially (but not ex-
clusively) as they appear in discussions of Orientalism. The virtually universal 
spread of vocabularies and methods of the modern European humanities, and 
their persistence even among apparently rival frameworks like Marr’s Japhetic 
theory, suggests that the kinds of knowledge articulated in the modern philologi-
cal humanities rest on very particular, and particularly powerful, practices and 
ideologies of language, which may be implicated less in the spread of any allegedly 
hegemonic Western philological Orientalism than in the performative power ef-
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fects of the wider patterns of vernacularization that occur during this period.30 
These power effects remain a topic for theoretical exploration.
Fourth and finally, the Soviet experience provides suggestive material for any-
one wishing to study the role of the humanities in the articulation of nationalism 
and empire. If arguments like Gourgouris’s and Nichanian’s hold, the Orientalist 
creation of an (Oriental or domestic) Other may be crucially linked to the na-
tionalist creation of a native self. Perhaps, then, a greater attention to cases like 
that of the Soviet Union may ultimately lead to a dissolution of  ‘Orientalism’ as a 
distinct analytical category into a more general theoretical framework formulated 
in terms of more general analytical notions like new disciplines of philological 
learning, specifically modern forms of power, and changing practices and ideolo-
gies of language. As such, it might even help to explain both the formation and 
persistence of national identities and the rise and demise of colonial forms of rule.
 Notes
1 Cf. R. Bauman & Ch. Briggs, Voices of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); Joep Leerssen, National Thought in Europe (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Uni-
versity Press, 2007). 
2 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
3 To mention but two examples, both dealing with the alleged spread of hegemonic Western 
norms of sexuality in the Arab world, see Khalid al-Rouayheb, Before Homosexuality in 
the Arab World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) and Joseph Massad, Desiring 
Arabs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); cf. my discussion of the latter, ‘Der 
Import des westlichen Sexualitätsmodells’, Inamo 52 (2008), 20-22.
4 For German Orientalism, see in particular Suzanne L. Marchand, German Orientalism 
in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). For a brief discussion of earlier criticisms of Said’s thesis along these lines, 
see also my ‘The Oriental origins of Orientalism: The Case of Dimitrie Cantemir’, in R. 
Bod et al. (eds.), The Making of the Humanities, Vol. II: From Early Modern to Modern 
Disciplines (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 243-263.
5 Stathis Gourgouris, Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization and the Institution of 
Modern Greece (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Marc Nichanian, Entre l’art et 
le témoignage, Littératures arméniennes au xxe siècle, vol. 2: Le deuil de la philologie (Geneva: 
MêtisPresses, 2007). 
6 Gourgouris, Dream Nation, 124; emphasis in original.
7 Nichanian, Le deuil de la philologie, ch. 3, esp. 110.
8 Ibid., 15-17; see also Nichanian’s earlier Ages et usages de la langue arménienne (Paris: 
Éditions entente, 1989). Foucault, astonishingly perhaps, nowhere in Les mots et les choses 
or elsewhere discusses either the nationalistic or the colonial projects in which philology 
in general, and Orientalism in particular, were implicated, except for a brief allusion on 
p. 303 of that work; I hope to discuss these matters in more detail on some future occa-
sion. Benedict Anderson’s oft-cited account of the rise of modern nationalism, Imagined 
Communities, 2nd ed. (New York and London: Verso Press, 1991), suffers from an overly 
111Soviet Orientalism and Subaltern Linguistics
functionalist approach to language, and ignores the literary and philological dimensions 
of nationalist modernity. See in particular Michael Silverstein, ‘Whorfianism and the Lin-
guistic Imagination of Nationality’, in Kroskrity (ed.), Regimes of Language (Santa Fe, 
NM: School of American Research Press, 2000), 85-138.
9 Nichanian, Le deuil de la philologie, 19. For the sake of brevity, I ignore here Nichanian’s 
point, crucial to his own arguments concerning twentieth-century Armenian literature, 
that the philological reconstruction of the past as irrevocably past is inherently linked to 
a sense of loss or mourning, but misrecognizes this mourning, in its nationalist project of 
constituting a native population and culture.
10 Vera Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late 
Imperial and Early Soviet Periods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. 100-101. 
Cf. David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind 
from Peter the Great to the Emigration (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2010). See also Anouar Abdel-Malek, ‘Orientalism in Crisis’, Diogenes 11 (1963), 103-140.
11 N.S. Trubetzkoy, Grundzüge der Phonologie (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977 
[1939]); for Trubetzkoy’s Eurasian views, see his ‘Europe and Mankind’, in The Legacy of 
Genghis Khan (Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991), 1-64.
12 N.S. Trubetzkoy, ‘Thoughts on the Indo-European Problem’, in Studies in General Lin-
guistics and Language Structure (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 87-98.
13 Relatively few of Marr’s numerous writings have been translated into Western languages. 
For a brief statement of the Japhetic theory, see his Der japhetische Kaukasus und das 
dritte etnische Element im Bildungsprozess der mittelländischen Kultur (Stuttgart: Kohl-
hammer, 1923). For a – very critical – overview of Marr’s academic merits as a linguist, 
see Lawrence Thomas, The Linguistic Theories of N.Ja. Marr (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1957); see also Thomas Samuelian, The Search for a Marxist Linguistics 
in the Soviet Union, 1917-1950 (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1981).
14 Samuelian, The Search for a Marxist Linguistics, 114.
15 Cf., e.g., J.P. Mallory, In Search of the Indo-Europeans: Language, Archaeology, and Myth 
(London: Thames & Hudson 1989), esp. 266-270, for Hübschmann’s assumptions about 
Aryan superiority; cf. Thomas, The Linguistic Theories of N.Ja. Marr, 18. 
16 N. Ja. Marr, Grammatika drevnearmjanskogo jazyka [Grammar of the Ancient Armenian 
Language] (Petersburg, 1903), xxxi.
17 Ibid., xxx-xxxi. Nichanian, Le deuil de la philologie, 131, only mentions Marr in passing, 
erroneously identifying him as ‘a Russian’; his overview of the Armenian language ig-
nores Marr altogether, but does mention a likely source of some of Marr’s doctrines, viz., 
Aydenian’s thesis of a ‘classical’ and a ‘vernacular’ variety of Armenian existing alongside 
each other ever since the fifth century CE, a claim originally developed in the latter’s 1866 
Critical Grammar of Modern Armenian (cf. Nichanian, Ages et usages de la langue arméni-
enne, 95). 
18 Cf. Samuelian, The Search for a Marxist Linguistics, 120.
19 N.Ja. Marr, ‘Ob izuchenii azerbaidzhana’ (unpublished lectures, Baku 1924), quoted in 
Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient, 152-153.
20 Quoted in Samuelian, The Search for a Marxist Linguistics, 106. See also Marr’s later La 
langue géorgienne (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1931), which is completely free from any Japhetic 
speculation (reportedly, at the insistence of Marr’s French hosts), and is praised as a valid 
contribution to Georgian philology even today.
21 Trubetzkoy, ‘Thoughts on the Indo-European Problem’, 266n. 
22 Cf. Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient, 165.
112 Michiel Leezenberg
23 J. Stalin, ‘Marksizm i natsional’nyy vopros’, Prosveshcheniye 3-5 (March-May 1913). Eng-
lish translation available via URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/
works/1913/03.htm. 
24 V.N. Volosinov, Marksizm i filosofija jazyk (Leningrad, 1930), translated as Marxism and 
the Philosophy of Language (New York: Seminar Press, 1973); E.D. Polivanov, ‘The Prob-
lem of Marxist Linguistics and the Japhetic Theory’, in A.A. Leontov (ed.), E.D. Poliva-
nov: Selected Works: Articles on General Linguistics (The Hague: Mouton, 1974). 
25 For an initial overview of Russian and Soviet Kurdology, see my ‘Soviet Kurdology and 
Kurdish Orientalism’, in M. Kemper and S. Conemann (eds.), The Heritage of Soviet Ori-
ental Studies (London: Routledge, 2011), 86-102; for a more detailed discussion of de-
velopments in 1920s and 1930s Soviet Armenia, see my ‘A People Forgotten by History: 
Soviet Studies of the Kurds’, paper presented at the International Conference on Soviet 
Iranology, Oxford University, December 2012. 
26 Marr wrote relatively little on the Kurds; see in particular his early ‘Eshcho o slove Celebi’ 
[Again Concerning the Word Çelebi], Zapiski vostocnogo otdeleniia imp. Russkago arkheo-
logiceskago obscestva 20 (1911), 99-151, a speculative discussion of the etymology of the 
term çelebi. For a hyperbolic appraisal of Marr’s importance for Soviet Kurdish studies, 
characteristic for its period and published shortly after Marr’s death in a special com-
memorative journal issue, see O. Vil’cevskij, ‘N. Ia. Marr i kurdovedenie’ [N. Ia. Marr and 
Kurdology], Yazyk i Myslenie VIII (1937), 209-234.
27 J. Stalin, ‘Marksizm i voprosy yazyznaniia’, Pravda ( June 20, 1950). English translation avail-
able via URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1950/jun/20.
htm. 
28 Among authors working on the Kurds, one may find critiques of Marr’s Japhetic theory 
later in the 1950s and 1960s; see, e.g., Q. Kurdoev, ‘Kritika oshibocnykh vzgliadov na 
kurdskii yazyk’ [Critique of Erroneous Opinions on the Kurdish Language], Kratkie 
soobsceniia Instituta vostokovedeniia 12 (1955), 43-61. See also the discussions of Marr 
in O. Vil’cevskij, Kurdy: Vvedenie v etniceskuiu istoriiu kurdskogo naroda [The Kurds: In-
troduction to the Ethnic History of the Kurdish People] (Moscow: Akademija Nauka, 
1961), passim.
29 The linguistic origins of the concept of hegemony are discussed in Franco Lo Piparo, Lin-
gua intellettuali egemonia in Gramsci (Rome: Laterza, 1979: 103-145), and more recently 
in Peter Ives, Language and hegemony in Gramsci (London: Pluto Press, 2004: ch. 2). 
30 I explore these wider patterns of vernacularization and their significance in my forthcom-
ing From Coffee House to Nation-State: The Creation of National Languages in the Ottoman 
Empire.
2.3 Root and Recursive Patterns in the Czuczor-
Fogarasi Dictionary of the Hungarian Language1
László Marácz
The first academic Hungarian dictionary A magyar nyelv szótára (The Dictionary 
of the Hungarian Language) was a monumental work compiled by two members 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: Gergely Czuczor (1800-1866) and János 
Fogarasi (1801-1878) that was published in six volumes between 1862 and 1874 
[Figs. 2 and 3]. Rather than just being a list of Hungarian words, Czuczor-Foga-
rasi’s monolingual dictionary (hereafter, the CzF Dictionary) must be considered 
a linguistic achievement. It contains 110,784 entries and is structured according 
to the agglutinative nature of the Hungarian language since it distinguishes roots 
and suffixes while also referring to interconnections within the root system. Its 
importance was recognized by one of the leading German linguists of the second 
half of the nineteenth century, August Friedrich Pott (1802-1887), who referred 
in his survey of European linguistics to the CzF Dictionary as an outstanding ac-
complishment on the part of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.2
Czuczor and Fogarasi formulated the following four objectives when writing 
their dictionary: (1) to make an inventory of Hungarian words and word parts; 
(2) to determine their grammatical properties; (3) to define their meaning; and 
(4) to establish the etymology of Hungarian words by comparing the Hungarian 
roots with those of other languages. The CzF Dictionary is thus an explanatory, 
comparative and etymological dictionary all in one. From this point of view it is 
remarkable that the work has fallen into oblivion.3 By uncovering the patterns 
of the Hungarian lexicon, the CzF Dictionary provided an interesting step for-
ward in empirical and theoretical approaches to the Hungarian language. In this 
respect the CzF Dictionary is also relevant to Rens Bod’s project detailing the 
history of the humanities in according with various patterns and rules.4 The pres-
ent paper will argue that a discussion of the patterns and rules seen in the CzF 
Dictionary can contribute to the richness of such a historiographical project and 
that there is therefore every reason to include such a dictionary in a history of the 
humanities based on pattern-seeking research.
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The present paper falls into four parts. In the first part, I will discuss the ideas 
that were responsible for creating a context for the emergence of the academic 
dictionary project. I shall demonstrate how it was attributable to a mixture of 
ideas originating from the Enlightenment, state-forming nationalism and Ro-
manticism. The second part of the paper will focus on the incentives behind the 
lexical project’s linguistic research. I will furthermore elaborate on the linguistic 
traditions the authors relied on when seeking patterns and will argue that both 
foreign and local traditions played a decisive role. The third part of this paper will 
give the reader some insight into the nature of the patterns and rules underlying 
the Hungarian language. Finally, I will assess the discoveries made by Czuczor 
and Fogarasi. It will be concluded that even if the work on the dictionary is basi-
cally empirical it remains a good starting point for pattern-based research into 
Hungarian lexical structures.
 Contextualizing the first Hungarian academic dictionary
At the end of the eighteenth century the ideals of the Enlightenment also reached 
Hungary. At first the Hungarian proponents of the Enlightenment were more active 
in Vienna than in Hungary itself, especially in circles linked to the Hungarian divi-
sion of the Imperial Guard that was established in 1760 by the Habsburg Empress 
Maria Theresa. The driving force within the Viennese nobility was György Besse-
nyei (1747-1811), a literator and admirer of Voltaire and the French encyclopedists.5
 Fig. 2: Gergely Czuczor (1800-1866)  Fig. 3: János Fogarasi (1801-1878)
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Bessenyei was convinced, just like his French counterparts, that happiness 
could only be achieved through the sciences, general access to which was only 
possible through one’s own mother tongue. According to him, no nation had ever 
gained access to science in the language of another nation. However, toward the 
end of the eighteenth century the Hungarian language had gained vernacular 
status, Latin being the only official language in the country until 1844 and so 
Hungarian was not a suitable language for the practicing of science. In his essays, 
Bessenyei forcefully argued in favor of the renewal and social promotion of the 
Hungarian language. In 1781 he also launched the idea of establishing a Hungar-
ian academy of sciences.6 The ideas of Bessenyei were adopted by a young mem-
ber of the high aristocracy who also belonged to the Viennese Imperial Guard, 
Count István Széchenyi (1791-1860).
The free-thinking Széchenyi and other enlightened Hungarian noblemen 
strove to modernize Hungary and give it a well-deserved place in the Habsburg 
Empire. Széchenyi’s modernization program focused not only on questions relat-
ing to politics and society, but also on putting cultural issues on the agenda. In 
this cultural program, the Hungarian language occupied a central role.7 Széche-
nyi wanted to secure the same status for the Hungarian language as that enjoyed 
by other national European languages. Hungarian should become the country’s 
official language and in order to prepare for this official function a Hungarian 
academy of sciences had to be established, just as Bessenyei had asserted.
In 1825, Széchenyi enthusiastically put forward his ideas at the Hungarian 
Diet.8 Thanks to his efforts, and financial support, the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences was established on November 17, 1830. The Academy immediately 
launched a number of projects relating to the Hungarian language, including the 
compilation of a grammar, an orthography, bilingual dictionaries and specialist 
dictionaries establishing scientific and scholarly terminology. In 1844 the Acad-
emy board decided to make a ‘great’ dictionary covering the entire lexicon of the 
Hungarian language. Two members of the Academy, Gergely Czuczor (1800-
1866) and János Fogarasi (1801-1878), were entrusted with this task. Gergely 
Czuczor was a monk of the Benedictine Order and János Fogarasi worked as a 
judge in the High Court of Appeal.
Apart from the ideas originating from the Enlightenment and nationalism, 
the language renewal movement in Hungary was also influenced by Romantic 
views. Hungarians strongly believed that they were related to ancient Central 
Asian peoples, like the Huns and Avars who, like the Hungarians themselves, 
had entered Europe in the ninth century. Széchenyi and his followers were of the 
opinion that the most important duty of the Hungarians was to gain an identity 
as a people in Europe that stemmed from Asia: ‘The Hungarian people, being the 
only European heterogenic offspring, have no smaller role than to represent the 
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unique talents which were hidden in the cradle in Asia, but never grew to frui-
tion’.9 This led researchers to believe that the Hungarian language was an Asiatic 
language which thus had an impact on the research conducted into the roots of 
the Hungarian language.
At the time, the West paid little attention to Hungarian political and eco-
nomic reforms and knew little about the research being undertaken by Széchenyi 
and his group. There was one exception, however. Besides being a businessman, 
traveler, liberal politician, government official and governor of Hong Kong be-
tween 1851 and 1859, the British citizen Sir John Bowring (1792-1872) was also a 
polyglot literator, who supported the emerging national movements in Europe by 
publishing anthologies of their literature.10 Early-nineteenth-century Hungary 
must have held some special attraction for the British traveler. Indeed, Hungary 
followed Great Britain in the liberal trend of political and economic reforms that 
Bowring enthusiastically supported. In addition, Bowring was a member of the 
Unitarian Church which was one of the Hungarian Protestant churches that 
played an important role in Hungary’s and Transylvania’s religious life.
In 1830, Bowring published a collection of Hungarian poems in English, Poetry 
of the Magyars, in the foreword of which one reads some notable statements con-
cerning the Hungarian language.11 There Bowring commented on the Hungarian 
language. In his opinion, the Hungarian language was independent and very old.12 
Having hardly changed over time, it had retained its Asiatic structure.13 Finally, 
Bowring claimed that the ancient forms of the Hungarian language, that is to say 
its root words, were composed of simple, monosyllabic lexical elements. These 
elements enabled the speakers of Hungarian to create an endless number of new 
lexical elements with the help of affixes.14
Bowring’s remarks about the Hungarian language are especially worthy of con-
sideration in view of the fact that they elaborate on linguistic theories developed 
in Hungary itself. In the Poetry of the Magyars, Bowring echoes the opinions that 
Széchenyi and his group held in the 1820s. Bowring’s knowledge of the Hungar-
ian language and literature came mostly from Gábor Döbrentei (1786-1851), the 
First Secretary of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences with whom he maintained 
close contact. Döbrentei belonged to Széchenyi’s inner circle and was his most 
influential advisor in the fields of Hungarian language and literature.15
The dictionary project of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences was interrupted 
by the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. Czuzcor was even incarcerated in Kufstein 
Prison from 1849 until 1851 for his anti-imperial activism. After the crushing of 
the Hungarian rebellion by the Austrian and Russian armies the Hungarians 
had to remain under Habsburg rule. Martial law was proclaimed and Hungary 
started being governed from Vienna. Under this rule, strong Germanizing poli-
tics prevailed throughout the country. Moreover, in 1858, a plan was proposed to 
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make German the official language of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The 
Academy’s directorate was replaced by scholars who were loyal to the Austrians, 
like Pál Hunfalvy (1810-1891), a lawyer who, in 1851, became the chief librarian at 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. His main task was, however, to reorganize 
the research being conducted into the Hungarian language.
Immediately after his Academy nomination in 1851, Hunfalvy started to attack 
the dictionary project of Czuzcor and Fogarasi. At an Academy meeting in 1851 he 
argued that from a methodological point of view the dictionary was inadequate 
and obsolete: ‘The sheer cliffs into which language research runs are mainly the 
meaning of letters and word roots’.16 Although Czuczor and Fogarasi were al-
lowed to finish their project, which finally went on to be published between 1862 
and 1874, the CzF Dictionary did not play any role in the domain of etymological 
and historical comparative research into the Hungarian language.17
Hunfalvy pushed hard to elaborate on a one-sided genetic relationship be-
tween Finnish and Hungarian and cast Czuzcor-Fogarasi’s root theory to one 
side. He entrusted the technical completion of this program to a young German 
linguist, Josef Budenz (1836-1892) who at the age of twenty-two was invited to go 
to Budapest to fulfill that task. Budenz was well equipped to do the job. He had 
read classical languages at the University of Göttingen and had also done com-
parative Indo-Germanic linguistics and Oriental studies. In 1868, when Budenz 
was made Honorary Professor of Finno-Ugric Linguistics at the University of 
Budapest, Hungarian genealogical language research suddenly took a completely 
different turn moving in a direction completely different to what the authors of 
the Academy Dictionary had had in mind.18 Although today’s Hungarian linguis-
tics specialists are more positive about the achievements of the CzF Dictionary 
and regard it as a standard work in the history of the lexicography of the Hungar-
ian language, internal analysis linked to finding the origin of words is still viewed 
as something ‘anachronistic’.19 In this paper, I will argue against this point of view.
 Searching for roots
The direct input regarding the linguistic work on the root dictionary originated 
from two important traditions. First of all, there were the developments in Eu-
ropean linguistics of the end of the eighteenth century. The first to publicize, al-
though certainly not the first to formulate the notion of Sanskrit being the oldest 
language on earth, the ‘mother’ of all major Eurasian languages, was the British 
philologist and scholar on ancient India, Sir William Jones.20 Hence, Sanskrit 
was considered to be the ancient Indo-European language from which all other 
Indo-European languages derived. Jones’ program was taken up in Germany and 
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soon intensive research activities in this field began. Throughout the nineteenth 
century outstanding linguists, such as Franz Bopp (1791-1867), Jacob Grimm 
(1785-1863), Max Müller (1823-1900), and August Friedrich Pott elaborated on 
this research program.21 At first German linguists hypothesized that the ancient 
roots of the German language could be found in Sanskrit with the help of lin-
guistic ‘reconstruction’. However, from 1870 onwards the importance of Sanskrit 
in reconstructing Indo-European gradually declined.22
Regardless of the precise results what this research was generally to do was to 
bring to the surface the different cognate roots connecting the Indo-European 
languages.23 Max Müller, a German philologist and Oriental scholar who lectured 
at Oxford University, estimated the number of Sanskrit roots to lie at 1700 and 
considered them to be the most important linguistic components:24 ‘These roots 
are definite in form and meaning: they are what I called phonetic types, firm in 
their outline, though still liable to important modifications’.25 ‘They are the “spe-
cific centres” of language, and without them the science of language would be 
impossible’.26 Note that Indo-European research was also driven by notions of 
Romanticism that were framed in biological metaphors, such as ‘language as an 
organism’, ‘mother-daughter languages’, ‘family of languages’ and other biological 
metaphors, like ‘roots’, ‘trunks’, ‘trees’, ‘organic groups’, etc.27
The German research into roots that commenced at the end of the eighteenth 
and intensified in the early nineteenth century was soon to catch on in Hungary. 
The first dictionary that was organized along the lines of the ‘root’ idea was pub-
lished by the Catholic priest Ferenc Kresznerics (1766-1832) in two-volumes in 
1831 and 1832.28 He was influenced by the theories of Johann Gottfried Herder 
(1744-1803) on ‘roots’ (Stammwörter) expounded in his ‘Abhandlung über den Ur-
sprung der Sprache’ (1772), as Kresznerics alludes to this influential work term-
ing it a point of reference in the preface to his dictionary.29 Kresznerics already 
started to work on the dictionary in 1808 and his point of departure was that 
Hungarian is an agglutinative language in which roots can be distinguished from 
suffixes and other affixes. Hence, under each root entry the total set of ‘deriva-
tives’, i.e., the roots with all their possible affixes and suffixes are listed. Czuzcor 
and Fogarasi saw Kresznerics’s dictionary as a forerunner, although they went on 
to considerably elaborate on the subject as will be discussed below.30 Much of the 
nomenclature referred to above in connection with Indo-European research also 
appears in the context of Czuzcor and Fogarasi’s dictionary project.
Apart from the European linguistic impulses that reached Hungary at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century, especially from Germany, which had taken 
the lead in linguistics, there was a second more local tradition that was influenc-
ing the evolution of Hungarian linguistics in that period. This input was also 
European-based.
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From the mid-seventeenth century onwards, Hungarian university students 
had been visiting Western European universities in the course of their academic 
formation. At that period there were few opportunities for university education 
in Hungary. The Habsburgs were not eager to actively support the establishment 
of academic opportunities in the Hungarian kingdom. Hungarian Protestants, 
who formed an obstacle to the Catholic Counter-Reformation which was sup-
ported by the Habsburgs, were excluded from university education in particular. 
Students with a Protestant background were therefore more or less forced to go 
abroad for their academic studies. They traveled to Western Europe, where they 
were welcomed at universities in Protestant countries like the Netherlands, Swit-
zerland and Britain. In the early modern period these universities became centers 
of peregrination for students from the Hungarian kingdom.
It appears from the publications of the peregrinating Hungarian students 
that they were familiar with the concept of the ‘radix’ (root) that was central to 
the analysis of classical languages like Greek, Latin and Hebrew. Most of these 
students had studied these languages because they had registered for theological 
studies. The radix is relevant to the work of the typographer Miklós Tótfalusi 
Kis (1650-1702), the translator of the ‘Amsterdam Bible’, a Hungarian-language 
edition that was published in Amsterdam in 1685. The Hungarian author Gyula 
Csernátoni points out that Tótfalusi Kis relied heavily on the ‘root’ for his Hun-
garian translation of the Bible: ‘When he explains the description of individual 
words he analyzes them grammatically; he tracks down their roots; and he ex-
amines the nature of the suffixes and affixes and gives general rules’.31 The radix 
is also frequently referred to in the dissertation on ancient Hungarian history 
of Fóris Ferenc Otrokócsi (1648-1718) that was defended at the University of 
Franeker in 1693.32
György Kalmár (1726-1782), a Hungarian theologian, linguist and poet who, in 
the second half of the eighteenth century, played an important part in developing 
Hungarian linguistics based on the radix (root) theory, also followed in this tradi-
tion. As a peregrination student, Kalmár visited a number of important centers of 
academic excellence in Western Europe, such as Universities of Oxford and Lei-
den. After his peregrination, he continued traveling in Western Europe and built 
up an extensive network of connections among scholars, including the outstand-
ing German-Swiss scientist Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777) and the Dutch 
Orientalist and professor at the University of Leiden, Hendrik Albert Schultens 
(1749-1782). From his linguistic projects, it appears that he was well aware of the 
importance of the radix or the root when studying language. Note that the ‘Se-
mitic’ root does not have the same characteristics as the ‘Indo-European’ root. It 
remains to be seen how scholars such as Kalmár interpreted these divergent no-
tions. Kalmár’s linguistics projects included a proposal for a universal language, a 
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hexameter poem and a grammar in Hebrew.33 A plan for an etymological Hungar-
ian dictionary was also one of his project plans but Kalmár’s etymological diction-
ary was lost. However, we know that it really existed because he refers to it as 
‘Lexicon Hungaricum’ and to its having the explicit character of a root dictionary.34
The concept of linguistic roots was clearly an integral part of Hungarian sci-
entific discourse in the early nineteenth century before the issue received further 
impetus from Germany. The success of the Kresznerics’s first attempt to compile 
a root dictionary was taken up by the newly established Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences which then passed the project on to Czuzcor and Fogarasi and so the 
CzF Dictionary was born.
 Patterns in the CzF Dictionary
Czuczor and Fogarasi assumed that Hungarian is an agglutinative language in 
which words display a synthetic structure consisting of a gyök ‘root’, the basic 
constituent of the Hungarian lexicon and suffixes attached to it. In order to find 
the root, a procedure of morphological segmentation comparable to Bopp’s Zer-
gliederung had to be first applied.35 Roots are those lexical items which, after hav-
ing been peeled off all the affixes and suffixes from the word structure, cannot 
be reduced into further segments without losing their well-identified phonetic 
structure and meaning.36 According to Czuzcor and Fogarasi, the Hungarian 
roots are minimal, monosyllabic lexical elements. Subsets of these roots can also 
appear as independent words, or ‘root words’. The dictionary presents an exhaus-
tive list of the Hungarian roots numbering some 2000 lexical items that display 
the following basic patterns, including V (19), VC (335), CV (146), and CVC 
(1500). Observe that the tryadic roots form the dominant pattern in Hungarian 
with 1500, that is 75% of the total number of roots.
A number of suffixes can be attached to the basic set of roots to form many 
new words, to form what are termed derivatives. According to Czuzcor and Foga-
rasi, the Hungarian language distinguishes around 170 suffixes. Seventy of these 
are simple and monosyllabic, the rest are a combination of the simple ones yield-
ing complex suffixes. Regularly, the Hungarian root does not change its form 
when being suffixed. Normally, after isolating the root by taking off the agglu-
tinated material (predominantly suffixes), the root will show a well-identified 
phonetic structure and meaning in its own right. Compare, for example, some of 
the derived forms of the root word KÖR ‘circle’:
(1) KÖR: KÖR ‘circle’, KÖR-ös ‘circular’, KÖR-öz ‘turn around in circles’, 
KÖR-ny-ék ‘environment, neighborhood’, KÖR-ny-ez ‘surround’
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As can be noted from (1) the root KÖR figures in derived words: ‘körös’, ‘köröz’, 
‘környék’ and ‘környez’. Note that the adjectival suffix -ös, the nominal suffix 
-nyék, and the verbal suffixes -öz and -ez can be attached to the root KÖR or to 
one of its respective derivatives. The derivatives of the root modify, accentuate, 
highlight or focus on an aspect of the basic meaning. In most of the cases, how-
ever, these meanings, discussed in the CzF Dictionary only in Hungarian, cannot 
easily and satisfactorily be translated into English due to the subtle connotations 
that Hungarian suffixes add to the core meaning.
Czuczor and Fogarasi further observe that by vocalizing the K-R consonant 
frame with other vowels, like A, E, O, U, and Ü new K-R root alternatives can 
be generated. With the help of suffixing these structures yield their own set of 
derivatives.37 Compare:
 (2) KAR: KAR ‘arm’, KAR-aj ‘(pork)chop’ , KAR-éj ‘slice’, KAR-ika ‘ring’ , 
KAR-ima ‘brim’, KAR-ing ‘make small movements in circles’
KER: KER-ek ‘rounded’, KER-ék ‘wheel’, KER-ül ‘to go around’, KER-ít ‘to 
ring around’, KER-ing ‘keep circling around’, KER-ge ‘bark (tree)’
KOR: KOR-ong ‘disk’, KOR-ona ‘crown’, KOR-lát ‘fence’, KOR-mány 
‘wheel’
KUR: KUR-kál ‘search around’
KÜR: KÜR-t ‘horn’
Czuczor and Fogarasi refer to the ‘horizontal’ groupings as szócsalád ‘word family’ 
and collectively to the set of all the cognates with their derived forms as szónemzet, 
i.e., ‘word nation’. Note that in this ‘organic’ word group a fixed K-R sound pat-
tern corresponds to a conceptual structure, a semantic field covering ‘a line that is 
curved into itself or a motion that follows such a line’.
The authors of the CzF Dictionary discovered not only interconnected, vocalized 
root patterns but also connections between roots. These connections result in 
new clusters of roots used to express a common idea.38 Compare:
(3) GÖR: GÖR-be ‘curvilinear’, GÖR-cs ‘round, hard knot on tree’, 
GÖR-dül ‘roll (intransitive)’, GÖR-dít ‘roll (a heavy object)’, GÖR-
nyed ‘bend (as in old age)’, GÖR-hes ‘person who is bent, rugged’ 
(4) GUR: GUR-ba ‘used together with GÖR-be as the twin word görbe-gur-
ba meaning ‘curvilinear’, GUR-ul ‘roll (intransitive)’, GUR-ít ‘roll (a round 
object smoothly)’, GUR-iga ‘round, wooden toy for children to play with, 
they roll it’
(5) GOR: GOR-nyad ‘droop’
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(6) GYÜR: GYÜR-ű ‘ring’, GYÜR-ke ‘crust (of bread)’, GYÜR-emlik 
‘crumbled cloths, wrinkles’ (‘Gy’ is the orthographic sign of a palatalized ‘d’ 
sound, i.e., ‘dj’ in Hungarian.)
(7) HOR: HOR-og ‘hook’, HOR-ony ‘hollow dent’, HOR-gas ‘hooked’, 
HOR-gadt ‘curved’, HOR-paszt ‘dent’
Note that ‘K’ in the K-R frame is related to the ‘G’ in the G-R frame which is then 
again vocalized with ‘Ö’, ‘U’ and ‘O’ to yield various alternatives in (3) to (5); the 
‘G’ in its turn is related to the ‘DJ’ in the DJ-R frame and to the ‘H’ in the H-R 
frame. The plosives ‘K’, ‘G’ and ‘DJ’ are related sounds that can be transformed 
into a fricative ‘H’. Note that such phonetic changes mimic the sound laws of 
Grimm thereby bearing out the diachronic divergences in Indo-European lan-
guages. Czuzcor and Fogarasi did refer to the Grimm brothers’ achievements in 
lexicography but failed to mention their linguistic work.39
To conclude, Czuczor and Fogarasi observed the following patterns and rules:
(8)
1. A set of monosyllabic roots and suffixes in Hungarian
2. A rule of vocalization connecting roots
3. Agglutination connecting roots and suffixes
4. Application of (2) and (3) yield recursive patterns
5. Roots can also be connected by ‘sound law-types’ of rules
6. A close connection between a specific basic sound pattern and a core meaning
 Discussion and outlook
Let us compare the Kresznerics Dictionary with the CzF Dictionary in order to 
determine the progress made. The Kresznerics Dictionary is a more empirical 
and less theoretically inspired dictionary in which only organic groupings are 
listed. Due to the interconnections Czuzcor-Fogarasi’s dictionary has more the 
structure of a reference dictionary. Under each root entry the interconnections 
within the dictionary are given as well. This yields a much more coherent struc-
ture of sound patterning and core meanings. Kresznerics only operated with 8(1) 
and 8(3). The interconnections within the root system, either by means of vocali-
zation 8(2) or through the ‘sound law-type rules’ 8(5) are lacking in his diction-
ary. As a result, he also missed the important correlation 8(6), the relationship 
between a specific sound structure and a core meaning. Czuzcor and Fogarasi 
went well beyond the simple concepts of basic primitives and the rule of aggluti-
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nation. Progress was made because Czuzcor and Fogarasi were searching for new 
patterns and rules. Note that this fits in well with Bod’s approach to writing a 
history of the humanities in terms of patterns. The CzF dictionary provides clear 
support for such an approach on the basis of pattern-seeking.40
Although in theoretical writings, Czuzcor and Fogarasi operated with levels of 
abstraction, by giving, for instance, the consonant frames with open positions for 
vowels, the K-R frame discussed above being a representative example, they dis-
played a predominantly empiricist attitude.41 Nevertheless the patterns and rules 
detected by Czuzcor and Fogarasi are impressive and open up the possibility for 
further formalizations, although it must be admitted that some of the rules listed 
in (8) are not always well understood and require much more research.
Marácz and Montvai is a first attempt to formalize rules like 8(5).42 Such rules 
have to comply with morphophonological and semantic conditions and obey the 
formation rules restricted on such grounds. Basic roots may be linked if and only 
if (i) they have a related meaning and (ii) only one of the two basic consonants is 
replaced, such as ‘G’ supplanting ‘K’ in KÖR (1) and GUR (4). In this way, it can 
be guaranteed that the mappings are recoverable. Marácz and Montvai proposed 
the following context-sensitive rule linking ‘minimal pairs’ of roots:43
(9) Linking of roots: C(x)_C(y) > C(x)_C(z) or C(z)_C(y),
in which all roots have a related meaning.
Formalizations like (9) and the embeddings in the theoretical frameworks of the 
CzF Dictionary patterns are crucial to making further progress. In recent years, 
dictionaries have been studied in terms of network theory. There is currently a 
true explosion of research in this field. What characterizes this research is its 
interdisciplinary nature and the fact that the study of language networks targets 
all the different modules of language, including also phonology, morphology and 
semantic-cognitive structures.44
The Czuzcor-Fogarasi Dictionary should be studied in conjunction with these 
theories of language networks and the basic topic of research in Hungarian and 
other agglutinative languages should not only operate at word-level but also at 
root-level. Indeed taking the root as a ‘hub’ will make it possible to carry out sig-
nificant lexical-statistical research. Different questions can then be posed relating 
to, for instance, the functional and distributional load of the individual roots in 
the Hungarian lexicon and the lexical-statistical distribution and load of indi-
vidual roots, such as K-R, across languages. Such typological patterns might also 
have some interesting repercussions for genealogical language research. Czuzcor 
and Fogarasi started to compare Hungarian roots with the roots of other lan-
guage families or groups. They were convinced that individual roots cross the 
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boundaries of established language families. Czuzcor and Fogarasi were in fact 
forerunners of the ‘one proto-language’ approach that figures on the ‘nostratic’ re-
search agenda. With modern digital resources these and related linguistic puzzles 
can be elaborated much more easily and effectively than in the time of Czuzcor 
and Fogarasi.
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3.1 A Domestic Culture
The Mise-en-scène of Modern Historiography
Jo Tollebeek
At the conclusion of her autobiographical sketch published a few years ago, the 
Italian historian Ilaria Porciani, living in Florence but working in Bologna, writes:
Like many Italian historians, I am a commuter. The saying that every Ital-
ian academic carries a train timetable could not be truer. The conversations 
which take place on Eurostars turn out to be a sort of extension of faculty 
or department meetings and [...] this is usually the right time not only to 
complain about the new reforms and shortage of money but also to discuss 
a new book or a project. [...]
 But I also think that I have also been a ‘passeur’ as the French would say: 
a traveller between different cultural traditions and countries. I have often 
missed the stability of a single school and a linear track. But I have enjoyed 
the much richer liberty of diverse approaches.
 Since I have spent and spend so much time commuting and travelling, 
maybe it will not come as a surprise that I started this contribution on a 
plane and that I have continued to write it – like others of my work – at 
least partly on trains: so mobile is our historians’ workshop nowadays.1
‘Self-Portrait of an Italian Historian as a Woman on the Train’ thus seems to 
end in a world of placeless scholarship, where the historian, forever on the move, 
contemplates reality on the basis of  ‘the view from nowhere’, to borrow the title 
of Thomas Nagel’s well-known book from 1989. In what follows, the mise-en-
scène of modern historiography will be central, and by extension the culture of 
the humanities that speaks from this mise-en-scène. Historiography, as we will 
see, underwent a clear process of self-localization in its first phase of profes-
sionalization, between 1870 and 1914. It was practiced at precisely identifiable 
places, in workshops with concrete, tangible practices. But just as Porciani’s mo-
bile workshop refers to a specific type of historiography – cosmopolitan, eclectic, 
130 Jo Tollebeek
open to innovation – so the workshops of the decades around 1900 also repre-
sent specific historiographical ideals. Hence the use of the term ‘mise-en-scène’: 
the discipline’s locations are not chosen by chance, and are not neutral, but are 
meaningful sites at which the production of knowledge – in this case historical 
knowledge – responds to or is supposed to respond to specific ambitions. They 
are real locations, but also counterlocations, and sometimes virtual locations, too, 
shaped by dreams whose conversion into reality lies in the future. Their culture 
defines modern historiography, and mutatis mutandis the other humanities dis-
ciplines, too – archeology, art history and musicology, literary studies, philology 
and linguistics, philosophy and theology. Even the mind has its fixed abode.
Three iconic places will be examined here: the attic room or garret of the uni-
versity building, the study in the professor’s home, and the laboratory. Together, 
they form the disciplinary landscape in which modern historiography took shape 
around 1900, a ‘geography of scientific knowledge’, in David Livingstone’s formu-
lation.2 In these garrets, studies and laboratories, historical research took shape, 
but what was more, a form of education was created there whose purpose was 
to make a nouvelle histoire possible. The web of meaning that was woven around 
these places was extensive: they were about a rejection of showmanship and a 
yearning for authenticity, about masculine detachment and family involvement, 
about prestige and progress, and above all about a desire for domesticity and the 
nostalgia that this ultimately entailed.
 The garret: The rhetoric of modesty
The historical discipline in the late nineteenth century underwent a process 
of transformation into a science and professionalization: it acquired a method 
and became a profession. These changes were coupled with academization. This 
meant that from around 1870 the universities – and no longer the societies, tra-
ditional academies or clubs – became the hauts lieux of the historical discipline, 
and that from then on, the tone in the profession was set by university profes-
sors. The situation was similar in the other humanities disciplines, too. It was 
not just that the number of professors grew in these disciplines: the universities 
also exerted a greater power of attraction in the subject. In literary studies, for 
example, writers and critics who not long before had denied the professors any 
say in literary questions sought to secure a university chair of their own after 
1900. At the same time, the university became a place of research: the profes-
sors increasingly started to focus on research, specializing and forming research 
groups or schools. In the natural sciences, this led to a new and powerful para-
digm: laboratory science.
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In the historical discipline, this research-oriented development assumed its 
most explicit form in – as is well-known – the seminar, which claimed a position 
alongside and opposite the traditional lecture.3 In the lecture, an overview of (part 
of ) the past was offered ex cathedra. This form of instruction did not disappear af-
ter 1900. It has indeed been pointed out recently how tedious the basis of many of 
these lectures was: the reading out of the same lecture notes time and time again.4 
The seminars offered an alternative, however. Here, the students were trained as 
independent researchers by discussing a specific historical problem together on 
the basis of a number of documents selected by the professor. They learned what 
source criticism was and received training of a highly technical nature.
The contrast between these two educational forms was accentuated by locating 
them in different places. This mise-en-scène was the work of those who cham-
pioned the further spread of the ‘practical classes’. One of these was the Ghent 
professor Paul Fredericq. This specialist in the history of the Inquisition was to 
acquire international fame primarily as a result of the reports that he published in 
the 1880s and 1890s on his tours of German, French, British and Dutch universi-
ties. For Fredericq’s European and American readers, these Notes et impressions 
de voyage were a showcase in which they could see which practices were in the 
ascendancy in modern historiography.5
Fredericq found the traditional lectures most obviously represented in the large 
auditoria and amphitheaters, with their podiums and lecterns, in the Collège de 
France in Paris.6 These were stately and imposing lecture halls, in keeping with the 
majestic, sweeping vistas that were presented there. Listeners would walk in and 
out from hall to hall, just as they went from chapel to chapel in churches. They 
were not just students – quite the contrary: the majority of the audience for these 
lectures consisted of tourists, persons of independent means and passersby, noted 
Fredericq. Nor did he hesitate, in a display of misogyny, to comment that quite a 
few of the lectures mainly drew women: beaucoup de dames et même un certain nom-
bre de prêtres.7 But the Collège de France did not have a monopoly on such practices. 
In Berlin, Heinrich von Treitschke gave his famous Vorlesungen in the so-called 
Barakken-Auditorium, which could seat no fewer than seven hundred and fifty lis-
teners (and the hall was too small even so).8 In England, where the ‘German’ semi-
nars did not enjoy much popularity, the lectures to large audiences were laconically 
justified with a reference to the goal of education: ‘We make not books but men’.9
How different the situation was with the seminars. They were often held in 
small rooms in the university library because it was easier to have access to the 
necessary study material there. Fredericq himself originally chose such a loca-
tion for his ‘practical classes’. But he knew that the premises were often even more 
cramped. In Paris, he had to climb the stairs of the Sorbonne to finally reach the 
fourth floor. There, below the roof, the École Pratique des Hautes Études organ-
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ized its seminars, in small, low-ceilinged rooms, presque des mansardes. Fredericq 
described the chambrettes in detail: how they were packed from top to bottom 
with books, the dark furniture and simple inkpots, the white porcelain stove, the 
view of the Sorbonne’s peaceful cour, the clock. In 1898 his Ghent colleague, Henri 
Pirenne, similarly recalled the cours pratique that he had attended under Godefroid 
Kurth in Liège: a small room on the second floor of the university building, with 
a stove, a few decrepit benches, one chair. There had been a view of the garden of 
the École des Mines, with its old machinery, and of the Meuse, ‘from which the 
whistle-blasts of the steamboats rose’.10 Simple but picturesque places, then, where 
time was forgotten: ‘The business was carried out’, said Fredericq, ‘like all impor-
tant business: modestly, without any fuss, in a small corner of the university’.11
The garret versus the amphitheater – the rhetoric of modesty that permeated 
the Paris and Liège vignettes revealed a vision of science, didactics, ‘epistemologi-
cal style’ (the term is borrowed from Michèle Lamont12) and ethics. Whereas the 
lectures were presented as events with all the features of that spectacular amuse-
ment for which there was such a taste in the fin-de-siècle,13 and where the ultimate 
aim was pseudo-science, the seminars appeared to be humble contributions to ‘true’ 
science: serious work was done there, without disruption by outsiders to that sci-
ence. The didactics differed just as much: whereas the panoramic overviews were 
presented in the amphitheaters in a monologue with beguiling rhetoric, knowledge 
was sought in the garrets in discussions between the professor and the students (al-
though the reality did not always live up to the ideal, with tongue-tied students who 
could not resist applauding the professor as though they were in an auditorium).
There were still more differences. The proceedings in the amphitheater revealed 
a hierarchical world in which scientific authority was only conferred on whoever 
stood on the podium or behind the lectern. In the roof of the university building, 
by contrast, the professor sat in the middle of his students, not on a raised plat-
form. As a matter of principle, he showed respect for what others had to say, for 
knowledge was not regarded as a given or as immutable; it originated in discussion, 
and even the students’ work represented fully valid contributions to this. What the 
students learned there for themselves was not an elaborate method (although this 
was codified in textbooks toward the end of the nineteenth century14). Rather, 
they learned a trade, with skills, ways of doing things and best practices. However, 
these were guided by certain epistemic virtues: suspicion toward the transmitted 
documents, criticism, impartiality. At the same time, an ethic was acquired – a 
bourgeois ethic: science was a matter of self-discipline, steadfastness, character.
The garrets were sites where the historical discipline renewed itself. By stress-
ing the modesty of these places, Fredericq and his allies emphasized the revolu-
tionary character of what was conveyed in the seminars. In the mansardes, on the 
margin, a break was made with the establishment.
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 The study: The rituals of intimacy
Much of what took place in the university garrets (or in the side-rooms of univer-
sity libraries) could be found in intensified form in the place that was naturally 
perceived as more personal: the professor’s own home, and the room that was 
regarded as the heart of that home, the study. For virtually all historians around 
1900, the study was still the self-evident place where they carried out their re-
search; despite the academization of the historical discipline, it remained a com-
munity of ‘home workers’. In fact, the professor’s house often had an extensive 
library and gave its owner the atmosphere that he apparently needed for his work. 
Anyone who sought routine and regularity could find it there: both the Leiden 
professor P.J. Blok and Pirenne would withdraw at set times every day into the 
cabinet de travail of their town house to write their great national history.15 Others 
found peace and quiet in the study of their dwelling located out of town. Johan 
Huizinga, who was a professor in Groningen, expressed his exultation to a friend 
after moving out of the town in 1911: ‘From my study I can see for miles; all the 
way to the Himalayas if I wish’.16
The study was the Holy of Holies. So it had been for a long time already. 
When, in around 1500, a separate museum or studiolo (to quote the Latin terms 
for the room) was defined in the scholar’s house for the first time, its express 
purpose was to guarantee the scholar a detached existence: the study was a pro-
tection against the intrusion of worldly affairs into his life. This was no longer 
so starkly expressed in the nineteenth century, but the longing for separation was 
never far away. It could also apply to whole enterprises: the gelehrte Gehilfe of the 
Monumenta Germaniae Historica, the great German series of editions, worked 
under the direction of both Georg Heinrich Pertz and Georg Waitz in the direc-
tor’s official home in Berlin; the former even regarded the Monumenta as sein 
Hausvermögen.17
Modern historiography too was thus – from a research viewpoint – still 
a domestic discipline. This distinguished it (and the other humanities disci-
plines) from the natural sciences, which in the course of the nineteenth century 
had generally become laboratory sciences, located outside the home. To be sure, 
Victorian biographers succeeded in ‘domesticating’ the heroes of science, such 
as Isaac Newton: as depicted in their history of science, in some cases they 
went from being godlike geniuses to domestic figures in dressing gowns, with 
children playing around them.18 But the natural sciences were only really do-
mestic – biology among the Cambridge geneticists around 1900 being a case 
in point19 – when their research was regarded as too marginal to be eligible for 
the ‘ordinary’ infrastructure to be allocated to it, and in such cases women too 
started to play a more than ‘ordinary’ role in the design and execution of the 
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research. Humanities disciplines such as history were domestic as a matter of 
principle rather than from necessity; their house, as was said about the profes-
sors of Leiden in the late nineteenth century, was their bulwark.20 This was not 
completely self-evident, for since Leopold von Ranke historiography had to a 
significant extent borrowed its identity as a discipline from the archive work 
that it performed. This had turned it too into a sometimes adventurous field-
work discipline.21
This domesticity recalls the long history traced out by Gadi Algazi: How 
could the scholar, who since the late fifteenth century had exchanged his life as 
a bachelor for a householder’s life (a Prozess der ‘Familiarisierung’), maintain his 
status as a scholar?22 Or, from another perspective: What was the position of the 
woman – the wife or in some cases the sister – in this constellation? The out-
come was usually clear: the woman was, like the maid who was always present 
in the professor’s home, denied access to the study – the Holy of Holies. A wife 
‘who will never invade my study’ was how it was put by the young English histo-
rian John Richard Green, preparing for marriage.23 So what was expected of the 
woman? Fredericq, who had remained single and lived with two sisters, associ-
ated them with the hearth of his home: the woman created the possibility for the 
man – for the historian – to work comfortably.24 The romantic ateliers in which 
man and wife worked closely together, as had been the case with Jules Michelet 
and Athénaïs Mialaret, seemed to have no further place at the end of the nine-
teenth century.25 But the wives of Blok, Pirenne and indeed of Green – his wife 
was Alice Stopford, who would also publish herself – in fact often did more than 
tend the hearth: it was not uncommon for them to take on the task of preparing 
their husband’s manuscript for printing.26
All of this was connected with the research that the historian performed. 
However, the professor’s house was also a place of instruction in the decades 
around 1900 – instruction that was far harder to separate from research at that 
time than was the case later on, as Mauro Moretti has recently emphasized on the 
basis of, among other sources, Friedrich Meinecke’s memoires.27 In other words, 
historical instruction also had a domestic character. This was less true of the 
lectures, although these too were given by some professors at the end of the nine-
teenth century in their own home – in a specially equipped ‘lecture room’.28 Above 
all, it was true of the seminars. This was how they had originated in Germany: 
Ranke, Johann Gustav Droysen and Waitz had set up their historische Uebungen 
(exercitationes historicae) as private Gesprächszirkel and received the students who 
attended them in their own Studierzimmer.29 Their example was followed: toward 
the end of the nineteenth century, professors of all descriptions left the library 
rooms and garrets to hold their seminars in their own homes. In Paris, Gabriel 
Monod taught students the métier in an apartment – a modest one of course, for 
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the same rhetoric applied – which was also referred to as an offshoot of Waitz’s 
seminar.30 In Belgium, Kurth and Fredericq now also received students at home. 
The image arose of a European chain of houses and apartments in which docu-
ments were discussed.
In this domestic setting, the seminars gained a specific, domestic character.31 
The number of students admitted to the classes in the professor’s house was 
small. It was a group that regarded itself as the elect, and could experience the 
sensational proximity of the discipline in the study: on Waitz’s desk the proofs 
of the next volume of the Monumenta lay ready. The room emanated warmth and 
life. The intimacy was reinforced by the manner in which the study was fitted out 
for the seminars. The students took their places around a long table, in the half-
light, between the packed bookcases. The documents to be discussed – whether 
originals or copies – lay on the table, together with the most important reference 
works and several folio editions of sources. In this intimate setting, the discussion 
got underway, always remaining informal.
Simply by virtue of the place where it occurred, the seminar was a private af-
fair: privatissime, as it was called in Berlin. This privacy was confirmed in many 
ways. The members of the company became acquainted with the secrets of the 
craft in weekly sessions (séances) in a private room. They were inducted into the 
discipline. Religious terms were often employed: they were ‘novices’, who were 
‘initiated’ (among other things into the rules of source criticism) and underwent 
a rite de passage. Together, they formed a ‘brotherhood’, a company that shut itself 
off from the world. The creation of the group’s own history was another element 
of this: after each meeting, a previously designated member of the group recorded 
in detail what had been discussed and what had taken place. The scientific work 
was also combined with forms of sociability: there was drinking and smoking, 
and a camaraderie arose (of an exclusively masculine character), which could be 
developed further on excursions. Thus the aspiring historians were also social-
ized. In a domestic culture, with the professor as role model, they were taught not 
just techniques, but also values.
Modern historiography was a domestic science, practiced comme en famille, 
as the metaphor had it.32 The setting in which many of the seminars took place 
also made it possible to understand the image literally: the students came into 
contact with the professor’s family. The boundary between private and public was 
not drawn sharply. The mere fact that the seminars were arranged in a private 
house which also acquired public significance through the instruction that was 
given there created an ambiguity. But if one passed in the professor’s house from 
the study room to the living room, this was a transgression. Nevertheless, such 
a transgression was not uncommon. After a visit to the study (whether or not 
in connection with a seminar), a student might be invited into the living room. 
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There, he could be introduced to the professor’s wife, converse with her or listen 
to her playing the piano, or dine with other guests.33 In this convivial atmosphere, 
further socialization took place – in a family setting.
Even those who did not have the opportunity to do this could be included 
in what has been referred to as the professor’s ‘extended family’.34 For example, 
Ranke was a Doktorvater who very explicitly regarded all his students as family 
members.35 The relationship between teacher and pupil could indeed be close to 
that between father and son. This could be expressed in dramatic ways. When 
Pirenne lost his favorite pupil Guillaume des Marez in 1931, he said in his funeral 
address: ‘It is monstrous that a father has to survive his son, just as that a profes-
sor survives his student’.36
In this ‘extended family’, the professor acted as mentor and patron. He placed 
his pupils in the professional field (usually in education or the world of archiv-
ing), and launched them in their academic career (by opening the doors of the 
new academic journals to them). As paterfamilias, he also felt responsible if they 
(or their family members) experienced financial or other adversity. For their part, 
the protégés were expected to show affection and respect for the paternal professor 
– and loyalty. They were supposed to belong to their patron’s ‘party’. That ‘party’ 
rarely if ever had a precise organizational structure or an elaborate ideology (on 
methodological issues, for example). It was unified not around a program, but 
around a figure. It formed a clan. Clearly, then, communities in modern histori-
ography (and by extension in the humanities in general) did not just arise on ra-
tional grounds. It was often a matter of honor and loyalty. This sometimes made 
the historians a turbulent family.37
The image of the family – in a metaphorical sense – was also apt for describing 
a variety of aspects of discipline- and community-building in historiography (and 
the humanities). Historiography acquired – like other subjects – fathers of the 
discipline, usually in a context of national historiography (for example, Robert 
Fruin became ‘the father of Dutch historiography’).38 The celebrations of anniver-
saries or retirements were characterized as ‘family celebrations’. The photographs 
of colleagues from home and abroad that were collected and hung up in the study 
or in the university building’s seminar room in order to demarcate the discipline’s 
space served as ‘family portraits’. In the seminars themselves, finally, the students 
were constantly informed of all kinds of ‘family news’.39 This family atmosphere 
had also found its way into the laboratories, incidentally. There too, the head of 
the community could act as a true paterfamilias, family ideals could prevail and 
suitable photographs in a pantheon could suggest the existence of a family com-
munity that extended far outside the laboratory.40
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 The laboratory: The representation of modernity
That the domesticity that was so closely bound up with the humanities, with its 
complex rituals of intimacy, was also able to become an element of the laboratory 
culture in the natural sciences, is one thing. But the reverse can be documented 
even more tellingly: the humanities culture of domesticity was affected by the ex-
isting culture of the natural sciences and was weakened by it. Already by the end 
of the nineteenth century, instruction in the professor’s home – both lectures and 
seminars – was being referred to by the historians themselves as a vieille tradition, 
an antique usage.41
Remaining in the professor’s study, for teaching purposes at least, came to be 
regarded, for various reasons, as an anatopism. The first of these reasons was 
simple: the growing number of students and the fact that seminar exercises had 
been made an obligatory part of the historian’s training made it harder to receive 
the students in the professor’s private study. A second reason was more subjec-
tive in nature: it was the desire to be modern. The proponents of the seminars 
– who viewed the showpieces in the amphitheaters with horror – felt themselves 
to be an academic elite, an aristocracy, leading a group of selected pupils. But 
they also wanted to be an avant-garde, members of a movement in keeping with 
the spirit of the age. In this progressivist discourse there was no room for an-
tiques usages.
Thus the return to the university buildings was embarked upon. But this time, 
it was not the mansardes that were sought out. The representation of modernity 
found its focus in the laboratories in the sciences and medicine, the disciplines 
that by around 1900 were starting to make an ever stronger mark on the uni-
versity landscape. An historian such as Fredericq was very familiar with these 
laboratories: one of his brothers had a brilliant career at the university of Liège 
in experimental physiology and biochemistry, and moved into a new Institut de 
Physiologie in the late 1880s. These were prestigious institutions. Among the his-
torians (and other practitioners of the humanities), the desire grew for something 
comparable. In their focus on the practice of historical research, could the semi-
nars not also be seen as laboratories?
Again, it was the German historians who took the lead, just as they had done 
in the 1830s when Ranke had established the first historische Uebungen. Now 
they – or some of them at any rate – called for institutionalized seminars, where 
with the government’s financial support properly equipped rooms could be fit-
ted out for practical instruction in history. The term ‘seminar’ now began to be 
used of these institutions rather than of the associated form of instruction.42 It 
was Heinrich von Sybel, a pupil of Ranke and professor in Munich, who was the 
first to establish such a ‘laboratory’: with the Bavarian government’s support, 
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in 1856 he was able to create a fixed infrastructure for his practical instruction. 
When he was appointed at Bonn several years later, a seminar was established 
there, too. But it was above all Carl von Noorden, who between 1868 and his 
death in 1883 was successively professor in Greifswald, Marburg, Tübingen, 
Bonn and Leipzig, that spread the system of ‘state seminars’. The most modern 
complex was built in Leipzig. It comprised five rooms: a study for the professors, 
a room in which atlases and paleographical and epigraphical albums were kept in 
drawers, and three rooms for the students, each of whom had his own desk and 
where the necessary reference works were also available. The complex was open 
until late in the evening. The professors called in every day to guide the students 
in their work.
Leipzig became a model, including in the survey presented by Fredericq, who 
himself attempted to institutionalize his ‘practical courses’ in Ghent and ob-
tain an annual government subsidy for them. Eventually, through his efforts, a 
wooden building was erected near the university’s Aula several years before the 
First World War. It was not much. But the optimism did not waver: the Arbeit-
Zimmer as designed by Von Noorden would become the rule in the future, it 
was said. It was an optimism borne along by a desire for modernity. The German 
‘state seminars’ offered work premises that were hygienic, well heated and well lit 
(as laboratories). Fredericq contrasted these contemporary rooms in his report 
with the étroites chambrettes and mansardes misérables in which the students usu-
ally lived. But the difference with those other mansardes also claimed attention: 
the garrets in the roof of the École Pratique des Hautes Études, which were 
praised for their irreplaceable style in the same Notes et impressions de voyage by 
Fredericq.
But not everyone was as enthusiastic about the efforts to institutionalize the 
Uebungen in modern seminars of this kind. Ranke himself refused to give his 
exercitationes (which he was also unwilling to call ‘seminars’) anywhere other than 
in his own study. It was his favorite pupil Waitz who, in 1867, on the occasion 
of a celebration of his teacher, summed up the points of criticism: in the new 
seminars, permanent guidance from the professors took away from the pupils any 
chance of autonomous development, the increase in scale was associated with me-
diocrity, the financial support provided to the students threatened to make greed 
a reason for starting such a course of education. Ranke and Waitz only wanted 
a few students, men with a true vocation, who were not motivated by financial 
gain. These men of character could only develop in a private education, not in the 
factories of Von Noorden that were being promoted. It showed how much the 
critics were living in the past, with a discipline that had not yet been corrupted 
by an industrial habitus and with historians who had not yet become Beamte.43 
They clung to their domesticity like the Victorian men described by John Tosh in 
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A Man’s Place (1999): the ‘hardness’ of the world of work outside the home made 
them see their own home as a place of peace, love and comfort, where higher mor-
als held sway, yet everyone could be themselves.44 Ranke and Waitz felt alienated 
from the new educational world – and turned inwards in order to find themselves 
there alone.
This uneasiness would persist. It carried on for generation after generation. 
It led to a broad nostalgia for places of science that no longer existed or had 
been changed beyond recognition, and with these places, it was sadly noted, a 
scientific culture was disappearing too. The Austrian historian Hans Pirchegger 
recalled in his autobiography, written in 1950, how the changes had also reached 
Marburg, where he had studied. In 1895, a new university building had been 
opened, where the historians and geographers had more space, proper lighting 
had been introduced and the seminar library had become more accessible. But, 
Pirchegger added, the old feeling of homeliness – Gemütlichkeit – had never 
returned.45
With the First World War came irreversible changes. The professors’ pros-
perity decreased, as did their status.46 Domesticity now completely disappeared 
from the world of university education, including in the humanities. There was 
no longer any teaching at home. Examinations formed one exception to this. In 
some countries and for certain groups, these were still taken in the professor’s 
house. The democratization of education and the advent of the mass university in 
the 1960s would put an end to this too. The old custom of the professor inviting 
students to tea on a Sunday and receiving them together with his wife had long 
since vanished.47
 Epilogue
In the years 1870-1914, historians sought and found their ideal discipline in uni-
versity garrets, in studies in private homes and in seminars that were modeled on 
natural science laboratories. These were not empty places, nor were they undis-
puted. They played a crucial role in the mise-en-scène of the professional histori-
cal discipline, which in this way achieved precise characterization: no showman-
ship, fed by intimate discussions, a modern setting. This last point pushed the 
domesticity of the discipline, academized though it was, into the background, 
at least on the teaching front. Because this remained a remarkable constant: as 
researchers, the historians continued for many more decades to be ‘home work-
ers’. Their study at home remained for them ‘the navel of the world’; their room 
in the university was in fact just a subsidiary office. As a result, public and private 
remained interconnected in the university world for a long time.48
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But this too came to an end. After the Second World War, the presentism in 
historiography became more pronounced. The historian was expected to engage 
in the great social projects that were under construction.49 He could be an arm-
chair scholar no longer. The rector of the University of Amsterdam reassured his 
listeners: the modern professor, it was said in 1948, was no longer ‘the absent-
minded professor, who from his peaceful study would from time to time dispatch 
a new section of his life’s work into the light of day’.50 As a result, the study fell 
into disrepute even as a place of research: it symbolized a private, asocial disci-
pline. Leave that room!, was the insistent advice.
But what could the historian do out in the wide world? ‘If he leaves the house 
of his subject and goes out into the street, the winds of doubt and contradiction 
confront him’, noted an ironic commentator a quarter of a century ago.51 For Por-
ciani it was therefore clear: the contemporary historian is a passeur, and in none 
of the old places does she still feel at home.
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The Game of the Goose (Ganzenbord) is the name of a traditional game with 
dice and pawns still played by many a Dutch family. Its popularity goes back to 
the Dutch Golden Age. You throw dice to get from field 1 to the winning field 63. 
Along the way you surmount various obstacles – a pit, a thorn bush, or a church-
yard may throw you back or get you stuck until somebody else’s pawn lands in the 
same field, thus setting you free again. Some other fields assist your advance, e.g., 
you may throw a second time and thus keep moving your pawn ahead. I recently 
discovered a nineteenth-century variety of the Game of the Goose with pictures 
of historical events that determine both the obstacles and the chances for quick 
advance. If you move ahead to the picture for 1789, ‘Beginning of the Revolution’, 
you must start the game all over again. If, by contrast, you land on the year 656, 
‘Conversion of the Heathen’, you receive a reward. This peculiar family game of 
1816 makes it crystal clear that history has become common property; it has been 
tailor-made without more ado for the historical aim it is meant to serve.1 We have 
here just one particular consequence of the changes that have meanwhile taken 
place in people’s conception of the past. Ordinary people have learned to deal 
with history. This in its turn is a consequence of history having turned public. 
It is as if in the nineteenth century history has moved from the closed spaces of 
society halls and stately rooms of well-educated noblemen to the living room, no 
longer necessarily stately but just run-of-the-mill. History has become part of 
collective memory, thus stepping into public space.
Until far into the eighteenth century history is private cultural property, both 
materially and immaterially so. It may be present in public space, as with early 
buildings or ruins, but there is no sense of an added quality of historical patri-
mony. These are just early buildings, which may or may not be in actual use for 
some specific purpose. History is present in collective memory only where the lo-
cals look back upon something extraordinarily impressive, as, for instance, a large 
natural disaster. For the rest, the past is in the hands of specialists, of lawyers, 
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of political and church authorities. It is being examined by narrowly confined, 
scholarly circles, united in societies or connected with the academy. Or history is 
being cultivated in the circles of amateur antiquarians, who are likewise united 
in societies, partly the same as those of the scholars. The boundaries between 
amateur and scholar, then, are not very strictly drawn. No chairs for the recent 
history of the fatherland do yet exist; in the academy everything is still directed 
toward antiquity and its classic texts.2
By the mid-eighteenth century, views of history begin to alter all over Europe. 
I shall distinguish between, and address successively, investigators of history of 
three different kinds, all of whom contributed to this large-scale development 
in their own way. Next, I show that these men began to tread other, so far un-
examined historical territory, thus attracting another kind of audience. So we 
encounter trespasses wherever we look – of disciplines, of target audiences, and 
of objects of study.
We cannot assign a precise birthday to when this new vision of the past emerg-
es. But it is easy to establish that an orientation toward history is growing ev-
erywhere. So much is certain that two editions of medieval poetry, which hit the 
British market almost simultaneously, have greatly furthered the breakthrough 
of history toward a large audience. In 1765 James Macpherson published his col-
lected Ossian poetry, or rather Ossian forgery. Ossian became popular all over 
Europe, and even though some doubt about authenticity arose at once, belief in 
Ossian proved near-unassailable. In the Netherlands we may even speak of dual 
mystification. Willem Bilderdijk, the leading Romantic poet of his time, trans-
lated Ossian for the Dutch market, all the while asserting that his own transla-
tion was closer to the – imagined – original Gaelic documents, as he had al-
legedly consulted them in person! True, Derick Thomson demonstrated in 1952 
that Macpherson really recorded authentic, orally transmitted songs and really 
inspected early texts, yet it remains true that the largest part of Ossian´s work 
stems from Macpherson’s own pen.3
Equally important is the definitely authentic collection of early ballads that 
Bishop Thomas Percy published in the same year 1765 under the title Reliques of 
Ancient English Poetry. The bishop had found a medieval folio manuscript in a 
friend’s kitchen, where the maid used it to kindle the fire. He took it home, edited 
the ballads in a fairly rigid manner, supplemented them with a few from other 
sources, and had them published.
The seed of the semi-forger, Macpherson, and of the sincere amateur, Percy, 
spread over all of Europe. Now an interest arises in vernacular editions, and a 
scholarly editing discipline emerges, in which the attainments of classical philol-
ogy are extended toward its vernacular counterpart. But they also influence the 
historical turn in literary fiction – between c. 1780 and c. 1840 one finds hardly 
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an author anywhere in Europe who has not written a historical romance, play, or 
novel. Percy’s ballads and Macpherson’s Ossian have an impact on all historically 
oriented poets and novelists of Romanticism, from Goethe to Bilderdijk, from 
Coleridge to Walter Scott, from Lamartine to Victor Hugo.
Another revolution in the scholarly pursuit of history that may be dated to the 
period is less tightly connected to the Ossian/Percy hype. This particular revolu-
tion has more to do with Enlightenment thinking and with new standards being 
set for the sciences. In what follows I shall show how editors, literary authors, 
and historians explored new pathways at the end of the eighteenth and the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, with enduring results over the entire nineteenth 
century up to and including our own time.
 Scholarly standards for history writing, and an appeal to the 
imagination
The emergence of scholarly standards for history writing Europe-wide is marked 
by Wilhelm von Humboldt’s establishing in 1810 a university in Berlin. From 
all over Germany he attracted interesting historians. His prime showpiece was 
Barthold Niebuhr, a specialist in Roman history who immersed himself in the 
Reformation. Niebuhr wanted to write objective history: ‘I seek to denude of all 
its foreign components a skeleton of fossil bones carelessly scraped together’.4 He 
was succeeded by Theodor Mommsen, who focused on reliable text editions all 
the while his primary end was to turn history into fine stories – a goal he attained 
so eminently that early in the twentieth century the effort even earned him the 
Nobel Prize for Literature.
The no less well-known historian Leopold von Ranke was also a professor 
at Berlin University. Ranke was concerned above all with establishing rigorous 
scholarly methods for the writing of history, which entailed a critical examination 
of the sources. As a born storyteller he managed to engage large groups of readers. 
He consequently regarded historiography as a profession halfway between the 
arts and the sciences. Strict methods should not stand in the way of the historian 
pleasing his readers in an aesthetic sense, too.5
The striving for objectivity demonstrated by Niebuhr, Ranke, and like-minded 
scholars made its way all over Europe. Lorraine Daston has pointed out that 
it is rather an anachronism to use the term ‘objectivity’ for the early nineteenth 
century.6 I stick to the term nonetheless, in the sense of a striving for reliability. 
The requirement of objectivity became ever more compelling, and standards for 
a solid education in history kept being raised. Most universities had departments 
for ancient history but none for the history of their own country. These came 
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into being in course of the nineteenth century. In the Netherlands this happened 
fairly late; the first chair in the History of the Fatherland (a term still in use 
today) dates from 1831. In France, a curriculum for archivists was set up in 1821. 
All over Europe source editions appeared, as indispensable groundwork for reli-
able historiography. France produced a series entitled Collection de Documents 
inédits sur l’histoire de la France. German historians found each other in a series 
of medieval source editions entitled Monumenta Germaniae Historica, with for 
nationalist-Romantic epigraph Sanctus amor patriae dat animum – ‘a holy love of 
the fatherland grants us the true spirit’.
This new way of writing history is linked up quite closely with a higher-pro-
file innovation in historiography – the Romantic variety. Thomas Macaulay de-
scribed his objective thus: ‘The perfect historian is he in whose work the char-
acter and spirit of an age is exhibited in miniature’.7 A historian such as Ranke, 
then, takes part in both currents: he insists on scholarly reliability but also wants 
to ascertain the real meaning and significance of past facts.
Around the 1820s the ‘nouvelle histoire’ starts with authors like Prosper Amable 
Barante, Augustin Thierry, and Jules Michelet, all of whom come up against their 
eighteenth-century predecessors. Thierry goes even farther than the others. He 
accuses them of impoverishing the past – life and inspiration are lacking in their 
narratives. Also, their accounts fail to narrate the true history, which is one of 
citizens and their striving for liberty. The new history writing ought to be not 
conventional, not rhetorical, not solemn, but in constant motion. No one phrased 
these principles in finer words than Alfred de Vigny, who wrote that history is a 
novel, with the people for its author.8
A Romantic historian saw the past as a rhythmical alternation of periods of 
flourishing and of decay, with huge crises possibly occurring in between. They 
derived this insight, surely from the classics, but more specifically from the eight-
eenth-century Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico, whom Michelet translated 
into French. Johann Gottfried von Herder provided German history with a simi-
lar cycle. In this manner the French Revolution acquired a place in history, as it 
now became possible to compare it with earlier historical crises, such as barbarian 
invasions of the Migration Period (fourth to eighth centuries). The new historian 
to describe these processes was compared with Champollion, who deciphered 
Egyptian hieroglyphs.9
It was in line with such aims that Barante engaged in battle with the novel-
ist Walter Scott – it should be possible to tell a captivating historical narrative 
without using fiction. Thierry insisted that the historian should set himself up as 
a judge of the past – an ideal of neutrality was not for him! He also pleaded for 
the writing of history, not only about all classes of society, but also for them, that 
is, for popularization. The most famous of all French Romantic historians, Jules 
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Michelet, regarded his craft as literary writing of a special kind. His nationalism 
and the attention he paid to oppressed parties can still be detected in current 
thinking about French history.
In other countries, too, Romantic historians gained a firm foothold, which dif-
fered for each nationality. We already saw that in Germany the objective school 
of historians also counted in its ranks storytellers like Mommsen or Ranke – ob-
jectivity in a neat dress. England had its own great narrators, like Thomas Carlyle, 
who wrote with a passionate intensity hitherto unknown in historical writing, 
and Thomas Macaulay, in such splendid command of the rhetoric of the black-
and-white story. In an essay entitled ‘History’ (1828) Macaulay voiced his annoy-
ance over contemporary historiography:
While our historians are practicing all the arts of controversy, they miser-
ably neglect the art of narration, the art of interesting the affections and 
presenting pictures to the imagination. [...] A history in which every par-
ticular incident may be true, may on the whole be false.10
He pointed out that official historians were given to filling hundreds of folios 
with state events, making no mention whatever of changes in customs and mor-
als, of poverty and wealth, which have such an outstanding influence on human-
ity’s sense of life.
So we are watching here a dual process of simultaneous exclusion and widen-
ing. In the universities history is turned into a scholarly craft, thus establishing 
itself as an academic discipline of a small number of practicians writing for small, 
specialized audiences. At the same time the Romantic historians attract a new, 
large public in their effort to draw the writing of history out of closed into public 
space. In so doing they widen the fields of history: no longer histories of princes 
and their wars but the history of common people, their customs and their ways 
of life.
 Editors as historians
We have already seen that philologists were at the very forefront of the new in-
terest in the past. Their numbers increase quickly, due among other things to 
the circumstance that during the French Revolution many medieval manuscripts 
come into public possession. With these editors, too, we witness a heightening of 
scholarly standards. But here, too, there is at the same time a noticeable move-
ment toward larger audiences and toward other, more popular sources from the 
past. In the eighteenth century already, Herder was out to collect popular songs 
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– an effort continued by Achim von Arnim and Clemens Brentano in a simi-
lar collection entitled Des Knaben Wunderhorn. Wilhelm and Jakob Grimm also 
swim with this current of attention paid to the people and its collective character. 
They collect fairy tales, chase medieval manuscripts, and set high standards for 
the scholarly reliability of their publications. On the basis of the attainments of 
classical philology, their friend Karl Lachmann, a philologist at the University 
of Berlin, develops a scholarly method for editions in the vernacular – a method 
which once again spreads all over Europe. Just as with the historians, there are 
among the editors men who aim for a large audience and who know how to play it. 
Other editors aim for scholarly specialization, thus narrowing the market. These 
two pathways merge with the Grimm brothers – fairy tales for the people, schol-
arly editions for the academy.11 This is true likewise for editions of medieval texts. 
Popular editions of texts like the Nibelungenlied, simple and cheap, may appear 
at the same time as scholarly editions of the same text, but now furnished with 
variant readings and with comments meant for fellow scholars. Widening takes 
place here as well. Previously the attention of philologists was directed primarily 
toward classic texts in Greek or Latin, or upon medieval chronicles in the ver-
nacular, but now narrative texts in the vernacular may likewise boast scholarly 
attention.
 Literary authors as history writers
Artists, too, felt at liberty to occupy themselves with history. Eighteenth-century 
experts had formed a closed world – a phenomenon to repeat itself when, by the 
end of the nineteenth, professionalization becomes predominant. But in between, 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, the most prominent historians are 
artists in search of a large audience. Authors like Walter Scott or Victor Hugo, or 
the painter Géricault, may well have contributed even more to people’s historical 
awareness than, say, Ranke or Thierry.
Particularly remarkable is how literary fiction manages to colonize history. In 
one sense this is, of course, nothing new – seventeenth-century drama often used 
historical matter, and medieval tales frequently went back to the past as well. 
What is novel, is the expansion toward new genres, to the history of the father-
land, and also the massive scale on which all this takes place. Here Walter Scott 
is the pivot – both in his poetry and in his novels he breaks new ground, soon 
to be covered all over Europe. Narrative history, notably about the Middle Ages, 
becomes popular on a scale without any precedent.
Not that popularization, as also the move toward imaginative genres, fails to 
meet with objections of a theoretical nature. Journal articles point at the histori-
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cal novel as a hybrid genre, it has been called ‘history in ballroom garb’,12 and seri-
ous historians fear that readers’ tastes will be corrupted by just imagined history, 
so that public interest in their objective history will wane. These risks look rather 
overdone in retrospect – it is impossible to find an era when there was a larger 
interest in history and when more novel functions for it were being developed 
than precisely the nineteenth century. Literary authors themselves argued that 
their imagination and their imitation of ‘couleur locale’ might well yield a better 
picture of an era than historians are able to produce.
In short, literary authors are responsible for history really turning into a popu-
lar possession. The professionalization of the historians might have led to history 
withdrawing further into the sphere of the academy. That this did not happen, 
is due to the evocative force of literary authors who, on a massive scale, began to 
write historical novels, drama, and poetry.
 Transgression and expansion
I have now pointed at students of history of three kinds – the editors, who be-
come true scholars but also seek to popularize; the historians, who professional-
ize and seek objectivity all the while taking a stance as romantic users of their 
historical imagination; finally, those literary authors who jump on board of the 
ship of history. Quite remarkably, these three distinct categories are often united 
in one person. Walter Scott was an editor, a historian, and a literary author, and 
hardly a failure in any of these respects. The same is true of Goethe, of Willem 
Bilderdijk, and of other leading public moralists. No problem is involved here in 
their own view – their border transgression requires no passport.
Disciplines are being transgressed, then, not only inside the humanities but 
also from the outside, as we need hardly doubt that the new standards for the cul-
tivation of history by editors and historians have been influenced by innovations 
in the exact sciences of the Enlightenment. Take an editor like Lachmann, who 
constructed his stemma hypothesis in a manner deliberately similar to William 
Jones’ language family tree, but possibly inspired as well by the analysis of earth 
strata in new fields like geology or paleontology.
The object of study is not only transcended, it is also expanded. If history 
ceases to consider nothing but battles and political events, there is much new 
history to be written. This is more than history from a novel point of view, it 
is also the writing of a history of a people, of its habits, its customs, its morals. 
This is what Macaulay meant when addressing the fake objectivity of official 
history writing:
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The circumstances which have most influence on the happiness of man-
kind, the changes of manners and morals, the transition of communities 
from poverty to wealth, from ignorance to knowledge, from ferocity to hu-
manity – these are, for the most part, noiseless revolutions. Their progress 
is rarely indicated by what historians are pleased to call important events. 
They are not achieved by armies, or enacted by senates. They are sanctioned 
by no treaties, and recorded in no archives.13
Indeed, so he argues, historians extol political victories, even though these have as 
a rule worked out miserably for the population at large.
The Netherlands were at the forefront of such expanded attention to the fate 
of the people, with a considerable impact upon authors abroad. Between 1749 and 
1759 the amateur historian Jan Wagenaar published a twenty-one-volume History 
of the Fatherland, which was all about the past of the Dutch people and its strug-
gle for liberation. As such, Wagenaar was far ahead of French historians when 
these, too, took up the theme of liberation. Abbreviated German translations of 
Wagenaar’s tomes were read by both Goethe and Schiller. The latter used it for 
his drama Don Karlos (1787). In course of the nineteenth century popular culture 
habitually received a place in offical histories.14 In the Netherlands the school-
master Jan ter Gouw retold in the second half of the century the history of the 
Dutch Golden Age, viewed from the perspective of everyday life of the common 
people, with attention being paid to toys, games, habits, the kitchen, signposts, 
expressions.
 Urgency
We return to Europe and to the background of this all-round fascination with 
history. Its urgency is closely tied up with the rise of nationalism. Processes of 
nation formation needed history, and history flourished due to the demand that 
came from these very processes. Each emerging nation at the time sought to legit-
imize itself by an appeal to the past, be it mythologized or genuine. Large groups 
of people acquired a sense of history, as a large variety of media kept instilling in 
them the idea that history belonged to themselves. The public at large came under 
the spell of history through a process of ongoing appropriation.
Paradoxically enough, the urgency of history was stimulated likewise by an 
awareness that past and present are not of one and the same guise. A sudden 
breakthrough of a sense of history may also induce a feeling of estrangement. 
According to Reinhart Koselleck, around 1800 the experience of a unity of 
pres ent and past gets lost, due to the very upheavals of the French Revolution.15 
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The past is different, and it requires an expert approach in that particular qual-
ity. It is no longer immediately applicable, so he argues, and thus it becomes 
a contemplative scholarly discipline. Peter Fritzsche, too, regards the Revolu-
tion as a trauma, due to which the past is no longer experienced as being one’s 
own.16
In 1828 Macaulay made another interesting comparison. He saw the reader of 
history as a traveler to regions yet unknown:
The effect of historical reading is analogous, in many respects, to that pro-
duced by foreign travel. The student, like the tourist, is transported into a 
new state of society. He sees new fashions. He hears new modes of expres-
sion. His mind is enlarged by contemplating the wide diversities of laws, of 
morals, and of manners.17
This, then, is what Koselleck meant with his ‘estrangement’, and this very strange-
ness of history makes its ongoing appropriation such an intriguing feat, as also 
appears from a fascinating study by David Lowenthal, The Past Is a Foreign 
Country.18
The effects of the explosive interest in history are reflected in the book market 
and in the diversity of ways in which history is being published. The Nether-
lands saw numerous editions of Wagenaar’s work: straightforward reprints of his 
twenty-one-volume History, school books based thereon, versions for children, 
versions for less educated grown-ups, short versions, illustrated luxury editions, 
versions in question-and-answer format. Moreover, in various countries abbrevi-
ated translations saw the light of day.19 When we examine the print histories of 
all great European historians, we see the same thing. In addition, the print runs of 
historical novels are larger than would ever have been thought possible. The same 
goes for books for children filled with historical matter, also for history journals, 
surveys, and illustrated histories for a large audience. Pertinent statistics show a 
vastly enlarged interest in history.
Even so, the fields of tension remain the same. On the one hand, there is pro-
fessionalization and academization, hence, a curtailment of the massive spread 
of history. On the other hand, there is the democratization of the past, with its 
expansion of the reading public in level and in age. Every practitioner of history in 
the nineteenth century seems to have doubts about his proper role. The academic 
historian wonders whether he may appropriate for his own ends the tools of the 
literary author, whereas the latter wants to be a historian as well. The dilemma 
is with us still.
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3.3 The Professionalization of the Historical 
Discipline 
Austrian Scholarly Periodicals, 1840-1900
ChrisTine OTTner
 Introduction
Scholarly periodicals are important pacemakers and trendsetters in the process 
of academic professionalization and institutionalization: they not only reflect 
developments within scientific disciplines or their relationship to other scien-
tific fields, they also influence such developments decisively by way of an ac-
tive editorial policy.1 Already in the course of the eighteenth century many jour-
nals dealing with ‘historical’ issues had been founded, i.e., treating genealogical, 
numismatic, and statistical contents.2 Most of them were media of education 
which intended to spread and discuss established ideas within a circle of edu-
cated readers.3 At that time and also during the early years of the nineteenth 
century, before the distinction between ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ historian be-
came clear-cut and complete, scholars working in the historical field did interest 
themselves in local history periodicals.4 Yet by the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury the ‘periodical’ in general had become a medium explicitly meant to address 
a specialized audience.5
As part of a multinational process, numerous such periodicals have been es-
tablished since the middle of the nineteenth century. Despite many structural 
differences and challenges, most of them have to be seen against the national-
political backdrop of this time as well as in the context of the then increasing 
professionalization of the discipline.6
This paper attempts to elucidate historical methods and patterns of profes-
sionalization in Austria between the 1840s and 1900 by means of an analysis of 
three case studies corresponding to three scholarly journals: Der österreichische 
Geschichtsforscher, the Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte, and, finally, the Mit-
teilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung. The reason for the 
selection of these three examples is that they all reflect typical characteristics of 
Austrian historical research in this period. First of all we have to face the prob-
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lem of an ‘Austrian’ history in connection with a national representation within 
the heterogeneous, multinational Habsburg Monarchy.7 On the one hand, this 
question has always been closely related to the issue of the model effect German 
historical undertakings and enterprises had on Austrian works.8 On the other 
hand, we find numerous attempts of dealing with the history of the Gesamtstaat 
– which means the entity of the Habsburg Monarchy not only as a complex of 
various more or less independent lands, but based on a common identity for the 
entire state.9 Furthermore, we have to take into consideration the development 
of specific philological methods for collecting, preparing, and editing historical 
sources. In Austria, efforts like these were parts of a longer tradition: following 
the examples set by the Bollandists and Maurists, some monks in the archives and 
libraries of various Austrian monasteries and abbeys had been organizing big his-
torical source collections and editions during the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century.10 All in all these trends already anticipated the constitutive significance 
of the archive in nineteenth-century historiography.11
 A historical repertory: Der österreichische Geschichtsforscher
Our first case study deals with the journal Der österreichische Geschichtsforscher, 
a short-lived periodical, published around 1840.12 It originated from a private ini-
tiative by Joseph Chmel, a very ambitious archivist of the Habsburg Privy House 
Archive in Vienna. While serving as a priest in an Abbey in Upper Austria, Chmel 
became acquainted with intensive studies on sources in the archive and the library 
of the monastery.13 A self-educated historian, he developed a deep passion for 
medieval historical sources and for patriotic history.14 He regarded his journal as 
a historical repertory for the writings of the widely dispersed historians of the en-
tire Habsburg Monarchy. Information stemming from manuscripts, charters and 
books was provided as a guide to find material dispersed to the same degree. He 
believed that the historical sources of Vienna and other parts of the Monarchy 
should make it possible to write a ‘complete and truthful history’. In the periodi-
cal, Chmel gave researchers clear instructions as to how to achieve this aim: ‘Der 
österreichische Geschichtsforscher must deliver solid building materials and should 
start building from below’.15
The periodical certainly failed in its purpose of being an aid for historians to 
become acquainted with yet unknown sources: its structure and contents were 
very heterogeneous and therefore the material was not very easy to handle for 
contemporary readers. Each volume consisted of three numbers, which included 
– without any chronological or thematic limitation – charters for an Austrian Co-
dex Diplomaticus as well as materials related to Austrian financial history, numis-
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matics, sphragistics, heraldry, diplomatic affairs, and other matters of historical 
interest. At the beginning most contributions were authored by Chmel himself, 
who wanted to give publicity to some of the documents he had found during his 
previous travels to various archives.16
When Chmel was planning the first volume, he had no idea which principles 
he should apply to arrange his material, which various scholars sent to him in 
great numbers every day.17 For this reason, the arrangement of the periodical 
exactly mirrors the ‘confused state of the documents’ prevailing in the archives.18 
Theodor von Sickel, the founder of modern diplomatics (critical document re-
search),19 copied some documents in an Italian archive for Chmel, long before 
he started his career at the Viennese university. And even Sickel laconically 
stated that ‘the chaos of his own work’ corresponded to the disorder of the 
archive.20
As editor of the periodical, Chmel accepted the manuscripts of his collabo-
rators without any changes, as he freely admitted.21 In many cases no hints 
of the origin and the transmission of the edited texts were given.22 Specific 
information on cartularies or archival signatures was often not provided to the 
reader. The form of presentation comprised excerpts of manuscripts, texts of 
‘Regesta’ as well as complete texts. Basically the Geschichtsforscher represented 
a mere collection of materials, only now and then interrupted by smaller trea-
tises.23
Each number of the periodical was accompanied by an appendix in which 
the editor offered bibliographical information as well as information on stud-
ies and projects undertaken or planned by numerous researchers in the lands 
of the Habsburg Monarchy.24 These appendices enable us to become acquainted 
with Chmel’s extensive network of correspondents and collaborators: these were 
mainly colleagues like librarians and archivists, but also civil servants in filing de-
partments and teachers in secondary schools who were also active as researchers. 
Chmel’s private correspondence bears witness to lively contacts with researchers 
in various parts of the Monarchy, especially in Moravia and Bohemia, among oth-
ers with František Palacký, historiographer of the Bohemian Estates.25 This is in 
accordance with the general findings of present-day scholars, that the connection 
between the Habsburgs’ German hereditary lands and Bohemia was much more 
fundamental and enduring in intellectual terms than its connection to Hungary 
or Galicia.26 It is interesting that Chmel fervently recommended the translation 
of some late medieval letters published in Palacký’s Archiv Český – yet not into 
German, but into Latin, ‘for the good of the historical researchers of all nations’.27
In his Geschichtsforscher, Chmel gives the impression of being the focal point 
of historical research in ‘Austria’, whose history he constantly equates with that 
of the Gesamtstaat. Nevertheless, his periodical remained thematically restricted 
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mainly to Lower and Upper Austria. After its second volume, the journal Ge-
schichtsforscher was given up: its circulation was low, and public interest in a peri-
odical of this kind was yet lacking in Austria.28 Nevertheless numerous contribu-
tions had been sent in to Chmel as editor – and also his own journeys had made 
him realize that the mass of material stored in the archives was enormous.29 But 
for Chmel himself it was nearly impossible to critically select the material that 
should be published: he preferred to have everything printed and wanted every-
body to help him in this respect.30
 A printed archive: The Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte
Nevertheless, the basic conception of the Geschichtsforscher proved to be trend-
setting. This leads us to the second case study dedicated to a journal published 
not by a private person, but by the Imperial Academy of Sciences in Vienna, 
which was founded in 1847, on the eve of the Revolution.31 As one of its first 
members the above-mentioned archivist Joseph Chmel influenced significantly 
the design and orientation of its first publications. He initiated the formation 
of the Historische Kommission, a department for Historical Research within 
the Imperial Academy, which should prepare, organize and publish editions of 
certain sources and also a specific historical journal. According to its title, Archiv 
für Österreichische Geschichte, the journal, first published in 1848, was meant to 
be a ‘printed’ archive to make historical material available and accessible to all re-
searchers in the Habsburg lands. At the same time these researchers themselves 
should participate in this historical ‘source collection program’. Parallel to the Ar-
chiv the sources of the individual crown lands were to be separately published in 
series of larger editions – as so-called Fontes rerum Austriacarum, Bohemicarum, 
Hungaricarum, Polonicarum and Italicarum. As acknowledged model for both, the 
Archiv and the Fontes, served a German enterprise: the popular Monumenta Ger-
maniae Historica.32
In the Austrian enterprise, the different meanings of ‘Austria’ became visible: 
on the one hand historical sources of the whole Austrian Monarchy had to be 
 edited, on the other hand the Res Austriacae should be only one part of a total of 
five and were supposed to represent the German hereditary lands.33 In combina-
tion with the Fontes the journal Archiv was conceived as a collection of source ma-
terial; but the Archiv also provided smaller historical treatises. Its main function 
was to prepare the groundwork for a big comprehensive history of the Austrian 
Empire (Österreichischer Kaiserstaat), which was revitalized after 1848. Apart 
from purely historical items the periodical was open also for historical-geograph-
ical, topographical, archeological and linguistic studies.34
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It is significant that the Archiv soon was regarded as a methodologically stand-
ardized journal and therefore was declared to be an ‘academic publication’.35 Yet, 
the conceptual policy paper of 1848 had welcomed all ‘friends of patriotic his-
tory’, without maintaining any professional differentiation.36 For this reason the 
journal represents an interesting interface between dilettante and increasingly 
professional claims.
In contrast with the practice of the predecessor Der österreichische Geschichts-
forscher, the Imperial Academy established an editorial staff that had to review 
the articles and editions before publication. It certainly is instructive to take a 
look at the reports and the persons who were doing this work. Most of them 
were members of the Historische Kommission and therefore closely related to 
the Academy, i.e., as full members. One of the first persons responsible for re-
viewing the incoming manuscripts was a specialist in German studies, Theodor 
von Karajan, who held a leading position as a court librarian.37 Apart from him, 
leading archivists, such as the above-mentioned Joseph Chmel as well as Alfred 
von Arneth, the future director of the Privy House Archive, were busy writing 
reviews and reports.38
In many cases the publication process was a lengthy procedure, including 
much communication between the authors and contributors and the members of 
the editorial staff. It is worth mentioning some of the individual approaches and 
arguments for accepting or declining a publication: Chmel, for example, want-
ed to ensure that really ‘new’ and yet unprinted source material was going to be 
published. For this reason, he often compared the editions with material kept in 
his own archive, and his final decision was predicated on this comparison.39 His 
colleague Karajan often was unsatisfied with the stylistic competence of some 
scholars who sent in their treatises. Moreover, he was not interested in any coop-
eration with ‘all friends of history’, because in his view the ‘academic’ publications 
by all means should be for ‘professionals’ and not for ‘amateurs’ or ‘laymen’.40 As a 
specialist in Austrian eighteenth-century history, Arneth felt that the journal did 
not treat this period adequately enough, which led him to approve the publica-
tion of an edition of materials from this century despite serious methodological 
defects.41 Most of the reviewers insisted on the relevance of the chosen source 
material for the political history of the Habsburg crown lands. But even here we 
find interesting exceptions: sometimes historical sources without any political 
significance were published if they concerned the history of very remote parts of 
the Monarchy.42
In spite of some attempts to represent the historical research of the Monarchy 
as a whole, all in all the periodical did not succeed in fulfilling these self-imposed 
requirements. Even internal communications within the editorial staff very soon 
designated the Archiv as a ‘German’ periodical.43 Indeed, the majority of the re-
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viewers and contributors originated from the German hereditary lands.44 How-
ever, there was an increasing personal and professional interconnection between 
the Academy and the rising universities, especially with that of Vienna, where 
the Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung played a prominent role in 
the methodological standardization of the historical discipline.45 Since the 1870s 
more professional historians can be found among the reviewers as well as among 
the contributors of the Archiv. As a consequence, the lengthy review procedure 
was shortened: From 1875 onwards it was not considered necessary anymore to 
write reports on treatises or editions, which already ‘at first sight’ did not deserve 
to be published. A short oral report was supposed to be sufficient to decline a 
submitted manuscript. None other than the above-mentioned historian Theo-
dor Sickel, professor at the University of Vienna and member of the Historische 
Kommission since 1872, had made this proposal.46 The research standards that 
requested the use and quotation of ‘original’ sources from the contributors were 
finally taken for granted.
However, the proportions of historical treatises and mere editions of sources 
within the Archiv were continuously changing: during its first decades the trea-
tises accounted for around 46%, whereas between 1895 and 1900 the percentage 
rose to 67%.47 Of course, these treatises were firmly based on historical source 
material and archival studies as well. This remained a characteristic feature of 
the periodical; but the process of professionalization also becomes evident when 
looking at the structure of the annotations and indices. Especially since the 1890s 
there were not only archival references and signatures but also numerous refer-
ences to secondary literature.48
 Promoting professional auxiliary sciences of history: The 
Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung
In 1880 the Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, located at the Uni-
versity of Vienna, began publishing its Mitteilungen,49 our third case study. It was 
the first scholarly historical periodical in Austria to survive to the present and 
is still one of Austria’s most important journals in this field. In addition to the 
methodological efforts of the Archiv, the new journal Mitteilungen was specifi-
cally designed for promoting certain historical disciplines: its initiators, first and 
foremost Theodor Sickel, mainly aimed at introducing auxiliary specializations 
in history, such as paleography, diplomatics, and archival science to the scientific 
community. These disciplines had been continually developed and taught at the 
Institut for the previous twenty-five years, i.e., since its foundation in 1854. How-
ever, according to the publisher’s advertisement the journal should be as universal 
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as possible and was not restricted to a certain historical epoch or discipline: legal 
history was meant to be presented as well as art history, cultural history, and 
Christian archeology.50
But in contrast to the aforementioned Archiv, the Mitteilungen provided criti-
cal treatises and articles in the field of the auxiliary sciences of history rather than 
mere source editions. According to Theodor Sickel, all the peers and colleagues 
who had been working in this research area were supposed to benefit from this 
new journal: It was meant to ‘glue together’ scholars interested in the auxiliary 
sciences of history.51 Therefore the periodical can also be seen as a professional 
collaborative project. Its aim was that the community and solidarity of profes-
sors, readers, lecturers, and current and former students of the institute would be 
underlined and strengthened. Many of the contributors of the Mitteilungen stood 
in close personal and functional relation to the institute where they were teaching 
or had been taught in the above-mentioned historical skills. It is interesting to 
see that this network of historians, which had been constituted during the time 
of the Monarchy, remained existent even after the First World War.52 A lot of 
contributors also held positions as lecturers or professors at renowned, especially 
German universities. This is why it might not have been necessary to ‘peer review’ 
the articles sent in for the Mitteilungen. Its editors just selected one colleague 
from among the Institute’s members to do the editorial work and to communicate 
with the authors.53
Around 1880 similar historical periodicals were founded, i.e., in France, Italy, 
England, Belgium and the United States.54 Twenty years earlier the Historische 
Zeitschrift in Germany had already marked the transition from a journal ad-
dressed to an educated public to a scholarly historical periodical.55 When found-
ing the Austrian Mitteilungen its first protagonists criticized the lack of a cor-
responding historical periodical for southern Germany and Austria. In the eyes 
of the Austrian professors and scholars, the Archiv of the Imperial Academy in 
Vienna had an excellent reputation; however, the complicated publication pro-
cedure did not meet the actual demands any more, which were aiming at a more 
timely publication process.56 Apart from that, and this is a significant structural 
detail, the Archiv did not contain book reviews or brief notices about specialized 
historical literature. By contrast, the new Mitteilungen emphasized the impor-
tance of extensive book reviews and reports on historical literature. These parts 
of the periodical contributed greatly to standardization: the attempts to exclude 
contributions which were not accepted for scientific reasons combined with 
the attempts to establish a professional solidarity within the academic environ-
ment.57 The editors of the Mitteilungen paid particular attention to this part of 
the journal for another reason as well: they wanted specialists to report regularly 
about the research results in the non-German parts of Austria-Hungary. Thus, 
164 Christine Ottner
the periodical offered extensive reports, e.g., on the Monumenta Historiae Hun-
garica or on the source publications of the Academies of Sciences in Kraków and 
Zagreb. The reviewers compared these editions to the standards represented by 
the Viennese Institute, and they also dealt with the problem of using the nation-
al languages in the introductions and annotations of the editions. In particular, 
the Hungarian publications were strongly criticized for using the Hungarian 
language instead of Latin.58
In any case the structure of the Mitteilungen enabled the periodical to re-
spond rather quickly to new subdisciplines and trends such as economic and 
social history around 1900.59 The growth and diversity of historical knowledge 
became part of the scholarly exchange by the inclusion of longer and smaller ar-
ticles, book reviews and research reports. The photographical reproduction and 
the method of using facsimile editions for paleographic studies, as it was done 
in the teaching courses at the Institute, found their way into the journal. This 
approach soon was taken up by related disciplines such as musicology and art 
history. There were corresponding articles and reports on similar undertakings 
dedicated to photographical reproductions not only within the Habsburg Mon-
archy or in Germany, but also in France and Italy.60 Despite its concentration on 
historical research in Germany and ‘Austria’, the periodical tried hard to become 
more international.
 Conclusion
To sum up: around 1840 Der Österreichische Geschichtsforscher had an anti-
quarian slant and consisted of a mere collection of various historical sources. 
Its primary aim was just to promote historical and archival research in gen-
eral within the Habsburg ‘Gesamtstaat’. Not only promotion and advancement, 
but also standardization was demanded by the Archiv für Österreichische Ge-
schichte, edited by the Imperial Academy of Sciences in Vienna since 1848. In 
order to achieve this, the Academy established its own staff for reviewing the 
incoming articles and source editions. The increasing personal interconnec-
tion between the Academy and the university made the distinction between 
‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ historian more pronounced. Our last case study, 
the periodical Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 
founded in 1880, was already a university cooperative enterprise. Its main pur-
pose was to promote the auxiliary sciences of history. In the context of Ger-
man historical research at the end of the nineteenth century, the journal also 
offered interesting attempts to distinguish itself by special ‘Austrian’ literary 
supplements and book reviews, which also tried to include the research results 
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of the eastern and southern lands of the Habsburg Monarchy. The structure of 
the Mitteilungen as a whole strongly correlated with other national scholarly 
historical periodicals and facilitated rapid reactions to new developments in 
the historical field.
The case studies reveal changing professional as well as political approaches 
in combination with the quest for methodological standardization. As part of 
the ‘making of ’ the historical discipline scholarly periodicals should therefore be 
regarded as important elements in the very complex academic process.
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3.4 Manuals on Historical Method
A Genre of Polemical Reflection on the Aims of Science
HerMan Paul
 Introduction
Manuals on historical method from around 1900 are like neoscholastic philoso-
phy textbooks: books that are supposed to be so dull and dreary that only few 
scholars dare venture into them. Although methodology manuals were once a 
flourishing genre, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
when such emerging academic disciplines as history, art history, and church histo-
ry were in need of methodological signposts and boundary markers, the hundreds 
of pages that these manuals typically devote to the minutiae of internal and exter-
nal source criticism now read like neoscholastic meditations on the analogia entis. 
At least, that is the impression offered by the spare secondary literature on such 
late nineteenth-century methodology books as Ernst Bernheim’s Lehrbuch der 
historischen Methode (1889) and the Introduction aux études historiques (1898) by 
Charles-Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos. If these manuals are not openly 
criticized for their positivist-inspired epistemologies,1 they are portrayed at best 
as dry, didactic means for codifying and conveying the methodological standards 
of newly established humanities disciplines.2
This, however, is to overlook that methodology books could serve as cannons 
or swords in heated debates over the aims of historical scholarship. Virtually un-
noticed in the literature so far is that manuals on historical method could serve as 
polemical interventions in debates on the nature and implications of a scholar’s 
vocation. This is true for historical manuals – think of Charles De Smedt’s Princi-
pes de la critique historique (1883), or Edward Augustus Freeman’s The Methods of 
Historical Study (1886) – but especially also for manuals in fields plagued by insol-
uble disagreement over the need for scholarly asceticism with regard to religious 
beliefs, aesthetic taste, or moral judgment. Reading Hans Tietze’s Die Methode 
der Kunstgeschichte (1913) and Guido Adler’s Methode der Musikgeschichte (1919), 
for instance, does not amount to entering a classroom where students are being 
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initiated into the methodological foundations of their discipline; it amounts to 
entering a battlefield. For whatever their titles may suggest, these manuals did not 
merely deal with methods, that is, etymologically speaking, with a scholar’s ‘ways’ 
or ‘paths’, but also in particular with the goals to which such roads supposedly led. 
The books engaged in debate over ends at least as much as over means.
If this is true, historians of the humanities may want to dust off these method-
ology manuals, for instance, if they are interested in what Lorraine Daston calls 
the persona of the scholar,3 or what I call the ‘scholarly self ’, that is, the habits, 
virtues, and character traits that were considered as distinguishing good scholars 
from less gifted ones.4 Why did late-nineteenth-century humanities scholars of-
ten fail to reach agreement on the qualities of the wissenschaftliche Persönlichkeit? 
Why did they often have rather different expectations of the scholar’s moral and 
intellectual character?5 Part of the answer is that these scholars did not quite 
agree on the aims that habits, virtues, and character traits were supposed to serve. 
What counted as scholarly virtues and vices depended, among other things, on 
the goods that scholars were supposed to pursue – that is, on the ‘aims of science’ 
(or, more broadly, the ‘aims of scholarship’) as debated in the pages of such meth-
odology manuals as Tietze’s Die Methode der Kunstgeschichte and Adler’s Methode 
der Musikgeschichte.6
So, what I shall argue, with these two books from early twentieth-century 
Vienna as my case studies, is that manuals on historical method, uninspiring as 
they may seem, offer in fact some fascinating insight into disciplinary polemics 
over the most fundamental of all questions: What is the goal our discipline must 
serve?
 The Viennese context
Both Tietze (1880-1954) and Adler (1855-1941) were firmly rooted in that vibrant 
center of intellectual, cultural, and political life that was Vienna in the 1910s.7 
Although both men had spent more than a decade in Prague – Tietze as a child, 
Adler on his first professorial chair – they had made the Austrian-Hungarian 
capital their home during their studies in Vienna and established themselves in 
Viennese upper-middle-class circles by marrying into local merchant families. 
Moreover, both Tietze and Adler belonged to one of those Viennese ‘schools’ 
or ‘circles’ that set their stamp on early-twentieth-century art, philosophy, and 
scholarship. As a former student of Franz Wickhoff, Alois Riegl, and Julius von 
Schlosser, and as Privatdozent in art history at the University of Vienna, Tietze 
belonged to the third generation of the ‘Viennese School of Art History’. Adler, 
on his turn, had exchanged his professoriate in Prague for the chair of his former 
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teacher Eduard Hanslick in Vienna in 1898. The ‘Second Viennese School’ to 
which Adler is often said to belong was not a historical school, but a group of 
avant-garde composers and musicians, the best-known members of which includ-
ed Arnold Schönberg, Alban Berg, and Anton Webern. Academically, however, 
Adler was expected to do for music history what the Viennese School of Art His-
tory was doing for the history of the visual arts: raising the level of scholarship 
so as to meet the strictest demands of modern, critical, source-based historical 
studies. As one of the members of the search committee responsible for Adler’s 
appointment had put it in 1896: ‘Without question, the university, as an abode 
of learned research, has above all the right and the need to assure that the study 
of music history is undertaken by the faculty according to the same methods as 
those used in every other historical discipline’.8
One wonders, though: How easily could ‘learned research’ be reconciled with 
deep fascination for Schönberg? To what extent was joyous immersion in Vien-
na’s cultural life compatible with the scholarly asceticism preached by advocates 
of scientific history? Both Tietze and Adler worked in academic contexts that put 
a premium on sharp lines of division between scholarly research and aesthetic 
appreciation of art. Moriz Thausing, for example, one of Tietze’s most influential 
predecessors in the Viennese School of Art History, had advocated a type of art 
history from which aesthetic criteria had been rigorously banned.9 This positiv-
ist legacy had been carried on by Tietze’s teachers, Wickhoff, who had put all his 
cards on rigorous source criticism, and Riegl, whose was reported to have said 
that the best art historian is a person without personal taste.10 Tietze, however, 
had a taste for art: he greatly enjoyed expressionist art and supported such young 
painters as Oskar Kokoschka (whose double portrait of the Tietzes, painted in 
1909, testifies to their close relationship).11
Similar tensions between the historical and the aesthetic existed in the emerg-
ing field of music history, where the German Bach biographer Philipp Spitta 
represented that end of the spectrum most committed to positivist Musikwissen-
schaft, while Hanslick, Adler’s predecessor and prolific music critic, was a speci-
men of the opposite style. No one doubted that after Hanslick’s retirement, in 
1895, the university longed for a Spitta-type of musicologist. As one Viennese 
observer put it, in a letter to Johannes Brahms: ‘Since work in the field of music 
history has, under Spitta’s magnificent influence, seen an upswing and an expan-
sion that was almost unimaginable twenty-five years ago, today one expects a 
completely different kind of knowledge from someone who occupies a pulpit like 
the one on which Hanslick stood’.12 That the university expected Adler to be a 
kind of second Spitta was hardly surprising. Not only did Adler know Spitta very 
well – they had, for example, cofounded the Vierteljahrsschrift für Musikwissen-
schaft – but he had also aligned himself closely with Spitta’s positivist program, 
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most notably in his 1885 article, ‘Umfang, Methode und Ziel der Musikwissen-
schaft’.13 One wonders, however, how carefully the Viennese search committee 
had read the last few pages of this manifesto, in which Adler, contrary to his posi-
tivist inclinations, had charged music historians with the responsibility of help-
ing, stimulating, and encouraging composers and musicians – a task that Spitta 
would have rejected as truly unscientific. And what did the committee know 
about Adler’s fascination, not only for Schönberg, but also for Gustav Mahler 
and Richard Wagner, or about his life-long wrestling with Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
question on the use of history for life?14
All this is to suggest that Tietze and Adler lived in a world ridden with ten-
sions: tensions between the historical and the aesthetic, between scholarship and 
art, as well as between Viennese cultural life and a university proud to be at the 
forefront of positivist science. Tietze and Adler, each in their own way, not merely 
encountered these tensions; they embodied them and tried to cope with them.
 The aims of science
Tietze’s and Adler’s methodology books are book-length proposals for working 
out such tensions. This is perhaps not immediately apparent. Both manuals have 
lengthy chapters on the auxiliary sciences of history. Both spend a significant 
number of pages on source criticism – the watchword of those committed to what 
Franz Schulz called a ‘philological ethos’ in the nineteenth-century humanities.15 
In this respect, the books fairly closely resemble Ernst Bernheim’s Lehrbuch der 
historischen Methode, which is perhaps the prime example of a methodology book 
that codified a broadly shared set of methods in a more or less student-friendly 
format. Tietze’s Methode even imitated the structure of Bernheim’s Lehrbuch and 
relied on it in matters of source criticism.16
Unlike Bernheim, however, Tietze and Adler were not in a position to codi-
fy a set of widely shared methods. Although Bernheim, a historian of medieval 
Europe, had also risked his neck, perhaps especially by choosing sides in such 
methodological disputes as those revolving around Dietrich Schäfer and Karl 
Lam precht,17 his book was conventional in the sense one expects a methodol-
ogy manual to be. It offered a state-of-the-art description of methods used by a 
majority of historians, working in the tradition of Leopold von Ranke, who con-
sequently felt little difficulty in recognizing the patterns laid out in Bernheim’s 
manual. Such conventions, however, did not, or not to the same degree, exist in 
Tietze’s and Adler’s fields of study. Even if they exaggerated in their complaints 
about an ‘almost endless number of approaches’, about an ‘anarchy that threatens 
the kernel of our discipline’, or, in military language, about a ‘fight’, a Krieg bis aufs 
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Messer, with ‘contending parties’ that treated each other like ‘enemies’,18 Tietze and 
Adler made controversial choices with every step they took. Was it appropriate, 
for example, to recommend a student of Mozart’s Requiem to subject the auto-
graph manuscript to external source criticism? Or would such a technical exami-
nation of the Requiem manuscript miss the whole point of studying this sublime 
piece of music, as a more aesthetically inclined musicologist might argue?19
Strikingly, when Tietze and Adler spoke about methods, they presented these 
as conditioned by the aims of scholarship. They highlighted the indissoluble ties 
between the methods that Mozart scholars chose to employ and the aims their 
scholarship served. Adler, for instance, regularly employed topographical meta-
phors in arguing that methods are like ‘roads’ leading to a ‘goal’. What kind of 
roads scholars have to travel, depends on the Zweck or Ziel they want to reach. 
Scholars must therefore be ‘goal-oriented’ (zweckgemäß) and, consequently, em-
ploy purposive (zweckentsprechende) methods.20 For Tietze, too, methods were 
always means to an end. Especially in the opening pages of his book, he spoke in 
one and the same breath about ‘goal and method’ (Zweck und Method), ‘method 
and tasks’ (Methode und Aufgaben), ‘task and working manner’ (Aufgabe und Ar-
beitsweise), and ‘method and purpose’ (Methode und Absicht). Apparently, what it 
meant for scholars to work methodically was to be goal-oriented, or unfailingly 
dedicated to, the ‘distinctive knowledge aims’ (eigentümlichen Erkenntniszielen) of 
their discipline.21
This explains why Tietze and Adler reflected at least as much on the aims, 
goals, and purposes of scholarship as on their methods and means. Confront-
ed with a diversity of approaches in their respective fields, they felt this ‘chaos’ 
was not so much a lack of methodological unanimity, but rather a divergence of 
views on the very goals that art historians or music historians were supposed to 
serve. Accordingly, the key word in their manuals was not method, but task, aim, 
goal (Aufgabe, Ziel, Zweck) or, more emphatically, ‘main task’ (Hauptaufgabe).22 
Especially Adler continuously reminded his readers of the distinctive Aufgabe 
or Hauptaufgabe der Musikgeschichte, arguing that music history could grow to 
maturity only if its practitioners stayed focused on its proper aim (resisting the 
lures of such unscientific goals as aesthetic pleasure and education of the general 
public).23
One might argue, of course, that the language of aims is inevitable in method-
ology books, especially if such manuals also practice the genre of encyclopedia by 
providing a map of the discipline and its constituent parts. Even Bernheim de-
voted a section to the ‘nature and task of historical scholarship’, while returning to 
the ‘goal of historical scholarship’ and the ‘fundamental tasks of our science’ when-
ever he dealt with such ‘temptations’ as artistic writing and romantic evocation of 
the past.24 Likewise, Langlois and Seignobos, in France, could not do without the 
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language of aims when they portrayed historians as traveling on a road toward 
the goal of their profession: establishing true facts about the past.25 However, 
while Bernheim, Langlois, and Seignobos could more or less expect their readers 
to agree with what they defined as the goal of their profession, given that deviant 
views mostly came from outside the mainstream of the historical discipline, Tietze 
and Adler saw themselves confronted with opposition from within the ranks of 
their profession. When they set out to define ‘the office of art history’,26 they were 
not articulating a broadly accepted position, but taking sides in a fierce debate 
about the scholar’s vocation.
 A lead for the future
Unsurprisingly, then, both Tietze and Adler presented their views on the aims 
of science in contrastive terms, that is, in explicit dissociation from alternative 
views on the goods that historical scholarship was supposed to pursue. Typical is, 
for example, Adler’s phrase ‘that the task of music history is not the exploration 
of artistic beauty [das Kunstschönen] in music, but knowledge of the development 
of music’.27 If this formulation already conveyed Adler’s desire to steer away from 
Hanslick,28 or more generally from all types of musicology in which aesthetic 
judgment took precedence over sober scientific analysis, it took only a couple 
of pages before the author had also dissociated himself from such colleagues as 
the Leipzig musicologist Hugo Riemann. He blamed Riemann, the editor of a 
multivolume Handbuch der Musikgeschichte (1904-1913), for collecting facts and 
toying with little problems without even trying to integrate these into an evolu-
tionary history of musical styles that, in Adler’s view, would best serve the aim of 
music history, which he defined as ‘the study and exposition of the development 
[Entwicklungsganges] of musical products’.29 The historicist trope of ‘development’, 
then, provided Adler with a solution for the tensions mentioned earlier. If the aim 
of music history was the detection of Entwicklung in musical styles, then music 
historians could, on the one hand, engage in what Adler called ‘scientific’ and ‘ob-
jective’ analysis of patterns and trends – a task to which much of the Methode was 
devoted.30 However, by doing so, music historians could also, on the other hand, 
provide current-day artists (composers such as Schönberg) with valuable clues as 
to where contemporary music came from and how it might be developed further 
– a role that Adler emphasized especially in his nonacademic publications.31
Although Tietze, twenty-five years Adler’s junior, presented a less articulat-
ed view on the aims of art history, his Methode nonetheless employed similar 
contrastive language. One front was Riegl’s dream of the art historian as a man 
without qualities, which Tietze rejected as incompatible with the hermeneutic 
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insight, derived from Wilhelm Dilthey, that art historians are always products of 
their times, voicing concerns and studying problems that inevitably reflect their 
own zeitgeist.32 ‘Objectivity’, therefore, was a word to be used only with caution 
and significant qualification: history is always being written by human beings 
of flesh and blood.33 Another methodological quarrel followed right out of this 
hermeneutical understanding of historical interpretation. Over against an art-
historical tradition that sought to identify lawlike patterns of stylistic change, 
Tietze firmly defended individual human agency, which he defined as ‘the most 
decisive factor’ in stylistic evolution.34 Given that this went right against such 
influential art historians as Heinrich Wölfflin, in Munich,35 it was evident that 
Tietze did not merely summarize or codify the views of others, but staked out a 
position of his own.
Given the divergence of views existing among music and art historians, it comes 
as no surprise that Tietze and especially Adler not only used contrastive language, 
but also wrote conditionally, about the gains to be obtained if just everyone agreed 
with their proposals, and in the future tense about the joyous day when scholars 
would eventually close the ranks and devote themselves jointly to research along 
the lines proposed in their books. How great would be the benefits if we could 
just ‘unite ourselves’ in methodological respect, Adler exclaimed. ‘We would only 
need to agree on the way of applying style criteria and, in the first place, become 
fully aware of our own treatment methods’.36 Near the end of his book, however, 
in a self-reflective passage on the possibility for this manual to ‘offer a lead for the 
future’, Adler admitted that this could take some time: ‘Almost all pages of this 
book point to new territory [Neuland] of music historical research, which has yet 
to be conquered’.37 Music history, in other words, had not yet reached a stage of 
shared paradigms: unanimity on the aims and methods of the discipline did not 
yet exist.38
Judging by its reception history, Adler’s volume did not suffer too much from 
this disagreement in the field. Even though critical voices were not lacking,39 
Adler’s approach resonated strongly among many of those, in Europe as well as 
overseas, who tried to establish musicology as a scholarly discipline.40 ‘What a 
university should teach the student of music has been set forth in The Method 
of Music History (1919) by Prof. Dr. Guido Adler of Vienna, dean of European 
musicologists’, stated an American admirer in 1925.41 Ten years later, that same 
American musicologist repeated his praise by hailing Adler as ‘the first to draw 
a ground-plan for the structure of musical research’, which had meanwhile been 
‘universally adopted’. ‘His disciples, far and wide, are teaching his theories’.42 One 
of these pupils, Wilhelm Fischer, even identified so thoroughly with Adler’s pro-
gram that he could not think of ‘serious [ernstzunehmenden] musical historical 
publications’ that did not adopt the methods laid down in Adler’s book.43
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If the Methode nonetheless did not achieve a status comparable to, for instance, 
Bernheim’s Lehrbuch, this was due to at least three factors. One is the modest 
size of the musicological discipline, another the fact that the Methode was not ex-
actly designed as an introductory textbook, and a third the circumstance that the 
manual quickly became overshadowed by Adler’s Handbuch der Musikgeschichte 
(1924),44 a thousand-plus-page tome that came to serve as ‘the textbook for Aus-
trian musicology students in the 1920s and 30s’.45 This, I note in passing, is an-
other challenge for the view that methodology manuals were primarily written 
for educational purposes. While Adler’s Methode cleared the ground, ambitiously 
and polemically, it was left to the Handbuch to survey the field in a more tranquil, 
encyclopedic, and student-friendly manner.46
Whereas Adler had therefore little reason to complain, Tietze’s manual met 
with fierce criticism. Although it was favorably reviewed by the French art his-
torian Louis Réau,47 most German-language reviews were unsparingly critical. 
They bemoaned not only the loose organization and inconvenient structure of 
the book, but especially also Tietze’s alignment with Bernheim, which was per-
ceived as repudiating the distinctiveness of the discipline and/or as testifying 
to an old-fashioned, source-oriented conception of art history. Tietze’s progres-
sive Viennese colleague, Joseph Strzygowski, for example, responded with dismay 
that Tietze seemed to want to bring the field back to pre-1890 standards.48 Erich 
Rothacker was slightly more sympathetic, but deeply puzzled by Tietze’s rather 
underdeveloped hermeneutics: How could he possibly combine a romantic no-
tion of human individuality with a positivist conception of science?49 Wölfflin’s 
former student Richard Hamann explained at length why Tietze’s rejection of 
laws in art history was fundamentally mistaken.50 And as if this was not enough, 
the Heidelberg art historian Carl Neumann, committed to a more aesthetically 
oriented type of art history, rebuked Tietze for rejecting aesthetic quality as a 
relevant category of art-historical interpretation.51
What these criticisms illustrate is not merely that Tietze was rather ineffective 
in proposing a hermeneutical conception of art history (so that it was left to anoth-
er Viennese colleague, Tietze’s fiend Max Dvořák, to advocate more successfully for 
a Kunstgeschichte als Geisteswissenschaft).52 More important for our present purpose 
is that almost all the reviewers treated the book not as a textbook, but as a piece 
of polemic, as a proposal or a stance in a debate over the nature and tasks of art 
history. They commented on Tietze’s ‘standpoint’,53 assessed his ‘polemics’,54 and, in 
Hamann’s case, took the book as an occasion to write a reply more than forty pages 
long. Tietze’s book figured, as it might have been intended to figure, in debates over 
what Tietze would later call the ‘fundamental questions’ and ‘fundamental prob-
lems’ of art history.55 It served, not as a repository of disciplinary wisdom, but as a 
stimulus to debate over the aims that art history was supposed to pursue.
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 Conclusion
Speaking about Bernheim’s Lehrbuch, Peter Novick once suggested that meth-
odology books of this kind were ‘probably more cited than read’.56 This may 
well have been the case, perhaps especially for those manuals, like Bernheim’s, 
that could be prescribed in university courses because of their extensive treat-
ment of nearly everything that historians could possibly wish to know about 
methods. It would be wrong, however, to assume that all manuals on historical 
method from around 1900 were encyclopedic surveys of methodological do’s 
and don’t’s, just as it would be inaccurate to assume that all manuals were pri-
marily written for educational purposes. In this paper, I have tried to argue 
that Tietze’s and Adler’s manuals challenge even some further clichés about 
the genre. These books did not codify an agreed-upon body of methods. They 
were neither dry-as-dust nor specimen of the fact-oriented sort of positivism 
epitomized by Langlois and Seignobos. Instead, these manuals were designed 
as polemical interventions in a debate over the proper aims of science. They 
dwelled on the scholar’s professional vocation at least as much as on details of 
source criticism. Moreover, they did not hesitate to do so in critical dissocia-
tion from alternative views on the aims of historical scholarship, in sometimes 
militantly polemical prose.
Accordingly, it is the genre of methodology manuals, as represented by Tiet-
ze and Adler, in which one may find some explicitly formulated answers to the 
question raised in the introduction of this paper: Why did late-nineteenth-cen-
tury humanities scholars disagree so often about the virtues, habits, and charac-
ter traits typical of a good, responsible, conscientious scholar? The gist of these 
answers is that scholars had different expectations of what counted as profes-
sional scholarly conduct, mainly (though not only) because they disagreed on the 
goals their work was supposed to serve. In fields fraught with moral, religious, 
and/or aesthetic sensibilities – that is, throughout the late-nineteenth-century 
humanities, even if these sensibilities were more contested in some fields than 
in others – the aims of science were a fundamental issue in disciplinary con-
troversies. They were fundamental, indeed, because these aims determined so 
much of what scholars associated with professional academic conduct, varying 
from methodological sophistication to technical skill and epistemic virtuousness. 
This explains, finally, why the genre of methodology manuals served more than 
educational purposes. Judging by Tietze’s and Adler’s contributions, manuals on 




1 Hans Schleier, ‘Ranke in the Manuals on Historical Methods of Droysen, Lorenz, and Bern-
heim’, in Georg G. Iggers and James M. Powell (eds.), Leopold von Ranke and the Shaping of 
the Historical Discipline (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 111-123; Philippe 
Carrard, ‘Disciplining Clio: The Rhetoric of Positivism’, Clio 24 (1995), 189-204.
2 Jeremy D. Popkin, History, Historians, and Autobiography (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), 16; Rolf Torstendahl, ‘Historical Professionalism: A Changing Product 
of Communities within the Discipline’, Storia della Storiografia 56 (2009), 3-26, at 10-11.
3 Lorraine Daston, ‘Die wissenschaftliche Persona: Arbeit und Berufung’, in Theresa Wob-
be (ed.), Zwischen Vorderbühne und Hinterbühne: Beiträge zum Wandel der Geschlechterbe-
ziehungen in der Wissenschaft vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (Bielefeld: Transcript 
Verlag, 2003), 110-136; Lorraine Daston and H. Otto Sibum, ‘Introduction: Scientific 
Personae and Their Histories’, Science in Context 16 (2003), 1-8.
4 Herman Paul, ‘The Scholarly Self: Ideals of Intellectual Virtue in Nineteenth-Century 
Leiden’, in Rens Bod, Jaap Maat, and Thijs Weststeijn (eds.), The Making of the Humani-
ties: From Early Modern to Modern Disciplines (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2012), 397-411.
5 Jo Tollebeek, Men of Character: The Emergence of the Modern Humanities (Wassenaar: 
Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011).
6 I borrow the expression ‘aims of science’ from Larry Laudan, Science and Values: The Aims 
of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate (Berkeley; London; Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1984).
7 For biographical details, see Ernst Lachnit, Die Wiener Schule der Kunstgeschichte und die 
Kunst ihrer Zeit: Zum Verhältnis von Methode und Forschungsgegenstand am Beginn der Mo-
derne (Vienna; Cologne; Weimar: Böhlau, 2005), 98-110; Almut Krapf-Weiler, ‘Daten zur 
Biographie’, in Hans Tietze, Lebendige Kunstwissenschaft: Texte 1910-1954, ed. Almut Krapf-
Weiler (Vienna: Schlebrügge, 2007), 308-315; Gabriele Johanna Eder, ‘Einleitung’, in Eder, 
Alexius Meinong und Guido Adler: Eine Freundschaft in Briefen (Amsterdam; Atlanta, GA: 
Rodopi, 1995), 3-52; idem, ‘Guido Adler: Grenzgänger zwischen Musikwissenschaft und 
Kulturleben’, in Theophil Antonicek and Gernot Gruber (eds.), Musikwissenschaft als Kul-
turwissenschaft damals und heute: Internationales Symposion (1989) zum Jubiläum der Instituts-
gründung an der Universität Wien vor 100 Jahren (Tutzing: Hans Schneider, 2005), 101-123.
8 Quoted in Kevin C. Karnes, Music, Criticism, and the Challenge of History: Shaping Mod-
ern Musical Thought in Late Nineteenth-Century Vienna (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 23.
9 M. Thausing, ‘Die Stellung der Kunstgeschichte als Wissenschaft: Aus einer Antritts-
vorlesung an der Wiener Universität im October 1873’, in Thausing, Wiener Kunstbriefe 
(Leipzig: E.A. Seemann, 1884), 1-20.
10 Cited in Max Dvořák, ‘Alois Riegl’, in Dvořák, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kunstgeschichte 
(Munich: R. Piper & Co., 1929), 280-298, there 285.
11 Catherine M. Soussloff, The Subject in Art: Portraiture and the Birth of the Modern (Dur-
ham; London: Duke University Press, 2006), 61-82.
12 Quoted in Karnes, Music, 24.
13 Guido Adler, ‘Umfang, Methode und Ziel der Musikwissenschaft’, Vierteljahrsschrift für 
Musikwissenschaft 1 (1885), 5-20. Cf. Philipp Spitta, ‘Kunstwissenschaft und Kunst’, in 
Spitta, Zur Musik: Sechzehn Aufsätze (Berlin: Gebrüder Paetel, 1892), 1-14.
181Manuals on Historical Method
14 Karnes, Music, 133-158.
15 Franz Schultz, ‘Die Entwicklung der Literaturwissenschaft von Herder bis Wilhelm 
Scherer’, in Philosophie der Literaturwissenschaft, ed. Emil Ermatinger (Berlin: Junker & 
Dünnhaupt, 1930), 1-42, at 37.
16 See, e.g., Hans Tietze, Die Methode der Kunstgeschichte: Ein Versuch (Leipzig: E.A. See-
mann, 1913), vi, 187, 240, 257, 288-289, 293, 298, 308, 316.
17 Mircea Ogrin, Ernst Bernheim (1850-1942): Historiker und Wissenschaftspolitiker im Kaiser-
reich und in der Weimarer Republik (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2012), 44-57; Hans Schleier, 
‘Ernst Bernheims Historik in seinem “Lehrbuch der historischen Methode”’, in Wolfgang 
Küttler (ed.), Das lange 19. Jahrhundert: Personen, Ereignisse, Ideen, Umwälzungen: Ernst 
Engelberg zum 90. Geburtstag (Berlin: Trafo, 1999), 275-292.
18 Guido Adler, Methode der Musikgeschichte (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1919), 2; Tietze, 
Methode, v, 4, 6, 3. All translations are mine.
19 Adler, Methode, 4-5.
20 Ibid., 2, 110, 59, 67, 63.
21 Tietze, Methode, 2, 7, 171.
22 E.g., ibid., 105, 107, 110, 113, 116, 123, 126, 165, 166, 176.
23 E.g., Adler, Methode, 6, 9, 10, 13, 15, 192.
24 Ernst Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode: Mit Nachweis der wichtigsten Quellen 
und Hülfsmittel zum Studium der Geschichte (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1889), 90-96, 
523, 528.
25 C.-V. Langlois and C. Seignobos, Introduction aux études historiques (Paris: Hechette & 
Cie., 1898), 44.
26 Tietze, Methode, 132.
27 Adler, Methode, 13.
28 On Adler’s difficult relation with Hanslick, see Gabriele Johanna Eder, ‘Eduard Hanslick und 
Guido Adler: Aspekte einer menschlichen und wissenschaftlichen Beziehung’, in Martin Sei-
ler and Friedrich Stadler (eds.), Kunst, Kunsttheorie und Kunstforschung im wissenschaftlichen 
Diskurs: In memoriam Kurt Blaukopf (1914-1999) (Vienna: ÖBV & HPT, 2000), 107-142.
29 Adler, Methode, 23, 9. Riemann, in turn, had dissociated himself from Adler in, for example, 
Hugo Riemann, Handbuch der Musikgeschichte, vol. II/2 (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1922), 
v-vi. On the relation between these two musicologists, see Barbara Boisits, ‘Hugo Riemann – 
Guido Adler: Zwei Konzepte von Musikwissenschaft vor dem Hintergrund geisteswissen-
schaftlicher Methodendiskussionen um 1900’, in Klaus Mehner and Tatjana Böhme-Mehner 
(eds.), Hugo Riemann (1849-1919): Musikwissenschaftler mit Universalanspruch (Cologne; 
Weimar; Vienna: Böhlau, 2001), 17-29; Alexander Rehding, Hugo Niemann and the Birth of 
Modern Musical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 138-149.
30 Barbara Boisits, ‘Historismus und Musikwissenschaft um 1900: Guido Adlers Begründung 
der Musikwissenschaft im Zeichen des Historismus’, Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 82 (2000), 
377-389; Barbara Boisits, ‘Kulturwissenschaftliche Ansätze in Adlers Begriff von Musik-
wissenschaft’, in Antonicek and Gruber, Musikwissenschaft als Kulturwissenschaft, 125-139.
31 Karnes, Music, 151-158.
32 For Dilthey’s influence on Tietze, see Riccardo Marchi, ‘Hans Tietze e la storia dell’arte 
come scienza dello spirito nella Vienna del primo Novecento’, Arte Lombarda 110/111 
(1994), 55-66.
33 Tietze, Methode, 455-466.
34 Ibid., 454.
35 Marchi, ‘Hans Tietze and Art History’, 20.
182 Herman Paul
36 Adler, Methode, 21.
37 Ibid., 193. 
38 These formulations reflect, of course, a progressivist narrative of disciplinary develop-
ment according to which Adler’s generation stood only ‘at the threshold’ of scientific re-
search (e.g., ibid., 26, 157, 192).
39 See Alfred Schnerich’s review in the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 87 (1920), 40.
40 See the reviews signed by J. M. and A. W., respectively, in Literarisches Zentralblatt für 
Deutschland 73 (1922), 39-40 and Musica Divina 11 (1923), 22-23.
41 Carl Engel, ‘Views and Reviews’, The Musical Quarterly 11 (1925), 617-629, there 620.
42 Carl Engel, ‘Views and Reviews’, The Musical Quarterly 21 (1935), 484-491, there 485.
43 Wilhelm Fischer, ‘Guido Adlers “Methode der Musikgeschichte”’, Zeitschrift für Musikwis-
senschaft 7 (1924), 500-503, at 503.
44 Guido Adler (ed.), Handbuch der Musikgeschichte (Frankfurt am Main: Frankfurter Ver-
lags-Anstalt, 1924).
45 John Charles Koslovsky, From Sinn und Wesen to Structural Hearing: The Development of 
Felix Salzer’s Ideas in Interwar Vienna and Their Transmission in the Postwar United States 
(PhD dissertation, University of Rochester, 2009), 72.
46 Fischer, ‘Guido Adlers Methode’, 501.
47 Louis Réau, ‘Un théoricien de l’histoire de l’art: Hans Tietze’, Revue de Synthèse Histo-
riques 28 (1914), 45-50, esp. 50.
48 Josef Strzygowski, Die Krisis der Geisteswissenschaften, vorgeführt am Beispiele der For-
schung über bildende Kunst: Ein gründsätzlicher Rahmenversuch (Vienna: Anton Schroll & 
Co., 1923), 55.
49 Erich Rothacker, ‘Literatur’, Repertorium für Kunstwissenschaft 41 (1919), 168-186, there 177.
50 R. Hamann, ‘Die Methode der Kunstgeschichte und die allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft’, 
Monatshefte für Kunstwissenschaft 9 (1916), 64-78, 103-114, 141-154.
51 Carl Neumann, ‘Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Kunstgeschichte’, Historische Zeitschrift 
116 (1916), 484-494, esp. 490-493.
52 Max Dvořák, Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte: Studien zur abendländischen Kunstent-
wicklung (Munich: R. Piper & Co., 1924).
53 Rothacker, ‘Literatur’, 176. 
54 Ibid., 179, 180; Neumann, ‘Theorie’, 485; Hamann, ‘Methode’, 64.
55 Hans Tietze, ‘Geisteswissenschaftliche Kunstgeschichte’, in Johannes Jahn (ed.), Die 
Kunstwissenschaft der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1924), 183-
198, at 183.
56 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical 
Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 38.
57 Research for this chapter was funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Re-
search (NWO).




This paper takes as its topic how the history of science, as a separate field of study, 
came into being in the early twentieth century and how it developed thereafter. 
The first signs of the institutionalization of the field as an academic discipline 
were the first international conference on the history of science held adjacent to 
the World Exhibition in Paris in 1900, the start of the journal Isis in 1912, and the 
founding of the History of Science Society in 1924. This journal and the society 
still occupy a prominent position in the field today. The period also saw the first 
chairs, textbooks and specialized courses in the history of science come about. To 
be sure, before the twentieth-century works on the history of science were writ-
ten. As a matter of fact historians operating in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury reacted to the philosophically informed views on the historical development 
of science of, for example, Comte, Whewell, Mach, and Duhem.2 Nothing ever 
starts in a void. Yet in the nineteenth century nothing resembling a modern aca-
demic specialization came about.3 For this reason I have chosen the early twen-
tieth century as a starting point of this overview of the development of the field.
Historiography of science is now a respected academic discipline all over the 
globe. Still, the field has not been institutionalized in a uniform way, for exam-
ple, as a clearly recognized subdiscipline of the study of history. Historians of 
science are often not employed by institutes of history but either appear as iso-
lated figures, scattered over the various faculties and institutes of universities, 
or are bundled in separate HPS (History and Philosophy of Science) or STS 
(Science, Technology and Society) institutions, quite often with strong ties to 
philosophy or sociology. The uneasy institutional status of the field is a symptom 
of profound differences in view on why and how the history of science should 
be studied. Among historians there is considerable difference of opinion on the 
purposes and aims of the field, what kinds of knowledge it should produce, by 
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what methods this knowledge should be arrived at, etc. One goal of this paper is 
to demonstrate where these differences come from. The paper starts with a sketch 
of the aims and goals that the first generation of professional historians of science 
set themselves. Their work, and the conscious reflection on this work, resulted 
in the formulation of a number of challenges for the new discipline. During and 
after the 1960s a thorough change in orientation in the field came about. A de-
scription of these changes is provided in this paper. We will then be in a position 
to consider the peculiar aspects of the maturation of the history of science and 
analyze the most important driving forces behind this process.
The output of scholarly research in the field clearly reflects the major reori-
entations after the 1960s. Yet other orientations, sometimes even opposite to the 
mainstream, continue to exist. The resulting picture of the current status of the 
field therefore is one of disorder. The variety in approaches to the history of sci-
ence can, to some extent, be viewed as a healthy form of pluralism. Yet there is 
also an aspect of unhealthy  ‘anarchy’ because fruitful exchanges of thought about 
the relative worth of the approaches, the possible compatibility of assumptions, 
etc., are rather scarce.4 This signals the need for reform. In the final section of the 
paper I argue that a road toward more unity in historiography of science can be 
found if two things are taken seriously. First, the recognition that the strong ties 
of the field to the natural sciences and to philosophy were not accidental. Aim-
ing to gain complete independence from these ‘parent’ disciplines must therefore 
be considered as a wrong-headed project. Second, the recognition that the chal-
lenges to the profession that were already formulated by the first generation of 
professional historians of science are still relevant today. It is with respect to these 
challenges that a new balance must be struck. These considerations show how the 
study of the history of a discipline can be relevant to the operations of that very 
discipline in the present.
 Aims of the field in the first phase of professionalization
The central figure in the first phase of the institutionalization of history of sci-
ence was George Sarton (1884-1956). Sarton was of Belgian origin but gained 
recognition as a professor at Harvard University. Sarton taught history of science 
there for many decades. Among his students were important later scholars in 
science studies, such as I.B. Cohen and Robert K. Merton. He was also instru-
mental in Alexandre Koyré’s move to the US, where he became highly influential. 
Sarton set up the journal Isis and was its editor-in-chief for many years. He was 
also involved in the creation of the History of Science Society. Sarton’s role in the 
institutionalization of the discipline is widely recognized. Of interest here are the 
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programmatic essays he wrote about the relevance of the field, not just to the rest 
of the academic system but to society as a whole, and the way it should be studied 
and taught to students. The arguments and motivations he gave for a thorough 
study of the history of science by way of a specialized academic discipline form an 
interrelated whole that is worthwhile to unravel. Sarton’s views will also be com-
pared to the views of his contemporaries; this comparison yields a good picture 
of the prevailing ideas with respect to the study of past science during the first 
phase of its professionalization.
Sarton saw science as the only human activity in which progress had been 
achieved. According to him the progressive force of science also had profound 
effects on society, especially in modern times. It was through science that the 
improvement of living conditions became possible and science also showed the 
way to improve the organization of society. Furthermore Sarton saw the striving 
for pure knowledge as a moral quest. Good scientific research was a disinter-
ested search for the truth and this attitude brought about the most outstanding 
achievements the human mind was capable of.
For all these reasons Sarton argued that the scientific enterprise had to be 
dealt with great care. If science fell into the wrong hands, or if it were practiced 
in the wrong way, this could only be harmful to society. A mistaken approach to 
science was not just a symptom of a bad regime: it could well be conducive to 
wrong political systems.5 Another danger was that scientists could start to over-
rate themselves and the importance of their contributions. Such hubris needed a 
check at all times. In premodern days people were kept in check by a clear social 
hierarchy: the church or the nobility. In modern times such social hierarchies, and 
the institutions connected to them, have only a marginal hold on people. Thus 
other forms of (institutional) control were needed.
Now Sarton firmly believed that modern historical consciousness could re-
place the older forms of social control if it was embedded in a spirit of ‘new hu-
manism’. The old humanism had known three categories: the natural, the human 
and the superhuman. The superhuman was thought to be the highest category, 
the natural to be the lowest. It followed that the study of man was also more im-
portant than the study of nature. This needed to be changed, according to Sarton. 
In his ‘new humanism’ the superhuman category disappeared and the study of 
man gained equal status with the study of nature. Only the combination of study 
of both fields could save humanity from the so-called technocrats: scientists who 
had become specialists in their own fields, who had no respect for the humanities 
and a total lack of appreciation of the unity of science. According to Sarton the 
role for the history of science in bringing this new humanism about was crucial: 
‘Between the old humanist and the scientist, there is but one bridge, the history of 
science, and the construction of that bridge is the main cultural need of our time’.6
186 Bart Karstens
Why was the history of science needed for this? Why not just concentrate on 
the products of modern science? Sarton answered this question by pointing to the 
complementary tasks of science and the historiography of science. For him there 
was no difference in principle between these fields. Both science and the study of 
its history worked toward the same goals, namely the acquisition of knowledge. It 
is only that the tasks of historians and scientists were different. Whereas the sci-
entist investigates nature and comes up with experimental and theoretical results, 
the historian should act as a critic of the products of the scientist, like art critics 
value the work of artists. Sarton thought that: ‘There can be no real understand-
ing of science, that is, there can be no science, without continuous criticism of it’.7 
This continuous criticism is the most important check on the dangers involved 
in the growth of knowledge and technology. On top of debates held within the 
scientific community, the historian was in a position to deliver such permanent 
criticism because he or she possessed the scholarship to place the products of the 
scientist and the debates held in scientific communities in a larger perspective 
and evaluate the new contribution with respect to the foregoing tradition. In this 
way historical understanding and current scientific research met and only a pro-
fessional historiography of science could provide the needed bridge.
Apart from being a critic, the historian should also act as a guardian. One 
of the main tasks of historiography of science was to establish the good tradi-
tion and do away with things that do not belong to it such as superstitions, 
undeserved privileges, (willful) error, etc. This good tradition was not a story of 
immutability. Tradition for Sarton was a dynamic force, not an endless repeti-
tion of the same behavior. He saw the good tradition as a sequence of the right 
steps. Only when this good tradition was safely protected could new discoveries 
and new claims to knowledge be assessed properly. The historian must thus be 
evaluative with respect to the past and present but not in the simplistic sense 
that everything in the past that contradicts present-day knowledge should be 
considered as bad science. Science progresses toward the truth but this road is 
difficult and almost every scientific theory so far has proven to be open for revi-
sion. The methods by which this constant revision is possible are thus of central 
importance to the whole endeavor.
It was equally important that the historian highlighted the human dimension 
in this process. Historians had to concentrate on the nonlinear development of 
science. Gathering knowledge about the world was a difficult process, which re-
quired a lot of effort. In the long run, with the benefit of hindsight, it is possible 
to see patterns and logical sequences but when focused on shorter time spans 
great struggles can be seen, hard work, wandering down wrong paths, periods of 
puzzlement and conflicts with others, victories and losses, etc. Clearly it was one 
of the historian’s tasks to highlight these struggles in narratives about the past. 
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‘New humanism’ thus also meant that the human effort that had to be put in to 
unravel nature’s mysteries gained the highest respect: ‘The New Humanist is of 
all men the one who is most conscious of his traditions and of the traditions of 
mankind. He admires the wonders of science but the greatest wonder of all he 
reflects is that man revealed them’.8
Finally, historians of science should become, perhaps somewhat paradoxi-
cally, specialists in generalization, and obtain long-term views lending unity to 
all scientific efforts. The general picture should act as an antidote to today’s de-
lusions and create the right attitude to science by sorting effects of moderation, 
patience and, most importantly, humility. Scientists are after the truth and their 
theories are converging toward it but they need to bear in mind that their ideas 
are continuously subject to revision. Knowledge of the history of science can 
help to critically evaluate present scientific ideas. Thus acquaintance with the 
history of science could have the following benefits: be an inspiration for cur-
rent scientists, act as a check on claims of originality, lend a scientific attitude 
to further scientists’ investigations and provide useful morals for present-day 
research.
In education the historian had to teach what science was about, its function 
and methods, its psychological and sociological implications, its deep humanity 
and its importance for the purification of thought and the integration of culture. 
In order to do all this a historian of science had to be an expert in history, have a 
good command of the state of the art in the sciences of both his or her own day 
and the past, be able to interpret past sources well (Sarton was also an empiri-
cist), and also be a good writer and an able teacher.
Taken together, and especially in an age of rapid discipline formation, the task 
was obviously impossible for a single scholar to perform. This is precisely the reason 
why Sarton put so much effort in the institutionalization of the field. The unearth-
ing of the sources and the interpretations of all episodes of the history of science 
for the most part still needed to commence. A great number of people was needed 
to perform such an abundance of detailed research projects. Good communica-
tion channels and an institutional platform for bringing all this knowledge together, 
passing it over to future generations and eventually build syntheses out of them, 
was therefore absolutely necessary. Otherwise historiography of science could nev-
er perform the important tasks Sarton had placed on it. And since these tasks were 
for him of crucial importance to the well-being of mankind as a whole, he devoted 
much energy to the legitimatization of the study of history of science as a separate 
discipline and the institutionalization of the field in the academic world.
According to Kragh, Sarton’s program was never carried out in practice.9 
There is, however, serious reason to doubt this. First the well-known historian 
of science A. Rupert Hall noticed a great influence of Sarton’s ideas in Cam-
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bridge at the onset of professional historiography of science there. He writes: 
‘the broad notion of the literate scientific culture, at once rigorous and humane, 
agnostic and experimental, which Sarton called the New Humanism had be-
come widespread during the first half of the century’.10 Apart from such direct 
references the similarities between Sarton’s programmatic writings and the work 
of other historians such as Alexandre Koyré (1892-1964), E.A. Burtt (1892-1989) 
and E.J. Dijksterhuis (1892-1965) are striking. These historians did not write 
lengthy programmatic essays but were all occupied with establishing the good 
tradition, with the issue of humanism and with the philosophical dimension of 
science.
 In the writings of both Koyré and Burtt we find the view of science as the most 
successful movement of thought history so far records. But in both we also find 
comments on the downside of the progress that modern science brought, not un-
like Max Weber’s ideas on the disenchantment of the world. According to Burtt 
the dominance of modern science in Western culture had led to a downgrading of 
the human spirit. It was the central task of philosophy ‘to reinstate man with his 
high spiritual claims’11 rather than let him become a mere entity reducible to the 
atomic categories of modern science. The remedy for this, according to Burtt, was 
to reconnect science in each historical period to the philosophical or metaphysical 
ideas that reigned supreme in these periods. The quest for scientific knowledge 
could be properly understood only in connection to these philosophical schemes. 
Hence the title of Burtt’s work, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical 
Science (1924). The fear of dehumanization is expressed in different terms than 
in the work of Sarton, who considered the scientific process dangerous, not in 
itself, but only if the control of science fell into the wrong hands. Yet the remedy 
both come up with is strikingly similar: a firm connection between the sciences 
and the humanities is needed in order to benefit most from the advancement in 
scientific knowledge.
Koyré’s ideas, although slightly different again, can easily be compared to the 
views of Burtt and Sarton. Like Burtt, Koyré too argued for the importance 
of studying philosophical schemes of the past. For him general mental frame-
works could not be separated from scientific research: in every period scien-
tific thought must be related to the ‘thinking cap’ prevalent in the period. In 
effect this can be seen as the start of contextualism in historiography of science.12 
What made the seventeenth-century breakthrough in science possible for Koyré 
was a change from Aristotelianism to Neoplatonism. The latter brought with it 
the idea that reality was to be captured in mathematical terms. From a world of 
‘more or less’ people started to live in a universe of precision. It was chiefly Gali-
leo who brought this revolution about. For Koyré, Galileo’s approach to science 
was basically the right one.13
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The praise for Neoplatonism was shared by Dijksterhuis, who launched the 
idea of a mechanization of the world picture, which was in fact a mathematiza-
tion of the world picture.14 A considerable difference of opinion with Koyré was 
that Dijksterhuis did not consider reality as fundamentally mathematical. He 
saw mathematics as a way of describing that gets us as close to reality as we can. 
Yet they both had a decidedly anti-positivist attitude, as can also be read off from 
Koyré’s slogan that ‘good physics is done a priori’. Thus there was a great differ-
ence with Sarton, who very much wanted to align history of science to the posi-
tivist project in philosophy. Yet what is most important for the present purposes 
is to see that they all tried, in very different ways to be sure, to relate the study of 
past science in one way or another to philosophy, thereby finding a way to distin-
guish the good tradition in science from the bad.
 Cohen has summed up Koyré’s achievements in the following way:
Let there be no mistake about it: Koyré had a most powerful message. It 
had all the strengths of a unitary account in which, through the magnetic 
action of the core conception, a huge number of hitherto unrelated histori-
cal facts were now arranged, like so many iron filings, along neat lines of 
force.15
That core conception was the Scientific Revolution. In Sartonian spirit Koyré’s 
unitary account combined the search for the right place of the human aspect in 
the development of science, the aim to distinguish the good tradition from the 
bad, and an attempt to secure a fundamental place for philosophy in writing of 
the history of science. The similarities in outlook on the goals and aims of the 
new profession are striking. The execution of them led to a number of challenges 
that, as will be argued, have remained pressing, especially for the study of past 
science in our day.
 Challenges to the profession
 Gradually historians started to doubt the value of sketching ‘big pictures’ of the 
history of science because these appeared to be centered too much on the present 
instead of the past. Therefore stories of the good tradition, spanning long periods 
of time, possibly held together with unifying concepts, are nowadays invariably 
set aside as ‘Whiggism’. In general one speaks of Whig history when the historical 
process is accounted for with present outcomes in mind. This lends the historical 
process a form of necessity and for this reason presentist schemes for the organi-
zation of historical narratives are mostly rejected. Next to presentism three other 
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Whiggish ‘sins’ can be associated with history of science, namely judgmentalism, 
triumphalism and internalism.
All these four aspects of Whiggism apply to the historiography of science that 
was produced until roughly the 1960s. It was presentist in the sense that histori-
ans sought to establish the string of ideas that had led to the present-day state of 
scientific knowledge. It was also presentist in its objectives: to keep contemporary 
developments of science in check by historical awareness. It was judgmental in 
the sense that studying the history of science led to inferences about what the 
correct way of doing science was. It was triumphalist as science was seen as poten-
tially beneficial to mankind and achievements in science, especially during and af-
ter the Scientific Revolution, were seen as the highest achievements of mankind. 
It was internalist in the sense that an influence of the so-called ‘external’ factors, 
such as social, economic, political and cultural factors, on the course of science 
was hardly recognized. Although a start of contextualism can be witnessed, this 
contextualism applies only to the wider mental, spiritual or philosophical con-
text, and certainly not to the socio-cultural context.
It comes as no surprise, then, that historians who did begin to put emphasis 
on an analysis of the socio-cultural context in order to understand past sci-
ence set aside the work of their predecessors as Whiggish. A recent example is 
Steven Shapin, who sees in Sarton no more than a triumphalist. He explains 
this triumphalism by Sarton’s institutional aims. The high achievements of the 
past were a good selling point for the study of history. When historiography 
of science had become a recognized discipline in the university system, Shapin 
argues, there was no longer any need for exaggeration and a process of ‘ lowering 
the tone’ could begin.16 There is maybe some truth in this analysis but in general 
I believe it can be harmful to brush off the older historiography of science as 
Whiggish with the implication that the work, as well as the incentives behind 
this work, can be considered irrelevant. In this way one loses sight of important 
motivations to engage in historical study of the past and equally important de-
liberations on the discipline’s aims and the prospects of and problems in achiev-
ing these aims.
The first generation of professional historians of science certainly was not 
naively Whiggish. There was keen appreciation of the struggles of past scientists 
and their modes of thinking. Not everything that must be considered wrong 
from the standards of present-day science was simply rejected as uninteresting 
or as bad science. Being an important link in the chain toward the present was 
the most important criterion to assess the science of the past. Progress was also 
not seen as a linear, gradual and smooth process, as an extreme Whig account 
of past science would have it. However, dividing the concept of Whig history 
into four aspects, presentism, judgmentalism, progressivism/triumphalism and 
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internalism, allows for a more balanced approach to ‘Whiggism’. It is quite well 
possible that interpretations of these aspects can be formulated without turning 
them into a ‘Whiggish sin’. It is, for example, not difficult to see that any form of 
historiography contains a degree of presentism, for the simple reason that the 
historian can never fully shake off his or her own rootedness in place and time. 
Moreover with the rejection of Whig history talk of progress has been aban-
doned in historiography of science. One can, with Elzinga, wonder whether this 
effect of the use of the notion of Whig history is desirable: ‘The reproach has 
become a shibboleth, which is placed in position against anyone who claims that 
science is in progress at all’.17
It is indeed important to recognize that the term ‘Whig history’ with refer-
ence to the historiography of science only came in use from the 1970s onwards.18 
If one searches the word in the Isis database one sees references to the term 
increase dramatically only from the 1980s onwards. This suggests that the usage 
of the term has played a role in the legitimatization of new approaches to past 
science (see the next section). Dismissing former approaches as naively Whig-
gish then appears also to have been a rhetorical strategy. This strategy leaves all 
kinds of questions unaddressed. If triumphalism was needed to legitimize the 
field, the question why the historiography of science was needed as a separate 
academic field is still open. Why were the concerns with humanism so strongly 
present in many scholars? And if the present was thought so important, why 
was a study of the history of science needed? Why not just devote all effort to 
present-day science? Only by zooming in on the ‘unitary’ accounts of scholars 
like Sarton and Koyré can we find answers to such questions. The uptake of 
this paper is that a number of challenges to the profession that can be extracted 
from this, have lost none of their relevance today. These challenges have in 
common that they are all about striking a right balance between generalism and 
specialism.
The first of three challenges is the tension between the universalist aspira-
tions of historiography of science and the increase in specialization in the natural 
sciences. How to satisfy the aim of maintaining a general overview of the whole 
development of science if it becomes so enormously complex? Even groups of his-
torians cannot keep up with the specialism required to understand what is going 
on in all the separate disciplines and subdisciplines.19 The issue of unity between 
past and present is at stake here as well as the issue of unity between science 
and history of science which Sarton, in particular, envisaged as complementary 
endeavors. A gap in expertise was already felt pressing before World War II. The 
continuing relevance of the problem can, however, be seen in the so-called ‘Sci-
ence Wars’ in the 1990s. In this period historians or sociologists of science were 
blamed by natural scientists for not having a clue about what they were talking 
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about in terms of the content of scientific theories. On the other hand natural 
scientists were blamed for ignoring the impact of contextual factors on the course 
of science. Both camps argued that the other camp was, through fundamental 
ignorance, not in a position to offer serious critique, analysis or interpretation of 
past and present science. The way these ‘Science Wars’ were conducted strikes one 
as not very fruitful and the debate in the end was quite inconclusive.20 Sarton’s 
worst fear of a separation between the sciences and the humanities appeared to 
have come about!
The second challenge involves the tension between the generalist attitude of 
the historian and the need to stay close to the sources. For Sarton generalization 
(the creation of larger historical syntheses) over detailed case studies was justi-
fied only after work on the primary sources had been done. Since in later genera-
tions the number of relevant factors to consider expanded dramatically (see the 
next section) the number of sources to take into account expanded as well. A 
decidedly empirical attitude then blocks the way to setting up a grand historical 
narrative about science. Sarton could still maintain a relatively simple concep-
tion of the good tradition and how to account for it, but such a thing is no longer 
possible today. The question the field has yet to answer satisfactorily is what the 
proper level of generalization is and how to connect this to detailed studies of 
source material tied to historical localities.
A final point of tension is the relation between philosophy of science and his-
toriography of science. Next to the natural sciences, philosophy of science must 
be considered as the mother discipline of the historiography of science. Clearly 
during the first period of professionalization the ties to philosophy were quite 
strong. In Sarton there was an emphasis on positivism; others sought to connect 
past science to its metaphysical backgrounds and held the turn to Neoplatonism 
in high esteem. Moreover all historians were involved in the philosophical project 
of setting up criteria for what good science consists of and this model of good sci-
ence was surely meant to be context independent. Philosophical thinking led to 
overarching normative models of science. Historical research was done in order 
to demonstrate or test such philosophical models. Today most historians abhor 
such historiography and the implication is that philosophy is mostly kept at a dis-
tance. Yet weakening the ties to the natural sciences and to philosophy of science 
did not lead to independent historical scholarship as ties to the social sciences 
such as sociology and anthropology were set in place. In the next two sections this 
profound change in orientation will be addressed and analyzed. We will then be 
in a position to assess the significance of the three challenges to the profession as 
it is currently practiced.
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 Changes to the profession
After World War II attention for the study of the history of science grew consid-
erably. In the US chairs were created at the insistence of not only university policy 
makers but also general politicians.21 Yet according to Kuhn professionalization 
in historical scholarship proceeded slowly. In a tribute paper to commemorate 
Sarton, Kuhn offered some valuable insights into the status of the field of the 
historiography of science in the 1950s. In hindsight he felt the field offered an 
amateurish sight. There were regular meetings of the History of Science Society 
but these were relatively small conferences, sometimes even held at the home 
of one of the members of the society. Moreover, Kuhn himself was appointed 
lecturer in the history of science while having had no training in that field what-
soever. He observed that such a thing would be impossible in the 1980s. Kuhn did 
not express any nostalgic feelings about this period and claimed that, in spite of 
all the efforts before, the professionalization of the discipline started only when 
his generation set out to work.22
This much-needed increase in historical sophistication occurred against the 
background of changing perspectives on the benefits of science for mankind. Sci-
ence was also seen as standing at the root of many negative things such as de-
humanization and alienation, pollution and dramatic forms of warfare. Perhaps 
the gain in scientific knowledge did not automatically lead to improvements in 
human life. Perhaps scientific progress was a myth. To address the fear of loss of 
control it was necessary to lower the tone of science.23 Because it put science on a 
high pedestal, making it something sacred and inaccessible, the universalist ideol-
ogy was seen to be part of the problem and not part of the solution as the older 
generation had thought. The concern with improving society, that was clearly 
present from the beginning of the process of professionalization, remained, but 
became articulated in a completely different way as new approaches to (past) sci-
ence came into being.
These new approaches invariably started to stress the contingent aspects of 
the historical process. The main idea became to understand past science on its 
own terms. Kuhn’s notion of the paradigm demonstrates the shift in attention 
well.24 In its most common interpretation a scientific paradigm is a ‘closed’ sys-
tem consisting of theories, methods of research and standards of evaluation, 
but also of a set of values, principles and background assumptions. This set is 
informed by the social and cultural factors dominant in a given period and/or 
place. All aspects together determine what normal science is within the para-
digm. When a shift occurs to a new paradigm Kuhn argued that no cumula-
tive process of increase of knowledge should be assumed, as the perspective 
on things, even on the most fundamental concepts like time and space, could 
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change dramatically. Thus the next paradigm should be understood on its own 
terms again, and so on.25
Older science students were aware that reality was not easily mirrored in sci-
entific theories but they did not imagine that the relationship could be so com-
plex with a multitude of contextual factors operating on it.26 Yet even Kuhn’s 
model of science as moving from paradigm to paradigm can nowadays appear as 
a bit old-fashioned. A paradigm for Kuhn could last very long, for example, the 
Newtonian paradigm that held sway from roughly 1700 to 1900. Moreover within 
a period of normal science the focus on scientific ideas is still quite dominant. 
Sociologists and historians after Kuhn found all this too schematic and too ab-
stract.27 They argued that research should focus on concrete local circumstances 
and the concrete interaction of people and things. Ideas were not just floating in 
the air but their emergence and acceptance or rejection should be understood in 
terms of these interactions. The maturation process of the history of science has 
therefore been one of increasing localization.
This process can be captured in two ways. It can be viewed as a process of 
increasing naturalization of the study of past science. By ‘naturalization’ I mean 
here the approach to explain science in causal terms. This can be done on the fol-
lowing levels: social interaction, man-nature interaction, psychological processing 
and historical factors.28 It depends on the specific approach to past science which 
form of causal interaction is given the most dominant explanatory force. The 
naturalist approach is opposed to the formal approach to the study of science, 
which aims to establish a logical succession in the historical process of theory re-
placement and seeks to identify relations in the total body of scientific knowledge 
by the use of formal logic. The formal approach has close ties to philosophy and 
has been increasingly rejected in favor of naturalist projects in history of science. 
Fields apt to serve such projects are the social sciences and also the study of his-
tory, broadly speaking.
Another way to capture the change in orientation in the study of past science 
is in terms of symmetry. The principle of symmetry, introduced to the study of 
science by sociologist David Bloor in 1976, orders us to study both true and false 
claims to knowledge in the same manner, i.e., symmetrically. For Bloor it is not 
the case that ‘good’ science can be explained by reference to a set of rational or 
formal rules and deviations from good science by reference to ‘disturbing’ social 
factors. Instead all acceptance and rejection of theories should according to him 
be explained by reference to the same type of factors, namely social factors. There 
may be other factors in play but social factors (meant in the widest sense possible) 
ultimately determine the course of science, for example, in the settling of scien-
tific controversies.29 Norms of rationality cannot be used to explain past science 
but acceptance of norms becomes itself a topic of investigation. The rationale of 
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this approach is to gain a better grasp of the decision-making processes in science. 
A deeper understanding of these social processes would yield more control over 
the scientific enterprise and possibly minimize harmful effects to society. Note 
that the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ is given up. In any historical 
context acceptance and rejection of knowledge claims is inextricably mixed up 
with all the societal factors present in that context.30
It has proven possible to erase more boundaries and expand the reach of the 
symmetry principle.31 Such generalized principles of symmetry declare even more 
things as topics of investigation, instead of using them as explanatory resources. 
In other words, analytical concepts and models are increasingly replaced in favor 
of a purely descriptive approach of rigidly following the actors, perhaps not far 
remote from the old Rankean spirit of  ‘bloss zeigen wie es eigentlich gewesen’.32
What these programmatic changes have meant for the research agenda of his-
torians of science has been brought together by Golinski in a useful survey.33 The 
following themes dominate this agenda: study of scientific and experimental prac-
tices (practical turn), focus on material circumstances, instruments and objects 
(material turn), focus on linguistic practice, discourse analysis, communication, 
representation (linguistic turn), attention to the places of research (geographical 
turn), the institutionalization process of universities, scientific disciplines, etc., 
the interaction of science and the public and the self-fashioning of scientists. To 
this list a number of socially oriented topics such as relations of trust and author-
ity among scientists, relations between science and politics and the interwoven-
ness of economic and scientific developments can be added (social turn). Golinski 
argues that this list of topics has become what mainstream historiography of sci-
ence is occupied with. I agree with this and add that this continues to be so to this 
day. As a Belgian historian recently put it: ‘It is widely accepted among historians 
of science that the production of knowledge is first and foremost a localized pro-
cess [...], the localized setting plays a crucial role in understanding its conceptual 
and epistemic features’.34
 A peculiar process of maturation
It is strange that the development in approaches to historiography of science has 
ended in a form of Rankean historicism, the model general professional histo-
riography started out with at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but that 
has long become obsolete.35 How can we account for this? Behind the process of 
naturalization of the study of past science two driving forces can be discerned. 
Lorraine Daston once said that ‘all epistemology is born in fear’. These two driv-
ing forces can both be seen as being born in fear. The first force I call the striving 
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for liberation. By liberation I mean the freeing of dogmas, norms and standards, 
Eurocentrism, Westernization, elitism, etc. There is a moral component in this. 
In presenting the development of science, both in terms of its knowledge claims 
and in terms of its institutions, as a highly contingent process and in denying that 
there exist transcendental norms with which all scientific activities and products 
can be judged, space is created to treat all actions and motives of past historical 
actors with equal respect. Further, stepping back from the modernist progressive 
project creates room for a critical engagement with this project, which staunch 
adherents of modernism are not willing to undertake. All this relates to a fear of 
objectivism: the dehumanizing force of science that destroys essential aspects of 
man’s life – something that bothered Burtt and Koyré. Perhaps it is ultimately 
a Romantic fear, as one of the points of Romanticism was to free the individual 
from the mechanistic and deterministic schemes that Enlightenment thinking 
had produced.
The second driving force I have called the striving for exactness. An empiricist 
attitude of being as exact as possible in explications of past science shows itself in 
the approach to investigate concrete causal relations. Pointing toward ‘influences’ 
of persons, ideas or movements on scientists is not enough but must be made 
concrete by identifying patterns of interaction. This approach has gradually gained 
the upper hand in the historiography of science. Grand narratives or large-scale 
comparisons are eschewed because they are regarded as speculative. This is the 
scientific side of the abolishment of a priori analytical concepts, or philosophi-
cally informed interpretive models of past science. Historians do not want to be 
reproached for being unscientific and therefore they insist on the most exact proof 
they can get. This fear of being unscientific relates to a more general fear of sub-
jectivism. Once progressive ideals and transcendental standards are given up there 
is nothing to go by and hence the door is open for subjective speculation. Only 
an insistence on proof of concrete causal interactions can keep this door closed.
The two fears are clearly different as one leads to a striving for less determina-
tion whereas the other leads to a striving for more determination. Yet strangely 
both lead to the same direction in historiography of science. Both lead to a local-
ist and descriptivist type of historiography.36 This becomes understandable if the 
striving for liberation is interpreted as an avoidance of prescriptivism. To let the 
past speak without fitting it into all kinds of straitjackets is not incompatible with 
an empiricist attitude of deriving theories from facts and being wary of too much 
theoretical speculation.
A conscious estrangement of philosophy and the natural sciences has occurred 
in connection. Historians of science no longer wanted to work in service of these 
disciplines and claimed independence instead. This, however, has proven more 
easily said than done. Interpretative models from the social sciences have started 
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to exert a strong influence on the field and cannot easily be passed by. And if the 
return to a naive historicism is the price that needs to be paid to become a fully 
recognized historical subdiscipline then this price is surely too high.37 I am drawn 
to the conclusion that to gain complete independence for historiography of sci-
ence is a mistaken goal. It belongs to the peculiarities of historiography of science 
that it really is a discipline that stands on a bridge between the natural sciences 
and the humanities. The subject matter historians of science have to deal with, 
the products of the sciences, together with the humanistic methods of studying 
and interpreting the past dictate this. Trying to gain independence by cutting off 
the bridge from the banks would be self-destructive. In light of this conclusion, 
and in light of the analysis of the developments in the approach to past science 
in mainstream historiography of science, the three challenges to the profession 
formulated above require renewed attention.
 Back to the challenges
In the development of approaches to the history of science the common aim has 
been to loosen the ties to the natural sciences and to philosophy. This enterprise 
has been driven by lofty ethical and scientific ideals but the end result of the pro-
cess is nonetheless unsatisfactory. We were drawn to the conclusion that the rela-
tion between historiography of science and its ‘parent’ disciplines has to be taken 
seriously. The challenge then is not to gain independence by cutting ties with these 
disciplines but to reconceptualize the relations between historiography of science, 
philosophy and the natural sciences. This challenge fits in remarkably well with the 
three challenges formulated above of striking the right balance between general-
ism and specialism. On all scores, the history of science has started to lean over to 
specialism. The danger of this is that the field is losing its relevance.
The first challenge was to address the tension between maintaining a universal 
picture of scientific development and the dramatic increase in specialization in 
the sciences. To place all the developments into the larger picture is very hard to 
do since it runs against the problem that highly specialized knowledge is needed 
for that. This is not something historians of science can easily acquire. The solu-
tion that has been followed by historians of science is to break off the past from 
the present and focus on past science, forbidding the use of present-day scientific 
knowledge in historical explication. This approach can, however, backfire, even 
when the aim is just gaining a better understanding of specific historical episodes. 
Although this has to be handled with great care, it can be argued that modern 
ideas about phenomena with which past scientists also struggled can help in ex-
plicating past science.38 In order to make proper use of modern scientific knowl-
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edge in accounts of past science cooperation needs to be sought with present-day 
scientists. Scientists can benefit from this cooperation too as historical scholar-
ship can be of aid in present-day research.39
The second challenge was to come up with a proper level of generalization. 
The prevalent empiricism in the historiography of science nowadays blocks gen-
eralization very quickly. The problem with a full empiricism, in which almost 
anything is declared a topic that requires explanation, is, however, that selective 
criteria of what is relevant in the past fail us. To describe everything is not only 
impossible – the past is far too complex for that – but also undesirable. It would 
be just a reproduction of the past without any gains or insight. One can won-
der what purpose the description of all the interactions between actors in the 
past serves since there is no longer a clear research agenda behind it.40 Although 
historical scholarship has markedly improved over the years, in the end the two 
forces driving the process have overshot their goals. They put restrictions on the 
tools of analysis historians of science are allowed to use and these restrictions 
lead to unwelcome consequences. The challenge is to retreat a few steps without 
relinquishing the abundance of insight that the symmetrical approaches to past 
science have brought. How to achieve this is one of the harder questions as it is 
very easy to slide back into Whig history or to the re-instantiation of norma-
tive philosophical models of science that do not square very well with the actual 
course of history.
Yet philosophy is indispensable for finding the way forward. Thomas Kuhn 
observed that ‘particularly in periods of acknowledged crisis, scientists have 
turned to philosophical analysis as a device for unlocking the riddles of their 
field’.41 This holds for historians of science as well, who still have to unlock the 
riddle of the connection between the general and the specific. This brings us to 
the third challenge: How can we envisage the relation between the historical (spe-
cific, concrete) and the philosophical (general, abstract) study of science?
It is good to recognize that in spite of all the rhetoric philosophy has never 
been cut out completely in the science studies. As a matter of fact, the shift in 
orientation toward past science was supported by philosophical arguments and 
new approaches were founded upon philosophical ideas. For example, the ideas of 
the later Wittgenstein on rule following, language games, life forms and ‘meaning 
is use’ or Quine’s naturalist epistemology and his holistic approach to scientific 
knowledge have played a profound role.42 Philosophy has thus been out only on 
the surface. Philosophical debates about science have continued and ‘symmetrists’ 
have amply taken part in them.43
All this is an indication that the role of philosophy in any approach to the 
study of science is indispensable. To satisfy the need for a new analytical frame-
work one has to turn to philosophy. Historians no longer have to be afraid that 
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philosophers do not recognize the value of their work. Historical winds have 
blown hard enough through the ranks of philosophy for philosophers to recog-
nize an important role for history in their models of science. Clear examples are 
projects in normative naturalism (Laudan, Rouse, Mayo), specific formulations 
of the analogy between science and evolutionary theory and new developments 
in thinking about the concept of error.44 Such projects, however, have not found 
their way into the community of historians of science yet. Perhaps reaching out 
to them still requires shrugging off stereotyped images of philosophy and Whig-
gism in the community of historians of science.
Another option would be to seriously investigate the merits of comparative 
historiography for the history of science. The suggestion is very logical because 
comparisons bring about a connection between what is specific and what is gen-
eral. When two particular historical localities are compared, what is present in 
both automatically becomes more general whereas what is present in only one 
context remains specific. Both findings can be valuable for historical explanation. 
Yet setting up a comparative framework for the historiography of science is not an 
easy task since the general intuition needs to be articulated in more specific terms 
with respect to the level of comparison, the suitable units of comparison, the 
steering role of prior analysis and the manner in which the results of comparative 
investigations need to be evaluated. Also comparativism has received a bad press 
among historians of science because of the projects of Needham and Zilsel that 
started out before World War II, which are mostly seen as just another version of 
Eurocentrism. So serious scruples need to be overcome.45
Whatever the next turn in the historiography of science will be, a general 
perspective is involved in any approach to past science. Different approaches to 
the history of science can lead to different views of what science actually is. The 
whole enterprise then is profoundly philosophical, just as every really good his-
toriography is. A conscious use of this insight may help to restore some of the 
old aims of the field: to be general, to be critical, to act as a bridge between the 
sciences and the humanities, to channel progress into the right direction and to 
contribute to the improvement of society.
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A century ago, one of the most important modes of research in the profes-
sional study of Greco-Roman antiquity as well as in a number of other fields 
was a recently developed specialty called by its admirers (back then it had no 
opponents) ‘Quellenforschung’. By decomposing the compilatory handbooks pro-
duced by the erudition of late antiquity into their various sources and establish-
ing the relations of dependence among them, the adepts of this method sought 
to trace back reports about a variety of aspects of the ancient world – primarily 
philosophy and history, but also religion, law, sculpture, and other matters – 
to their earliest origins. They were convinced that they would thereby place 
themselves in a position to assess with greater precision the reliability of those 
reports and would hence be able to make claims of greater validity about those 
aspects of antiquity.
Nowadays, Quellenforschung is not dead, but it seems moribund. It has moved 
from the fashionable center of classical studies to the swamps at their periphery; 
it is practiced by relatively few scholars and seems to be ignored, if not held in 
suspicion or contempt, by most. Yet, until recently at least, many of the results 
experts in this field obtained a century ago or more have continued to provide 
a seemingly solid foundation for studies in a wide variety of disciplines within 
classical scholarship and beyond it in related and dependent areas of research for 
which classical scholarship seems itself to have functioned not only as a model 
but also as a source. Why this has been the case deserves analysis and reflection, 
and not only because of the implications of these developments for these disci-
plines themselves.
What are the Quellen of Quellenforschung? The notion that authors use 
sources is neither novel nor exciting. Derrida was not – indeed, on principle 
could not possibly have been – the first to proclaim citationality as a fundamen-
tal feature of language, nor to point to the countless paradoxes and problems 
that arise from it. For every way that an author can use a source – indicating 
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it clearly, blurring the limits of who said what, citing it verbatim or paraphras-
ing or distorting or even inventing it, pretending to have used it when he did 
not, pretending not to have used it when he did, misunderstanding it slightly 
or greatly or completely, deliberately or inadvertently – can cause difficulties 
for those readers who want to know not only what is being said, but also and 
especially just who it is who is saying it.2 In premodern times, these difficulties 
were greatly exacerbated by the absence of such generally agreed upon, unam-
biguous typographical signals as single and double quotation marks, ‘x’, “x”, «x», 
etc.3 Thus, in the ‘Introductory Remarks’ to his Guide for the Perplexed, Moses 
Maimonides writes,
There are seven causes of inconsistencies and contradictions to be met with 
in a literary work. The first cause arises from the fact that the author collects 
the opinions of various men, each differing from the other, but neglects to 
mention the name of the author of any particular opinion. In such a work 
contradictions or inconsistencies must occur, since any two statements may 
belong to two different authors. [...] Inconsistencies occurring in the Mish-
nah and Boraitot are traceable to the first cause. You meet frequently in the 
Gemara with passages like the following: ‘Does not the beginning of the 
passage contradict the end? No; the beginning is the dictum of a certain 
Rabbi; the end that of another’; or ‘Rabbi (Jehuda ha-Nasi) approved of the 
opinion of a certain rabbi in one case and gave it therefore anonymously, 
and having accepted that of another rabbi in the other case he introduced 
that view without naming the authority’; or ‘Who is the author of this 
anonymous dictum? Rabbi A’. ‘Who is that author of that paragraph in the 
Mishnah? Rabbi B’. Instances of this kind are innumerable.4
But if sources and confusions are anthropological universals, the search for an-
cient sources is a cultural phenomenon which has gone in and out of fashion and 
Quellenforschung in particular is a specific scholarly technique with its own his-
tory quite limited in space and time – if not with legally valid certificates of birth 
and death, then at least with a roughly dateable rise and fall.
One deep-seated psychological basis for the search for earliest sources is the 
conviction, already widespread in antiquity, that the best wisdom is a dead one. 
If (as many old men who think themselves wise suppose) old men are wiser than 
young men, then perhaps old cultures are wiser than young cultures, too. Hero-
dotus and Plato were impressed by how much more ancient Egyptian culture 
was than Greek, and were not the only classical Greek authors to pass on to 
their Greek readers various stories about Greek institutions whose sources lay 
in a primeval barbarian past (and which, depending upon the point of view, were 
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therefore either legitimized or delegitimized). In the cosmopolitan, rootless Hel-
lenistic period, the compensatory demand for the αἴτια (‘causes, origins’) was 
satisfied both by Greek poets and scholars and by foreigners who supplied more 
or less authentic versions of ancient barbarian wisdom, Egyptian, Phoenician, 
Babylonian, and so on. But it was above all during late antiquity that Chaldaean 
oracles, Orphic poems, Hermetic revelations, Pythagorean speculations, and 
other genuinely preserved or, more often, piously forged texts satisfied a need, 
concentrated in but by no means limited to the Stoic and especially Neoplatonist 
philosophers, for primitive sources of a wisdom uncontaminated by (and hence 
redemptive of ) quotidian realities.
A direct affinity links this attitude with that of the Renaissance Neopla-
tonists, who, when they rediscovered Plato in the fifteenth century, read him 
through the lens of his late ancient commentators and inherited their antiquari-
an tastes, magnified now by the further historical distance. Pico della Mirandola, 
for example, uses a surprisingly sophisticated source analysis both constructively 
– in the nine hundred theses for which his oration De dignitate hominum was in-
tended as a preface and which, derived from the comparison of surviving ancient 
philosophical texts, represented what these had in common and must presum-
ably therefore have served as their ultimate sources – and critically – in his last 
work, an unfinished polemic against astrology in which he tried to demonstrate 
that this was not after all a science by investigating its origins and reducing it to 
its sources. Some other Italian humanists, above all Politian, made significant 
contributions in this field, but it seems thereafter not to have been immediately 
taken up in general but instead, with some exceptions like the study of Roman 
law, to have lapsed as a dominant mode of historical research for about two cen-
turies. It was not until the Pyrrhonian skeptics of the latter seventeenth century 
that the general distrust of historical documentation and the search for new 
methods for validating and especially for falsifying ancient claims brought the 
question of the lost sources for extant documents to the forefront of scholarly 
consciousness.
It is in this context, and above all in the theological scholarship of the eight-
eenth century, that both of the two ultimate Quellen of nineteenth-century Ger-
man Quellenforschung are to be found. For in fact Quellenforschung is methodo-
logically a Siamese twin, whose two interdependent halves have rather different 
characteristics and pedigrees.
On the one hand, Quellenforschung seeks to break apart the transmitted an-
cient texts that their authors went to so much trouble to weld together out of 
the various sources they consulted. Such an analysis, which we may term ‘de-
constructive’, attentively examines the text for any evidence of errors or incon-
sistencies – self-contradictions, variations in language or style, anachronisms, 
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etc. – which could suggest that different parts might have derived from different 
sources; yet at the same time it retains a conviction of the great value of that text 
despite its evident defects (for otherwise investigating it will lead not to analyz-
ing its sources but simply to repudiating its authority). Precisely this fragile 
combination of rational analysis and stubborn faith is a characteristic feature of 
some religious traditions based upon a sacred text; and it was above all in the 
Hebrew Bible that the Enlightenment found ample opportunity to exercise its 
skills in this variety of source criticism.5 By careful analysis of textual anomalies6 
Spinoza was able to demonstrate that the Pentateuch could not possibly have 
been written by Moses, but only by someone else who had lived much later, 
perhaps Esra; he thereby in effect replaced the notion of a unified text created 
all at once in a single act of divine afflatus by the image of a lengthy histori-
cal development involving contributions and modifications by human authors 
from different periods who were pursuing different interests. So too, Spinoza 
analyzed the Book of Daniel into one part (Chapters 1-7) derived in the Mac-
cabaean period from Chaldaean writings and another (Chapters 8-12) written 
by Daniel himself; he suggested that some later editor must have put these parts 
together and published them.7 But it was above all Henning Bernhard Witter 
and Jean Astruc, who in the early eighteenth century argued that the Pentateuch 
is a heterogeneous compilation. Astruc’s analysis of the text into Moses’ three 
sources – ‘mémoire A’ (which calls God ‘Elohim’), ‘mémoire B’ (which uses the 
term ‘Jehova’), and an additional ‘mémoire C’ (further subdivided into 8 rubrics) 
– was at first dismissed by such scholars as Johann David Michaelis, but by 
the last quarter of the eighteenth century had won acceptance, especially by the 
Göttingen specialist for the Hebrew Bible, Johann Gottfried Eichhorn. It was in 
turn Eichhorn’s work which went on to serve as a model for Friedrich August 
Wolf ’s Prolegomena ad Homerum of 1795, in which the discrepancies and anoma-
lies of the transmitted Homeric text were taken as evidence that it had been 
compiled out of earlier, originally independent songs and had acquired its pre-
sent form in the course of centuries of transmission and modification.8 Wolf ’s 
authoritative transference of deconstructive source criticism from the founding 
text of the theologians to that of the philologists ensured that the method of 
Quellenforschung would become canonical for nineteenth-century German clas-
sical scholarship.
But this method is only one of the two sources involved: for Quellenforschung 
not only tries to tear apart existing texts but also to reconstruct lost ones. How 
can one be sure that some passage in a surviving ancient text B was not invented 
by that text’s author but was taken over by him from some other earlier text A? 
Obviously, matters seem simple if text A is still available to us, so that we can de-
termine that the two passages in question are identical.9 But suppose that text A 
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has been lost. The standard technique of philological Quellenforschung involves 
comparing that surviving passage in one text B with some other similar pas-
sage in another surviving text B1 (and with similar passages in surviving texts 
B2, B3, etc. if available) and arguing that since (1) the similarity between these 
passages in B and in B1 (and Bn) is too great to be explained by chance and (2) 
the two surviving texts seem to be independent of one another in the sense that 
neither of them was the direct cause of the other, they must consequently both 
derive from some third text A, earlier than both of them but subsequently lost, 
which can be reconstructed on the basis of this comparison. This is the ‘recon-
structive’, synthetic method of Quellenforschung, and it explains why so many 
works of late–nineteenth-century German scholarship bear an uncanny visual 
resemblance to the menus in Chinese restaurants: the page is divided into two 
(or in some cases three or even more) narrower columns, printed in parallel with 
one another; and the reader is invited, if not to choose one item from Column 
A and one from Column B, then at least to be convinced by the apparent evi-
dence of the similarity of the various columns that there must have been a lost 
progenitor responsible for both. Here too the source for the technique is to be 
found in theological scholarship – but this time, concerning not the Hebrew 
Bible but the Christian New Testament. For the life and teachings of Jesus were 
validated by not just one, but four canonical Gospels; and these inevitably were 
very similar to one another in some regards, rather different in others. Ulti-
mately, the Chinese menus of German Quellenforschung go back to the synoptic 
harmonies of the Gospels: early modern theologians printed the four Gospels 
in parallel columns, placing reports of the same events next to one another and 
balancing solitary reports in one or more Gospels by blank spaces in the others. 
Their intent was to prove the miraculous preestablished harmony of the Gospels 
and to create a divinely sanctioned mega-text in which all the individual reports 
could supplement one another: where two reports agreed, they corroborated 
one another reciprocally; where one was silent, divine providence had ensured 
that another would speak. But in the course of the eighteenth century, the same 
printing technique came increasingly to produce quite a different effect upon 
its readers: differences between the Gospels began to look like discrepancies, 
and similarities came to seem less the work of divine wisdom than the product 
of shared earlier human sources. Already in 1761 Johann August Ernesti had 
asserted in his Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti that the primary purpose 
of the interpreter of the New Testament, as of any other text, was to determine 
the original intention of its human author. By the end of the eighteenth century, 
New Testament scholars like Ritschl had begun the hunt for the lost sources of 
our Gospels – after all, were not their human authors even closer to the holy 
events they described than any text that had reached us?
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The relationship between theology and classics continued to remain often 
quite close through the nineteenth century. But the fact that the apparent results 
of source criticism inevitably raised unsettling questions for dogmatic theology 
meant that it was not until toward the end of the nineteenth century that the 
historical-critical method could come to dominate biblical studies; and it is only 
nowadays that most academic scholars, at least, are fully convinced of the histori-
cally composite, derivative nature of both the Hebrew Bible and the Christian 
New Testament. By contrast, Wolf ’s transference of the method to the field of 
ancient pagan literature meant that it could flourish there in a theologically neu-
tral atmosphere: in classical studies Wolf ’s treatise was immediately hailed as 
epoch-making and served as a model for numerous other studies. The Homeric 
epics were the first and most prestigious test case: their analysis into the smaller, 
earlier songs that were thought to have been their direct sources occupied many 
of the finest minds of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century German classical 
scholarship. But in the early decades of the nineteenth century this particular 
variant of source criticism was applied not only to Homer but to many other 
problems as well: for example, by Lobeck and K.O. Müller to the analysis of 
the ancient reports concerning Greek religion and by Friedrich Welcker to the 
reconstruction of the history of Sappho’s reputation in antiquity and of the lost 
masterpieces of Athenian tragedy. Toward the middle of the century, Karl Lehrs 
programmatically adopted and refined Wolf ’s method and applied it to the field 
of ancient scholarship on Greek poetry; its application to other subdisciplines of 
ancient scholarship, such as Greek philosophy or historiography or Roman cop-
ies of Greek sculptures, was only the logical next step.
In these fields, much of the work that was done by the practitioners of Quellen-
forschung has proven to be of enduring value. But consideration of even the more 
successful examples of this method suggests not only how it was conceived by its 
adepts and why it seemed so attractive to generations of philologists – but also 
why in the end it could not help but achieve results which were rarely more than 
possible and all too often were simply arbitrary. The wave of popularity of this 
particular mode of source criticism, which began at the turn of the nineteenth 
century and started to crest in the second half of that same century, was already 
subsiding in the first half of the twentieth century. Why?
Quellenforschung was not only a specifically nineteenth-century German vari-
ant of the age-old scholarly technique of source criticism; it was also a peculiarly 
philological variant of a much more widespread development in nineteenth-
century culture, the historicization of science. Like historical linguistics, his-
torical geology, evolutionary biology, and a number of other contemporary sci-
ences, Quellenforschung sought to bring order into a disparate and inconsistent 
mass of data by telling a genealogical narrative about the various steps by which 
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these data had gradually come about. Post hoc, propter hoc: the hypothesized 
diachronic, causal relations were thought to guarantee scientific validity even 
in the absence of any conclusive corroboratory evidence for the actual existence 
of the postulated origins and phases of development. Quellenforschung was thus 
part of a wider cultural movement that sought to translate questions of iden-
tity into ones of origin, and we can explain part of its fascination in terms of 
this larger context. But a seduction more specific to the particular discipline 
of classical philology is likely also to have been at work. Part of what attracted 
many classicists to Quellenforschung was, I would suggest, precisely what was 
in fact wrong with Quellenforschung – its evident similarity to the genealogical 
method of the study of the relations of dependence and affiliation among the 
manuscripts which transmit an ancient author. The similarity is manifest, but in 
fact it was misleading, and it necessarily limited the validity of any results this 
method could obtain.
The genealogical method of textual constitution is a modern response to a 
fundamental problem textual scholars have always faced: what to do when one 
manuscript contradicts another one in its reading in a certain passage. Already 
in the Renaissance, some scholars like Politian had recognized that in order to 
assess the value of a manuscript’s readings it is important to try to determine 
what other manuscript it was copied from (its ‘parent’) and with which oth-
ers it could be associated in order to be classified into a group of manuscripts 
sharing the same derivation (‘families’).10 But it was in eighteenth-century New 
Testament studies that such a recognition first attained not only philological, 
but also theological urgency, and it is in this field that the implications of such 
sporadic insights first began to be worked out systematically – thus Johann Al-
brecht Bengel postulated as early as 1734 what he called a tabula genealogica of 
all the New Testament manuscripts.11 Throughout the early nineteenth century, 
German scholars gradually developed a philological technique for establishing 
such relations which climaxed in what was called Lachmann’s method, since it 
was Karl Lachmann’s edition of Lucretius (1850) which made the method fa-
mous by reconstructing, on the basis of the errors and contradictions among the 
surviving manuscripts of the poet, a highly detailed image of the hypothetical 
archetype which was their source. But already in the decades preceding that 
edition much of the conception and terminology was already familiar – for ex-
ample, Friedrich Ritschl, wrote in his notebooks in 1837 in Italy that his aim was 
to produce ‘einen förmlichen genealogischen Stammbaum über die Abstammung 
und Verwandtschaft aller Väter, Söhne, Brüder, Enkel und Neffen in der großen 
Plautinischen Manuscriptenfamilie’.12
Lachmann’s method was widely hailed as the technique which permitted 
German Classical philology to establish itself as a reliable scientific enterprise; 
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and there can be little doubt that Quellenforschung derived a great deal of its 
attraction from its parasitic similarity to that technique – indeed, often it was 
unmistakably, if at times perhaps unconsciously, modeled upon it. Like Lach-
mann’s method, Quellenforschung too provide a set of procedures for resolving 
contradictions and inconcinnities, this time not between the textual readings of 
various manuscripts, but instead in the informational content supplied within 
and among various ancient works, and it inquired not into how manuscripts 
were copied from and related to one another, but instead into how one text cop-
ied its information from another (its source) and was related to other texts. 
Both methods combined an analytic procedure, attentively examining the extant 
documents for contradictions or discrepancies that could be used as evidence for 
different lines of derivation, with a synthetic one, hypothesizing shared common 
ancestors when comparison between two extant documents revealed similarities 
that were too marked to be ascribable to mere chance. Both methods attempted 
to harmonize chronologically a synchronic plurality of logically discrepant prop-
ositions, by transposing them into a diachronic genealogical narrative in which 
a number of individually coherent positions could be projected onto the same 
number of different speakers operating at different moments along the same 
temporal axis.
But a moment’s reflection suffices to suggest how implausible the assumptions 
underlying the applications of the principles of the criticism of textual variants 
to those of the criticism of sources really are. What author could possibly be 
as sleepy and as lazy as scholars imagined a late ancient compiler to be? Even 
if that were possible, why should that mean that he used only one main source 
rather than five or ten? Why should anyone go to the trouble of transcribing so 
completely some other man’s published and available work, and then publish it 
as though it were his own? Whom could he hope to fool? Would not anyone 
with the intelligence and energy to conceal the evidence for his plagiarism so 
thoroughly have preferred to deploy his capabilities in a more constructive and 
creative way? Might not the later author have had different sources available to 
him at different stages of his production of his text, or differing versions of the 
same sources? Might he not have used different methods in dealing with different 
sources, trusting some more, modifying others, correcting here and conflating 
there? Does it make sense to assume that any extant author must be purely me-
chanical and receptive, and that only ones that are entirely lost could have been 
creative and productive?
Such questions could easily be multiplied further, but the point should al-
ready be clear: that the only reason for making these presuppositions is not 
that they have been independently, empirically verified beforehand, but rather 
that it is only if they are admitted as premises that a certain kind of scholarly 
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procedure, which is attractive for other reasons, can be undertaken. But, in 
consequence, the results of Quellenforschung are not so much entirely false, nor 
certainly entirely true, as rather all too often just arbitrary. Until the sands of 
Egypt or the monastery libraries of Asia Minor finally yield up manuscripts 
that provide direct testimony of one of the postulated early sources of trans-
mitted late ancient compilations, we shall never be able to test the results of 
the reconstructions of modern Quellenforschung – and this has not happened 
yet nor would any but the most incautious or wealthy wager that it will happen 
any time soon.13 This is no doubt one reason why the impetus toward this line 
of research gradually petered out, but it is not hard to think of other reasons 
as well. Where it was possible to attain relatively secure results, these were ob-
tained fairly quickly; in most other cases the arbitrariness of the procedure and 
the fragility of the results became inescapably obvious; the sheer quantity of 
the texts that best lent themselves to this kind of analysis (largely late ancient 
prose compilations of earlier scholarship) was finite to begin with and even-
tually became depleted; the interests of many philologists shifted away from 
causal explanations of diachronic processes toward literary interpretations of 
synchronic structures; the effect of Quellenforschung was all too often to make 
the texts we actually possess seem not more interesting than we had thought 
beforehand, but much less interesting; and a wider skepticism set in, particu-
larly after the nineteenth century, concerning the ultimate value of genealogical 
explanation as a whole, in this as in other fields.
In the end, what is perhaps most surprising is that Quellenforschung lasted as 
long as it did.14 Its survival was assisted by a combination of inertia, corporate 
solidarity, methodological naïveté, a concentration upon individual results rather 
than upon general premises, and the seductive paradigm of Lachmann’s method. 
Whatever results it obtained, its adherence to a set of unquestioned assumptions 
about how ancient scholars might have worked impeded for a long time detailed 
and pragmatic research into a much more important and interesting question: 
how ancient scholars actually did work, and, more generally, how the cultures of 
authors and readers have differed from period to period in history and from place 
to place in the world. That the presuppositions of Quellenforschung do not bear 
close examination and that its results were all too often possible but arbitrary 
certainly does not mean that everything it produced can simply be rejected as 
false. We all depend upon the results of Quellenforschung and make use of them 
in our own work, with greater or lesser degree of anxiety. I myself am currently 
preparing a new edition of the early Greek philosophers; and not a day goes by 
in which I do not employ the results and the techniques of Quellenforschung. Un-
fortunately, even if much of the work this method produced is likely to have been 
quite correct, we shall almost certainly never be in a position to tell just which 
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parts, or why. Hence scholars today have little choice but to continue to make use 
of the Quellenforschung of their predecessors – but with caution and doubt, and 
with the painful awareness that they are building not upon solid rock, but upon 
a swamp.
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4.2 History of Religions in the Making  
Franz Cumont (1868-1947) and the  
‘Oriental Religions’
Eline Scheerlinck1
As is the case for many of his colleagues within the humanities, it is hard to pin 
one label on Franz Cumont (1868-1947). His work moves at the crossroads of his-
tory of religions, classical philology, ancient history, archeology and Orientalism. 
However, Cumont employed this multidisciplinarity in such a way as to make 
him a pioneer within the developing field of history of religions at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. In what follows I will focus mainly on Cumont as a historian 
of religion and on the renewing role which he played in the development of the 
history of religions as an independent academic discipline. Cumont created a new 
methodological model for the study of ancient religions. Moreover, Cumont’s fo-
cus on the Oriental influence on Greek and Roman religion was a symptom of his 
original yet nuanced ideas on the role of the ancient Near East within the history 
of Western culture, in particular Western religions and (pseudo)sciences such as 
astrology and magic.
 A new method for Mithras
At the end of the nineteenth century some students of ancient religion had grown 
to be dissatisfied with the methodology which had dominated the field until 
then. In the previous decades, the study of religion had been approached from 
a purely philological perspective. One of the founding fathers of the compara-
tive study of religions, Oxford professor Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900), was 
a comparative philologist, who traced the evolution from a primordial monothe-
ism to polytheism by studying the names of the gods in the so-called Semitic 
and Indo-European languages.2 According to Max Müller, divinities came into 
existence through epitheta which were originally given to the one god. It is clear 
that, to the comparative mythologist, ‘the history of religions was a history of lan-
guage’.3 However, Max Müller was also responsible for the edition and translation 
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to English of different ancient Eastern religious texts, from, e.g., Zoroastrianism 
and Confucianism. These ‘Sacred Books of the East’, were published by Oxford 
University Press in fifty volumes from 1879 until 1910, a few decades later than 
Max Müller’s earlier theoretical work.4 This collecting and editing of texts fits in 
well with the methodological climate of history of religions at that time. The pop-
ularity of the approach of comparative mythology had started to teem toward the 
last decade of the nineteenth century, as scholars criticized its generalizing claims 
which were not satisfyingly based on documents. A more positivist methodology 
for the history of religions asserted itself: the methods of the academic discipline 
of history were to be applied to the history of religions: to collect the data, classify 
and analyze them were the historian of religions’ priorities. Synthesizing and gen-
eralizing ideas were to be formulated in a later stage.5 This was the viewpoint of, 
e.g., Jules Toutain (1865-1961) (cf. infra) and Maurice Vernes (1845-1923). Vernes 
was the founder of the Revue de l’histoire des religions in 1880 and director of the 
‘V section: Sciences religieuses’, established in 1885, at the École Pratique des 
Hautes Études in Paris.6 These are two important examples which show how, in 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a history of religions independent from 
theology, was institutionalized.7
What was the role or place of Franz Cumont within this development? Al-
though Cumont studied comparative grammar with Charles Michel (1853-1929) 
in Ghent and comparative mythology with Hermann Usener (1834-1905, cf. infra) 
in Bonn, as a historian of religion he was not a comparatist.8 He did not pay much 
attention to the subjects to which students of comparative mythology or religion 
were generally drawn, such as the origin of religion or parallels between religions 
which had never been in contact. However, Hermann Usener’s ideas would have 
a lasting influence on the Belgian scholar,9 as he was most probably responsible 
for Cumont’s open mind when it came to other cultures of the Mediterranean 
(cf. infra).10 However, Cumont’s approach would certainly not be entirely his 
teacher Usener’s, who in 1893 published Götternamen, a major work in the tradi-
tion of comparative mythology.11
That Franz Cumont provided the history of religions with a model for the 
study of ancient religions was affirmed by his contemporaries (cf. infra) as well 
as it is the consensus within the academic community today.12 He famously did 
this with his work on Mithras. ‘L’Homme de Mithra’13 developed his interest in 
the Persian god during his study period in Germany and Austria (1887-1890), 
when he wrote essays on the topic and went on a first journey of exploration in 
Hungary and Romania, in search of inscriptions and other ancient remnants that 
would attest the presence of the cult of Mithras.14 In the following years, Cu-
mont collected, assisted by his international network of correspondents, Mithraic 
monuments from all over Europe,15 after which he published the two monumental 
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volumes of Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra (TMMM) 
in 1896 and 1899.16 Instead of focusing on language, names, texts and myths, Cu-
mont thus examined this one specific ancient religion in the Greco-Roman world 
from the viewpoint of the entire Altertumswissenschaft. In TMMM, which estab-
lished him as a world authority in the study of ancient religions, Cumont took 
account of all literary texts in Greek, Latin and Oriental languages, particularly 
Armenian. Moreover, he included all inscriptions and all figurative archeological 
monuments, such as statues or the typically subterranean and cavelike Mithraic 
temples.17 In 1910 Jules Toutain wrote an article in the Revue de synthèse historique 
on the progress of the discipline of history of religions in the previous decades.18 
Applauding Cumont’s TMMM as a perfect example, as a model even, of the his-
torical method, he compared it in a positive way to the new comparative approach 
within the study of religions, connected with anthropology, which we find in the 
work of influential scholars such as James Frazer (1854-1941) and William Rob-
ertson Smith (1846-1894).19 Toutain contrasts Cumont’s inductive method with 
the deductive, ‘arbitrary’ approach of the comparative school:
Souci constant de ne recourir, pour expliquer le caractère et le succès des 
mystères mithriaques, qu’à des idées ou des faits recueillis soit dans la civilisation 
iranienne soit dans la civilisation gréco-romaine des premiers siècles de l’empire; 
usage de la méthode inductive, à l’exclusion de toute comparaison arbitraire, de 
toute déduction purement logique; clarté de la pensée, maîtrise de l’expression 
toujours adéquate, par sa précision même, à l’idée de l’auteur toutes ces qualités 
donnent au grand ouvrage de M. Cumont une valeur hors pair.20
 Between Hellenomania and Panbabylonism
Cumont’s preference for a Near Eastern god for his first important study of 
ancient religion is another aspect of the classicist’s pioneering role. After this 
groundbreaking work on Mithras, the scholar broadened his outlook to other 
mystery cults who found their origin in the Near East. In his most important 
work, Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain, he described mystery cults 
from Asia Minor, Egypt, Syria and Persia, and the pseudosciences astrology and 
magic, in terms of their impact on the Roman West.21 In this work, Cumont ar-
gued that these cults, as a group, completely destroyed the Roman state religion. 
Moreover, in his evolutionist take on the religious history of late antiquity, the 
‘Oriental’ religions constitute an intermediary step, paving the way for Christian-
ity.22 Thus, again rather exceptionally, Cumont assigned to the Near East an ac-
tive and positive role in the moral and religious evolution of the Roman Empire.23 
By emphasizing the role of these ‘Oriental’ religions within the Roman religious 
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landscape, Cumont presented an interpretation of late antique religious evolution 
that was new in the field of history of religions, which tended to focus on Judaism 
as the precursor of Christianity.24 While Cumont acknowledges the similarities 
between the mystery cults and Christianity, he does not aim to explain them.25
These issues were also tackled by contemporary scholars. In Germany, Rich-
ard Reitzenstein (1861-1931) discussed the ‘Hellenistischen Mysterien-religionen’ 
and their influence on Christianity.26 Reitzenstein was an exponent of the Reli-
gionsgeschichtliche Schule, a group of scholars from the University of Göttingen, 
for example, Hermann Gunkel (1862-1932), Otto Gruppe (1851-1921) and Adolf 
Deiss mann (1866-1937), who challenged the originality of Christianity by study-
ing it in its historical, Oriental context.27 For example, Deissmann compared the 
Greek of early Christian literature with popular Greek language in the papyri 
from Egypt, where, e.g., the Oxyrynchus cache was found in 1897.28 This signifi-
cant development in the history of the study of Christianity and ancient religions 
was connected with the heightened political interest of Europe in the East during 
the second half of the nineteenth century, which brought with it an intensification 
of archeological excavations and scientific missions in the Orient. Scholars could 
make use of a profusion of new documents, the knowledge of ancient languages 
and writing systems increased enormously, remnants of ancient civilizations were 
unearthed. This meant also that some subjects, such as the classical civilizations 
of Greece and Rome and the history of Christianity, could be studied in a broader 
context. These subjects, both crucial for the formation of European identity, were 
until then studied as fairly isolated phenomena and the new approach challenged 
their supposed originality and/or superiority. As for Greece, nineteenth-century 
German Hellenists were studying it as an autonomous culture, rejecting the pos-
sibility of substantial foreign influence on the idealized Greeks.29 One of the most 
influential exponents of this tradition and a founding father of classical philol-
ogy, Hellenist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1848-1931) could consider 
the ancient civilizations of the Middle East as:
the peoples and states of the Semites and the Egyptians which had been 
decaying for centuries and which, in spite of the antiquity of their culture, 
were unable to contribute anything to the Hellenes other than a few man-
ual skills, costumes, and implements of bad taste, antiquated ornaments, 
repulsive fetishes for even more repulsive fake divinities.30
Marchand has argued that the Religious Historical School which we discussed 
above belonged to what she called the ‘furious Orientalists’, a generation of Ger-
man scholars characterized by a focus on the Oriental material which had been 
excavated and deciphered mostly by previous generations and by a tendency to 
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use this material to decentralize Greek culture but also Judaism within the his-
tory of religions, whereby anti-Semitism not seldom lurked around the corner.31 
In many respects, Cumont was affiliated to these ‘furious Orientalists’: by consid-
ering the Oriental mystery cults to be the predecessors of Christianity, the latter 
was, although implicitly, compared with the former and robbed of its original-
ity. Moreover, Cumont accorded great importance to the archeological material 
unearthed in the Middle East.32 In 1893 Cumont gave the opening lecture of the 
course of Greek history at Ghent University.33 He discussed the recent progress 
in that domain, and the causes thereof:
La première des causes et la plus éloignée, c’est cette merveilleuse décou-
verte de l’ancien Orient, qui dans le domaine historique restera certaine-
ment le titre scientifique le plus brillant du XIXe siècle. [...] Ce coup de 
théâtre a exercé une influence énorme sur l’histoire grecque: [...] mais notre 
conception générale du rôle de la race grecque en a été profondément mo-
difiée. Pour la première fois nous la voyons agir dans son milieu, nous sa-
vons ce qui exista avant elle, il nous est permis de contempler la toile de 
fond devant laquelle se déroule le drame hellénique. Il n’est plus possible de 
supposer aujourd’hui, comme on faisait complaisamment autrefois, que la 
Grèce ait tout ou presque tout tiré de son propre fonds. Elle a été pendant 
longtemps, fort longtemps, à l’école de l’Orient.34
Cumont deems the archeological discovery of the ancient Orient responsible 
for a very decisive change in how Greek history should be approached in his 
days, questioning the originality of Greek culture and affirming the influence of 
the Near East. Throughout his whole career, the East-West interaction in the 
ancient world – mainly but not exclusively, as we will discuss further on, in the 
Hellenistic and Roman periods – was the major theme in Cumont’s scholarly 
work. Martin Bernal, who accused generations of classicists and ancient his-
torians of Eurocentrism and racism, actually cites Cumont as an example of a 
scholar who did acknowledge the influence of the Middle East on ancient Greek 
science.35 We can compare Cumont’s words from the citation above with another 
opening lecture, given one year later, in 1894, by Egyptologist Henri Édouard 
Naville (1844-1926) president of the International Orientalist Congress in Ge-
neva, held in 1894:
J’en demande pardon aux hellénistes de l’école d’Ottfried Müller, le carac-
tère absolument autochtone de la civilisation hellénique, ce point de vue 
qu’il défendit avec opiniâtreté me semble avoir reçu un rude coup; et au 
risque de paraître me faire l’écho de ce que l’illustre helléniste allemand 
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appellerait les idées préconçues d’un orientaliste, je n’hésite pas à dire qu’au-
jourd’hui on ne peut plus séparer la Grèce de l’Orient; et que ce que nous 
avons à rechercher, c’est la part qui revient à l’un et à l’autre dans ce merveil-
leux ensemble qu’on nomme la civilisation grecque.36
In that year, the Orientalist Congress organized for the first time a section ‘Grèce 
et Orient’, where specialists of antiquity, such as the Hellenist and papyrologist 
Jules Nicole (1842-1921) and the archeologist and Hellenist Georges Perrot (1832-
1914) presented studies based on both Greek sources and Oriental documents. 
The section was a great success, according to the French archeologist and all-
round classicist Théodore Reinach (1860-1928), who invited Cumont to speak at 
the next congress in Paris, held in 1897.37
On the other hand, Cumont also reacted against some scholars’ tendencies 
to overestimate Oriental influence on Western culture.38 In Marchand’s catego-
rization, the ‘furious Orientalists’ also comprise the so-called Panbabylonists, 
who argued that Babylonian astrology was the origin of all art and all mythol-
ogy – Hugo Winckler (1863-1913), Peter Jensen (1861-1936) and Alfred Jeremias 
(1864-1935).39 In 1910 Cumont writes a letter to his former teacher Hermann 
Diels, a specialist in Greek philosophy and literature and congratulates him on 
his work on Oriental literature and its influence on Greek culture.40 In this let-
ter Cumont’s professes his interest in the issue of Babylonian influence on the 
West and denounces the likes of ‘scatterbrain’ Jeremias for having confused it 
with their ‘aberrations’: ‘Tout ce qui peut éclaircir la question des emprunts faits 
par l’Occident à Babylone m’intéresse particulièrement. Il est déplorable que des 
brouillons comme Jeremias l’aient troublées par leurs aberrations’.41 In fact, in 
those years Cumont was indeed working on the interconnections between Greek 
and Mesopotamian astronomy and astrology. In 1911, Cumont traveled to Swe-
den and the United States, giving lectures on ‘Astrology and Religion among 
the Greeks and Romans’, which were published one year later in the ‘American 
lectures on the history of religions’ series.42 At the beginning of his first lecture, 
Cumont briefly summarized the theories of the Panbabylonists, after which 
he evaluates them. During a lecture or in an academic publication, Cumont, of 
course, had not the same liberty of speech as in his private correspondence with 
Hermann Diels, but in this passage Cumont clearly showed where he thought 
the errors of the Panbabylonists lay:
Now of this system it may be said that what is true in it is not new, and 
what is new is not true. That Babylon was the mother of astronomy, star-
worship, and astrology, that thence these sciences and these beliefs spread 
over the world, is a fact already told us by the ancients, and the course of 
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these lectures will prove it clearly. But the mistake of the Pan-Babylonists, 
whose wide generalizations rest on the narrowest and flimsiest of bases, 
lies in the fact that they have transferred to the nebulous origins of history 
conceptions which were not developed at the beginning but quite at the end 
of Babylonian civilization.43
While according to the ‘Babylonian mirage’ of the Panbabylonists the Babylonian 
astronomy was established in the fifth millennium BCE, Cumont argued that 
on the basis of the sources available, the Mesopotamian cuneiform tablets which 
were recently deciphered, astronomy was only instituted in those regions in the 
first millennium BCE.44 In the second chapter of Astrology and Religion, ‘Baby-
lon and Greece’, Cumont did not fail to pay the Mesopotamian astronomers the 
respect which was due to them, as he, e.g., discussed how certain astronomical 
discoveries, which had hitherto been attributed to the Greeks, were in fact to 
be ascribed to the Babylonians.45 To compare, in a 1920 letter to the Orientalist 
Giorgio Levi della Vida (1986-1967), Cumont praised the abilities and accom-
plishments of the Babylonian astronomers.
Après tout, ce sont des Sémites qui ont été les grands initiateurs en as-
tronomie; je veux bien qu’ils aient étudié la marche des corps célestes dans 
un but pratique, pour y chercher des présages, mais ils ont poursuivi leurs 
recherches avec une précision, une patience sagace, qui seraient méritoires 
même chez des savants modernes et ils ont tiré avec une logique rigoureuse 
les résultats de leurs observations.46
In the course of ‘Babylon and Greece’, Cumont discussed how the Greeks, in dif-
ferent periods of their history, came into contact with and adopted Babylonian 
astronomy and star worship. On the other hand, to explain the apparent dis-
interest of the Greek philosophers in Chaldean astrology until the fourth cen-
tury BCE, Cumont appealed to the rational, critical and logical Volksgeist of the 
Greeks, rather in the vein of the philhellenic tradition which he refuted.
The insatiable curiosity of the Greeks, then, did not ignore astrology, but 
their sober genius rejected its hazardous doctrines, and their keen critical 
sense was able to distinguish the scientific data observed by the Babylonians 
from the erroneous conclusions which they derived from them. It is to their 
everlasting honour that, amid the tangle of precise observations and super-
stitious fancies which made up the priestly lore of the East, they discovered 
and utilized the serious elements, while neglecting the rubbish.47
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Apparently, Cumont’s admiration for the ancient Near East did not diminish his 
appreciation for the Greeks and their intellectual abilities, which he, at least in 
this passage, seems to deem superior to those of the Orientals.
In this paper we have examined in which ways Franz Cumont was a pioneer 
in the development of the field of history of religion around the turn of the nine-
teenth century. Not only did he introduce a new model for the study of ancient 
religions, he also played an important part in the European academic debates 
on the influence of the ancient East on Western culture, particularly regarding 
religion and (pseudo)science. These debates, which have recurred at intervals 
during the history of the Western humanities, were renewed at the end of the 
nineteenth century, thanks to the accumulation of new sources from the ancient 
Near East. Moving at the crossroads of classics, Orientalism and history of reli-
gions, Franz Cumont belonged to a new generation of scholars who went against 
the grain of an academic tradition which treated Christianity and Greek civiliza-
tion as autonomous and wholly original cultural phenomena. Although Cumont’s 
approach is also nuanced, as he attacks the far-fetched conclusions of the Pan-
babylonists, throughout his whole career he would call attention to the Eastern 
influence on the West. Moreover, he considered this influence a positive one: the 
East, whether it be in the form of Middle Eastern mystery cults, or in the form 
of Babylonian astronomy and sidereal theology, was a decisive and constructive 
actor in the moral and intellectual development of the West.
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4.3 ‘Big Science’ in Classics in the Nineteenth 
Century and the Academicization of Antiquity
AnneTTe M. BaerTschi
The digital revolution of the past years has profoundly changed higher education 
and the academic world in general. Not only has ‘much of the teaching and learn-
ing apparatus moved online’, thus effectuating new forms of classroom instruc-
tion, but ‘the computational technologies and methodologies’ available today have 
also ‘transformed research practices in every discipline’.1 The digital humanities 
in particular have created exciting new tools, which have attracted a lot of atten-
tion within the scholarly community and received positive media coverage.2 This 
in turn has boosted public interest in humanities research, especially in relation 
to new technologies that ‘facilitate insights into history, language, art and culture 
that human researchers might never have been able to glean on their own’.3 With 
considerable grants being awarded to such projects – the sums allotted can range 
from $50,000 to $250,000 – some even see in them the new frontier that will 
restore government support of, and funding for the humanities and secure their 
survival within academia in the current era of ‘cuts’. While it remains to be seen 
whether this will be the case, it is certainly true that the humanities have been 
able to reclaim some of their lost territory thanks to digital initiatives, which 
showed how technology and computational research methods can be fruitfully 
applied to the study of literature, history, and the arts.
Needless to say, there is a wide variety of activities and projects usually sub-
sumed under the umbrella term ‘digital humanities’, ranging from online archiv-
ing of texts and artifacts to digital mapping and the creation of 3D models of 
cities and monuments to the use of geographic information systems.4 In terms 
of goal and methodology, however, these projects all share the compilation and 
continuous updating of massive databases, which are made publicly available 
for computer-assisted analysis by scientists and other users. Moreover, they 
rely heavily on interdisciplinary as well as international collaboration with col-
leagues and institutions inside and outside of academia. In other words, they are 
truly communal enterprises, making use of contributions from a global circle of 
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experts, since modern technology allows scholars to communicate easily with 
distant partners across the world and thus to expand their communities beyond 
the physical borders.
Interestingly, ‘[t]his “methodological moment” [...] is similar to the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, when scholars were preoccupied with col-
lating and cataloging the flood of information brought about by revolutions in 
communication, transportation and science. The practical issues of discipline 
building, of assembling an annotated bibliography, of defining the research agen-
da’ together with new critical editions of the materials discovered ‘were the main 
work of a great number of scholars’.5 In this paper, I will look at the emergence 
of large-scale collective research projects in Classical Studies that were launched 
by the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin in the last third of the nineteenth 
century and greatly added to the international renown of the German Altertums-
wissenschaft. I will argue that these projects not only made specific ancient pri-
mary sources, both literary and material, accessible for the first time, but also 
established new forms of institutional organization and scholarly collaboration, 
which became standard for academic enterprises in the humanities and the sci-
ences. In addition, I will discuss the impact that this type of Großwissenschaft or 
‘Big Science’,6 as it was commonly referred to, had on Classics as a discipline as 
well as on the perception of antiquity and the status of its study within academia. 
Finally, I will explore some of the parallels than can be drawn to current digital 
humanities projects and scholarship.
First, however, I would like to give a brief overview of the development of 
Classical Studies in the first half of the nineteenth century, which in turn will 
explain the focus on Berlin in this contribution, and then also clarify the meaning 
and use of the term ‘Big Science’.
As is well known, the founder of the modern Altertumswissenschaft is Friedrich 
August Wolf (1759-1824), who insisted on enrolling as a student of philology, not 
theology, at the University of Göttingen against the explicit advice of his teacher 
Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729-1812) and then became a professor at the Uni-
versity of Halle (1783) before joining the newly founded University of Berlin in 
1810 after the University of Halle had been closed (1806-1807). Wolf transformed 
Classical Studies by defining them as a purely historical science and advocating 
a new critical approach to ancient texts based on strict objectivity. This agenda 
had already informed his most successful, but also deeply polarizing work, Pro-
legomena ad Homerum (1795), in which he argued that the texts we know as the 
Iliad and the Odyssey were not the work of a single poet but the products of 
centuries of ancient song that had been given their final form by the textual crit-
ics of Hellenistic Alexandria. Furthermore, Wolf introduced an innovative form 
of teaching in Halle, the philological seminar (1787).7 Imitating Heyne’s model 
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in Göttingen, but deliberately distancing himself from his teacher by excluding 
students of theology, Wolf ’s seminar was no longer simply devoted to preparing 
participants for a career as schoolteachers. Rather, it was designed as a forum in 
which those interested in becoming classical scholars could gain experience in 
conducting original research. In other words, the main goal of the seminar was to 
instruct students in the method(s) of the discipline, not to teach them ‘a closed 
body of knowledge’.8 In light of this it is not surprising that Wilhelm von Hum-
boldt (1767-1835), a life-long friend of Wolf since 1792, was keen on appointing 
him as a professor at his new university, which distinguished itself from others 
precisely by demanding the unity of research and teaching and whose internal 
organization by departments reflected the seminar principle of discipline-specific 
training.9
Wolf explained and justified the new historical approach to antiquity in his 
programmatic treatise Darstellung der Alterthumswissenschaft nach Begriff, Um-
fang, Zweck und Werth (1807), which is rightly regarded as the founding docu-
ment of modern Classical Studies. He declared the aim of philology to be ‘the 
knowledge of human nature in antiquity, which comes from the observation of 
an organically developed, significant national culture, founded on study of the 
ancient remains’.10 Given that ‘national culture’ could manifest itself as much in 
texts as in works of art and other material remains he encouraged his students to 
master the various subdisciplines of Classics from philosophy of language, her-
meneutics and criticism to geography, history, chronology, and numismatics and 
to ‘fuse them in a single interdisciplinary “science of antiquity” ’.11
Similarly, August Boeckh (1785-1867), a former student of Wolf, who in 1811 
was appointed as professor eloquentiae et poeseos at the University of Berlin,12 de-
fined Classical Studies as a comprehensive, historically and philosophically based 
science of the ancient world. Boeckh had also studied with Friedrich Schleier-
macher (1768-1834) at Halle, and it was the latter’s influence that led him to char-
acterize philology as Erkenntniss des Erkannten13 (‘knowledge of what is known’) 
in his posthumously edited and published Encyklopädie und Methodologie der phi-
lologischen Wissenschaften (1877). The work was based on a lecture series which 
Boeckh held twenty-six times at the University of Berlin and in which he devel-
oped a general hermeneutics for the humanities. For in contrast to Wolf, Boeckh 
was less intent on establishing ‘the absolute supremacy of Greek (and Roman) 
culture, arguing that studies of Hebrew, Indic, Chinese, and other Oriental phi-
lology possessed the same fundamental importance’.14 The only reason to accord 
a privileged position to classical antiquity was that it was the foundation of all 
European culture.15 Das Erkannte (‘what is known’) in Boeckh’s memorable for-
mula Erkenntniss des Erkannten denoted any form of cultural production, not 
only texts, but also artifacts, institutions, practices, and places,16 since for him 
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philology was one with history: ‘That which is produced historically is a product 
of the mind which has been translated into action’.17 Consequently, he stipulated 
that ‘the philology of antiquity contains ... as material of knowledge the entire 
historical evidence of antiquity’.18
In keeping with this approach Boeckh urged his students to consider ‘all genres 
in which classical civilization had been transmitted’, as Wolf had done, and in par-
ticular to combine the study of literature ‘with an overall view of social “realities” 
based on empirical foundations’.19 His early masterpiece, Die Staatshaushaltung 
der Athener (1817), is a representative example of this type of classical scholar-
ship, offering an exhaustive survey of the Athenian economy in the classical pe-
riod. Boeckh broke new ground by drawing heavily on epigraphic sources for his 
work and subsequently suggested the collection of all Greek inscriptions by the 
Prussian Academy of Sciences resulting in the impressive Corpus inscriptionum 
Graecarum (1825-1860), of which he edited the first two volumes.
Boeckh was a prolific scholar and published numerous works on a range of 
topics in line with his universal conception of Classical Studies as a science for 
antiquity as a whole.20 Equally impressive are his achievements as an academic 
administrator: He served five times as rector and six times as dean of the Univer-
sity of Berlin, regularly defending academic freedom in his speeches against po-
litical control and instrumentalization. Furthermore, from 1834 through 1861 he 
was the secretary (Secretar) of the Philosophical Class of the Prussian Academy 
of Sciences (he had been a member since 1814) and initiated its transition from a 
mere society of the learned to a sponsor of large-scale research projects. In addi-
tion, he was an external or corresponding member of numerous other academies 
as well as a member of the German Archaeological Institutes in Rome, Athens, 
and Cairo, while also serving as the permanent director of the philological and 
the pedagogical seminar at the university.21 From his arrival in Berlin in 1811 to 
his retirement in 1867 Boeckh counted no less than 1,602 participants in his 
seminar, many of whom became well-known scholars.22It is thus safe to say that 
Boeckh dominated and shaped Classical Studies in Berlin like no other in the 
first half of the nineteenth century23 and set the standards for the discipline, 
which by now had reached the status of a fully developed profession instead of 
simply being ‘an intermediary stage on the way to higher office’.24 As a conse-
quence, all German universities began to introduce philological seminars lead-
ing to an unprecedented rise both in quantity and quality of works devoted to 
classical antiquity.25
In particular, in the field of classical editing based on the methodological 
principles championed by Karl Lachmann (1793-1851) a new era set in. While 
the first printed texts relied only on a few manuscripts of often dubious quality 
and subsequent editions equally failed systematically to incorporate new variant 
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readings and conjectures, the new approach developed by New Testament crit-
ics at the end of the eighteenth century and then adopted by classical scholars 
attempted to collate all the manuscripts available and then to group them into 
families and identify the genealogical relationships among them.26 This allowed 
scholars not only to distinguish which textual versions ‘possessed independent 
authority and which were purely derivative’,27 but also to reconstruct the lost 
archetype on the basis of common readings in the main families. Lachmann 
refined the so-called stemmatic method by splitting the editorial process into 
recensio (examination of the manuscript evidence) and emendatio (correction 
of errors) in order to restore the surviving texts as closely as possible to their 
original form.28 His many editions, especially that of Lucretius, had a lasting 
influence on his contemporaries and shaped textual scholarship throughout the 
nineteenth century (and beyond).
At the same time, classical scholars embraced Boeckh’s holistic approach and 
situated the ancient literary sources within their wider historical and cultural 
context, combining rigorous philological criticism with socio-political analysis.29
According to Grafton, “not all of this work was original either in conception or 
in execution”. Rather, “German classicists continued to rely on the Latin mono-
graphs and commentaries written by French and Dutch inhabitants of the six-
teenth- and seventeenth-century Republic of Letters”.30
For instance, Johann Georg Graevius’ Thesaurus antiquitatum Romanarum 
(1694−1699) and Jacob Gronovius’ Thesaurus Graecarum antiquitatum (1697−1702), 
both of which also considered material evidence and included printed images, re-
mained important resources. Similarly, Jan Gruter’s epochal collection of ancient 
inscriptions (Inscriptiones antiquae [1602]) was still in use.31 The modern Alter-
tumswissenschaft in the first half of the nineteenth century thus drew in many 
ways on the contributions of the antiquarians and ‘polyhistors’ in the preceding 
centuries sharing their goal to consolidate and enlarge the textual and material 
foundations for the study of antiquity.32 Moreover, most of these efforts were car-
ried out by outstanding individuals who were toiling away in solitude, often for 
years, with little institutional or financial support or cross-disciplinary fertiliza-
tion. This changed with the advent of ‘Big Science’ in Classical Studies, which 
established a new framework for scholarly activity based on collaboration and 
facilitated by public funding.
The term ‘Big Science’ was coined when, in the aftermath of World War II, a 
new form of research facility was established, the government-sponsored labora-
tory, employing hundreds, if not thousands of scientists and technicians.33 These 
national laboratories were a legacy left by the so-called Manhattan Project, the 
international research and development program led by the United States that 
had produced the first atomic bomb during World War II. For this reason, most 
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people view ‘Big Science’ as a specific characteristic of nuclear research in the 
second half of the twentieth century34 and associate the term with large-scale pro-
jects that are funded by national governments or groups of governments and have 
enormous budgets (‘Big Budgets’) as well as large numbers of staff (‘Big Staffs’). 
In addition, these projects often use massive machines as their main research tool 
(‘Big Machines’), which require both significant financial and human resources to 
build and maintain, and concentrate their scientific work in large research centers 
(‘Big Laboratories’).35
But as historians of science have pointed out, ‘Big Science’ is not limited to 
national laboratories and nuclear research nor can it simply be measured by quan-
titative criteria.36 Rather, ‘Big Science’ is characterized more broadly by collabora-
tive research, a large team of coworkers, and multidisciplinarity, since expertise 
in several academic fields is usually required; furthermore, by a steady flow of 
publications, (inter)national connections, specialized working methods, and last, 
but certainly not least, public funding.37 The earliest examples of this type of en-
terprise emerged in the last third of the nineteenth century and introduced a new 
era of scientific organization and scholarly collaboration, with not the sciences 
but the humanities, and in particular Classical Studies, paving the way.38
In fact, the beginning of ‘Big Science’ in Classics can be dated precisely:39 On 
April 27, 1858 Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903) was elected as an ordinary member 
of the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin after having been a corresponding 
member since 1853.40 In his inaugural address, he demonstrated using the example 
of the Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum, which he had founded in 1853, how scien-
tific research had to be structured in the future in order to organize and preserve 
what he called the Archive der Vergangenheit.41 He explained that German and 
foreign scholars had to work together in government-funded projects and that 
the traditional but ineffective fragmentation of work in Classical Studies at the 
Prussian Academy had to be replaced with an interdisciplinary collaboration of 
historians, philologists, and jurists.42
In the following decades of his membership at the Prussian Academy, in 
which he held the position of secretary (Secretar) from 1874 to 1895, Mommsen 
consistently and successfully put his vision into practice by founding or initiat-
ing numerous large-scale research projects, some of which exist to the present 
day, such as the aforementioned Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum and the Pro-
sopographia Imperii Romani, founded in 1874.43 He also established and chaired 
several scientific committees, among them the committee for the edition of the 
correspondence of the Roman orator Fronto (c. 95-166 CE) and the commit-
tee for the edition of the Codex Theodosianus (collected and published between 
429-438 CE), collaborated with the German Archaeological Institute and played 
an important role in the publication of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica. 
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Finally, in 1893, he designed the by-laws for the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, the 
ambitious enterprise of the newly formed cartel of the German Academies of 
Arts and Sciences.44
Through his work and the resulting collections and editions of ancient primary 
sources Mommsen put classical scholarship on a new foundation. He demanded 
categorically that all ancient evidence, and not just the textual documents, be sys-
tematically collected, cataloged, indexed, and subsequently published, since the 
entire legacy of Greek and Roman antiquity (cognitio totius antiquitatis)45 had to 
be taken into consideration. Furthermore, he insisted that the strict philological 
method be applied to any text in order to guarantee authenticity,46 as the large-
scale projects undertaken by the Prussian Academy were ‘directed toward pro-
viding the materials to permit an unprejudiced historical understanding’ of the 
ancient world.47 In short, he combined the practice inherited from Wolf, Boeckh, 
and Lachmann – source criticism – ‘with a new agenda – the ideal of totality – 
for the purpose of constructing a new vision of antiquity and of Roman history 
especially’.48 In so doing, Mommsen perpetuated Boeckh’s conception of Clas-
sical Studies as a comprehensive and interdisciplinary science of antiquity, but 
reconfigured and re-organized academic activity following industrial and mili-
tary models.49 He created a new structural framework for classical scholarship by 
establishing ‘Big Science’ at the Prussian Academy and successfully implemented 
‘the principle of a factory-like division of labor’, while also securing the necessary 
financial and political support.50
Mommsen’s pioneering efforts were continued by his successor as secretary of 
the Prussian Academy, Hermann Diels (1848-1922), best known for his epoch-
making edition of the Fragments of the Presocratics (first edition 1903, sixth edi-
tion, revised by Walther Kranz, 1952), which to this day provides an indispensa-
ble textual basis for the study of early Greek philosophy. Diels was put in charge 
of the edition of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, of which twenty-six vol-
umes were published from 1882 through 1909, with Diels himself contributing the 
two volumes of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristoteles’ Physics and proofreading 
all the others. In 1907, Diels also founded the Corpus Medicorum Graecorum/
Latinorum, which only recently has been completed. Similarly, in 1891, the theo-
logian and prominent church historian Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930) started 
to edit the Greek church fathers together with Mommsen; the project was first 
called Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte and 
after 1945 renamed Griechische Christliche Schriftsteller (completed 2010).51 Oth-
er long-term enterprises followed, for instance, the Wörterbuch der ägyptischen 
Sprache, initiated by Adolf Erman in 1897, of which thirteen volumes appeared 
between 1926 and 1963 and which found a continuation in the current Altägyp-
tisches Wörterbuch.
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All these monumental projects boosted the international reputation of the 
German Altertumswissenschaft and served as methodological and organizational 
paradigm for ‘Big Science’ in other disciplines and countries, especially in Eng-
land, France, and Italy.52 At the same time, the institutionalization of ‘Big Science’ 
had far-reaching consequences both for the Prussian Academy of Sciences and 
for Classical Studies as a discipline. The former had been founded in 1700 by the 
Prussian prince-elector Frederick III, the later Frederick I of Prussia, upon the 
advice of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Leibniz (1646-
1716). Despite its original conceptualization as a general society of the learned, it 
had been primarily an association of dignitaries in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, organized by disciplines and providing a forum for specialized schol-
arly discourse.53 Mommsen restructured the Prussian Academy in the course of 
his appointment as secretary and transformed it into a large-scale research in-
stitution, redefining its function as a sponsor for the new type of collaborative, 
government-funded, and interdisciplinary academic enterprises that he had ini-
tiated.54 Simultaneously, the Academy began to play a major role in education, 
since the various projects and committees in Classical Studies provided an oppor-
tunity for recruiting and training young academics. For even though the unity of 
research and teaching at the new University of Berlin allowed promising students 
to participate in the scholarly discussion, it was at the Academy that they truly 
gained firsthand practical experience carrying out specific work assignments.55
Even more fundamental were the changes that Classical Studies as a disci-
pline experienced following the introduction of ‘Big Science’. Since Mommsen 
demanded that the entire legacy of classical antiquity be taken into account, all 
literary and material remains – texts of all sorts, inscriptions, papyri, coins, ar-
chaeological objects, etc. – were collected, organized, and edited in the aim ‘to 
capture the Greco-Roman culture in its very essence as well as in its individual 
forms and expressions’, as Wilamowitz later wrote.56 This led to an enormous 
expansion of the ancient source material and a multitude of highly specialized 
research projects requiring specific techniques and scholarly expertise, which in 
turn accelerated the division of Classical Studies into discrete disciplines such 
as Greek and Latin Philology, Classical Archeology, Ancient History, Epigraphy, 
Papyrology, etc.57 The emergence of independent fields of study, however, result-
ed in the abandonment of the conception of Altertumswissenschaft as a systematic 
and all-encompassing science of the ancient world. Moreover, the notion of classi-
cal antiquity as an overarching cognitive ideal was given up and replaced with the 
specific paradigm(s) of knowledge in the different subdisciplines.58
Simultaneously, the professionalization of Classical Studies effectuated by 
‘Big Science’ and, as a consequence, the academicization of antiquity deprived 
the ancient world both of the exceptional status and the normative function that 
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it had had in previous centuries.59 Most scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries had no doubt about ‘the exemplary nature, or at least the profound cul-
tural importance of classical antiquity, and especially that of the Greeks’.60 But 
the definition of Classical Studies as a purely historical science led to a consist-
ent de-idealization of antiquity, even if policy makers in higher education clung 
to the neohumanist appreciation of the absolute primacy of Greek and Roman 
culture. Mommsen and his contemporaries did not reflect much on the theoretical 
assumptions and premises of their work nor did they continue earlier efforts to 
develop a philosophy of science or a universal methodology, as August Boeckh had 
done. Rather, they focused on the organization of research now that ‘Big Science’ 
in Classical Studies had been institutionalized and had produced tremendous re-
sults.61 ‘Faith in progress and optimism about the power of scholarship marked the 
professionalized and diversified study of antiquity in universities and academies’.62
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, the ‘positivistic and histor-
icist investigation of the past’63 as represented by the collective research enterpris-
es of the Prussian Academy increasingly met resistance. They were considered 
uncreative, unproductive, and inadequately theorized, concerned only with the 
amassing of material without accounting for the necessity and function of such 
collections or asking about their relevance for real life.64 Even Mommsen felt that 
his own scholarly achievement had been relativized and that he had turned into a 
servant of science.65 Similarly, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1848-1931), 
his son-in-law and later president of the Prussian Academy (from 1902 onward) 
as well as director of the Inscriptiones Graecae, wrote at the beginning of his mon-
ograph on ancient Greek lyric: ‘My heart is truly more attached to the poets than 
to the inscriptions; but the Academy has made me the leader of the Inscriptiones 
Graecae, and duty comes before inclination’.66
While there is much to learn from the rise and fall of ‘Big Science’ in Classical 
Studies at the turn of the past century, it may be particularly timely to look back 
at the new type of research project established by Theodor Mommsen in light of 
current digital humanities initiatives, since there are some interesting parallels. 
This is not to say that the digital humanities are to be seen as modern successors 
of the academic enterprises at the Prussian Academy of Sciences, but rather that 
the history of the latter symbolizing a pretheoretical age can provide a useful 
perspective on present-day activities ‘in an academic landscape that thinks of it-
self as post-theory (though of course not un-theoretical)’.67 In addition, it needs 
to be pointed out that despite all justified criticism of nineteenth-century ‘Big 
Science’ for its exclusive focus on collecting, cataloging, and publishing, not for 
its cataloging, and publishing all surviving texts and objects from classical antiq-
uity, ‘any sustained attempt to work with the body of older scholarship is likely 
to make it clear that there are advantages in having a usable documentary basis 
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for Classical Studies’.68 The research projects launched by the Prussian Academy 
provided the fundamental tools for the study of Greco-Roman culture and civi-
lization on which scholars rely to this day, even if it is necessary to examine them 
critically and to transcend ‘the intellectual limitations of the positivist legacy’.69
Tellingly, Classics was one of the first humanities disciplines to adopt comput-
ing approaches and to develop technological tools for the study of antiquity, just 
as in the nineteenth century Mommsen’s vision of Altertumswissenschaft initiated 
the transition to ‘Big Science’. The Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, for instance, was 
founded as early as 1972 and has since then collected and digitized most extant 
texts written in Greek from Homer to the fall of Constantinople in 1453 CE. 
Similarly, the text collections of the Packard Humanities Institute, established in 
1987, and the Perseus Digital Library Project, also under development since 1987, 
have set the trend. Finally, the collaborators of Rome Reborn, one of the pioneer-
ing 3D digital projects, have been working on their model since 1997, with the first 
version made public in 2007.
All these digital humanities projects in Classical Studies – and the same goes 
for other fields – are collective enterprises, regularly involving several institutions 
as well as numerous individual scholars from various disciplines and countries 
(not to mention experts from outside academia) and thus share the same form of 
research organization as the long-term projects of the Prussian Academy of Sci-
ences.70 Furthermore, they usually provide opportunities for students and young 
academics to participate in, and contribute to the respective research activity, thus 
offering further, often highly specialized training and professional experience 
similar to their counterparts in the nineteenth century.
However, the digital humanities not only invite comparison with ‘Big Science’ at 
the Prussian Academy in terms of organizational structure, international and mul-
tidisciplinary collaboration, and – of course – public funding, but also with regard 
to goal, scope, and methodology. To remain in the field of Classical Studies, the 
digital projects mentioned above all aim at making the literary and material remains 
of classical antiquity available to present-day scholars and students in order to ad-
vance (and enrich) knowledge, improve research conditions in various disciplines, 
and open up new avenues for scientific inquiry. The Perseus Digital Library Project 
defines its objectives even more broadly and states that ‘our mission is to make the 
full record of humanity – linguistic sources, physical artifacts, historical spaces – as 
intellectually accessible as possible to every human being, regardless of linguistic 
or cultural background’.71 This clearly evokes Mommsen’s demand to consider the 
entire legacy of the Greek and Roman world and to make it available in large criti-
cal editions. Similarly, most contemporary digital humanities projects are primarily 
engaged with the collection of vast amounts of data and other evidence just like the 
large-scale academic enterprises Mommsen founded or sponsored.
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To be sure, the actual processes look very different today; moreover, modern 
digital technology offers unprecedented opportunities especially for the visual 
representation of both texts and objects, thus allowing for new forms of study. 
For instance, electronic editions can not only produce faithful facsimiles of man-
uscripts or papyri, but also document the entire textual history of a work, since 
technical applications like color coding, layering, and moving images can effec-
tively display multiple versions, which in a traditional print edition would result 
in a hopelessly confusing labyrinth of variants.72 Likewise, digital commentaries 
can do justice to the evolving reading habits in recent years due to the influence 
of such tools as the hyperlink (or pop-up information), immediate search, or the 
scrolling page, and include material which the limited space of a printed book 
does not permit or not as fully as desirable.
While contemporary technological progress thus holds much potential, many 
scholars remain concerned about what actual new insights can be gained from the 
ever-growing number of databases and online libraries of digitized sources. More 
specifically, they fear that quantification comes at the expense of interpretation 
and that people ‘forget [that] the digital media are means and not ends’, as a well-
known historian of science recently put it.73 For databases ‘[...] do not tell stories; 
they do not have a beginning or end; in fact, they do not have any development, 
thematically, formally, or otherwise that would organize their elements into a se-
quence. Instead, they are collections of individual items, with every item possess-
ing the same significance as any other’.74 Similarly, critics of nineteenth-century 
‘Big Science’ in Classical Studies complained about the unreflected amassing of 
evidence without consideration of its actual meaning both in the original context 
and for our understanding of classical antiquity. In light of this, it seems all the 
more pressing to start thinking about how the new media alter our practices of 
reading, analysis, and interpretation, how they change our conception of the lib-
eral arts and the production, exchange, and dissemination of knowledge, and in 
which new direction(s) research should be pushed.
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4.4 New Philology and Ancient Editors  
Some Dynamics of Textual Criticism
Jacqueline KloosTer
 Introduction
This paper discusses the place of New Philology in the history of textual criti-
cism of ancient texts. In particular, I will look at the benefits and drawbacks of 
applying this approach to the textual edition of ancient Greek poetry, by compar-
ing modern editing techniques with what we know about their ancient transmis-
sion and editing techniques.
 Modes of textual criticism
In his monograph on textual criticism, Paul Maas makes clear the problem that 
everyone who seriously wishes to study ancient texts inevitably comes across:
We have no autograph manuscripts of the Greek and Roman classical writ-
ers and no copies which have been collated with the originals; the manu-
scripts we possess derive from the originals through an unknown number 
of intermediate copies, and are consequentially of questionable trustwor-
thiness. The business of textual criticism is to produce a text as close as 
possible to the original (constitutio textus).1
Although textual criticism has a history of at least 2300 years, it is mainly in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the study of texts and manuscript 
traditions gets a theoretical underpinning. To determine or reconstruct what an 
author wrote, three modes of textual criticism can be distinguished, which show 
some overlap in method.2 Of these methods, the first is that of eclectic criti-
cism, where the editor determines, based on the evidence of contrasts between 
various witnesses of one text what the most plausible reading should be, without 
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necessarily singling out one manuscript as being most reliable. The comparison 
between manuscripts in this process makes it akin to the second method, copy-
text editing.3 In this second procedure first a single most trustworthy manuscript 
(the base text), often but not always the oldest testimony at hand, is selected and 
compared to other copies, after which errors in the base text are remedied with 
the help of these other witnesses. This has been the dominant method until the 
nineteenth century.
Finally, the most rigorous is that known as stemmatology, in which, on the 
basis of comparison of the surviving manuscript evidence (recensio) a family tree 
of surviving manuscripts is reconstructed in order to determine what the arche-
type of a text hypothetically looked like. This paradigm, known as Lachmann’s 
method,4 was first developed in the nineteenth century for the textual criticism of 
medieval literary texts and New Testament studies, but later applied successfully 
by Karl Lachmann, most famously in his edition of Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura. 
Thence it became a staple of classical philology. The steps followed in this process 
are the following:
Recensio (also selectio): Sorting through and collating the surviving manu-
script evidence (and the creation of a stemma or cladorama)
Examinatio: An attempt to establish the earliest possible version of a text 
(the reconstruction of a (hyp)archetype)
emendatio: Correcting the text when none of the surviving manuscripts ap-
pears to preserve the correct reading; this may include making a conjecture5
The procedure results in a text edition with a critical apparatus (in which edito-
rial decisions, conjectures and variae lectiones are noted) and a stemma codicum. 
This method is still employed and is usually justified by pointing out that it is 
essential to possess as much knowledge as possible of the assumed original text 
in order to study factual content in a responsible way (e.g., if one wishes to know 
whether a certain general in Thucydides is called Philippides or Pheidippides), but 
also if one wishes to reach decisions on matters of style and linguistics.
Stemmatology generally involves a strong evaluative element: some manu-
scripts or readings are dubbed ‘inferior’, others ‘superior’; one speaks of ‘corrup-
tion’ or ‘contamination’ of manuscripts when a scribe has not followed a single 
tradition, but combined two. It should moreover be noted that despite its aura of 
scientific objectivity, several objections have been raised against this mode of text 
constitution.6 For instance, the assumption that scribes only alter texts by mis-
take is a famous misconception (they may, of course, ameliorate them). Likewise, 
the idea that commonality of error implies common origin, is only defendable 
in cases where the text critic is able to identify the error, i.e., where the error is 
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recognizable as such – which it may not always be. Another problem (raised by 
Joseph Bedier in the nineteenth century) was that the method clearly favored bi-
partite stemmata, whereas in many cases alternative, more complex, family trees 
were imaginable. Despite these attacks on the alleged rigor and scientific sound-
ness of the method, the stemmatic approach has remained the dominant way of 
constituting medieval and classical texts.
Meanwhile, in the wake of sociological studies in historical research in the first 
half of the twentieth century, a systematic interest in the Sitz im Leben of texts 
and their bearers came more and more to the foreground in literary, and also, 
finally, philological studies. Awareness of the historical context of the produc-
tion of a text was an already Rankean procedure,7 but it took a long time before 
existing practices translated into something like the program suggested by the 
label of ‘New Philology’ as a discipline. It was in the 1970s that this discipline 
was finally developed by James Lockhart, in the wake of a second development in 
historical study, namely anthropology, particularly the anthropological approach 
of ethnologists studying the written and oral cultures or Meso-America.8
To return to the topic of text editing classical and medieval texts, it was in 
1989, informed by insights from these quarters that the French medievalist Ber-
nard Cerquiglini, in his book Éloge de la Variante: critique de la philologie, polemi-
cally stated that the stemmatic method really amounts to a fallacy in the case of 
medieval poetry in the vulgar languages. His argument was taken up in 1990 (in 
the journal Speculum) by a group of American medievalists, who proposed that 
‘New Philology’ was indeed what was called for: an approach that recognizes the 
specific nature of this poetry, namely its oral transmission alongside the writ-
ten records. Because of its orality, poetry of this type is more flexible than texts 
that are both conceived and transmitted in written form. This explains the high 
number of variants in the manuscripts of poets like the medieval Walther von 
der Vogelweide. Typically, these variants take the shape of (1) different text order, 
(2) different wording, and (3) sizeable omissions (or additions of text passages).9
These variants cannot be considered ‘mistakes’ of transcription, nor should 
they be regarded as ‘inferior interpolations’. Rather, they are manifestations of the 
text that are all equally valuable and authentic. Apart from this, the Speculum-
New Philologists promoted so-called multitextual or multiform editions, which 
allow the reader to see at a glance the numerous variants, without trying to estab-
lish a stemmalike model.
It may be noted that such multiform editions are not entirely new as a concept, 
in the sense that earlier so-called variorum editions had already been produced 
(in which various manuscript readings were placed side by side in an edition, and 
accompanied by the notes of various scholars).10 Even a critical apparatus has 
potential elements of the multiform, in that it records various traditions. The 
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most important conceptual difference between this and the multiform is that 
 stemmatology aims mainly at constituting a hypothetical archetype, and pays less 
attention to the later manuscript traditions.
Although, certainly in the world of medieval and classical textual criticism, 
traditional and New Philology seemed destined to become polemically opposed 
disciplines, a kind of synthesis and some degree of mutual adaptation has now in 
many cases been reached.11
A number of classicists have recently argued that this New Philological way 
of editing should also be fully applied to the text criticism of archaic Greek po-
etry, because here we are also dealing with oral transmission mixed with written 
records. Of course, an awareness of the Sitz im Leben of ancient texts was well 
established in Altertumswissenschaften almost from their beginning, but the curi-
ous fact remained that this was not always taken into account in editing practices, 
as I have tried to make clear in the above. In the rest of this paper I will focus on 
the question what the theoretical benefits and problems with a New Philological 
approach to editing might be in the case of Greek poetry.12
 New Philology and archaic Greek poetry: Which genres?
Clearly, some genres in ancient Greek poetry more readily lend themselves to a 
New Philologist editorial approach than others. A genre like Pindaric choral vic-
tory ode, for instance, is so complex in metrical structure, thought and wording 
that any possibility of a truly fluid state of the text (resulting from improvisation 
and a dominant oral transmission) needs to be dismissed. Pindaric lyric poetry 
was heavily scripted and was moreover ‘protected’ by its complex metrical struc-
ture (with its close metrical responsions) from interpolations. In cases like this, 
there must have been a single authentic text (allowing perhaps a reworking by 
the author for reperformance),13 and editors may well strive to approximate it as 
closely as possible.
Homeric or other epic poetry (and to a lesser extent early elegy), on the other 
hand, originates from long traditions of oral transmission, and hence employs a 
relatively simple metrical scheme, a specific vocabulary, the repetition of typical 
scenes and formulaic verses, which facilitate improvisation, and hence justifies a 
New Philologist approach.
Or rather, it should be noted that the oral nature of Homeric poetry has been 
recognized since at least Friedrich Wolf (1759-1824), and has developed into a 
field of study wholly sui generis (the famous Homeric Question), but nevertheless 
presents noteworthy parallels and overlaps with the approaches of New Philol-
ogy, although until recently, multiform editions were not available.
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An interesting field between these two extremes is monodic lyric (i.e., poetry 
sung by an individual to the accompaniment of a lyre), exemplified by the songs 
of Sappho or Alcaeus. This type of poetry seems to result from single authorship, 
rather than from an improvisational tradition. Hence, here we might perhaps 
ultimately postulate an, albeit elusive, original text. In length, Sappho’s songs are, 
of course, no comparison with either Pindaric lyric, or Homeric epic. Moreover, 
mon odic lyric is mainly a performative and therefore oral art. It does not possess 
the complex structures of Pindaric choral lyric. These last two features would 
have encouraged textual variation by oral repetition and improvisation to a great-
er extent than Pindaric lyric allows.
In the following, I look at Homeric epic in order to identify the parallels in the 
approaches of orality studies and New Philology, and will then turn toward the 
field of monodic lyric, to see what the benefits and drawbacks of New Philology 
are in this latter genre.
 Homer
Homer illustrates the paradox of the ‘oral text’ perfectly. Since the work of Lord 
and Parry,14 the oral nature of Homeric poetry, which had already been postulated 
by Wolf in 1795, has been generally accepted, though not perhaps in the extreme 
form Wolf envisaged. This entails acceptance of the fact that it is impossible to 
reconstruct a single authoritative version of these poems, because each oral per-
formance would have been –however slightly – different, and would have consti-
tuted an original in its own right.
Nevertheless, while paying lip service to this creed, some editors still treat 
their editions of Homer as though they could in fact reconstruct a single authori-
tative text.15 The projected archetype of this version is presumed to have been 
written down or dictated at some early point (some say the seventh century BC), 
and from it all later written copies are believed to derive.16 While, of course, there 
may have been a single, earliest written down version of the Homeric epics, the 
subsequent continuation of the oral performances by rhapsodes, and the written 
versions that resulted from these performances, ensure that the postulation of 
such a version has a different status from what is usually subsumed under the 
header of ‘authoritative text’.
Quotations in ancient authors and remarks in the scholia attest to the very 
early existence of alternative versions, as Wolf already noticed. The scholia to the 
Venetus Marcianus codex (A, the so-called Viermänner Kommentar) attest that in 
antiquity, from very early onward, i.e., in sixth century, various texts of Homer 
circulated in editions either named after their city of origin (ekdoseis kata poleis, 
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from places as widely apart as Marseille, Argos and Sidon) or their editor (ekdo-
seis kat’ andra, of which the earliest known is that of Antimachus, c. 404 BC); 
these may well have been transcriptions of different oral traditions. Indeed, it has 
been estimated that when the Alexandrian scholars in the Hellenistic era created 
their editions of Homer, they may have had as many as 400 different versions of 
the Homeric poems available.17
Since the nineteenth century we also possess the amazing testimony of the nu-
merous Ptolemaic Homer papyri (third to first century BC). What makes these 
‘wild’ or ‘eccentric papyri’ so intriguing are the notorious ‘plus lines’, extra lines, 
sometimes amounting up to 33% of a single fragment. These lines do not ap-
pear in the witnesses later than 150 BC, i.e., not in the so-called ‘vulgate’ versions 
on which our text of Homer is based. Moreover, the lines are so numerous and 
blend so organically into the surrounding text that they cannot be discounted 
as ‘mistakes’ or random interpolations: they are variants, examples of different 
traditions. 18 In this sense they resemble the medieval traditions of the songs of 
Walther von der Vogelweide mentioned above.
The date of 150 BC appears to have been a watershed, presumably some-
how related to Aristarchus’s edition of the Homeric epics.19 The model of an 
authoritative archetype from the seventh century leading to a more or less con-
sistent manuscript tradition can hardly be correct therefore, and should not in-
form modern editions of Homer. A number of scholars in fact now insist that 
the multitextuality of the tradition should be acknowledged and made visible in 
digital editions, and this is currently being worked on at the Homer multitext 
website of the Harvard Center for Hellenic Studies. The resemblance to the 
editing ideals of some radical New Philologists is clear. One might wonder what 
such choices mean for the time-honored distinction between aoidoi (creative 
singers, ‘poets’) and rhapsodoi, the singers of traditional tales, which they embel-
lish but do not create wholesale: if all versions of the text are put on a same level, 
then, theoretically, the difference between these categories diminishes or even 
disappears.
Without wishing to discredit this line of investigation, it remains a rather 
striking thought that New Philology editing and its aims (i.e., to show that 
there is not a single retrievable Homer text, and to celebrate the variants of the 
tradition) theoretically seem to run counter not only to ‘traditional’ philology, 
but also to recognizable currents in the philological approaches throughout 
antiquity.
Consider the following: the ancient Greeks apparently wished to put one 
name to the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey – the blind bard Homer; in 
order to make him a more tangible character, they provided him with several 
biographies. It is also clear that from a very early point onwards general opin-
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ion held that only Iliad and Odyssey were authentic (together with the now 
lost comic poem Margites) as distinct from the largely anonymous later so-
called ‘cyclical’ epics.20 We moreover hear (although this is nowadays generally 
considered a legend) that as early as the sixth century BC there was an at-
tempt to standardize, protect and privilege a certain version of Homeric epic, 
in Athens, the so-called Peisistratean recension. Even if this story may be a 
later fabrication,21 the fact that textual editions were made as early as 404 BC 
by individual scholar-poets like Antimachus points toward the wish to privi-
lege one form of the text. At the same time, these ongoing attempts at stand-
ardization demonstrate if anything how difficult it must have been to stand-
ardize Homer’s text.
The most systematic attempt at standardization took place in the Hellen-
istic era, the great age of Greek scholarship, when Zenodotus, Aristophanes 
of Byzantium and Aristarchus produced their so-called diorthoseis (emended 
versions), ekdoseis (editions, presumably mainly for scholarly consultation), and 
hypomnemata (commentaries). This undertaking points toward the attempt 
to reach some authentic core of Homeric material, distinct from later accre-
tions. Scholarly opinions differ on how the Homeric critics actually went about 
these editions, but clearly they did not yet possess the refined stemmatological 
method. It seems most likely that their attempts were more similar to the copy-
editing style of textual criticism. From what we can retrieve from the scholia, 
they apparently selected a single manuscript (presumably an old one they con-
sidered to be reliable) and clarified by means of marginal signs (like the famous 
obelos) whether they thought the text at the passage in question was authentic or 
not. They did not cut from or add to the text; their separate commentaries (hy-
pomnemata) presumably explained their editorial choices. The idea of ‘what was 
fitting’ for Homer (to prepon) often played an important role in their decisions 
about authenticity.22 Indeed, the common sense idea that Homer should be clari-
fied out of his own texts (Homeros ex Homerou safenizein) informs Aristarchus’s 
critical choices.23
It may be noted that not many of the suggestions of the Alexandrian editors 
made it into the vulgate, but it does seem likely that the vulgate represents the 
reliable text they chose to work with.24 What needs consideration, then, is the 
fact that throughout antiquity, next to the unstable improvisational oral trans-
missions, a tendency toward a single, authentic text has also always played an 
important role in the Homeric tradition. Indeed, without it, we might not even 
have any Homer to speak of.
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 Monodic lyric
Let us now briefly turn to monodic lyric. This is a challenging field because it lies 
between the two extremes of improvisational oral epic and extensively scripted 
Pindaric lyric. To begin with, the material is multifarious. The few fragments we 
have of Sappho, Ibycus and Alcaeus are very different from, e.g., the voluminous 
collection known as the Theognidea, which comprises a nucleus of poems that 
appear to be by a certain Theognis of Megara (sixth century BC),25 and much 
traditional symposium-related material besides, which we also encounter in other 
elegists. For this reason, and also because of the fact that elegy and monodic song 
presumably served different purposes, one would probably need different theo-
retical approaches in the editing of such texts.
Also, concentrating for the purposes of this paper, for instance, on the case 
of Sappho,26 the obvious challenge presents itself that we have far less material; 
there is not, as with Homer, a vulgate against which we can compare ‘variant 
versions’. For all we know, fragments of Sappho’s poetry of which we now pos-
sess a single version might otherwise have been ‘variants’. Besides, as in the case 
of Homer, we have very little reliable knowledge of the composition and early 
transmission of these texts although some guesses may be made on the basis of 
circumstantial evidence.
First, and perhaps most importantly, we do not know whether Sappho actu-
ally existed as a historical person, even if it seems highly likely, perhaps more so 
than in Homer’s case. Secondly, it is unclear how Sappho’s poetry was composed: 
in writing? It may have been, or it may have been dictated or written down soon 
afterwards. And how and where was it first preserved? In the cases of other early 
authors, such as Alcaeus, we hear of author copies of texts that are deposited in 
temples (for safekeeping, but presumably also to enable eventual transcription).27 
And what form did these early texts take? Were they poetry collections written on 
papyrus, or other materials, and if so, was there a definite order to these collections? 
Did the order of the poems matter, and was it decided on by the author herself?
With regard to the early transmission scholars struggle with the same amount 
of uncertainties: how was Sappho’s poetry first transmitted beyond her own cir-
cle, and when did this begin? Quotations in other early texts make it clear that 
Sappho’s poetry was known outside of Lesbos from as early as the sixth century 
onwards. Her songs may well have traveled orally: there is a record for learning 
these songs from hearing them.28 One, regrettably late, and therefore not entirely 
trustworthy, anecdote relates how Solon asked his nephew to teach him a song by 
Sappho, which he overheard the boy singing. 29 Testimonies like these apart, it is 
certain that written copies (serving as scripts for performance, as aide-mémoire 
for the singer) were also involved right from the start and throughout.30 As An-
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drew Ford argues, the scribes of these very early texts, however, presumably did 
not strive with scholarly rigor for an authoritative version of the poem. Rather, 
texts were means toward an end: the oral performance. Only in the Alexandrian 
era, again, do we find an attempt at standardization of Sappho’s works.
This explains why the written record shows that Sappho’s texts were transmit-
ted in widely different versions, both on a word level, and on the level of strophes 
or actual poems, that is to say their ordering, and inclusion or omission of texts. 
The following example, taken from a forthcoming article by André Lardinois,31 
illustrates this well:
1) Ostracon Flor.
ἔνθα δὴ σὺ... ἔλοισα Κύπρι
χρυσίαισιν ἐν κυλίκεσσιν ἄ<β>ρως
<ὀ>μ<με>μείχμενον θαλίαισι νέκταρ
<οἰ>νοχόαισον
Where you, having taken up (wreaths?), Cypris,
pour nectar gracefully
in golden cups
mingled with the festivities.
2) Athenaeus 11.463e
... ἐλθέ, Κύπρι,
χρυσίαισιν ἐν κυλίκεσσιν ἁβρῶς
συμμεμιγμένον θαλίαισι νέκταρ
οἰνοχοοῦσα
...  Come, Cypris,
pouring nectar gracefully
in golden cups
mingled with the festivities.
Of course, if we would consider a digital multitext edition of Sappho, such vari-
ants are all part of the transmission history. However, assuming that there was 
– different perhaps from the case of Homer – a poet called Sappho and that she 
composed her songs in writing, when we edit her songs in different versions, we 
are really recording different stages in the later transmission. But there may have 
been, again, differently from Homer, originally, a single authoritative written text. 
This is a fundamentally different point of departure. It is, of course, also clear 
that such a hypothetical text must forever remain elusive. In this sense the way in 
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which Sappho’s poetry was transmitted does come close to some of the medieval 
poems by Walther von der Vogelweide.
In Sappho’s case there appears not to have been a pervasive attempt at stand-
ardization such as we saw in the case of Homer. This may be due to lack of 
surviving evidence, but other explanations are readily conceivable. It might, for 
instance, point to the fact that the material was not so wildly prone to variants as 
the Homeric epics, or, equally importantly perhaps, was not considered to be of 
the same Panhellenic cultural importance as Homer’s epics.
 As noted, the first real attempt at producing an authoritative and standard-
ized text of Sappho’s poetry is attested, again, with the age of the great Alexan-
drian scholars, who made editions of her works. In this case we may ask: what 
texts did they possess for Sappho? The Alexandrian edition of Sappho’s poetry 
is said to have amounted to nine books of poems (i.e., nine scrolls of papyrus), so 
there must have been quite some (written) material around.
A final intriguing piece of information related to Alexandrian editing concerns 
the Hellenistic scholar-poet Callimachus and his Pinakes, a (now lost) 120-scroll 
catalogue of authors kept in the Alexandrian Library, and their works ordered ac-
cording to genre. This catalogue seems to have listed not only incipits of the works 
of these authors, but also the number of verses they contained.32 This raises the 
question what Callimachus would have done with poetry collections, like Sap-
pho’s: did he list the incipits of all poems on the scroll (thus preserving or estab-
lishing an ‘authentic’ ordering),33 or just the incipit of the first poem?
The information that he wrote down the total number of verses is even more 
fascinating, because this suggests that there was a more or less ‘definite’ version of 
the work in question. This verse total could then serve as a kind of safeguarding 
of this version. Of course, we have no way of knowing how Callimachus deter-
mined the correct number of lines.
 By way of conclusion
New Philology editing seems a fully justified approach to forms of Greek poetry 
that find their origin in oral improvisation, like epic and elegy. In the case of 
Greek monodic lyric too, it seems a viable idea to produce, e.g., a website show-
ing all available variants of a text, in order to enable readers to see synchronically 
and diachronically what evidence there is for any given poem. This will certainly 
provide a more realistic image of the history of such texts and their users than a 
traditional text edition with a necessarily limited apparatus criticus. Yet, it must be 
kept in mind that an author’s copy may well have once existed, even if it is now – 
and has probably been for the longest time even in antiquity – ultimately elusive.
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Also, we do well to recognize that alongside the unstable and often unorgan-
ized transmission of texts in antiquity there existed an important tendency that 
did focus on authorship, authenticity and standardized texts, and to which, in 
great part, we probably owe the actual survival of these texts. It is an interest-
ing paradox that this tendency toward standardization should be included in the 
multiform-oriented approaches of New Philology, and that the rigorous and sci-
entifically inspired nineteenth-century stemmatological approach too could and 
indeed should be accounted for in the new, historicizing digital text editions, 
which record the life of a text in all its facets. Contextualization, anthropology 
and awareness of the Sitz im Leben of texts become central to textual criticism, a 
discipline that entered the twentieth century with a much more closely circum-
scribed, philologically centered outlook, and which was all about determining 
whether a reading was inferior or superior.
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4.5 What Books Are Made of
Scholarship and Intertextuality in the History of the 
Humanities
Floris Solleveld
 Introduction: Paper castles
In 1866 Alfred Blot, a history teacher at the Collège Stanislas, published a re-
edition of Louis de Beaufort’s 1738 Dissertation sur l’Incertitude des Cinq Premiers 
Siècles de l’Histoire Romaine [Fig. 4]. Out of print for more than a century, the 
main virtue of Beaufort’s work was to show systematically how little we know 
about the mythical past. The gist of Beaufort’s argument is that most of the early 
Roman historical record and monuments perished in the sack of the city by the 
Gauls in 387 or 390 BCE, and that of the two main sources we have today, Diony-
sius of Halicarnassus is overly credulous and Livy knows that he is working with 
unreliable legend but has nothing else to fill the gaps. The book then proceeds to 
list inconsistencies in early Roman history, for 500 pages.
In support of his new edition, Blot cites two authorities in his introduction, 
Michelet and Hyppolite Taine. Both describe Beaufort, in strikingly similar terms, 
as ‘the first true reformer’, who ‘deserves to be reprinted’, the man who destroyed 
the idealized past in order to make space for proper historiography – in short, a 
French precursor to Niebuhr and Mommsen. Niebuhr, for that matter, in the fore-
word to his Römische Geschichte, makes a somewhat grudging acknowledgement 
toward Beaufort as the only predecessor in early Roman history whose work makes 
sense, but puts him down as ‘mehr Gewährsmann als Vorgänger’, someone whose 
sound judgment has proved reliable rather than someone who actually contributed 
substantial work. This is not entirely fair as Beaufort proceeded, thirty years later, 
to publish a two-volume Plan Géneral of the Roman Republic, for which the Dis-
sertation self-avowedly prepared ground; but as far as the Dissertation is concerned 
one is tempted to agree with Niebuhr. Beaufort’s contribution is indeed entirely 
negative in terms of facts, though it does propound new arguments.
Blot’s edition and its argument about the origins of source criticism make a 
nice case of how text is made of earlier text. There are at least six layers of that: 
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Fig. 4: P. Yver, frontispiece to Louis de Beaufort, Dissertation sur l’incertitude des cinq 
premiers siècles de l’histoire romaine (Utrecht, 1738), engraving (© University Library, 
University of Amsterdam, Special Collections)
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the ancient Roman records, now lost; the work of Roman and Greek historians, 
partly preserved; early modern comments on those histories; the Dissertation; 
its reception; and finally, the schoolmaster’s foreword. (Moreover, Blot’s edition 
includes Beaufort’s response to ‘l’écrit d’un certain Allemand’ that had doubted 
the originality of his work and even accused him of plagiarism.)1 What is relevant 
here is the ways in which these text are linked: already in the ten pages of the 
introduction, we see different kinds of quotation, allusion, comparison, reformu-
lation and criticism at work. Highlighting Beaufort’s originality and his contribu-
tion to classical scholarship requires in itself a whole network of such links.
This illustrates the duplicity inherent in all scholarship concerned with text, 
not just historiography but also philology and language study: of building and 
destroying paper castles at the same time, so that one arrives at the underlying 
fact. At the end of the paper trail is a very concrete event: the sack of Rome by 
the Gauls in 387/390 BCE, before which nothing can be known with certainty. 
Beaufort merits canonization, according to Blot, Taine and Michelet, precisely 
because of his destructive work so that others can build. Beaufort says it with a 
frontispiece: Ignorance and Fable Cover the Truth of Roman History.
 Reproduction and innovation
My aim in this article is to argue for the study of types of intertextuality as a 
means for mapping developments in the humanities. The basic idea is simple. 
Scholarly work is, in many ways, a compound of earlier text. Very little, at least 
in the humanities, is the report of direct observation or firsthand experience. In 
August Boeckh’s dictum, philology (in a very inclusive sense) is die Erkenntnis des 
Erkannten, the recognition of what has been recognized. The question, then, is: 
to what extent does research in the humanities add significant new information? 
And how do the means of information management change?
Intertextuality is not mere replication. Or rather, replication is just the simplest 
form of intertextuality; we have already seen more sophisticated types such as 
comparison, continuation, emendation, comment and critique. Rather than being 
the opposite of adding significant new insight, intertextuality is the precondition 
of it: only by building upon previous work, by accumulation as well as rejection, 
is progress in the humanities possible. Still, from Descartes and Bacon onwards, 
historians and philologists have been accused of building paper castles, of heap-
ing together stacks of useless antiquarian facts and comments on footnotes – and 
every generation of scholars has since been occupied with defending its practice, 
putting it on new footing, presenting new ways of doing ‘scienza nuova’, writing 
proper history, and time and again announcing a ‘crisis in the humanities’.
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The notion of intertextuality, stemming from literary studies, has until re-
cently rarely been applied to the history of scholarship, or to the history of ideas 
at large.2 According to the principle of ‘guilt by association’, this may well be be-
cause it stems from literary studies. There has, however, been substantial previous 
work in intellectual history on the notion of ‘influence’,3 the paper trail of ‘core 
concepts’,4 information management,5 the history of the footnote,6 and, more re-
cently, digital humanities scholarship on textual borrowing.7 This article aligns 
with the latter rather than the former. My main interest in intertextuality is in 
how bits of source text are embedded into the argument of the target text, and 
what this reveals about changes in scholarly practice. Although there is an obvi-
ous similarity between my analysis of ‘types of intertextuality’ and the five ‘types 
of transtextuality’ identified by Genette,8 and the six ‘levels of intertextuality’ dis-
tinguished by Bazermann,9 their concern is ultimately with authorship, whereas 
mine is with information management.
In this article I will be offering a typology of different types of intertextuality 
with some examples from the history of scholarship. The aim behind this typol-
ogy is to find a way of assessing changes in scholarly practice while short-stepping 
discussions of epistemology, ideology, or worldview, without recourse to such no-
tions as ‘hermeneutics’, ‘narrative’, ‘discourse’, and ‘context’. This perspective, obvi-
ously, is internalist; it only takes into view what scholars were doing in, not what 
they were doing by writing a particular text. However, intertextuality includes the 
replication, reformulation and extension of arguments, the reuse and redefinition 
of concepts by which scholars define themselves, and models and examples they 
follow; as well as the selection and arrangement of this material. All this requires 
a more substantive analysis for which the mere study of intertextuality only sup-
plies the raw data; which is why, in conclusion, I will propose an integrated ap-
proach in which types of intertextuality are one element.
 Types of intertextuality
The typology offered here is essentially open and informal: it can be extended 
with further types, and there is a certain overlap between types. Some elements 
in the typology – those dealing with literal replication – can and have been the 
object of computational research: given the availability of a substantial digitized 
corpus, it is relatively easy to do queries over word or word-pair matches and 
distribution of terms. With other types, such as paraphrase, model-following, cri-
tique and borrowing or continuing arguments, that depends on whether sources 
are stated. But for each type, the issue is not just how often it is done but also 
how it is done.
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The typology should at least include the following:
Quotation, paraphrase, reference, samples, excerpts, summaries, editing, trans-
lation, comparison, continuation, following models, borrowing concepts, bor-
rowing arguments, critique, comment, emendation, plagiarism.
In table 1 below, these are listed according to how they use the source text, what 
role the source text plays in the target text, and what else is distinctive of this or 
that type.
Table 1: Types of Intertextuality
Type Use of the source text Role in the target text Specific function or features
Quotation literal reproduction of the 
source text
embedded in the 
argument of the target 
text
often a status marker that 
attributes authority to 
what is cited
Paraphrase a reformulation of (the 
crucial information from) 
the source text
integrated into the target 
text, often interspersed 
with quotes
more interpretive than 
quoting; requires further 
support by references, 
unless the content is 
assumed to be ‘common 
knowledge’
Reference pointing to a source text 
for some information, 
quote, or paraphrase
supplies additional 
information that does not 
fit into the main text
represented by a symbol 
or abbreviation
Samples reproduce source text, but 
it’s not the content that 
matters
functions as an 
illustration of something 
asserted in the target text
crucial for dictionaries 
and linguistic proofs
Excerpts a type of ‘longer 
quotation’ which presents 
the source text in its own 
right
independent bit of text, 
referred to in the main 
text or part of a larger 
compilation of excerpts
often used in compendia, 
chrestomathies, etc.
Summaries a ‘longer paraphrase’ 
which abbreviates 
the source text into a 
(supposed) semantic 
equivalent of the relevant 
information
either integrated or 
referred to in the main 
text; if integrated into 
a novel argument, the 
summary also contains 
comment and/or critique
a way of applying 
Ockham’s razor through 
selection
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Type Use of the source text Role in the target text Specific function or features
Editing reproduces the source 
text in full, after a 
critical examination and 
comparison of different 
(printed/manuscript) 
versions
target text becomes 
a fuller, more correct 
version of the source text





Translation replaces the source text 
by a (supposed) semantic 
equivalent in a different 
language
translation = the target 
text
translation involves 
a reformulation or 
introduction of novel/
alien concepts
Comparison presents source texts 
(versions/translations) 
side-by-side as a tool for 
analysis
comparison supports a 
generalization/selection/
preferred reading
leads to specific kinds of 
layout: double columns, 
tables, glosses, etc.
Continuation ‘updates’ the source text 
with emendations and 
extensions
source text is literally 
copied as a model for 
presenting information
target text generally 
makes no claim of original 
authorship, unless the 
divergence is substantial
Models target text does not 
reproduce source text 
or content as such but 
follows its example
source text functions 
as an guide for how to 
structure and present 
one’s material
operates on a second or 
‘meta-intertextual’ level
Concepts borrows a specific 
(abstract) term drawing 
upon its previous 
associations, implications 
and definitions
employs a previously 
defined concept in a novel 
argument; alternatively, 
it introduces a new 
though related term or 
description 
equivalence of concepts 
cannot be established 
unambiguously, even if 
the same term is used
Arguments rarely ever reproduced 
from the source text 
in exact terms, but 
rather paraphrased and 
commented upon
structures the target 
text through extended 
argument
arguments (unlike 
proofs) are essentially 




Critique either extends or 
reformulates the source 
text, drawing out false 
implications or noting 
contradictions with other 
source material
statements or arguments 
from the source text are 
corrected or ruled out as 
false (often in support 
of the argument of the 
target text)
functions both as a 
selection mechanism for 
novel insight, a step to 
new ideas through the 
rejection of old ones, and 
an expression of scholarly 
morals and standards
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Type Use of the source text Role in the target text Specific function or features
Comment extends the source text 
with elucidation or 
significant additional 
information
embeds a quote or 
paraphrase
when comment raises 
questions, it overlaps with 
critique
Emendation fills lacunae in the source 
text with additional 
information
target text becomes 
a fuller, more correct 
version of the source text
Plagiarism reproducing the source 
text or its significant new 
information without 
mentioning the source
presenting the source 
text or its content as a 
new text
makes a false claim of 
original authorship, or 
disregards considerations 
of authorship
Several things can be concluded from this list. First, that the different types not 
merely overlap but also combine: a comment upon the source text contains a quote 
or paraphrase, concepts are borrowed as words but also through the continuation 
of arguments, quotes and paraphrases are marked with a reference. Second, that 
although the list is not strictly hierarchical, there are different levels on which 
intertextuality operates: there is the basic level of reproducing text; the more 
interpretive level of reproducing content; the meta-level of concepts, arguments, 
and the structure of a text; and the supra-level of models and critique. This is 
only an analytical distinction: these levels do not exist as different layers in the 
text. Third, that some types are alike in what they do to the source text, and oth-
ers in how they function in the target text. Accordingly, there are two possible 
subdivisions within this typology.
One can distinguish three categories in ‘what is done to the source text’:
Replication: quotes, references, samples, excerpts, plagiarism
Reformulation: summaries, arguments, concepts, critique, comparison, 
translation
Extension: editing, continuation, model-following, comment, emenda-
tion
Equally, one can distinguish three ways in which the source text functions in the 
target text. There are ways in which the source text is embedded in a line of argu-
ment, ways in which the source text or its content is presented in its own right, 
and there are ways in which the source text plays a structuring role, in which the 
target text is built around it:
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Embedding: quotes, references, arguments, paraphrase, concepts, plagia-
rism, translation
Presenting: summaries, samples, excerpts, comparison, editing, emenda-
tion
Structuring: continuation, models, critique, arguments, concepts
The division between embedded source text and being structured around the 
source text is one of degree: comments and critique can be an element of a larger 
text as well as an entire new text, and concepts and arguments affect the content 
and structure of the text they are embedded in. These higher-level types of inter-
textuality are on the whole more difficult to pin down; if there is no lower-level 
marker (say, a quote, a reference, an allusion, or word matches) then there is only 
a subjective judgment on similarity and possible influences.10
Table 2: Subdivisions
Use of the source text Function in the target text
Embedding Presenting Structuring
Replication quotes, references, 
plagiarism
samples, excerpts
Reformulation paraphrase, arguments, 
concepts, critique
summaries, translation critique, concepts, 
arguments
Extension emendation, comment editing continuation, model-
following
One could include more elements in this typology. For instance, there is arrange-
ment or collation, and also parody (which is not a very common scholarly device, 
but it happens). Even forging is to a large extent an intertextual construct. Equally, 
I’m not sure whether coagulation – that is, combining things – should be a sepa-
rate category. But the resultant picture of what we as scholars do most of the time 
is clear enough: we read, pen in hand, and then we write. Like the typology, this 
may sound like stating the obvious. But the most obvious conclusion of all is that 
you don’t structure a text by simply replicating it.
 Shifting patterns
Within the scope of this article, it is impossible to give detailed examples for each 
type;11 but the Beaufort/Blot example serves to show that, at least in the percep-
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tion of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scholars, there was indeed a shift in 
the uses of source text. As Glenn Most argues elsewhere in this volume, we are 
so used now to smoothened narratives in scholarly publications that we are sur-
prised to see how openly early modern works display their building blocks. This 
is particularly true for the genre of compendia, which is now restricted to well-
defined types of lexicon but had a much wider scope in the early modern period. 
Some examples are below.
Equally, there is a shift in citation strategies from representative to epistemic 
uses; that is, in the early modern period, authorities are often quoted because they 
are authorities, even when the actual information is drawn from elsewhere. As 
recent articles by Edelstein and by Horton, Olson, Roe et al. have shown,12 the En-
cyclopédie predominantly quotes classical and seventeenth-century authors, while 
shamelessly plundering passages from Montesquieu (681), Voltaire (528), Moréri’s 
Grand Dictionnaire Historique (2606), and the Dictionnaire de Trévoux (11,430). 
These figures also serve to illustrate different attitudes toward plagiarism.
The great shift in model-following is toward disciplinary models: Ranke and 
Niebuhr in history, and Bopp and Grimm in linguistics are key examples. Their 
influence in this regard is not so much in the content of what they write as in the 
example they give of how to write, and how to be a scholar. In this, they are unlike 
earlier models like Montesquieu and Gibbon, Condillac and Port-Royal: they are 
not examples of a genre, such as Histoire Philosophique and Grammaire Générale, 
but of a profession.13
As stated in the previous section, intertextuality takes place on different levels: 
reproducing text; reproducing content; the meta-level of concepts and structure; 
and the supra-level of models and critique. The next section will provide exam-
ples of intertextuality on all these levels: the uses of samples, excerpts and sum-
maries in compendia; the methodological problems in tracking arguments and con-
cepts; and the uses of criticism as a means of fact-checking. Accordingly, these are 
examples of how content is organized, presented, and scrutinized, and the role 
that intertextuality plays in this. How these different aspects can be combined in 
an integrated approach will be addressed in the final section.
 Examples
Compendia
Toward the end of his life, German lexicographer Johann Christoph Adelung 
published the first volume of Mithridates, oder allgemeine Sprachenkunde mit dem 
Vaterunser als Sprachprobe. The title says it all: in four volumes, Mithridates pre-
sents all (c. 500) known languages with the Lord’s Prayer as standard sample. 
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Why the Paternoster? Because that was the first text that Jesuit missionaries 
would translate; which is where approx. half the samples come from. Obviously, 
in these samples, it’s not their content that matters, but their uniformity.
One of Adelung’s avowed aims, in this overview, is to avoid all kind of partial-
ity and speculation:
Ich habe keine Lieblingsmeinung, keine Hypothese zum Grunde zu legen, 
sondern ging unmittelbar von dem aus, was ist, ohne mich um das zu küm-
mern, was seyn kann, oder was seyn sollte. Ich leite nicht alle Sprachen 
von einer her; Noah’s Arche ist mir eine verschlossene Burg, und Babylons 
Schutt bleibt von mir völlig in seiner Ruhe.14
Compare that with the following. In his two-volume Histoire des Navigations 
aux Terres Australes (1755), Charles de Brosses explicitly disavows the ambition 
to wield ‘la plume de l’historien’15 in flowery storytelling. Rather, for the sake of 
objectivity, De Brosses offers a lengthy digest of all the known voyages to the 
southern seas. He reproduces and translates journals and travel literature from 
the past two centuries, sometimes commenting on the reliability of the sources 
and judiciously selecting, but never quite interfering with the original accounts.
This, indeed, is ‘applying Ockham’s razor’: De Brosses’ own comments are 
sparse, but he sifts the information so that the reader is in a position to com-
pare and draw out the relevant information without going through fifty-three 
books. (Together, this makes a ‘compound argument’ for further exploration in 
the South Seas; the English translation indeed motivated Captain Cook’s expe-
ditions.) With summaries, the information can be condensed even further than 
with excerpts: instead of reproducing the most relevant passages, one can refor-
mulate the relevant information in the shortest possible way. However, such re-
formulation also means a substantial loss in transparency.
Johann Gottfried Eichhorn’s Geschichte der Litteratur von ihrem Anfang bis 
auf die neuesten Zeiten (1805-1812) is a late example of a compendium of the 
whole of fiction and nonfiction from the West as well as the Rest. One could see 
it as an early ‘history of the humanities’, though it’s actually rather a ‘handbook 
in encyclopedia’, intended primarily for students but also aimed at the general 
educated public. In the first three volumes, Eichhorn presents an overview of 
the arts and sciences of each period, divided by genre and subgenre, ordered by 
country or region. In the next three volumes, he treats the history of Schöne Re-
dekunsten, Sprachwissenschaft, and theology. The text is divided into paragraphs 
dealing with each specific field (as in ‘Political Sciences in Sweden, 1650-1810,’ 
vol. 3, 861-863). At the end of each paragraph, he provides references for further 
reading.
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These compendia are entirely built upon previous text: nothing in them could 
count as ‘original research’. Partly textbooks, partly reference works, they belong 
to a previous age in information management. Eichhorn devotes the first 130 
pages of the first volume to speculation about the arts and sciences until 1483 
BCE (that is, before Moses), true to the conventions of historia litteraria that 
require him to start at zero. Still, by sheer virtue of completeness, these works 
are excellent indicators of the state of knowledge at the time of writing: Eichhorn 
points in a footnote to the forthcoming work of Adelung, Adelung’s posthumous 
editor and continuator Vater makes abundant use of Alexander von Humboldt’s 
reports from Southern America, and De Brosses may have a mistaken belief in 
a ‘great southern continent’ as a counterweight to the Eurasian land mass, but 
he very acutely points out a knowledge gap. Most striking is an observation in 
Adelung’s foreword: ‘Nur aus der Vergleichung der Wurzelsylben lässt sich die 
Verwandtschaft und Verschiedenheit der Sprachen beurtheylen’16 – a quite more 
precise statement than William Jones’ famous remark on the Sanskrit language.
Concepts and arguments
Hans Aarsleff, in his collection of essays From Locke to Saussure, argues against 
the ‘standard account’ of the history of linguistics by pointing out that intellectual 
debts cannot be inferred from references, nor even from the lending of certain 
concepts, but only by identifying similarities in arguments in which these concepts 
are employed. The problem is that this kind of similarity between arguments is 
much more subjective than references or word matches: it requires interpretation, 
or even rational reconstruction.
Dietrich Busse levies a similar kind of methodological critique in Historische 
Semantik: Analyse eines Programms. Busse describes the lexicon Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe and related works by Reinhart Koselleck and Jürgen Kocka as a 
‘mountain ridge tour’ (Gratwanderung) along canonical figures.17 The approach 
of Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, according to Busse, is insufficient as an account 
of the development of ‘core concepts’; to get a full grasp of how a term was used 
in discourse and what an author was doing in using it, one would need to know 
how common a certain term was in a certain period and who else were using it to 
what ends.
In 1987, this was an impossible demand in terms of scale – Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe already fills eight big volumes. In the digital age, this has become 
easier. Although the degree to which books and journals have been digitized var-
ies, one could now more easily do a corpus search for the earliest occurrences and 
the frequency of specific words in a certain period. However, this does not yet 
solve the problem noted by Aarsleff; the results of such queries still need to be 
assessed (not merely filtered) by human readers.
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Both through rational reconstruction and through tracking references, the 
search for where a certain concept or argument derives from tends to be quite 
canon-confirming. Concepts are generally associated with a small set of authors 
who (re)defined it, and they are wound up with arguments in strands of reasoning 
which require lengthy formulation. The lengthiest reconstruction of intellectual 
debts to date, Pocock’s multivolume work on Gibbon’s Decline and Fall, reads like 
a ‘Who’s who?’ of Enlightenment philosophy and historiography in spite of its 
contextualist approach. This does not mean that the history of concepts can only 
be a Big Man history; rather, one can also view the standard authors as shorthand 
for a certain thought complex, as nodes in the organization of knowledge.
Critique
The greatest shift that takes place in criticism is probably the professionalization 
of it: that is, the degree to which a work of scholarship is judged as a contribution 
to expert knowledge. Thus, during the nineteenth century, criticism increasingly 
becomes a way of distinguishing experts from amateurs – a distinction that was 
more diffuse during the early modern period. However, that is not in itself a 
change in the intertextual format of it – though the more professional criticism 
also tends to be more argumentative rather than simply listing mistakes and in-
consistencies.
What sets critique apart from other types of intertextuality is its power to 
pierce through paper: more than any other kind of reformulation or extension it 
connects the source text to the outside world. This is apparent in the Beaufort ex-
ample. An even more telling example is the nineteenth-century historiography of 
the French Revolution. The Revolution did not only bring about a drastic shift in 
historiographic perspective (one for which classical antiquity no longer provided 
a model, and in which social, economic and ideological factors became impossible 
to ignore), but histories of the Revolution were also particularly vulnerable as 
they were liable to incite public debate and drew on recent and sometimes living 
sources. Particularly noteworthy is a case previously discussed in Ann Rigney’s 
The Rhetoric of Historical Representation: Nettement’s critique of Lamartine’s His-
toire des Girondins.
Alphonse de Lamartine’s Histoire des Girondins became an instant bestseller 
upon its appearance in 1847. In the avertissement, he stated his procedure: ‘We 
don’t request faith on word. Indeed we haven’t supplied footnotes, citations and 
pièces justificatives, but there is not one assertion which is not authorized by au-
thentic memories, be they unpublished memoirs, correspondence or oral commu-
nication’.18 As Lamartine’s work presents a romanticized picture of the Revolution 
in which the heroes and villains are united by the larger historical drama, and as 
he fills the gaps with what one would charitably call ‘narrative imagination’, it is 
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unsurprising that his conservative adversaries did not take this for granted. One 
of them, the Catholic journalist and historian Alfred Nettement, published an 
announcement inviting critical responses.
This provided the basis for Nettement’s Études Critiques sur les Girondins 
(1848). A large part of the book consists of letters and excerpts from letters, 
mainly from nobles, notables, and clerics: pages 64-160 are entirely filled with 
them, other letters are quoted and alluded to throughout. Some correspondents 
complain against Lamartine soiling their families’ good name; one argues, more 
convincingly, that his grandfather was not guillotined at all; still others produce 
written counterevidence or give a point-by-point reading of events of which they 
were an eyewitness. A rather uneven lot, these ‘rectifications historiques’ still 
serve their purpose in throwing doubt on Lamartine’s reliability as a historian.
Not that Nettement fared any better: in his own Histoire de la Conquête d’Alger 
(1856) he did not take the trouble of asking any Algerians how they felt about the 
matter. On the whole, his Études Critiques are entirely dependent in content and 
outline on the book they wish to discredit. The argument developed throughout 
500 pages of pedantry is that freethinking leads to terror and that any attempt 
at ‘rehabilitation’ of the Revolution should therefore be dispelled. It is interesting 
to note what Nettement did next: in the same year (1848) he published a new 
edition of Bossuet’s Discours sur l’Histoire Universelle as an example for modern 
historians of how history should be written – that is, in a theological frame. As 
this was the book that Voltaire’s Essai sur les Moeurs famously set out to outdo, 
Nettement’s statement will have been read by at least some of his readers as ‘tak-
ing back Voltaire’.19
 Conclusion: An integrated approach
What the above examples show is that intertextuality goes further than providing 
‘building blocks’. Rather, the typology contributes to a history of the humanities 
in terms of information management and the organization of knowledge. More 
specifically, intertextuality is part of how information is turned into knowledge. 
That process is in no way reducible to intertextuality, but it requires a constant 
reassembly of facts and concepts precisely in virtue of being creative and self-
corrective.20 The typology and the above examples show different ways in which 
content is collected and selected; but they also show that it must be organized, 
presented, and scrutinized.
An integrated approach, accordingly, should take into account: (1) What 
counts as a ‘fact’, how is an argument built from the source material? (2) How 
are these findings presented (rhetorically, visually) and ordered? (3) How is fact-
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checking done, what counts as valid/relevant/good scholarship? and (4) Where 
does the content come from and what is added to it? As a grid for answering 
question 4, the typology developed here is one step toward developing such an 
integrated approach.
These questions correspond to four broad categories of analysis: (1) styles of 
reasoning, (2) forms of presentation, (3) ways of criticism, and (4) types of intertex-
tuality.21 These are, to some extent, overlapping categories. Criticism is itself a 
type of intertextuality, different styles of reasoning are manifest in different forms 
of presentation, and the form of presentation generally depends upon a model 
– that is, something borrowed. The overlap is excusable as it is precisely the in-
terrelation between these categories that connects scholarly ideals and scholarly 
practice. The terms by which scholars define themselves and their practice, the 
criticism they give, the models they follow are not a ‘top layer’ of ideology, they are 
part of the intertextual fabric.
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5.1 Furio Jesi and the Culture of the Right
Ingrid D. Rowland
On the night of June 16, 1980, Furio Jesi, Italian scholar, critic, poet, novelist, ac-
tor and political activist, died in his home, suffocated by an accidental gas leak 
from the water heater.1 He had turned thirty-nine only a month before, but his 
curriculum vitae was already long enough for several people twice his age: he had 
written nearly twenty monographs on subjects including Egyptology, mythology, 
German literature, and Hebrew mysticism, as well as newspaper articles, novels, 
translations, poetry, and a spate of unpublished manuscripts. In 1979, typically, 
he had produced two books, Materiali mitologici (Mythological Materials: Myth 
and Anthropology in Central European Culture) and Cultura di destra (Right-wing 
Culture), a study focused on the twentieth century, with special emphasis on Italy. 
Republished in 2011 with the encouragement of the Wu Ming writer’s coopera-
tive, Cultura di destra has lost none of its originality. And though Furio Jesi may 
have died when Silvio Berlusconi was no more than an aspiring tycoon in the Mi-
lanese provinces, many of his observations about the connection between middle-
class culture, pulp culture and right-wing culture still apply three decades later, 
with Berlusconi himself as a prime example.2
Cultura di destra used relatively plain language with biting wit at a time when 
florid rhetoric in a whole spectrum of styles was the norm for left, right, literati, 
bureaucrats, academics, and terrorists. Photographs of its author, most of them 
taken in his thirties, almost always show Furio Jesi grinning broadly, long-haired, 
bearded, cigarette in hand, radiating energy and humor amid a pile of books and 
papers; in the Sixties, when he was in his twenties, already married and the father 
of two, he is short-haired, clean-shaven, and deeply serious.
Furio Jesi was a complicated man, with a complicated background. Although 
his parents belonged to Turin’s large Jewish community, he was a nonbeliever and 
did not practice religion of any kind. Furthermore, his father, Bruno, had been 
granted honorary Aryan status for heroic service as a Fascist cavalry officer in 
Ethiopia in World War II.3 In 1943, when Furio was two, Bruno Jesi died of the 
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injuries he had sustained in combat in Africa.4 The boy grew up with his mother, 
Vanna Chiron, an art historian, and his maternal aunt and uncle, in a house filled 
with books, artworks, and archeological artifacts.5 The setting ensured that he 
was both prodigiously well read and prodigiously precocious. By the time Furio 
Jesi reached his teens, he had begun to publish scholarly articles; he completed his 
first book, Tales and Legends of Ancient Rome, at the age of fifteen, and his second, 
Egyptian Pottery, at seventeen.6 He abandoned formal schooling before finishing 
the liceo and traveled instead. After time spent as a researcher in Brussels and 
Hildesheim, he returned to Turin in 1969, where he combined editorial work 
with journalism, theater, and activity on behalf of the Communist labor union, 
the CGIL. His publications on German culture and his translations of German 
authors earned him a professorship of German at the University of Palermo in 
1976, and then a chair in the same field at the University of Genoa in 1979. Dis-
illusioned with the pressures of city life (at a moment when Italian cities were 
literal battlegrounds between left and right), he and his family withdrew to live in 
the countryside outside Genoa, and it was in this rural refuge that he died unex-
pectedly of carbon monoxide poisoning on a summer night in 1980.
Myth, culture, and anthropology were recurrent keywords in Jesi’s writing, as 
they were in the writing of many of his contemporaries; these were words that 
captured the Zeitgeist. So did the word ‘politics’, in all its ramifications. But Jesi ul-
timately came to mistrust large words of indefinable content, and Cultura di destra 
presents the most sustained evidence for that mistrust. Although he does not ex-
plicitly address the paradox, Jesi seems to be perfectly conscious that the words 
‘Cultura’ and ‘destra’ themselves ran the risk of being large, empty abstractions.
 Despite his bourgeois background and upbringing in Piedmont, the most his-
torically bourgeois of Italy’s regions, Jesi’s own political convictions leaned pow-
erfully leftward, at the moment in Italian history that would later be known as 
the anni di piombo (Years of Lead); lead for their distance from any glimmer of 
a Golden Age, lead for the bullets that flew so freely in every direction from left, 
right, Mafia, and central state, lead for the weight of gray despair that had fol-
lowed so brutally on Italy’s hopeful prosperity of the 1960s.7 Cultura di destra ar-
rived in bookshops shortly after one of the defining events of those leaden years, 
the kidnapping, fifty-five-day imprisonment, and murder of former Prime Min-
ister Aldo Moro at the hands of the radically left-wing Red Brigades in the spring 
of 1978.8 But the author of Italy’s first sustained study of rightist culture did not 
live to see the most dramatic gesture ascribed to Italy’s radical right. Two months 
after Jesi’s death, on August 2, 1980, a bomb would rip through Bologna’s central 
train station, killing eighty-three people.9 Two members of a group called the Nu-
clei Armati Rivoluzionari were eventually sentenced to life imprisonment for that 
atrocity.10 But there had been earlier random bombings over the course of more 
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than a decade, all of them aimed to kill and injure civilians, most of them to this 
day never formally ascribed to a perpetrator, though the impetus evidently came 
from the right.11 There had been left-wing fire-bombings as well: the most terrible 
killed two brothers in a working-class Roman suburb when their apartment was 
set on fire one April night in 1973; their father served as secretary for a local section 
of the neo-Fascist MSI. As neighbors, family, and firefighters watched, twenty-
two-year-old Virgilio Mattei burned to death at a window in a desperate attempt 
to shield his ten-year-old brother Stefano from the flames.12 Another left-wing 
bomb in 1978 scarred a future president of Italy’s parliament, Gianfranco Fini.13 
For a country still traumatized by its memories of World War II, this near civil war 
between left and right in the ‘Years of Lead’ not only revived old hostilities, it also 
pulled the conflict into a new generation, a generation of young people who often 
seemed to be at war with their elders as much as with traditional political adver-
saries. It was in the middle of this terrifying new world of old battles that Furio Jesi 
published the last and most controversial of his many books.
The title Cultura di destra played knowingly on the ambiguity of the term ‘cul-
ture’. In its short, dense chapters, Jesi dealt both with culture in the anthropologi-
cal sense (what the American archeologist Lewis Binford had then begun to call 
‘lifeways’ with reference to prehistoric peoples) and culture in the more restricted 
fine-arts sense implicit, for example, in institutions like the national Ministry of 
Archaeological and Cultural Property.14 Jesi defined rightist culture as a culture 
of ‘ideas without words’ (a phrase drawn from Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the 
West), abstractions so overused that they had lost their meaning: Myth, Father-
land, Jack the Ripper – the anecdotal inclusion of the Victorian serial killer in 
a list of lofty principles is a typical Jesi touch. But Jack, as he points out, is an 
unknown and therefore has an unknown meaning, as inherently empty a phrase 
as ‘patriotism’ – or, though Jesi does not say so explicitly, ‘dictatorship of the pro-
letariat’.15 He does warn his readers, however, that left and right are not always so 
easy to distinguish, no matter how polarized postwar Italy seemed to be by the 
battle between Fascists and Communists:
Most of the cultural heritage, even of those who have no desire to be on the 
right, is a cultural residue of the right. In past centuries, the culture that 
has been preserved and transmitted is above all the culture of the wealthy 
and powerful, or more accurately, it has not been, except minimally, the 
culture of the weak and poor. It is useless and irrational to be scandalized 
by the presence of these residues, but it is also necessary to try to find out 
where they come from. [...] Left-wing speech is dense with ‘ideas without 
words’, including the most incendiary left, and in this respect it is related to 
its institutional adversaries.16
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In this passage, Jesi shows both his left-wing sympathies (history has seldom 
been written by the weak and the poor) and his growing skepticism about all 
mass movements (‘Left-wing speech is dense with “ideas without words”’). As a 
younger man, he was more certain of his convictions. In 1968, at the age of twen-
ty-six, he broke off a four-year friendship with the older Hungarian scholar Karl 
Kerenyi when Kerenyi reproved him for simplifying his arguments in a typical 
‘Italo-Communist’ fashion; Jesi’s bristling reply, to a man who had lived through 
the Communist occupation of Hungary, never received an answer.17 The young 
man had caught the older man’s point: that Jesi’s thinking was clever but im-
mature, and he reacted by growing up. Although they never corresponded again, 
Furio Jesi delivered the eulogy at Kerenyi’s funeral in 1974.18
In the ensuing quarter century, scholars have done precisely what Jesi sug-
gests doing in the passage cited above from Cultura di destra, namely, devoting 
their attention to less privileged strata of society, motivated by some of the same 
concerns he himself expresses in hopes that overlooked voices should be heard 
at last. This research has shown that on the whole, the poor and weak have usu-
ally been just as conservative as the rich and powerful, with the same general 
tendency to hold fast to whatever has favored their survival in a harsh world. 
The poor and powerless are not, in fact, inherently leftist, or communist; they 
are often fiercely attached to their traditional ways, as another Italian scholar of 
phenomenal erudition, Torinese Jewish heritage, and left-wing convictions had 
begun to show in these same years. By the time Cultura di destra emerged from 
the press in 1979, Carlo Ginzburg had completed two famous studies of peasant 
culture in northern Italy: I benandanti (1966; translated in English as The Night 
Battles), which argued that a group of northern Italian peasants preserved the 
remnants of ancient, pre-Christian cults, and Il formaggio e i vermi (The Cheese 
and the Worms [1976]), which examined the case of a sixteenth-century Friulian 
miller named Menocchio, whose smattering of education made him a truly crea-
tive thinker about religion and cosmology, and thus brought him to the attention 
of the Inquisition. Ginzburg derived Menocchio’s peculiar ideas about cosmology 
from peasant myth, passed by ‘oral transmission from generation to generation’, 
and he treated the beliefs of the Benandanti, a group of peasants distinguished 
by having been born with a caul, as a similar survival of an immemorial culture 
preserved by the less privileged strata of human society. Although his political 
and scholarly orientation were, and are, firmly situated on the left, certain aspects 
of Ginsburg’s argument fit comfortably into Jesi’s category of destra, such as the 
attempt to root historical phenomena in a kind of folk mythology, not to men-
tion the peasants’ inclination to preserve immemorial custom, conservative in the 
most genuine sense of the word. This tendency to loose inclusiveness is one of the 
inherent problems with Jesi’s use of destra as a diagnostic term.
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But the problematic nature of the term destra runs to more than its inclusive-
ness. Jesi’s warnings about the ‘incendiary left’ alert his readers to a phenomenon 
that has become much better documented in the years since his death: there were 
Italian terrorists who played both sides of the political spectrum, more excited 
by a life of lawlessness, violence, and peremptory authority than by any specific 
ideology of right or left.19 For these individuals, Jesi’s description of rightist cul-
ture as a compendium of ‘ideas without words’ and a ‘religion of death’ applies to 
the forces that drove both extremes, as well as Italian organized crime. But given 
the fact that the far-right movements of Fascism and National Socialism began 
as left-wing socialism, the problem may have more to do with ‘right’ and ‘left’ as 
analytical categories.
For his analysis of the ‘religion of death’, Jesi found Italian Fascism too involved 
in theatrical display to provide a good example, too involved, as he writes, with life.20 
He therefore focused his discussion on other Fascist movements in Europe: the 
German SS, the Spanish Legionaries of Francisco Franco, and the Romanian Iron 
Guard, where he found his most revealing example in Mircea Eliade, the Romanian 
historian of religion who had held a distinguished professorship at the University 
of Chicago since the end of World War II. In 1973 Jesi had edited an Italian transla-
tion of Eliade’s book on yoga, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, for publication.21
In 1972, however, a Romanian-language periodical published in Israel, Toladot, 
produced extracts from Eliade’s extensive diaries to show that shortly after his 
return from India in 1931, this famous student of yoga, shamanism, and world reli-
gion had become a fervent supporter of the Iron Guard, or Legion of St. Michael, 
the Romanian paramilitary organization that combined Orthodox Christianity 
with Fascist authoritarianism.22 Drawing on this evidence, first in an encyclopedia 
entry on ‘Myth’ from 1973, and then, more extensively, in Cultura di destra, Jesi 
showed Eliade as obsessed with an Orthodox Christian version of the ‘religion of 
death’. His discussion in the latter book begins with Eliade’s use of a Romanian 
folktale about Master Manole, a man who cannot build a house until he has im-
mured his wife inside it, in what Eliade himself called a ‘foundation sacrifice’, a 
practice that goes back to antiquity, and seems, for example, to be attested in recent 
excavations of archeological sites like the Roman Forum and Etruscan Tarquinia.23
From the idea of foundational sacrifice, Jesi turns to the Iron Guard’s rhetoric 
of sacrifice in battle as a necessary step toward building a new Christian world 
order and compares this rhetoric with Eliade’s own writings about religion and 
human redemption.
In order to last [Eliade writes], a building must be animated: that is it must 
receive both a life and a soul. The transfer of the soul is not possible except 
by means of a sacrifice; in other words, by means of a violent death. Like-
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wise, sacrifices of human victims are performed to ensure the success of an 
activity, or the historical duration of a spiritual undertaking.24
In journal entries that range from the 1920s to the 1950s, Eliade often wrote about 
the withdrawal of a Supreme Being from the world, and how religions had been 
invented to fill the void left by that withdrawal; this is the basic premise of his 
famous book on shamanism, and of his four-volume History of Religions.25
From these remarks Jesi argues that in the final analysis the Jews, as the chosen 
people of God, provided the Iron Guard and the National Socialists with the 
perfect foundation sacrifice for their religion of death. Yet the very idea of God’s 
withdrawal, Jesi notes, is also fundamental to early modern Jewish mysticism; 
he notes that Eliade even applies the Kabbalistic term tzimtzum, ‘withdrawal’ or 
‘contraction’ to this phenomenon of God’s departure:
Eliade says, ‘Myths and “religions” [...] are the result of the void left in the 
world because of God’s withdrawal’. The Kabbalah [of Isaac Luria] affirms 
that ‘God, in order to guarantee the possibility of the world’s existence, 
needed to create a place that was emptied of his being, from which He 
therefore withdrew himself ’.26
Jesi here suggests, in short, that Eliade has taken his scheme of divine withdrawal, 
ultimately to be compensated by the Holocaust, from a Jewish source. Like his 
exchanges with Kerenyi a decade earlier, his exposition of Eliade seems to reveal 
enthusiastic admiration for an elder scholar that has turned to disillusionment, 
expressed along narrowly defined political lines, but also reflective of something 
larger. Jesi suggested more than once that all scholarly work was autobiographi-
cal, and in these troubled relationships with scholarly father figures, admired and 
then viewed critically as rightists, it is not hard to see the Jewish father who is 
Fascist, Aryan, and as absent from his son’s life as the God who has withdrawn 
from the world by contracting into himself.
Jesi was not the only follower of Eliade to struggle with this legacy. The asser-
tions of Cultura di destra greatly upset both the elder historian himself and his 
international following, especially the Romanian student of religion who eventu-
ally followed Eliade to Chicago and became his literary executor, Ioan Culianu.27 
In 1987, a year after Eliade’s death, Culianu confided to a colleague that his men-
tor ‘had never been an anti-Semite, or a member of the Iron Guard, or a pro-
Nazi. But I understand anyway that he was closer to the I[ron] G[uard] than I 
might have liked to think’.28 Culianu’s mysterious assassination on the University 
of Chicago campus in 1991 further complicated reaching any clear assessment of 
Eliade’s legacy by removing his most evident intellectual heir.29
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It is clear in any case that Eliade was close to the Iron Guard in the late 1930s, 
whether through naïve patriotism, as Culianu eventually concluded, or through 
the more complicated mystical impulse that Jesi outlined in Cultura di destra. If 
Jesi himself had lived longer, he may well have analyzed Eliade’s career somewhat 
differently as historical events turned many of his fellow Italian Communists into 
social democrats. Culianu, somewhat defensively (of both Eliade and himself ) 
explained his mentor’s Legionary sympathies by a particular historical situation 
in Romania; what is particularly compelling about Jesi’s account is its immersion 
in a particular situation within the history of religion, or at least of mysticism, 
rather than the history of politics.30
Jesi’s change of heart about Mircea Eliade was not an isolated phenomenon 
among young historians of religion. At the very same time, the brilliant German 
classicist Walter Burkert, ten years older than Jesi, was beginning to rethink 
his own pioneering book on sacrificial ritual, Homo Necans (1972).31 Deeply 
influenced by the work of an older Swiss scholar, Karl Meuli, and captivated 
by Meuli’s vividly imaginative descriptions of ritual life in prehistoric human 
society, Burkert had gradually come to realize how extensively those accounts 
might have reflected Meuli’s contemporary political sympathies rather than an-
cient realities.32 To a conspicuous extent, in fact, the history of religion in the 
early to mid-twentieth century was written by scholars who leaned to the po-
litical right and helped to create what Jesi would term a ‘mythological machine’ 
of prototypes and archetypes – not only Eliade and Meuli, but also figures like 
the French Indo-Europeanists Georges Dumézil and Émile Benveniste and the 
American Joseph Campbell.33 Their students, on the other hand, often came 
from a completely different political background, like Jesi himself, or Burkert, 
or the Swede Jesper Svenbro, or the American Gregory Nagy. Not every attitude 
these historians of religion shared, including the conviction that the world was 
in a state of decline and the longing for an imagined past, was necessarily politi-
cal; many of the notoriously cranky Joseph Campbell’s most biting statements, 
for example, were expressions of curmudgeonly temper rather than ideological 
conviction.
The Eastern European mystical currents that Jesi brought into play in his 
discussion of European Fascism had already figured largely in another of his 
books, Mitologie intorno all’Illuminismo (1972; Enlightenment Mythologies).34 This 
volume’s title promised to upset the image of the eighteenth-century Enlighten-
ment as a triumph of reason, much as the Irish scholar E.R. Dodds had upset 
the image of ancient Greece as a paradise of reason with his lectures published 
as The Greeks and the Irrational (1962).35 In Mitologie, Jesi treated, among other 
themes, the eighteenth-century messianic Jewish movements that followed Shab-
batai Zevi and Joseph Frank, figures to whom he returned in Cultura di destra. In 
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one sense, Shabbatai Zevi and Joseph Frank, as Jewish saviors, represented the 
perfect fulfillment of their contemporaries’ hopes for a new order. But rather than 
immolating themselves as sacrificial victims, Zevi eventually converted to Islam 
and Frank to Christianity. Jesi tries to explain their actions within his scheme of 
foundational self-immolation, but it seems more likely that both men were acting 
out of a practical instinct for self-preservation:
Extensive research has been carried out on Shabbatai Zevi; it turns out 
that this ‘holy sinner’ who had presented himself as an ‘apostate messiah’ 
committed ‘evil acts’ but when the inspiration ceased ‘he behaved like an 
entirely ordinary man, and regretted the strange actions he had commit-
ted’. In this sense of guilt he made plain the tragedy of his condition: the 
Law that he broke had to be broken in order to establish the Law of the new 
kingdom, but it was still the Law.36
Jesi’s discussion of Zevi and Frank comes just after his exposé of Mircea Eliade’s 
sympathies with the Iron Guard, suggesting that on some level he may suspect 
that Eliade’s case, too, is probably impossible to confine within a scheme of 
 sacrificial mysticism, or, for that matter, of consistent human behavior. Eliade, 
Zevi, and Frank lived in troubled times; so did Furio Jesi, but he was less ex-
posed to physical risk than these three men who changed their beliefs to fit their 
surroundings.
Clearly, Furio Jesi himself was powerfully attracted to the same histories, 
myths, and fantasies as the scholars he analyzed. By the time he reached the age 
of thirty, however, he had begun to see these histories and myths as invented sto-
ries rather than archetypal realities, and this skeptical detachment led to another 
important theme of Cultura di destra: the conclusion that myths and historical 
pasts had been invented ex post facto by people who needed such stories to justify 
their own actions or their own position in the world. Like his elder contemporary 
Walter Burkert, Furio Jesi was beginning to face the full extent to which the re-
mote past was simply unknowable.
Furthermore, as a nonbeliever in matters of religion, he had also come to dis-
believe in myth per se – in good left-wing materialist fashion, he began to write 
about ‘mythological materials’, a phrase that also appears in the title of his pe-
nultimate book, published a few months before Cultura di destra. For the forgers 
of rightist culture, he would argue in a 1979 interview, ‘ideas without words’ and 
‘mythological materials’ provided ‘a kind of homogenized pulp that can be mod-
eled and held to a shape in the most expedient way’.37
When Jesi traced the fate of ‘ideas without words’ in Italian popular culture, 
he did so as a pioneer. The second long essay of Cultura di destra examines Italian 
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neo-Fascism in an effort to understand the ideology of right-wing terrorism (one 
year before the crowning act of right-wing terrorism in Italy, the bombing of the 
Bologna train station). Jesi notes first that Italian Fascism is distinctive because 
the persistence of the Catholic Church and the aristocracy have resulted in a rela-
tively small middle class, which is largely secular and liberal in its attitudes rather 
than taken by mystical or occult movements:
The modern Italian bourgeoisie, especially the petit and middling bour-
geoisie, has never had a particular propensity for esoterica and Knights of 
the Holy Grail. A bit of occultism – but in small doses and certainly much 
smaller than those absorbed, for example, by the German or French bour-
geoisie – a bit of Freemasonry (and that not for the petit bourgeoisie), but 
this, too, secularized often as not, is much more anticlerical, liberal, and 
inspired by Unification rather than by ‘secret centers’.
Within his contemporary Italian context, Jesi identifies two kinds of neo-Fas-
cism: ‘fierce-faced Fascism’ and ‘Fascism in a suit’, the former typical of the 1970s 
heirs of the violent, black-shirted squadristi who brought Mussolini to power, and 
the latter their more socially acceptable sympathizers, who combined two catego-
ries invidious to Jesi’s own political stance: Fascist and bourgeois.38 Jesi warns his 
readers, however, that these two categories of neo-Fascist are interchangeable: 
the mildest of Fascists-in-a-suit still keeps a black leather jacket in his closet (as 
a later Minister of Justice in Silvio Berlusconi’s ‘center-right’ governments, former 
MSI member Ignazio La Russa, would demonstrate by his sartorial choices in 
office and out).
Typical of Italian Fascism, Jesi argues, is the figure of Julius Evola, the ideo-
logue both for Mussolini and for postwar neo-Fascism:
Julius Evola is a person with whom no one as yet has reckoned thoroughly. 
It is not enough, in fact, to declare him so filthy a racist that it is revolting 
to touch him (which is true) and so jejune that it is a waste of time paying 
attention to him (which is not true). But [...] to examine him as a significant 
cultural personality does not at all mean ascribing to him merits and stat-
ure of any consequence.39
Evola wrote in a visionary vein, but the real soul of Italian Fascism and its later 
successor, Jesi argues, is to be found in popular culture (it was Mussolini, after all, 
who created a Ministry of Popular Culture, the notorious ‘Minculpop’). He dis-
cusses openly Fascist writers like the eccentric, flamboyant Gabriele D’Annunzio, 
and compares D’Annunzio’s eroticism and hothouse prose with that of the pop-
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ular romance novelist Amalia Liana Negretti Odescalchi Cambiasi, to whom 
D’Annunzio himself suggested the pen name Liala ‘so that she would always have 
a wing (ala) in her name’ – the aristocratic Liala’s long-time lover was an aviator 
killed in 1926.
Despite her own noble origins, Liala was overwhelmingly popular with women 
of every class, who felt that she ‘spoke to them in their own language’. Jesi attacks 
that apparent fellow-felling relentlessly. Liala’s romances, obsessed with the min-
ute description of interior decor, boats, airplanes, clothing, and fast cars, were 
written, he contended, in a language:
that does not ask to be ‘understood’ in any sense, if ‘understand’ implies any 
sort of exercise of reason. It is the language of package vacations organized 
by those in power for those who lack it, so that the vacation will mean the 
cessation of all effort.40
Jesi also devoted a sardonic paragraph of his analysis of luxury to the man he 
called the ‘little marquis (marchesino) of racing cars’, by whom he meant Luca 
Cordero di Montezemolo, the future head of Ferrari, whose vanity the rumpled 
scholar captured mercilessly.41 ( Jesi’s right-wing adversaries borrowed the term 
marchesino immediately to describe Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer, who 
was, in fact, a Sardinian aristocrat.)
Liala, Jesi notes, dwells on the icons, the ‘ideas without words’ that denote 
luxury (a word that means both ‘luxury’ and ‘lust’ in Italian), by dwelling lov-
ingly on the physical trappings of a wealth that most of her readers would never 
enjoy. Until the later stages of her career, when changing sexual mores changed 
the plots of romance novels, she also devoted extensive space in her novels to 
the preservation of female virginity (Liala lived from 1897 to 1985). Through the 
same emphasis on extravagant consumption, the same appeal to the desire for the 
physical trappings of what would soon be called benessere, ‘well-being’ (but mean-
ing luxury), Silvio Berlusconi would soon create his own cultura di destra, first in 
the media and then in politics.
Clearly, on some level Jesi acknowledged the overwhelmingly visual emphasis 
of Fascist culture, but did so without using his own experience in art, archeology 
and art history to develop an argument about visual media and ‘ideas without 
words’ – for this still young, and inveterately bookish man, Cultura continued to 
mean literary culture.
Thus Jesi misses some of the importance of Giorgio Almirante, the charismat-
ic head of the MSI, the postwar heir to the Fascist Party. The son of two actors, 
Almirante used his face and gestures as a medium in the way that Mussolini had 
before him. But Almirante’s physicality was not simply a matter of empty ‘ideas 
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without words’: often, he let his presence speak on his behalf in a way that gave 
him enormous authority with his rank and file. When he appeared at the funeral 
of Communist Party secretary Enrico Berlinguer, his meaning was perfectly clear 
right across the political spectrum.42
Some of Almirante’s followers caught on to this aspect of his conduct. In his 
study of gentrification in a Roman working-class neighborhood, anthropologist 
Michael Herzfeld noticed that the people who were physically present to protect 
the long-time residents from pressures to move and eviction notices belonged to 
Alleanza Nazionale, the party that succeeded Almirante’s MSI and renounced 
Fascism for a position they defined as center-right; whereas former Communists, 
become eager capitalists, were driving the process of gentrification as eagerly as 
more traditional, business-minded conservatives.43
Inspired though it may have been by a certain amount of standard Commu-
nist rhetoric about the perils of capitalism, Jesi’s picture of an Italy lulled into 
thoughtlessness by the obsessive, empty-minded consumption of luxuries and 
empty symbols seems as apposite in the sunset years of Silvio Berlusconi is it did 
in the ‘Years of Lead’, no longer quite ‘Fascism in a suit’ but an evident descendant 
of the ‘luxurious’ branch of the same rightist culture.
Jesi also evokes a terrifying vision of the right-wing sage, but it is really the 
picture of any self-styled authority, and a warning to himself as much as to his 
readers:
The sage [saggio] is the author of an essay [saggio]; mythological masks that 
he adopts and outcomes to which he is exposed, mythological materials 
that he manages and outcomes he claims to have sensed in advance, at the 
same time become myths and outcomes that envelop his work. He runs the 
risk, by assuming that mask and managing those materials, of identify-
ing himself with his knowledge-by-composition to the point that he falls 
headlong, before his own May 5 [the date of Napoleon’s death in exile], into 
a ‘There has never been anyone like Napoleon’. But he also believes that 
he has been offered the opportunity to wear down, by a procedure related 
to Romantic irony or Jewish assimilationism, mechanisms and materials, 
museum pieces, that he promises to himself that he will reduce, by consum-
ing them, under the stimulus of his own inspiration, to a transparency suf-
ficient to counterbalance the opaque density he has conferred on his own 
face by assuming the features of a pundit.44
Interestingly, the only moving image to survive of Furio Jesi is a brief appearance 
in a television documentary by Ferdinand Braudel on the meaning of Europe. 
Here, Jesi, long-haired and bearded, appears through the fog of the Po Valley, 
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crunching his way across a snowy field, wrapped in a shaggy lambskin coat with 
a broad collar, talking about the myth of Europa and Mediterranean solar cults. 
The ice and fog make him mysterious and remote, though his voice is warm and 
his way of speaking is ironic and conversational. Is he opaque or transparent, 
scholar or prophet? He is certainly an artist.
In many ways, Cultura di destra represents Furio Jesi’s coming of age as a 
scholar; in this, his last book, he succeeds in putting his vast trove of knowledge 
into a series of coherent patterns, without denying the complexity and muta-
bility of individual human beings, or of their society. Unlike Burkert, he did 
not live long enough to rethink his own ideas, and to some extent they remain 
bound to his own time and the black-and-white contrasts of early, schematic 
formulations. Italian politics, in those days, was divided into three broad cat-
egories. Just over half the country’s population tended to favor conservative and 
Catholic positions, but a substantial minority, about one-third of the citizenry, 
favored a strictly secular socialist or social-democratic state. After the eclipse 
of Fascism at the end of World War II, these two positions solidified in the 
Christian Democratic Party (DC), working in overt concert with the Roman 
Catholic Church, and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), insistent on its in-
dependence but strongly tied to the Soviet Union. A smaller contingent, some 
twenty percent, maintained its Fascist loyalties, crystallized in the Italian So-
cial Movement (MSI). All these parties dissolved abruptly in the early 1990s, 
but the people involved have gone away much more slowly, and so have their 
basic conflicts.
But there are also differences between today’s Italy and the Italy of Cultura 
di destra. Culture in the 1970s, in any sense of that word, was still largely a face-
to-face activity, from the smoke-filled cinema clubs to street theater to opera; 
television was state-run, in black and white, but capable, like radio, of extraor-
dinary quality.45 Contacts were physical rather than virtual, including the con-
stant clashes of right and left on Italian streets. Large segments of the official 
state apparatus were still shot through with Fascist sympathizers; this is why 
it has proven so difficult to prosecute right-wing terrorists and why an Italian 
military court could refuse to prosecute the Nazi war criminal Erich Priebke 
as late as 1996. At the same time, to please the Roman Church and the United 
States, Communists continued to be categorically excluded from government.46 
The grip of the Christian Democratic Party on Italy seemed destined to last in 
saecula saeculorum.
It all changed, of course, and sometimes with startling rapidity. The Ber-
lin Wall came down in 1989, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists came 
down in a hail of corruption charges in 1992 and 1993, the old Fascists died 
and the one-time Communists turned into Democrats of the Left, then simply 
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Democrats, and took the roles once denied to them: Prime Minister, Senator, 
Deputy, President of Italy. Former neo-Fascists from the MSI followed suit, 
holding offices like President of Parliament and Mayor of Rome. Between 
1992 and 2012, a perpetually smiling little plutocrat named Silvio Berlusconi 
bought the right wing of the Italian political system with a combination of 
money, television, newspapers, and a constant cry of anti-Communism.47 The 
Polish cardinal who had just been elected pope when Jesi died, John Paul II, 
would reign for another quarter century, ushering in a new Catholic cultura di 
destra that fostered secretive, ideological organizations like Opus Dei and the 
Legionaries of Christ at the expense of more traditional religious orders, most 
notably the Jesuits. (Now changing again with the election of the Jesuit Pope 
Francis I.)
Yet Cultura di destra still provides a trenchant analysis of many phenomena in 
today’s Italy, its hard-core right, its Catholic right, and its center right, of which 
there are, by now, several different manifestations, even though the spirit of Jesi’s 
enterprise remains very much the spirit of the late 1970s.
That spirit emerges on film as vividly as it does in the written word, and not 
only in Jesi’s spectral appearance in the snow. In the sodden October of 1978, 
as the young author put the finishing touches on Cultura di destra, the English 
film director Joseph Losey began to shoot a cinematic version of Mozart’s Don 
Giovanni in Vicenza near Venice, amid the buildings of the Renaissance architect 
Andrea Palladio.48 One of the first images in the film, which came out in the 
spring of 1979, is a quotation from the Prison Diaries of Italian Communist leader 
Antonio Gramsci: ‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying 
and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symp-
toms appear’.49 Gramsci was referring to the beginnings of Fascism; for Losey, 
who had collided with McCarthyism in the United States, the citation was a way 
of emphasizing the revolutionary qualities of Mozart’s opera, the story of a liber-
tine composed and produced in the years between the American and the French 
Revolutions. Losey’s stroke of genius was to sense the same revolutionary vibra-
tions in Palladio’s sixteenth-century architecture, which may look placid in plan 
and photograph, but in real space is strange, disquieting, charged with elemental 
force.50 Losey’s Don Giovanni, Ruggero Raimondi, was born, like Furio Jesi, in 
1941, and in many ways his performance embodies the same conflicts, myths, and 
violent upsets that Jesi explores in his work.51 Both Cultura di destra and Don 
Giovanni, in other words, are sublime creatures of their time, a dreadful time in 
many ways, but a time that in retrospect seems rooted and real in ways that our 
virtual world no longer does.
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5.2 Scientification and Popularization in the 
Historiography of World Literature, 1850-1950
A Dutch Case Study1
Ton van KalMThouT
 Introduction
In 1827, in one of his best known quotations, Goethe said:
I am more and more convinced [...] that poetry is the universal possession 
of mankind, revealing itself everywhere, and at all times, in hundreds and 
hundreds of men. [...] National literature is now a rather unmeaning term; 
the epoch of World literature is at hand, and everyone must strive to hasten 
its approach.2
In Europe, interest in other cultures had began to grow in the course of the eigh-
teenth century, a development connected with the expansion of the notion of  ‘cul-
ture’ at the time. Formerly, it had been used exclusively in relation to individuals, 
but around 1800 it had also become applicable to collectives or even to the whole 
of humanity.3 The growing interest in foreign cultures seems to have been inten-
sified by at least two factors. Firstly, a growing concern with preserving national 
character and national identity automatically focused attention on other nations. 
A nation could profile itself in comparison and in competition with other na-
tions, which could also serve as a touchstone or as a source of inspiration. Sec-
ondly, the Enlightenment advocated the idea that all men are equal and that they 
all take part in a nation-transcending brotherhood, the human race. And since 
the spiritual life of a single nation was supposed to manifest itself in its national 
literature, the spiritual life of all mankind could be read in a transnational litera-
ture, in world literature.
In the quotation above, Goethe appears to have brought the term Weltliteratur 
into wider circulation, primarily to denote the international dissemination of lit-
erary art, including non-Western literature.4 However, the meaning he attributed 
to the concept of Weltliteratur did not immediately elicit a widespread response. 
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A much more businesslike and pragmatic notion of world literature was more 
common in the nineteenth century. It was seen as the sum of all literary works 
brought into circulation by all nations or by mankind in general over the course 
of time, or at least its undisputed highlights, such as the masterpieces by Dante, 
Shakespeare and Goethe. Viewed in this way, these international figures did not 
belong solely to the Italians, the English, or the Germans. Given the fact that 
their works were the spiritual heritage of the entire human race, they were also 
owned by other nations.
Since the nineteenth century, several literary histories have been written with 
the aim of describing the literary heritage of more than one nation or even of all 
mankind in a single comprehensive historical account. I want to explore the de-
velopment of this historiographical genre in the second half of the nineteenth and 
the first half of the twentieth century using a number of Dutch examples.5 In the 
Netherlands, the genre is part of a tradition established in the preceding period. 
I will follow two lines of evolution, which I shall refer to as (1) academization or 
scientification and (2) popularization or democratization. Both lines come to-
gether in a transnational literary history published during World War II.
But now, back to Goethe’s era. While he was developing his cosmopolitan con-
cept of literature, a young man named Willem de Clercq was writing a unique 
literary history.6 In the winter of 1820/21, the Royal Netherlands Institute of Arts 
and Sciences had announced a competition for a treatise on the following topical 
issue: ‘What influence has foreign literature, especially Italian, Spanish, French 
and German literature, had on Dutch language and literature from the beginning 
of the fifteenth century to the present day?’7 De Clercq submitted his manuscript 
after only a few months. In extended and printed form it would number more 
than three hundred pages.8
His answer to the question was unique, and not simply because it was the only 
answer submitted. It pleased the Academy so much that it awarded De Clercq a 
gold medal. De Clercq had established a reputation at a single stroke. His book 
would continue to command the admiration of readers and, in the Netherlands, 
it even became famous as the first comprehensive comparative literary history 
ever written.9 At any rate, its author can be regarded as one of the pioneers of 
comparative literature. This field of study, inspired by emerging disciplines such 
as comparative linguistics, would flourish in the second half of the nineteenth 
and the first half of the twentieth century. In this process of discipline formation, 
the two tendencies mentioned above – scientification and democratization – can 
be distinguished, tendencies I want to highlight here on the basis of a number of 
Dutch books written in the tradition established by De Clercq.
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 Scientification
In the Netherlands, history teacher Willem Doorenbos and the somewhat 
younger professor of Dutch Gerrit Kalff represent the scientification tendency. 
Unlike De Clercq, they both completed a university degree during which they 
acquired modern scientific views. In their generation the new scientific paradigm 
of historism emerged in the comparatist’s thinking. Just like any other man of 
science he was expected to describe and explain literary phenomena – from the 
smallest details to entire literatures – by collecting empirically observable facts 
and assessing them impartially. To this end, these phenomena must be compared 
and causally related to each another, as Kalff – the most important theoretician 
in this field in the Netherlands – prescribed around 1900. A literary work, for 
instance, might be explained by the life of its author and by other factors influ-
encing its properties.
According to Kalff there were several ways to obtain a picture of the literary 
art of a large number of nations. Different national literatures could simply be 
placed side by side, highlighting perhaps their points of contact or other rela-
tionships. Kalff himself, however, inspired by comparatists like Posnett (1886) 
and Ker (1896),10 preferred an approach which fully abandoned the national pat-
tern, concentrating, for instance, on literary currents or literary contents occur-
ring internationally. As such, Kalff distanced himself from a compiling approach. 
Doorenbos had used this approach in his Handleiding tot de geschiedenis der letter-
kunde (Guide to the History of Literature), published in 1870. This book examined 
Indian, Hebrew, Greek, Roman, Arab, Persian, medieval Christian, Castilian and 
Germanic literature in succession, as well as Italian, French, Spanish, English, 
German and Dutch literature.
Books like these and a growing number of partial studies by other authors show 
us that comparative literature took root in the course of the nineteenth century.11 
Kalff provisionally completed a Dutch academic and nation-transcending liter-
ary history in 1923-1924, publishing his two-volume Westeuropeesche letterkunde 
(Western European Literature).12 In this book, he attempted to abandon the na-
tional point of view completely. His foreword to volume I describes his aim: ‘Start-
ing from the supposition that, during the Middle Ages, the nations of Western 
Europe more or less formed a unity in faith, civilization, art and other respects, I 
have tried to show the revelation of this unity in literature’.13 In the course of his 
life, Kalff had repeatedly defended extremely nationalistic ideas. Westeuropeesche 
letterkunde, however, proved that he was also able to apply a pan-European per-
spective which would, he believed, reconcile nations.14 This is apparent from the 
broad perspective of both volumes which, incidentally, present a cultural history 
based on literary examples rather than a literary history in the narrower sense. The 
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first volume opens with an introduction about the genesis of nations and states, 
about the church versus the secular world, about the Renaissance and the role of 
clergymen and laymen. Chapter 1 deals with the three medieval estates, Chapter 
2 with wise, amorous and foolish narratives, and Chapter 3 examines art, artists 
and their public. The first chapter of Volume 2 continues with the Reformation 
and Counter-Reformation, Chapter 2 discusses several genres of the Renaissance, 
Chapter 3 examines literary currents, and Chapter 4, finally, covers genres and 
writers like Spencer and Cervantes who also influenced the course of literature.
 Popularization
Besides academization, comparative literary historiography included a popular-
scientific tendency, representing a form of middlebrow culture: easily digestible, 
tailored to a mass audience of consumers for whom high culture was not accessi-
ble as a matter of course, but who wished to gain access to it.15 One representative 
of this new kind of historiography was Steven Margadant, an educated author, 
but not a trained philologist.16 Margadant opted for a less academic route. He 
studied mathematics and physics at the University of Leyden, but while teaching 
these subjects17 he also developed as a classicist. In the 1930s, he edited a number 
of popular scientific magazines. Two of his books were typically intended for a 
middlebrow audience: De wereldlitteratuur (World Literature) (1930) and Twin-
tigduizend citaten, aphorismen en spreekwoorden (Twenty Thousand Quotations, 
Aphorisms and Proverbs) (1935).
Margadant never precisely explained the intentions behind his book on world 
literature. However, it must have had the same aim as the successful German 
book that served as his model: Paul Wiegler’s Geschichte der Weltliteratur (History 
of World Literature) of 1914.18 Wiegler declared that he wanted to bring the reader 
closer to the cultural wealth of the poetry and prose of the leading nations.19 His 
book presented only the main outlines, leaving aside the ballast of details useful 
for specialists. It only discussed writers who, according to Wiegler, still accorded 
with the perceptions of modern people, or who had lived a remarkable life. This 
must have been Margadant’s point of view too. His book had twenty-five chap-
ters, beginning with the literary art of the Egyptians, Babylonians and Assyrians, 
of the Indians, Jews, Greeks and Romans. It continued with early Christian lit-
erature, Persian and Arab literature, the literature of the age of chivalry and of 
the Teutons. Then, several European literatures were examined in turn in each 
period. Margadant finished with the literature of East Asia. In his book, he acts 
explicitly as a guide surveying the whole. High literature was his standard and 
there was no place for folklore, even if it was artistic. Characteristically, how-
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ever, Margadant did consider less valued popular poetry and he did not reject 
wholesale the mechanistic production of literature as practiced in the writing 
workshops of Alexandre Dumas, père, and Eugène Scribe. Margadant took into 
account the tastes and abilities of the widest possible readership. And that was 
not all he did to broaden his appeal.
The price of De wereldlitteratuur – eight guilders and seventy-five cents – was 
fairly low,20 certainly given its attractive design, with almost six hundred pages on 
large-format heavy paper. It was bound in a stylish cover and according to the title 
page it contained no fewer than two hundred illustrations. It lacked a bibliogra-
phy, but anyone in need of enrichment could turn to the in-depth passages which 
alternated with the main text in a smaller font. Margadant’s writing style focused 
first and foremost on accessibility, drawing the reader on.21 He also tried to hold 
the reader’s attention with juicy anecdotes. Pietro Aretino was presented as the 
first journalist ever to use blackmail and as the most feared man of his time, lead-
ing a life of debauchery, surviving an assault and using his pen to write threaten-
ing and begging letters, satires and pornographic texts. Nevertheless, Margadant 
himself appeared to share the values of the common citizen, taking a conservative 
and anti-revolutionary position. This is also clear from his exclusively Eurocen-
tric perspective. If literature did not meet Western standards, Margadant was not 
interested. He made literary life more familiar for his compatriots, in particular, 
by referring occasionally to their homeland.
Did Margadant really reach his intended audience? This is not clear; data 
on the matter are scarce. The weekly magazine De Groene Amsterdammer (The 
Green Amsterdam Weekly) and, in particular, the quality newspaper Het Vader-
land (The Nation) gave the book a negative reception.22 The latter review induced 
Margadant to respond and his publisher Kruseman to place an advertisement in 
which a series of positive reviews were printed to counterbalance the Vaderland 
review.23 Another response came from Jan Walch, a professor of Dutch in Paris 
who had formerly written appreciative reviews of Westeuropeesche letterkunde by 
Kalff,24 his former teacher and PhD supervisor. Walch had been willing to pro-
vide an introduction for Margadant’s book, which was, of course, positive.25 How-
ever, some principled remarks preceded his friendly words, in which he distanced 
himself from the kind of historiography championed by Margadant. Referring 
to the results comparative literature had achieved by then, Walch concluded that 
different approaches had arisen in the field. The one he himself preferred proved 
that he was a pupil of Kalff. More than Margadant had realized, Walch advocated 
a cultural-historical approach. He thought a literary historian should not take as 
his basis the insights and tastes of his own time. He had to empathize with other 
cultures and periods and to use a scientific method focused on establishing causal 
historical relations:
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The historian must, with receptivity to all that is human and with real sci-
entific love for truth, try to understand the coherence of what he notices 
as emerged in the wide scope of space and time. It has all grown from the 
bottom of the human heart, and who truly doesn’t want to deem something 
human strange will, by understanding, be able to approach the essence of 
all this; often, he must also consider other sides of the history of mankind – 
political, economic, philosophical history – in a given period and in a given 
region in order to achieve an insight why art had to form and to elaborate 
its performances in a particular manner then and there.26
Apart from sympathy and scientific sense, the literary historian should have the 
aesthetic sensibility needed to assess the value of verbal art. Furthermore, he 
should be able to distinguish textual relations: ‘He has to register influences, the 
more or less immediate connections, between works of art of a particular period 
and between these artefacts and nonartistic phenomena’.27 With these require-
ments Walch declared his rejection of the prevailing inclination of some of his 
colleagues to confine themselves to aesthetic appreciation and to focus on their 
own time. According to Walch, this inclination was caused by ‘the rise of a social 
class which, although not elevated in traditions and not educated in the humani-
ties, may and can assert itself culturally’.28 Walch adjured that this did not imply a 
negative judgment about democratized society. At the same time, however, he felt 
that democratization had developed to the detriment of historical awareness and 
tradition.29 Some ten years later, Walch would himself write a history of world 
literature.
 Jan Walch’s book on world literature
Before Walch had been appointed professor in Paris, he made a career as a teacher 
of Dutch, as a journalist on several quality newspapers and as a Privatdozent of 
theater history at the University of Leiden. He also came to the fore as a play-
wright and a prose writer, and he published a handbook on Dutch literary history. 
After a thirteen-year professorship in Paris, Walch returned to the Netherlands 
in 1939 in order to become director of the Theater School in Amsterdam.30 He 
set about writing Het boek der wereldlitteratuur (The Book of World Literature), 
which appeared in 1943. The book considers the Greeks, Latin literature, early 
Christianity in literature, the courtly love lyric, humanism and the Renaissance, 
and, finally, the nineteenth century. It does not therefore examine literature na-
tion by nation, but rather period by period. Walch did not include a program-
matic introduction like the one he had written for Margadant’s book. Neverthe-
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less, he gave out signals that he advocated a scientifically sound, cultural history 
approach, revealing the correlation between literary works and the context from 
which they originated. A representation of medieval mystics as overwrought peo-
ple, Walch says, is not typical of the Middle Ages.31 And studying a particular 
period will require one to delve into what was believed and thought at the time. 
However, despite this basic scientific attitude, the book also displays quite a few 
features that can be characterized as middlebrow. It is in these features that the 
two tendencies in comparative literature I have discussed – scientification and 
democratization – meet.
According to his introduction, Walch wrote the book for readers who appreci-
ated an interesting novel and who were obviously striving for a general literary 
education.32 How did Walch try to satisfy this desire? To begin with, he pub-
lished his book as a course in the popular science series of the ‘Universiteit voor 
Zelfstudie’ [‘University for Self-Study’]. Walch, who according to ’s-Gravesande 
remained a journalist under all conditions, was undeniably determined to share 
his literary expertise with nonspecialists in clear language.33 He set the tone at the 
beginning with a definition of world literature:
Having read a book that touched you or made you laugh, did you ever think 
about the fact that hundreds of generations at hundreds of thousands of 
places in the world experienced the same emotions by reading or [...] by 
hearing someone reading aloud?
 This book will examine this phenomenon, this thing that has given 
reading pleasure through the ages: world literature.34
Sometimes Walch’s literary history is quite emphatically didactic, for instance, 
where he provides lined pages for a personal table of contents. New to the genre 
of the history of world literature, but proven in education, was Walch’s illustra-
tion method, alternating his historical narrative with a large number of annotated 
sample texts translated or adapted for a Dutch readership. That is why his book is 
also an anthology. Often even book titles were translated, apparently for readers 
who were not familiar with modern European languages. And Walch also uses 
several captivating strategies to hold the attention of the students of the Univer-
sity of Self-Study.
Just like Margadant, Walch sometimes uses anecdotes. At the beginning of 
his book he promises a historical narrative which will be anything but dry; ‘it’s 
often more romantic than a novel. And it is: a true “story”’.35 Lope de Vega, for 
instance, was an extremely remarkable man: ‘His life was infinitely more adven-
turous – and less noble – than the life of Cervantes. In all things he was exces-
sive!’36 He blackmailed his beloved and was banned, he abducted a woman and 
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he joined the Spanish Armada, he had love affairs and fought duels, he married 
a lady and became a priest after her death, again taking many lovers. Another 
strategy Walch used to captivate his audience was to present himself as a guide, 
just like Margadant – a guide on a jaunty stroll, a saunter through the world of 
literature. Again and again Walch takes a moment to draw the attention of his fel-
low walkers to the most beautiful places, not least in the final words of the book:
We have completed a long walk through the literature of Europe. We have 
not seen everything; I hope my readers, like myself, are not tourists who 
want to see everything, that they are content to be able to admire some 
beautiful things. [...] This journey has at least yielded a series of clues as to 
what is worth considering further. If it has brought my readers to such a 
further consideration of some of the indicated works, it will bring joy and 
gratitude to the compiler of this book.37
It is no mistake that Walch refers to the literature of Europe rather than world 
literature. Despite the title of his book – Het boek der wereldlitteratuur – he again 
takes as his basis a strictly Eurocentric frame of reference. Non-European lit-
erature is almost entirely disregarded. For Walch, world literature is European 
literature. Moreover, Dutch literature gets preferential treatment. Even if it is 
poorer quality, Walch believes it is interesting for his readers because it comes 
from ‘our own country’ and because Dutch examples are more instructive for his 
readers than others.
Sometimes Walch responds to the current socio-political situation – a final 
way to conform to the views of his audience. In 1943, it was determined for largely 
by the German occupation of the Netherlands. Reading what Walch wrote about 
classical literature, one can detect hidden references to the modern era. The impe-
rialistic Roman nation (read: Germany) is presented as having overridden Greece 
(read: the occupied countries).38 However, Walch’s message is that, in the end, 
brute force will lose the battle to the spiritual civilization of the conquered. It 
was not for nothing that as early as 1941 a leading national-socialist newspaper 
called him a cowardly servant of the Jews.39 In any case, his attitude toward the 
Germans could hardly be described as submissive. This is also apparent from the 
fact that he did not omit Heinrich Heine, whose books had recently been burnt 
in Germany:
He was a Jew by birth, he converted to Christianity, but this had no pro-
found effect on his emotional life. [...] His Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen 
is also witty, full of scoffing at his homeland in which his love for his coun-
try nevertheless repeatedly breaks through.40
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 Conclusion
Comprehensive histories of world literature written by an individual author have 
already been out of fashion for more than half a century.41 However, investigat-
ing a number of Dutch examples shows that, alongside the traditional nationally 
oriented literary historiography, an international sister discipline developed in 
the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.42 An academic variant of 
this historiography developed from compiling national literatures to generalizing 
literary phenomena. Meanwhile, a popular scientific variant arising from the lat-
ter more or less retained the compilation approach. This middlebrow literary his-
toriography can be regarded as a kind of postschool literary education. Initially, 
it was in the hands of authors with no academic literary training, who were, how-
ever, accustomed to writing for a nonspecialist audience. Jan Walch, versatile as 
he was, tried to combine both subgenres, ending up in the field of popular science.
Paradoxically, the historiography of world literature has often been motivated 
by nationalistic considerations, or has developed according to national patterns. 
Unlike Goethe’s intentions in referring to Weltliteratur, his contemporary De 
Clercq, for example, had a nation-building intention: by researching systemati-
cally which foreign influences made themselves felt in Dutch literary history, he 
tried to denote the uniqueness of Dutch literature and hence the Dutch national 
character. The more comparative literary historians had to address a large audi-
ence, trying to conform to its way of thinking and its social context, the more they 
opted for such a nationalistic view. Furthermore, world literature was invariably 
considered from a Eurocentric angle.43 Although receptiveness to foreign litera-
ture can be identified at various levels in intellectual circles, the middlebrow au-
dience in particular seems to have been internationally minded to only a limited 
extent, even less so in the past than in our own time. A time in which – as Erich 
Auerbach observed, adapting Goethe – our philological homeland is no longer 
the nation, but the earth.44
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5.3 Theater Studies from the Early Twentieth Century 
to Contemporary Debates
The Scientific Status of Interdisciplinary-Oriented 
Research
Chiara Maria Buglioni
The complexity of theory pales by comparison to the abundant wealth of theatri-
cal experiments in our times. Many of these are having some success, whether 
research into space, body expression, rereadings of classics, or the fundamental 
relationship between actor and spectator. But beware those who proclaim the 
death of staging or history, the disappearance of theater, a return to the evi-
dence of the text or the incontestable supremacy of the actor, for underlying such 
statements is often a rejection of reflection and meaning, a return to a critical 
obscurantism with sinister echoes. In these times of ideological uncertainty, as 
the humanist heritage is liquidated between two fire sales of concepts too soon 
shop-soiled, of hermeneutical gadgets and flashy postmodern devices, a process 
of historical and structural reflection seems ever more necessary to stave off the 
vertigo of theoretical relativism and aestheticism.1
No other discipline within the humanities has had to struggle with its own in-
terdisciplinary character as much as theater research in Europe. The fathers of 
the new-born scholarship Theaterwissenschaft were mainly concerned with dis-
tinguishing theater from other forms of art and with asserting its right as an 
independent field of enquiry. The need to define a specific methodological ap-
proach, however, was not taken into account. This initial lack in the creation of 
the scientific discipline has influenced the controversial development of theater 
studies and has caused frequent identity crises.
The new challenge within theater studies is called the integrated approach.2 
From the mid-80s, under the condition of postmodernity, which reflects the col-
lapse of categories and the blurring of traditional genres, theater research has 
pursued the analysis of every aspect and form of the theatrical medium, reject-
ing the conventional boundaries highly specialized scholarship has imposed since 
the foundation of the discipline. What is more, the focus of the discipline has 
witnessed a gradual shift from theater, an aesthetic object, but also an audience-
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based activity and an institution, to all kinds of cultural and social performances, 
to be read as a semiotic process. This way, theater scholars are called on to share 
the knowledge of many fields of enquiry and to discover the potential points 
of contact theatrical events have with other disciplines. Nonetheless, such in-
terdisciplinary-oriented research tends to superficiality rather than to scientific 
enterprises through the cooperation with other fields; ultimately, it is willing to 
analyze every small pseudo-theatrical incident in daily life, without carrying any 
contribution to the history of the humanities, rather than to limit its object and 
to display the contents and results of its investigations in a systematic way. The 
theoretical quarrels among opposing factions such as hermeneutical scholars, his-
torians, semioticians, poststructuralist thinkers and performance practitioners 
have now been sublimated into an all-embracing methodology, in a sometimes 
confusing multitude of definitions, practices and procedures that makes theater 
lovers wonder why theater studies fears to deal with theater art. Theater scholars 
are constantly repeating that theater studies is not an omnicomprehensive cul-
tural scholarship, else no precise, specific questions could be raised, discussed 
and solved.3 However, they all flinch from delimiting the boundaries of their dis-
cipline: since an exhaustive definition of aesthetic experience is hard to find, the 
difference between artistic performance and nonartistic performance seems to 
be inexistent. If it is true that all the humanities are interwoven, the nature and 
substance of a single scholarship can nevertheless be endangered by a denial of its 
particular object of investigation and of its own methodology, which should build 
its own framework for research instead of resorting to predetermined categories.
This essay questions the assumption that a certain methodological polytheism 
– of heterogeneous tools and skills – is the proper answer to the scientific status 
of theater studies and that the eclectic nature of the discipline corresponds to its 
strength. Through an historical overview of theater studies as interdisciplinary-
oriented research, the article aims at demonstrating how the self-imposed lack of 
definitions and methodological stances, as well as the irresistible urge to assess 
the discipline within the mainstream of other humanities and social sciences, is 
just a way to avoid fundamental issues. It is hence necessary to clarify the au-
thor’s position with respect to the object ‘theater’. The point of departure is not 
the classical, Eurocentric concept of theater as performance of dramatic texts, 
but as theatrical performance, live art, communicative event in which the alea-
tory component is always mediated by the performer(s)’ choice – the so-called 
‘planned uncertainty’ –, by the audience’s expectations and the relative stability of 
theatrical contexts. As Willmar Sauter rightly asserts, the artistic level is one of 
the constituent elements of theatrical performance: ‘The artistic level of commu-
nication is built on coded actions, and each theatrical genre has a specific set of 
expressive strategies’.4 The subject matter of theater studies should be therefore 
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its relation to the aesthetic and the performance as art form and as social/cultural 
behavior: the discipline should rediscover the aesthetic properties of theater and 
make them an integral part of its enquiry.
 A young discipline fighting for independence and recognition
The autonomous status of theater research was undermined at the very begin-
ning of its career, when the pathfinders of the German Theaterwissenschaft called 
for the recognition of a theatrical art to be analyzed separately from literary stud-
ies, but ignored to distinguish their work in terms of methodology. Curiously, the 
German name contains the word ‘science’, which linked the newborn academic 
subject to a broad cultural process through which Dilthey’s Geisteswissenschaften 
tried to attain the same scientific status of the natural sciences. Wilhelmine Ger-
many was characterized by two connected trends: on the one hand, the relation-
ship between society and theater changed, since the latter lost its educational role; 
on the other hand, new disciplines found their way into the highly conservative 
university system – for example, archeology, the history of art, and musicology. In 
the fervid shift toward modernity, some scholars focused their attention on the 
fin-de-siècle theatrical revolution. The demand for performances was increasing 
and, consequently, the number of public and private houses tripled after the pass-
ing of the trade laws in 1869, which had allowed public establishments to open 
without legal restrictions. As for drama and staging, the first moves toward a 
director’s theater were to be seen at the Meiningen Court Theater or in the work 
of other pioneers such as Richard Wagner, Max Reinhardt and Georg Fuchs, 
who arrested the so-called literalization of theater. New avant-garde movements 
likewise tried to overcome the impasse of a standardized theater by experiment-
ing with stage effects and illusions, space and audience involvement: this was the 
period of Edward Gordon Craig and Adolphe Appia. The public at large grew in-
creasingly interested in theater, and, partly as a result, theater criticism grew out 
of the field of literary criticism. Another relevant circumstance is the appearance 
of theater societies (Gesellschaften) and theater associations (Vereine) which both 
allowed the staging of innovative theatrical forms in close circuits and helped the 
establishment of theater departments in the German universities.5
In 1900 Max Herrmann (1865-1942) delivered the first lectures and tutori-
als in Theaterwissenschaft at the University of Berlin, and nine years later Ar-
tur Kutscher (1878-1960) did the same in Munich. The universities of Kiel and 
Cologne followed in 1918 and 1920 respectively, under the aegis of the literary 
historian Eugen Wolff (1863-1929) at the former and Carl Niessen (1890-1969) at 
the latter. In 1923 Herrmann was able to establish his ‘Theaterwissenschaftliches 
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Institut an der Universität Berlin’, but Kutscher never did witness the realization 
of his dream; the department of Theaterwissenschaft, in fact, was established at the 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität only in 1974.6 The main concern of these schol-
ars was to prove that the art of theater could not be reduced to a mere manifesta-
tion of the dramatic text. As an object composed of different elements, it needed 
an independent discipline. Herrmann’s first observation refers to the spatial dy-
namics of theater. In order to interpret theater, which is primarily a spatial art, 
scholars have to know in detail about both the actual theatrical space and the way 
it is used and transformed by theatrical practitioners. Placed precisely within its 
space, a drama can be fully translated into mimic, gestural communication, and 
proxemic action. Literary studies cannot grasp the phenomenon of theater because 
its tools are simply insufficient – they are limited, that is, to abstract speculations. 
When, in 1919, Herrmann outlined the essential subjects to be taught in the new 
department of theater studies, he expounded his idea of theater as a spatial art 
to be studied from a practical point of view. The syllabus follows three strands: 
theater history, theater aesthetic and theater legislation. Beside a general study 
of the art of theater as well as a study of dramatics, staging, acting, costumes, 
lighting and sets, theater students must have practical notions (for example, about 
theater administration or censorship) and must apply their knowledge through 
exercises. For this reason, a small revolving stage is placed inside the institute.7 
As far as the question of method is concerned, Herrmann has to deal with the 
transience of theatrical performance. In this respect, although theater studies is to 
be subtracted from the hegemony of history and literary studies, these disciplines 
can all the same supply scholars with the tools needed to work out the problems 
connected with an evanescent performance;8 what is more, the historical method-
ology was the only one acknowledged in the early twentieth century for scholarly 
pursuits. Max  Herr mann provided the first systematic approach to theater history 
by supplying us with a model called ‘reconstruction’. As a theater historian, the 
creator of Theater wissenschaft in Berlin applies strategies developed by archeol-
ogy to document single elements of a mise-en-scène, rather than a whole, unique 
performance.9 The final goal is to understand the practice and staging of a par-
ticular form of theater, such as the theater of the Meistersingers of Nuremberg, 
and to place it within the wider context of German theater: ‘Theater studies is the 
vital lesson from the past connected to the teachings of contemporary theater’.10 
Granted that Herrmann’s field of interest is not the historical past tout court, but 
the relationship between the conditions of previous performances and those of 
modern theater, all the same he avoids studying contemporary forms of theater.11
At Munich University, on the contrary, Kutscher arouses his students’ curios-
ity in extremely contemporary manifestations of theater by organizing evening 
debates and performances with famous playwrights and artists. He reinforces 
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the dichotomy of theory and practice in theater studies as he prompts students 
to experiment on the stage and with dramatic texts. However, he, too, does not 
deal systematically with contemporary performances: the literary drama is al-
ways analyzed with the tools of poetics, since Kutscher’s main concern is the 
diachronic enquiry into theatrical expression. He tries to explain the interrela-
tion of complex and primitive modes of performance by identifying their original 
source: mime. This is the way through which human bodies express themselves. 
It is innate in human beings, but theater studies must limit its attention to the 
deliberate, noninstinctive use of the body as a means of expression. This way of 
controlling and showing ‘tensions, emotions and life-nexuses’ can be subsumed 
under the concept ‘play’.12 The play instinct is the basic instinct of mankind, since 
it combines the use of the imagination with an awareness of one’s own strengths. 
Starting from the speculations of Hermann Reich and Hugo Dinger, Kutscher 
argues that theatrical art differs from literature in its mimic character.13 Theater, 
he says, communicates above all through space and movement. Kutscher develops 
a theory of mime whose aim is to explain why literary studies are unable to de-
fine theater. Carl Niessen reelaborates this theory, trying to stress the importance 
mimesis – as representational instinct – has for the definition of mime, but he 
shares Kutscher’s scope: the desire to demonstrate that theater comes from in-
stincts which transcend culture and time, rather than from dramatic forms linked 
to ritual acts. Herrmann and Kutscher have a different idea of theater and, conse-
quently, a different methodological approach. The Munich scholar overlooks the 
need for a specific set of working methods, so much so that he claims:
The term Theaterwissenschaft or, at the beginning, Theaterwissenschaften, 
was coined by myself, since I was convinced that theater, as the object of a 
discipline within the Humanities, grants and requires method of its own. 
What kind of method should that be? [...] Mime must be the core of the-
ater studies. [...] Its method comprises everything that belongs to science as 
such and that can be grasped with scientific tools.14
What emerges from this tautological phrase is the impossibility of detaching 
theater studies from philological and historical principles in the academic con-
text, the so-called ‘science’. Kutscher considers the risks of such a mixing-up of 
methods,15 but he wants to enrich theatrical analyses with reflections coming 
from other fields. He is the first theater scholar to consider anthropology and 
ethnology as important aids for the newborn discipline, to open up the scholar-
ship to other branches of knowledge.16 Since social sciences were underestimated 
in the German university system at that time, he didn’t dare get rid of the study 
of literature and history.
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Max Herrmann and Artur Kutscher, as well as Carl Niessen, overlooked the 
actual dilemma of Theaterwissenschaft, namely the relationship of its many-sided 
object of study with extremely different factors and domains. The pioneers of 
German theater research were, in fact, the first scholars to favor the subdivision 
of the discipline, through the application of methods borrowed from other fields 
or through the claim that theater research actually needs no specific methodol-
ogy. Even if they challenged the traditional approach to the theatrical phenom-
enon based on the textual study, they were unable to choose between historical, 
literary-critical, and anthropological analyses.
 Approaches to theater studies: 
Relationships to the other humanities
Although the path-breaking discipline defined itself through the epistemological 
‘passage from the object-dramatic text to the object-performance’,17 it is clear that 
its founders could not overcome the conflict with literary studies. Herrmann and 
Kutscher had a philological curriculum, as they had both qualified as professors 
of German literature. What is more, they were convinced of the supremacy of 
the poetic text within the theatrical performance. Herrmann defended any play-
wrights’ work against a director’s free interpretation of the text – he believed the 
author’s intention should always be preserved in the way the text was staged18 – 
and Kutscher described the main property of drama as ‘ennobled’ mime, because 
it masters the poetic text on a mimic basis. Lastly, the inner quality of theater 
history must be borne in mind, as it is based on actual documentary records, 
and thus on texts. Herrmann himself believed the art of theater could speak di-
rectly to the present through its sources, and these sources are, first and foremost, 
literary ones. Drama-based theater studies takes as its legitimation this origi-
nal commitment to the written text, and as a result hermeneutical analyses and 
philological speculation on texts dominated the discipline till the late 1960s. As 
a ‘method of interpreting text and performance’, hermeneutics attempts to seek 
out the relationship between the theatrical work and the outside world, thereby 
falling within the area of dramatic criticism.19 However, what must be underlined 
here is that Herrmann’s and Kutscher’s different approaches to the theater, com-
bined with a similar kind of uncertainty about methodology, led to two parallel 
approaches to theater studies.
On the one hand, the positivist foundations of the discipline influenced thea-
ter historians, who had to struggle first with ‘vulgar positivism’ and then with 
its ‘more subtle reappearance’20: the former includes the methodological assump-
tion that it is possible to achieve the objective reconstruction of truths based 
319The Scientific Status of Theater Studies
on facts, while residual positivism is based on the belief that facts can remain 
neutral and analyses can be impartial. On the other hand, the theory of theater as 
mime survived because theories of cultural evolution tried to place cultural events 
on evolutionary ladders and origin theories explained how the legitimate theater 
(fifth-century Attic tragedy and comedy) had derived from a ‘Primal Ritual’. The 
common element of hermeneutical, historical and evolutionary-anthropological 
perspectives is, then, the search for unprovable signs that Richard Schechner de-
plores in older approaches to the theater.21 According to him, these ‘vertical’ theo-
retical approaches force theater into a literary context in which it does not belong. 
The opposite development of theater studies, a development that explores ‘hori-
zontal relationships’, can be seen in semiotics and performance studies. Despite the 
fact that these fields of enquiry – which are not simply a discipline, nor properly a 
method (as Keir Elam would say22) – are linked to different concepts of theater, it 
is possible to unite them in an attempt to work on all the phenomena involved in 
performance with a unified set of approaches. After an initial period, characterized 
by the textual analyses of theatrical performances (the 1970s to the early 1980s), 
theater semioticians are now engaged in ordering inputs from various fields of 
investigation in a meta-disciplinary frame by using semiotic principles. The main 
object of study is therefore the ‘theatrical relationship’ during the creative pro-
cess (hence the relationship between playwright and director, director and actors, 
etc.) and in its result (the relationship between performance and spectator). The 
poles of this relationship are the actor and the spectator, ‘which are conceived as 
interdependent entities, but also as active subjects, provided with a relative mu-
tual autonomy’.23 This definition emphasizes the spectator-response as a partial, 
creative independence with respect to the performance, and aims at denying the 
deconstructive claim for boundless spectator’s autonomy. Semiotics has been 
linked to reception theories or corrected by phenomenological reflections about 
direct experiential aspects of the performance. Problems concerning taxonomy 
and methods are, however, far from being solved. Critiques of theater semiotics 
have always involved the process of transferring linguistic terms and metaphors to 
theater – which is a polyphonic system, not merely a verbal phenomenon – and the 
oversystematization of its concepts. As far as phenomenological theater theories is 
concerned, they also express the needless attempt to define theater:
[A]ny specialized vocabulary or set of terms does not exhaust the phenom-
enon it is intended to describe (performance, theater, art), but simply ‘fixes’ 
it from one possible angle of intentionality or expressiveness; for the phe-
nomenon is always nameless and multiform before a vocabulary traps it 
in one of its manifestations. [...] We can only seek the essential nature of 
performability, not a taxonomy of performable objects or behaviors.24
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On the other side of theatrical investigation, cultural studies and avant-garde 
artistic practices have favored, in the US, the emergence of performance studies. 
Taking important tools from social sciences in the late 1960s and from ethnology 
and anthropology in the early 1970s, the father of performance theory and poet-
ics, Richard Schechner, declares that theater belongs among ‘public performance 
activities of humans’, along with ritual, play, games, sports, dance and music.25 
With the word ‘performance’ Schechner limits Erwin Goffman’s idea of a mode 
of behavior that qualifies any human activity and coins the classical definition: 
‘a performance is an activity done by an individual or group in the presence of 
and for another individual or group’.26 The field of performance studies imme-
diately defines itself in opposition to the American theatrical theory – which 
was at its foundation concerned with drama; however, its development has fol-
lowed the traces of the different approaches to theater studies in existence in the 
1940s: the Midwestern and Northwestern traditions entailed an oral interpreta-
tion- and communication-oriented approach to theater studies as a part of the 
broader School of Speech, while on the East Coast scholars focused on theater 
as a physical event and stressed the importance of the material conditions of each 
performance. After Schechner, performance research at New York University 
aims at developing an interdisciplinary faculty, by stressing the fundamental role 
of dialogue with specialists from different disciplines and cultures.
In 1992, Schechner reformulates the theory he has been developing for dec-
ades and declares a paradigm shift from theater – or written drama – to per-
formance. In so doing, the performance practitioner and theorist follows two 
rationales: ‘ Theater Studies lacked the scope to engage with increasingly “per-
formative” as well as “intercultural” Western societies, or performances beyond; 
and it addressed a redundant form’.27 Meanwhile, Phillip Zarrilli’s definition of 
performance as ‘an arena for the constant process of negotiating experiences and 
meanings that constitute culture’28 clearly emphasizes the pragmatic interest of 
his – and others’ – performance theory as well as his intercultural perspective. 
Theater studies has become one element of the new paradigm of performance. 
On the whole, in performance studies attention is shifted away from the tra-
ditional aesthetic to the universal, intercultural basis for the relationship be-
tween social and aesthetic drama.29 Through an arbitrary metaphorical gesture, 
performance studies has claimed epistemological superiority over theater stud-
ies, ignoring the fact that theater is also an aesthetic, artistic object of enquiry 
and pursuing the wider democratic scope of including identities marginalized 
by so-called highbrow culture, with its canonical texts and institutional con-
texts. If we think of Jon McKenzie’s recent statements, in which he argues that 
the twenty-first century is the very ‘age of global performance’,30 thus an age in 
which everything is performance, in which every human activity is dominated 
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by a ‘formation of power and knowledge’,31 and in which performances largely 
contribute to the process of globalization, the absence of interest for artistic 
and theatrical performance is evident. According to McKenzie, cultural special-
ists should analyze not only the discursive discipline of performance studies 
and its respective colegitimating object of study (cultural performance), but 
also the paradigms of performance management and techno-performance with 
their objects (organizational performance and technological performance), in 
order to embrace, understand, and use performance as a tool to transform so-
ciety. Jill Dolan rightly evokes a model of exchange between theater and other 
disciplines, ‘rather than one in which the performative evacuates theater stud-
ies’.32 In Geographies of Learning, Dolan tries to cross the gulf between theory 
and practice, so that, in Chapter 4, she argues for a new alignment of the objects 
of investigation and for a new methodology that can transform theater studies 
into a lively discipline. She proposes ‘borrowing back’ concepts and metaphors 
historically developed by theater studies which have been lifted by other dis-
ciplines in recent times. The idea is certainly suggestive, but no explanations 
have been offered to show how precise methodological characteristics could 
structure this process of reappropriation and retranslation. An interesting as-
pect is the theoretical affinity Marvin Carlson sees between Jill Dolan’s studies 
and Erika Fischer-Lichte’s continental perspective on the field of theater and 
performance research.33
Again in Germany, the discussion about performance studies has been re-
ceived in the late 1980s and is directly connected with Fischer-Lichte’s later 
work. As she herself recalls, the focus of her interest quite spontaneously shifted 
to ‘the performative aspect of theater performances and other cultural perfor-
mances’34 in an epoch marked by the new metaphor ‘culture as performance’. Her 
attempt to connect the performance studies discourse to the birth of theater 
studies in Germany and to present the contemporary evolution of the discipline 
as already foreseen and theorized in Max Herrmann’s concept of theater unrav-
els the desire to remark Germany’s hegemonic position in the field of theater/
performance studies, against the so-called ‘US/UK PS empire’.35 There is no 
doubt that Herrmann understood theater ‘as an event, as festive play and, there-
fore, as performative art’,36 nonetheless he was exclusively interested in events 
or performances which allowed particular aesthetic experience and which were 
broadly considered works of art. His research interest was not ‘any kind of cul-
tural performance’, as Fischer-Lichte now defines the object of enquiry of theater 
studies.37 Rightly enough, Carlson observes that Fischer-Lichte ‘draws her exam-
ples almost exclusively from what might be called the artistic tradition of theater 
and performance art, instead of ranging broadly through other examples of so-
cial and cultural performance as an American theorist might do’,38 an aspect that 
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shows the divergence between her approach based on the aesthetic side of live 
art and the will to place German theater studies at the core of the Anglo-Saxon 
performance studies debate.39
If theater studies has been questioned at theoretical and methodological level 
by gender theories, cultural studies, postcolonial analyses, and communication 
models, there is a need for the discipline to take up a position with respect to its 
research aims and the procedures of other fields. The attempt to redefine itself 
must not be blamed as an old-fashioned urge to categorize knowledge and to pre-
clude any historical and cultural development of the discipline.
 Epilogue
From the time of its foundations in Germany, the main concern of theater stud-
ies has been to organize the tools and methods deriving from historical, semi-
otic, anthropological and other areas of scholarship. The multimedia theatrical 
phenomenon, in the way it works out in practice, and in terms of its deter-
mining factors, meanings and response is the actual object of enquiry, but the 
existence of so many theater concepts and borrowed tools makes the scholars’ 
path perilous. Even though theater as an overall reality can only be analyzed by 
privileging single perspectives – in terms of spatial art, expressive art, dramatic 
art, communicative art, performative art, representational art and so on – the 
essence of theater is left aside. In the preface to his new ‘theatrology’ in 1988, 
De Marinis warned theater experts that interdisciplinary eclecticism constantly 
endangers the efforts of theater scholars, forcing them to use concepts that are 
imprecise and foreign to the field in a somewhat confused fashion.40 Twenty-
four years later, in 2012, Andreas Kotte concludes his reference book Theater-
wissenschaft in a similar way. In the epilogue he asserts: ‘Creating new theater 
concepts is legitimate from a scientific point of view, but acknowledging many 
of them the same validity brings the charge of relativism’.41 At the present time, 
conferring scientific status on theater studies, as an autonomous Human Sci-
ence, is still extremely problematic and the discipline unity is constantly threat-
ened by its scholars’ uncertainty about descriptive research goals and methods. 
A fusion of theories and approaches could be reached through the claim of the 
peculiarity of theater studies: its analysis of theater as a performative artistic 
event. Only the clear, courageous definition of its subject matter and of its own 
investigative framework would ensure the survival of theater studies as an aca-
demic discipline.
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6.1 Embracing World Art
Art History’s Universal History and the Making of 
Image Studies
BirgiT MersMann
Within the realm of modernizing the humanities, the aspiration of art history 
to transform into a universal discipline and modern science manifests itself as a 
cultural, anthropological, and spatial orientation toward world art and universal 
history. The ground for this modern shift was prepared by the universalization 
of art as based on the concept of mutual cultural influences and historical trans-
fers. At the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, art history joined 
forces with subbranches of history such as universal history and cultural history. 
Through these interdisciplinary linkages, it also opened to a new self-definition 
and revaluation as image history.
The primary objective of this paper is to closely examine how cross-discipli-
nary fertilizations between universal history (or world history), cultural history, 
and art history have resulted in a reconceptualization of art history, its study 
objects, methodology, and geographical framing. For this purpose, it will focus on 
three areas of reconfiguration, as they manifested themselves in the German and 
partly Austrian debate on the notion of universal history: (1) the new definition 
of art history as universal history and world history performed in the scholarly 
work of the art historians Alois Riegl and Oskar Beyer, (2) the redefinition of 
universal history as cultural history, as proposed by the historian Karl Lampre-
cht, and (3) the reconceptualization of art history as a cultural history of images, 
that was implemented by the art historian Aby Warburg.
 Art history and universal history: New linkages
Historically, the Austrian art historian Alois Riegl opened the debate on art his-
tory as universal history. He formulated a critique of the academic discipline 
of art history which, in its essential features, anticipated Oskar Beyer’s critical 
diagnosis of art history’s inappropriate philological constitution and West-cen-
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teredness made twenty-five years later. In Kunstgeschichte und Universalgeschichte 
(1898), Riegl turned against the critical-historical method, the pedantry of source 
study and the hyperspecialization practiced by most contemporary art historians. 
At the same time, he asserted to recognize an ongoing change in the field of art 
history, characterized by a move from art history as connoisseurship (Kunstge-
lehrtentum) to a full-fledged science. This scientific transformation is acknowl-
edged as a process of modernization. Riegl observes a displacement of what he 
calls an ‘individual history or art’ (Individualgeschichte der Kunst) by a reawaken-
ing interest in a universal history of art:
The tendency of specialized history of the past 30 to 40 years appears to be 
replaced by a new universal trend. The researchers of preceding generations 
have comprehended each art-historical manifestation as an individual one 
which, produced by particular causes, expressed only very peculiar effects. 
[...] The most advanced ‘modernists’ among art historians [...] stress the fact 
that art-historical manifestations are not only separated by individual fea-
tures, but also connected by common characteristics.1
The intention behind the universal extension of art is a bringing together of tem-
porally and spatially distant art periods for comparison. In order to better under-
stand the new linkages between art history and universal history, a closer histori-
cal look at the cultural reinterpretation of universal history has to be taken.
 Universal history as cultural history:  
A new concept and methodology of historical research
The redefinition of universal history as cultural history was integral part of the 
so-called ‘method dispute’ (Methodenstreit) in the historical sciences at the end 
of the nineteenth century. This is reflected in two influential methods-centered 
studies on universal and cultural history by Karl Lamprecht: (1) Die kulturhis-
torische Methode (Berlin, 1900); (2) Zur universalgeschichtlichen Methodenbildung 
(Leipzig, 1909).
Until the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, ‘world’ history 
and ‘universal’ history were almost interchangeable concepts. The purpose of as-
sessing world history was to recognize the universal elements in the history of 
humankind. In the course of the method dispute, it became clear that the con-
troversy was mostly sparked by determining the universal component (or com-
ponents) in the concept of world history. The most articulated confrontation line 
ran between (a) universality in world history as political history, and (b) univer-
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sality in world history as cultural history. Whereas in the first category of world-
historical search for universal patterns that give meaning to all of human history, 
peoples ‘without culture’ were excluded as study objects due to their a-historicity, 
in the second search category the prehistory of man as well as the cultures of early 
civilizations were included. This also meant that culture-oriented world histori-
ans welcomed the usage of visual artifacts as prehistorical sources.
Among the most prominent proponents of the first universalistic fraction of 
world historians, one finds the German historian Leopold von Ranke. His World 
History (Weltgeschichte) in nine volumes (1881-1986) presented human history as 
a civilizational history of progression and higher development from Egypt via 
the Middle East, Greece and Rome into the Germanic Middle Ages, culminat-
ing in the Christian nation-states of modern Europe. This Rankean tradition 
and orientation of writing world history was carried on by his pupil Theodor 
Lindner. In his Weltgeschichte seit der Völkerwanderung (9 volumes, 1906-1916), 
non-Western peoples were part of the historical account, but they only served 
to highlight the superiority and universality of Western culture. The main argu-
ment for this assertion was that the most human culture is the most universal: 
‘West European culture, the crowning of Indo-European culture, strikes us as 
the most human’.2
The foundation of universal history as world history of culture took off with 
Kurt Breysig’s history of humanity (Die Geschichte der Menschheit: Die Völker 
ewiger Urzeit. Die Amerikaner des Westens und des Nordens [1907]). New about 
this record of world history was the explicit interest in problems of ethnology as 
linked with the issue of universality. Breysig had a clear institutional vision for 
implementing his world-historical research agenda. He attempted to establish an 
interdisciplinary institute for comparative historical research at the Humboldt 
University in Berlin, but he failed due to the resistance from respected histori-
ans active in the university’s historical department. It was only Karl Lamprecht 
who, following Breysig’s path and vision, finally succeeded in establishing an in-
terdisciplinary historical ‘Institute for Cultural and Universal History’ (Institut 
für Kultur- und Universalgeschichte) at the University of Leipzig in 1909, which 
was officially supported by the King of Saxony. The institute still exists today, 
although it was renamed as the ‘Global and European Studies Institute’ (GESI), 
thus evidencing its far-reaching mission of modernizing and at the same time 
globalizing historical studies.3
Regarding these changes and subdisciplinary differentiations in the emerging 
field of universal history, the crucial methodological question to be addressed 
is: What were the cultural and art-historical implications of Karl Lamprecht’s 
universal-historical method? Most effectively, Lamprecht actuated a cultural para-
digm shift in the historical sciences and its methods. This one is instigated by a 
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critique of how contemporary universal history is pursued methodologically. The 
fundamental criticism is mainly directed against the philosophy of history, fol-
lowing the deductive method in its application to a metaphysical concept of his-
tory, and the particular history, following the inductive, historical-critical method 
of source criticism. For Lamprecht, the new methodological challenge for his-
torical studies lay in embedding the universal-historical method into a broader 
framework of cultural history.
Universal history was considered to be a process of renaissances and recep-
tions. Because these movements are cultural-historical phenomena, the core of 
universal history was defined by cultural history. The formation of universal 
history presupposes a ‘double’ comparative approach in order to transgress the 
fragmentation of isolated history writings. It should involve two phases of com-
parative studies: (1) a comparison of the historical development of particular sub-
fields of history (political history, constitutional history, economic history, social 
history, religious history, art history) across different nations, ideally all of them, 
and (2) an international, cross-cultural comparison of national histories, their 
overall developments.
Departing from the subfields of historical development, Lamprecht comes to 
the conclusion that intellectual and mental history in contrast to material history 
aspires most closely to world-historical significance, and that, among it, art his-
tory entails the highest potential of universality, as its products (that is, artifacts) 
are reflections of the cognitive and mental capacity of imagination (Phantasietätig-
keit). For this reason, he recommends art history – in particular, the examination 
of plastic and graphic arts – as a primary field of study for establishing a universal 
history. The main argument for art’s universality is twofold in Lamprecht. Firstly, 
he stresses the production side by reasoning that human artistic creativity is a 
universal phenomenon. All peoples on earth have created artifacts, thereby pro-
viding evidence that the human as image maker is an anthropological constant 
throughout history and beyond historical writing. Secondly, his argument draws 
upon the reception side. Scientists have universal access to visually shaped and 
crafted material worldwide. Given the option of direct contact and experience, 
they can study these object as unmediated forms of cultural representation and 
historical tradition. These two aspects of art’s universality imply the visual inter-
pretation of cultural history, thus launching two types of visual studies: (1) visual 
history as historical study of visual monuments, and (2) visual (culture) studies 
as the study of activities and forms of visualization. Both branches offer a com-
bination of studies in material and mental culture, as emphasized by Lamprecht.
But where to start from, when applying the universal-historical method to art 
history? In the vein of Lamprecht’s approach, the main point of departure for 
studying visual imagination in the field of artistic creation was the ornament. The 
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first contribution to a universal art history of ornamental style, using Lamprecht’s 
newly introduced universal-historical method, was a dissertation by Werner von 
Hörschelmann on the development of ancient Chinese ornament (Die Entwick-
lung der alt-chinesischen Ornamentik [Leipzig, 1907]) submitted at the Institute 
of Cultural and Universal History in Leipzig. That Chinese art history with its 
long-standing tradition became the first case study for proving universal art his-
tory gives a clear indication that a new world horizon of art was about to form at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.
 Cultural history of images:  
The emergence of image studies in the work of Aby Warburg
The tremendous impact of Lamprecht’s model of universal cultural history on 
the reconceptualization of the discipline of art history in the German-speaking 
countries is most pronouncedly reflected in the work of Aby Warburg, although 
this influence has never been studied to the full extent of its significance.4 As Aby 
Warburg studied cultural history with Karl Lamprecht at the University of Bonn 
as one important component of his studies in art history, history, and archeology, a 
direct link of influence is obviously given. Foremost, it was Lamprecht’s universal-
historical method that gained influence in the field of art history and contributed 
to reshape its methodology. The change in art history’s methodology is a reper-
cussion of the historical method dispute fiercely led in the historical sciences in 
the 1890s. The methods controversy was carried out between Leopold von Ranke 
as proponent of the descriptive historical method and Karl Lam precht as ad-
vocate of a new genetic approach to historical studies. Warburg’s introduction 
of iconology as a new cultural-scientific method of art history that transcends 
the motif- and content-based analysis of iconography adheres to the concept of 
Lamprecht’s universal cultural history. Ascending to the ‘Warburg method’ in art 
history’s reception, it had a big impact on the redefinition of art history as uni-
versal cultural history.
One of the most effective [methods and schools of art history] (and one of 
the few to have been somewhat self-analytical) is iconology – or the Warburg 
method, after its promulgator. [...] This method in simple essence is to study 
the work of art as a carrier of the interests of its culture and its social myths.5
In proposing iconology as a new art-historical method, new emphasis was put on 
studying art works as activities of the human mind (and soul) and transmitters 
of culture and society.
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The strong influence of Lamprecht’s universal-historical method formation on 
Warburg is also reflected in the interdisciplinary modeling of Warburg’s Kultur-
wissenschaftliche Bibliothek (Library for the Study of Culture) after the agenda 
of the Leipzig Institute for Cultural and Universal History. Warburg himself had 
defined his Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek as the ‘Institut für methodologi-
sche Grenzüberschreitung’ (Institute for the Crossing of Methodological Fron-
tiers). The crossing of methodological frontiers, implemented by a new library 
system of ordering scientific books according to the interdisciplinary principle of 
‘good neighborship’, intended a traversing of usually separated disciplinary frame-
works and methodologies, including the interlacing of scientifically segregated 
historical epochs from antiquity to modernity. Warburg’s interdisciplinary relo-
cation of the field of art history aimed at the widening of the art horizon in time 
and space. He strove for its embedding into cultural history, universal history, and 
image history. In line with Lamprecht’s assumption that the course of universal 
history is constituted by processes of renaissances and receptions as dominant 
cultural-historical manifestations and thus coincides with cultural history,6 War-
burg redefined art history as cultural history, therein including the formation of 
cultural memory through the transmission of images. Cultural history of art thus 
aspires to build an organum of remembrance of ‘images past’. At this point of the 
Warburgian mental, psychic and cognitive refunctionalization of art history, im-
age history joins forces with cultural history.
The particular concern about the psychological dimension of art and culture 
as well as the ‘modern’ idea of culture as a whole way of life is nurtured by Lam-
precht’s psychologization of historical studies. Lamprecht distinguished between 
two concepts of history: (a) an individual-psychological understanding of history, 
in his view identical with traditional political historiography, and (b) a socio-psy-
chological understanding of history congruent with cultural history. Accordingly, 
cultural history is interpreted as history of human socialization. For Lamprecht, 
the socio-psychological or cultural factor is the actual causal factor of historical 
development. It becomes visible as diapason, the overall habitus of an epoch or 
era, accumulatively formed by the transmission of cultural conditions cast into 
traditions.7 Cultural development follows the law of the ‘historical resultant’, a 
principle Lamprecht adopts from Wilhelm Wundt.8 The appropriation of the 
cultural past does not only take shape as an addition of individual factors, but as 
a processing of a socio-psychological or cultural overage or surplus, resulting in 
the advancement of culture and a reshaping of the diapason of a society:
[R]egarding the organic unity of each socio-psychic life of a given time, the 
transformations are not restricted solely to the economic and social life, 
they rather affect the complete advanced intellectual life: as observed, it 
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adapts the effects as quickly that, through spontaneous energy, it further 
develops them much faster than the development on the topsoil of the eco-
nomic life and the societal stratification would allow.9
The universal element inherent in cultural history is constituted by a profound 
developing potency, reoccurring in all forms of human community buildings so 
that it naturally establishes a nexus between different cultural eras:
The most deepest and lowest causes can only be grasped as particular pro-
cesses of the one developing potency, which manifests itself throughout 
the history of all large-scale human communities, [...] as movements of the 
specific potency of the human-social and finally also the human-individual 
soul, in as much as this one is inscribed into the general chronology and the 
particular development of its social environment.10
The triangular modeling of the relation between art, culture, and the image in 
the work of Aby Warburg is strongly influenced by Lamprecht’s thoughts on the 
universal-historical formation of culture, his acknowledgement of the human col-
lective consciousness. This can be seen from Warburg’s cultural-historical recon-
ceptualization of the principal functions and meanings of art, culture, and the 
image as medial and symbolic transfer unit. Culture is defined as ‘historical sum 
of all efforts made by man to overcome his fear’.11 The artwork is comprehended as 
a pathetic representation of the dialectic between expressive energies of the past 
and rational orientations of the present. The image is understood as engram of 
culture and (re)collection of mnemonic energies. At the same time (and this does 
not stand in contradiction to its definition as ‘pathos formula’), it is considered as 
a document of historical evidence. Warburg’s concept of the historical ‘survival’ or 
‘afterlife of images’, that is, particular visual forms of human expression which are 
transmitted throughout history via their motional potency, is closely connected 
to the idea of socio-psychological overflow, the surplus value of the historical 
resultant.
 The universalist concept of modern world art history
In the European history of art-historical studies, the development of a modern 
world art history as based on the idea of universal history was most prominent-
ly conceptualized in German-speaking academia by the Dresden art historian 
Oskar Beyer in his book Welt-Kunst. Von einer Umwertung der Kunstgeschichte 
(Dresden 1923). Although the book has not been extremely influential at the time 
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of its publication, it was recently rediscovered in the context of the revival of 
world art studies as one of the earliest conceptual attempts to transform classical 
Western art history into modern world art history.12 The transvaluation of art 
history (Umwertung der Kunstgeschichte) explicitly stated in the book title refers 
to the modernization of art history as academic discipline, its content, scope, and 
methodology. The essay’s direction of impact is inspired by the French tradition 
of the ‘Quérelles des Anciens et Modernes’, virulent at the turn from the seventeenth 
to the eighteenth century. By transposing the controversy into the new modern 
era at the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, it formulates a criti-
cism of the old, classical model of art history, its concepts and methods, and sug-
gests a new modern art history in the shape of world art history.
The crucial elements claimed by Beyer in Welt-Kunst for modernizing art his-
tory are contemporaneity and dehistorization. Both factors are coupled, as the 
relevance of the present and its significance for the future implies a devaluation 
of the past: ‘The new research will no longer deal with the past of art, with art 
“history”, but [...] ultimately always with art contemporaneities’.13 The devalua-
tion of the historical dimension is tantamount to the dephilologization of art 
history:
For this reason, we may reckon that the study of art [Kunstwissenschaft] will 
increasingly lose its historical character, as the aspect of history turns out 
to be unsignificant with regard to the numerous new works flooding in; the 
historical interest shall only be an auxiliary agent, because in principle it 
has nothing to do with the spirit of art.14
Parallel to the devalorization of the historicizing component, a revalorization of 
space takes shape. This spatial turn is to be understood as a process of de- and re-
territorialization of art history, the geographical extension of European/Western 
art history to world art history:
We may expect that the history of art will transform into a comparative 
research on style [...]. Its function would be to help understand the indi-
vidual domains of style of the world art arena [Weltkunstkreis] from within 
themselves, their spiritual form, to characterize them in the most intense 
plasticity, and to extend all of them onto one and the same plane of knowl-
edge so that they can be surveyed as on a topographical map: Where do 
things belonging together exist, where do historical lines of connection run, 
where to find typical parallel phenomena, and where those elements that 
are incompatible by essence?15
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This geospatial shift in the perspectivization of art history is paired with a new 
interest in visual art as material culture and, as a consequence, a reorientation to-
ward a focus on objects as opposed to the fixation on the artist as ingenious origi-
nator. The revaluation of the art object itself and its critical reflection, supported 
by the argument of unmediated access and the advantage of a direct visual-per-
ceptual experience, effectuates a move away from art philology, as rooted in the 
art-historiographical tradition of Vasari’s Lives of the Artists (Le vite), toward art 
philosophy as a new self-reflective approach to the study of art. In the same line 
and in coalition with the advancement of the natural sciences, art history argues 
for a comprehensive scientification of its discipline, including its methodological 
framework. As a result, art history is redefined in Beyer’s world art project either 
as kunsthistorische Wissenschaft (art-historical science) or even Kunstwissenschaft 
(art science), thereby signaling that the long-standing burden of history or histo-
riography is thrown overboard and that art history can no longer be confined to 
the role of an ‘auxiliary agent’ for the historical sciences.
The endeavor of scientifically modernizing the classical discipline of art 
history is acted out by means of a harsh criticism toward the existing tradi-
tion of art history and its scholars. The whole first chapter of Beyer’s book on 
Welt-Kunst stands under the agenda of ‘unmasking’ (Entlarvung). It reveals the 
state-of-the arts conditionality of art history as single-sided and inadequate. 
The main point of critique refers to the so-called ‘historical dogma’, the idea of 
a continuous progress and higher development of art (creation), culminating 
in the appraisal of peak stages. Contrary to this teleological, progress-oriented 
historical dogma, Beyer pronounces himself for a revaluation of early stages of 
art design, articulating interest in stylistic transformations as a reflection of 
changing needs of expression in a particular culture and society. By doing so, 
he advocates a more pronounced cultural approach to art history, moving from 
what he calls a ‘conviction of art’ (Kunstüberzeugung) to a ‘conviction of culture’ 
(Kulturüberzeugung).16 In addition to the criticism of the historical dogma, Bey-
er pounces on the ‘antique dogma’ as the basis of classical art history. The idea 
of art as representational form, as imitation of nature, is refused because of its 
extreme limitation.
The same critique of constriction is also applied to the individualistic and bi-
ographistic approach of classical art history, the celebration of technical virtuos-
ity ruled by the principle of ‘art for art’s sake’. The reproach is that art is valued as 
the individual product of a unique and creative personality, but not as a product 
of community, including a particular culture. According to Beyer, the attention 
of new world art studies should be directed toward the ‘communitarian work of 
art’ (Werk der Gemeinschaft), and not any more to the ‘artwork of individualis-
tic isolation’ (Werk der Vereinzelung). Consequently, folk art and popular art are 
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strongly upvalued; they take center stage as agents and determinants of universal 
art history. In the same string of argumentation, universal history is conceived of 
as a counter model to individual history, the latter being equated with the excep-
tional, particular status of Western art and art history. It is exactly the idea of an 
individual history of art, for centuries dominant in the Western hemisphere of 
the art world, that has to be overcome in order to open the way to the constitution 
of a universal history of art.
Bundling all of these points for change, foremost the geospatial and socio-
cultural turn, it becomes clear that Beyer’s critique of what is usually designated 
as classical art history points to the limitations of the European/Western concept 
of art and art history. It is the confrontation with the new world horizon of art 
that pushes classical European art history beyond its long-standing conceptual 
and methodological boundaries. The inclusion of the new world horizon antici-
pates art history in a global perspective. The reorientation of art history follows 
the trends and transformations in historical research prevailing in those days, 
namely the study of world history as universal history. Accordingly, art history 
is located between world art history and universal art history. The primary goal 
of Beyer’s transvaluation of art history is the extension of its geographical scope. 
Art history must transcend its regional boundaries and cultural-historical bonds, 
thus opening spaces for its transition to world art history.
When assessing the limits of art-historical research of his time and former pe-
riods, Beyer comes to the conclusion that art history mostly suffers from a strong 
nationalism. He criticizes the national art historiography in Europe, its reduc-
tion to German and Italian art, and, as a countermove, calls for a truly European 
art history. New research emphasis is put on both, the internationalization and 
regionalization of art and art history. At the same time, so-called European or 
Western art history is considered to be exceptional, that is solely representative 
for the particular, but not for the universal. By aiming at the new horizon of world 
art and art history, Beyer also practices a strategy of provincializing European art 
history. Western art history in its disposition of the early twentieth century is not 
(or in the logic of his argumentation: not yet) universal, or universally applicable, 
although it claims the universality of its modern condition. The global moderni-
zation of art history, as pursued by Beyer, thus resonates with the questioning of 
the Western concept of art and art history, its ‘universalist’ consensus.
The universal dimension of art history can only lie in the universal perspec-
tive of a world horizon of art. The narrow-mindedness of the ‘old’ traditional 
art-historical perspective shall be superseded by an open-minded wide-angle per-
spective of a new future-oriented art history with a high viewpoint that allows 
to make the ‘vastness of world art manifestations’ visible. In this sense, world art 
history enacts a shift from a micro-historical to a macro-structural perspective.
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In principle, Beyer follows Lamprecht’s approach of universal history as cul-
ture-comparative history. According to this position, the universal in art coin-
cides with the spiritual (form) in art. It can only be grasped by means of a com-
parative research on style. One of the consequences of this universal, spiritual 
turn is that art history is remodeled, even upgraded, into a truly ‘spiritual’ science 
(Geisteswissenschaft). The scientification of art history, in particular its spiritual-
ization, takes shape under the growing influence of the natural sciences:
As a recently created university discipline, the study of art history had to 
demonstrate its ‘scientific’ dimension in comparison with other human sci-
ences – and it had to fulfill the requirements of a ‘science’, primarily ex-
pressed as holistic explanatory models and laws [...]. Simultaneously, art 
history had to secure an independent profile in order to contrast itself to 
the discipline of history, which had provided the most important method-
ological model of the positivist Kunstgeschichte in the tradition of Rumohr. 
[...] Probably the most decisive attempt to solve this dilemma on the part 
of Kunstwissenschaft involved an orientation towards the natural sciences, 
initially based on their classification systems.17
The transformation from Kunstgeschichte to Kunstwissenschaft signifies a switch 
from a historical (auxiliary) science to a full-fledged science of mind, a Geisteswis-
senschaft in the Wundtian sense wherein the spiritual component is prevalent. Par-
allel to this reorientation, Beyer envisages a new type of art historian, the so-called 
Kunstdenker (art thinker), who stands in for the change of mind, the scientific 
advancement of art history from an art-historical philology to a proper art philos-
ophy, qualified for higher knowledge. The remodeling of art history into a genuine 
Geisteswissenschaft, a philosophical science of art, is oriented toward the integra-
tion of the human sciences. It aims at understanding the human mind by looking at 
worldwide human artistic creativity, its forms and structures of expression, and by 
defining art forms and styles as ‘living forms’ of cultural and societal life. Because 
the creation of art is reacknowledged as a human capacity and social phenomenon, 
it calls for a transdisciplinary brotherhood of researchers. Here, the preference of 
universal/world art history for the study of collective art (Gemeinschaftskunst) is 
transferred to the idea of an international community of art researchers contrib-
uting to the formation of a universal history of world art. From the viewpoint of 
Beyer, this transformation of art history into a spiritual human and social science 
is already on its way. The transvaluation of European/Western art from repre-
sentational art (Darstellungskunst) to expressive art (Ausdruckskunst) under the 
influence of world art/non-Western art is understood as a clear signal that the 
reorientation of classical art history toward world art history has begun.
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 Modern global humanities and the making of image studies
The shift in historical studies toward universal history had a lasting effect on the 
redefinition of art history as modern science. The cultural-scientific approach, 
including psychophysical and anthropological elements, to the study of art re-
vealed the image as a new and autonomous category of investigation. This held 
true for both of the here discussed reform projects of art history, the ones by 
Beyer and Warburg, although they undoubtedly differ largely in their incentive 
and design. In postulating world art history, Beyer relied on artistic expression as 
human activity. He set the agenda for a universal history and theory of creative 
imaging, focusing on the interrelations between conceptions of the world and im-
age concepts, in short: between world pictures and pictorial worlds. One central 
drawback inherent to this universalistic conceptualization of world art history is 
that it does not allow thinking beyond the category of style. Universal art history 
is – also in terms of methodology – restricted to a comparative analysis of style; 
hence, it cannot reach the status of a genuine image history or even image science. 
Moreover, it adheres to the modern idea of the universal as spiritual, coming dan-
gerously close to the folkish, nationalistic ideology of the given period.
Also Warburg is in search of the universal image of mankind and humanity 
that transcends the individual work of art. This is why he develops interest in 
the return of the image, the renaissance or survival of the image. By definition, 
the universal image is both at once, an image of remembrance and an image of 
expression, an internalized and externalized, mental and physical image. Because 
of the new valorization of the mediating qualities of images, their emotional and 
translational potency, Warburg took a pioneering role in not only transforming 
art history into image and media history, 18 but also reshaping it as universal art 
history.
Certain parallels in reorientation between the making of the modern science 
of art history around 1900 and the attempts of making art history into a global 
discipline around 2000 can be detected. These manifest themselves in two dif-
ferent shapes: firstly as transposition from world art history to world art stud-
ies19 and from Western art history to global art history20 and secondly as a move 
from art history to image studies (Bildwissenschaften) and visual culture studies. 
Although the impact direction and main interest in transcending the historical, 
cultural, and methodological limitations of Western art history and plunging into 
the exploration of visual creativity and visual imagery appear to resemble each 
other with regard to the science-led renewal of art history during the time peri-
ods of around 1900 and 2000, the goals, conceptions, and implications of modern 
world art history strongly differ from those of contemporary global art history. 
Whereas the hegemony of Western modernism with its universal ideology still 
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prevails in world art history, global art history endeavors to deconstruct it by 
revealing the alter-modernities of a purported postmodern and postcolonial era. 
This is one of the reasons why the art historian Hans Belting has strictly warned 
against identifying world art history with global art history:
World Art History cannot serve as a synonym [for Global Art History], as 
it is a history of world art and as such presents even a double problem: on 
the one hand the notion of world art, as an art concept with a questionable 
universalism, and on the other hand the notion of history that implies the 
even more questionable assumption that world art, in its utter diversity, al-
lows for a common history in terms of art history.21
In particular the last sentence constitutes a direct link to the here discussed at-
tempts at creating a universal art history. Drawing on the pitfall of the universal, 
Belting views globalism as
almost an antithesis to universalism because it decentralizes a unified and 
uni-directional world view and allows for ‘multiple modernities’. [...] This 
also means that in the arts, the notion ‘modern’ becomes a historical defini-
tion and accordingly loses the authority of a universal model.22
A full critical assessment of what these differences mean for the concatenation 
between modern and global studies of art history is strongly required, but it lies 
beyond the purpose of this paper. The arguments brought forward here intended 
to suggest that the early-twentieth-century German projects to make art history 
into a purportedly ‘modern’ science present an important historical foundation, 
but also a critical lesson for future attempts at methodologically and theoretically 
reconceptualizing art history in the contemporary global context.
 Notes
1 Alois Riegl, ‘Kunstgeschichte und Universalgeschichte’, in Festgaben zu Ehren May Büdin-
gers von seinen Freunden und Schülern (Innsbruck, 1898), 454. English translation by the 
author.
2 Cf. after Roger Chickering, Karl Lamprecht: A German Academic Life (1856-1915) (Atlan-
tic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993), 336.
3 For detailed information about the history of the Leipzig Institute for Cultural and Uni-
versal History from its foundation up to the present, see Matthias Middell, Weltgeschichts-
schreibung im Zeitalter der Verfachlichung und Professionalisierung. Das Leipziger Institut 
für Kultur- und Universalgeschichte 1890-1990, Von der Vergleichenden Kulturgeschichte 
zur Revolutionskomparatistik, Bd. 1: Das Institut unter der Leitung von Karl Lamprecht 
342 Birgit Mersmann
(Leipzig: Akademieverlag, 2005). For the successor institution, that is, the Global and Eu-
ropean Studies Institute at Leipzig, see URL: http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~gesi/home/.
4 An exception to this is Kathryn Brush, ‘Aby Warburg and the Cultural Historian Karl 
Lamprecht’, in Richard Woodfield (ed.), Art History as Cultural History: Warburg’s Proj-
ects (Amsterdam: G + B Arts International, 2001), 65-92.
5 Panofsky quoted in Creighton Gilbert (ed.), Renaissance Art (New York: Harper, 1970), 
XVI.
6 Karl Lamprecht, Zur universalgeschichtlichen Methodenbildung (Leipzig: Teubner, 1909), 
634.
7 The term ‘diapason’ is introduced by Karl Lamprecht in ibid., ‘Was ist Kulturgeschichte? 
Beitrag zu einer empirischen Historik’, in Herbert Schönebaum (ed.), Karl Lamprecht. 
Ausgewählte Schriften zur Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeschichte und zur Theorie der Geschichts-
wissenschaft (Aalen: Scientia, 1974), 309. It means a general sociopsychical disposition of 
human culture and society as causal factor of historical development and is also referred 
to as ‘Gesamtwille, Gesamtgefühl, ein Gesamtkomplex von Vorstellungen und Begriffen’ 
(ibid., 264), which unifies the material and spiritual culture of an epoch to one organic 
whole. Based on the idea of diapason, Lamprecht conceives of historical change and devel-
opment as intensification of the sociopsychical life. This is expressed in his periodization 
theory of five historical cultural epochs: symbolism, typism, conventionalism, individual-
ism, and subjectivism. 
8 The law of the historical resultant has been developed by Wilhelm Wundt in his Logik. 
Eine Untersuchung der Prinzipien der Erkenntnis und der Methoden wissenschaftlicher For-
schung, Vol. 3, Logik der Geisteswissenschaften (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1908), where 
he discusses the logic and the principles of the historical sciences (see in particular Sec-
tion 2: 400-442). Embedded into his overall psychophysiological empirical approach to 
the humanities, it is related to the formation of psychological cognitive processes in a 
long-term historical perspective. Each psychic and mental activity from intuition over 
conceptions to complex decisions and powerful actions contains a surplus value with 
respect to its constituting elements. As the ‘resultant’ entails a qualitative growth, it has 
also been defined by Wundt as ‘creative resultant’. In his treatise ‘Was ist Kulturgeschich-
te?’ Lamprecht draws upon the psychological science model of Wundt as proposed in 
Logik, arguing that psychology as ‘exact science of the laws of spiritual life’ (Lamprecht, 
Was ist Kulturgeschichte?, 272) would be the ‘foundation of all historical sciences’ (Ibid., 
259). By adopting the principle of the historical resultant from Wundt, he attempts to 
explain the qualitative higher development of human culture, society, economy, and sci-
ence which, in a feedback loop, induces the cultural-historical universalization of mental 
and cognitive operations. 
9 Karl Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte, Ergänzungsband zur jüngsten deutschen Vergan-
genheit, Bd. 2.1 Wirtschaftsleben, soziale Entwicklung (Berlin: Gaernter, 1912), 472. 
English translation by the author.
10 Karl Lamprecht, Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft. Fünf Vorträge von Karl Lamprecht (Ber-
lin: Weimannsche Buchhandlung, 1909), 17. English translation by the author.
11 Cf. after Jan Assmann, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’, New German Critique 65 
(1995), 130.
12 See Susanne Leeb, ‘Weltkunstgeschichte und Universalismusbegriffe: 1900/2010’, Kri-
tische Berichte (2012), 13-25, and Ulrich Pfisterer, ‘Origins and Principles of World Art 
History – 1900 (and 2000)’, in Kitty Zijlmans and Wilfried van Damme (eds.), World Art 
Studies: Exploring Concepts and Approaches (Amsterdam: Valiz, 2008), 69-85.
343Embracing World Art: Art History’s Universal History




16 Ibid., 28. 
17 Pfisterer, ‘Origins and Principles of World Art History’, 71-72.
18 Compare Thomas Hensel’s book Wie aus der Kunstgeschichte eine Bildwissenschaft wurde. 
Aby Warburgs Graphien (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011).
19 For a new contemporary conceptualization of world art studies as transdisciplinary un-
dertaking involving anthropological, psychological, evolutionary, creative, and neuroscien-
tific studies, see Kitty Zijlmans and Wilfried van Damme (eds.), World Art Studies: Ex-
ploring Concepts and Approaches (Amsterdam: Valiz, 2008), in particular the first chapter 
‘Introducing World Art Studies’ (23-61).
20 For the contested discourse on global art history, see James Elkins (ed.), Is Art History 
Global? (New York, London: Routledge, 2007).
21 Hans Belting, ‘Contemporary Art as Global Art: A Critical Estimate’, in Hans Belting 
and Andrea Buddensieg (eds.), The Global Art World: Audiences, Markets, and Museums 
(Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2009), 45.
22 Hans Belting, ‘Contemporary Art and the Museum in the Global Age’, in Peter Weibel 
and Andrea Buddensieg (eds.), Contemporary Art and the Museum: A Global Perspective 
(Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2007), 22.

6.2 Generic Classification and  
Habitual Subject Matter1
Adi Efal
One of the operations included in philological inquiries is the restoration of ety-
mologies, built up of linguistic units enduring through ages, languages, meanings, 
usages and contexts.2 The following essay attempts a possible deployment of an 
etymology of the lingual unit ‘genre’. Our trail will be guided by two stations in 
the long and extended history of this etymon: First, the Aristotelian origins of 
the etymon ‘genre’ are reconsidered; second, attention is given to the presence of 
the same etymon in the vocabulary of modern art criticism. Working within a 
comparative framework, this essay tries to create a trail between literary artistic 
and philosophical discourses. In all three domains, ‘genre’ appears as a classifica-
tory instrument, and it is as a classificatory instrument that genre is addressed 
here. In the second anthology of ‘The Making of the Humanities’, Mats Malm 
portrayed the chart of relations between literary genre theory, rhetorical motives 
and emotional figures, as well as demonstrated the affinities between literary 
genre theory and theory of painting.3 The present essay joins this trail and tries 
to ponder about the methodic tenor and relevancy of generic classification to the 
humanities.
 Genre: Critics and defenders
Henri Bergson blamed generic classification for causing situations of imprecision: 
‘Imprecision is, usually, the inclusion of a thing in a genre too wide’.4 This ar-
ticulation takes part in the general critical attitude toward generic classification, 
a criticism launched throughout the twentieth century across the humanities. 
Numerous authors, many of them motivated by vitalist tendencies, such as Wal-
ter Benjamin,5 Erich Auerbach,6 Mikhail Bakhtin,7 Jean-François Lyotard8 and 
Jacques Derrida9 interrogated the complexities of generic classifications. Their 
interrogations entail several problems regarding the concept of genre: the generic 
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method of classification is considered as too wide, too rigid, too hierarchic or 
too essentialist. In his Ursprung des Deutsches Trauerspiel, Benjamin, drawing his 
argument from Benedetto Croce’s criticism of the schematic deduction of literary 
genres, preferred to promote the importance of the ‘idea’ of a work rather than 
sticking to generic systems of classifications, as
It is [...] precisely the more significant works, in as much as they are not 
the original, and so to speak, ideal embodiments of the genre, which fall 
outside the limits of genre. A major work will either establish the genre or 
abolish it, and the perfect work will do both.10
More recently, Derrida questioned the validity of the classical rigid dictum: ‘gen-
res are not to be mixed’, a dictum demanding a strict separation between the gen-
res. Derrida described the disciplinary rigidity forced by the generic regime thus:
As soon as the word ‘genre’ is sounded, as soon as it is heard, as soon as one 
attempts to conceive it, a limit is drawn. And when a limit is established, 
norms and interdictions are not far behind. ‘Do’, ‘Do not’ says ‘genre’, the 
word ‘genre’, the figure, the voice or the law of genre.
Thus, as soon as genre announces itself, one must respect a norm. One must 
not cross a line of demarcation, one must not risk impurity, anomaly or 
monstrosity.11
This deconstructive criticism expresses unease with the rigid differentiations that 
are enforced by generic classifications. Indeed, the organization of the humanist 
disciplines embodies generic rationality and its effective method of classification 
according to subject matters and themes, a classification according to ‘what is at 
stake’, i.e., the subject matter of the inquiry. Twentieth-century critics of genre 
promoted mixing between genres, making the genres interpenetrate both within 
the disciplinary discourses and between them. Within the twentieth-century 
landscape of genre criticism, the moderate, favorable position of Gérard Genette 
stands as an exception.12 Both in his ‘Introduction de l’architexte’ and more so 
in his ‘Des Genres et des Œuvres’, Genette conceived of generic rationality as 
a challenge, and his poetics, in fact, involves elaborations of the conceptual and 
terminological potential of generic rationality. Genette notes: ‘To the question, 
“Can one love a genre?”, the proper answer may be this other question: “Can one 
really love anything else?”’13
The experiment in this present essay is to follow Genette’s approach to gener-
ic rationality, and to defend the place of the concept of genre as a methodic in-
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strument in the humanities. This does not mean that the concept of ‘genre’ must 
retain all its traditional coordinates, yet it does mean that the broader concept 
of genre as it was furnished by Aristotle could still be used as an Archimedean 
point for enquiries within the humanities. The compact review of the trails of 
usage of the concept of genre that is suggested here supports the conclusion that 
something did change in the modern period in the application of the concept 
of genre, something which has to do with its original Aristotelian roots. That 
is to say: In modern times, i.e., from the eighteenth century onwards, a change 
occurred within the hierarchic structure of genres, leading to the situation in 
which the ‘lower’ genres have been gradually regarded as a primary reality from 
which subject matter is to be drawn. Therefore, in modern times genre has been 
not so much a system as a problem, a task, perhaps yet to be accomplished.
Literary genres and their Aristotelian origins
Though the origin of literary ‘genre theory’ is to be found in Aristotle’s Poetics 
what was later to be known as ‘generic differentiation’ has its origins in the Ar-
istotelian differentiation between poetic forms (eide), not genres. It is rather in 
his logical, metaphysical and biological writings that the concept of genre (genos) 
plays a central role.14 In the Poetics Aristotle differentiated between the central 
forms of poietic mimesis: epic, tragedy and comedy, and only the last two were 
considered by him as dramatic, as they imitate an action in a direct manner, told 
from the point of view of the characters themselves.15
This basic differentiation established the long and canonic tradition of liter-
ary ‘genre theory’, consisting of a system of classification of kinds of literature;16 
the generic distinction between tragedy and comedy is based on the subject 
matter that the work imitates. And though, as Genette demonstrated, the long 
history of genre theory largely deviated from the Aristotelian designations,17 yet, 
the basic Aristotelian alleged ‘generic’ differentiation of the Poetics was retained: 
it is the one drawing a distinction between tragedy, which is a mimesis of a ‘seri-
ous’, good praxis, performed by good or noble, that is to say ‘better’ characters, 
and comedy, which imitates ridiculous, laughable deeds, performed by ‘lesser’ 
characters.18 This distinction entails a hierarchy, distinguishing between that 
which is imbued with importance and tenor, and that which is considered as mi-
nor, insignificant and habitual. The generic literary distinction between tragic 
and comic subject matter was still being maintained in literary seventeenth-cen-
tury neoclassical discourse. During the second half of the seventeenth century, 
the vocabulary of generic classification was transferred to the discourse of the 
plastic arts. This passage was carried out by the development of artistic theory 
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in the academies. In his preface to the Conférences de l’académie royale de peinture 
et de sculpture,19 André Félibien used the literary hierarchy of genres in order to 
discuss painting and sculpture, constructing a hierarchy of subject matter, which 
begins from still-life and landscape (the lowest genres), continues to portraiture, 
and culminates in history and theological painting, which were taken to be as 
the higher, respectable genres.20 Yet artistic discourse in the eighteenth century 
entailed a notable deviation in the etymon’s trail, to which our trail now turns.
 Peintres de genre and habitual subject matter
Artistic vocabulary in the eighteenth century had to follow contemporary changes 
in the conditions of production of artistic works. As early as in the seventeenth 
century, mostly in the Netherlands, a notable school of painting developed, having 
its sources in earlier Dutch painting and ‘Caravaggism’. This class of paintings is 
characterized by subject matter which are admittedly nonheroic and nonhistori-
cal, but rather belong to everyday life, describing human habitudes, many times 
accentuating moral frailty. In France, one should note the paintings of the Le Nain 
brothers, who worked in the same thematic framework and were known and in-
fluential in their own times. The paintings of this ‘kind’ were referred to initially 
by the Italian-driven derogatory term Bambochades,21 meaning laughable, fake, or 
even deformed. The word ‘genre’ was not used in the seventeenth-century Neth-
erlands to describe what was later to be referred to by this word.22 Only in the 
eighteenth century does one start to find in French art criticism the use of the term 
peinture de genre to refer to the above class of painting. Therefore, the term ‘peinture 
de genre’ was a retroactive term, serving French authors of the eighteenth century to 
refer and to define seventeenth-century (mostly Dutch) paintings and to affiliate 
these with their own present-day painterly production. This new encompassing 
category of ‘genre painting’, as Wolfgang Stechow specified, ‘embraced the minor 
categories [les genres] of painting, such as landscape, still life and everyday scenes’.23
Localizing precisely the original eighteenth-century textual usage of the term 
peinture de genre (genre painting), or peintre de genre (genre painter) is a complicat-
ed task. The term is clearly to be found in Diderot’s art criticism, though he referred 
to it as an already commonly used term. Notwithstanding, the expression ‘peinture 
de genre’ does not make an explicit category in earlier eighteenth-century French art 
criticism, such as those by Roger de Piles, l’Abbé Dubos or La Font de Saint-Yenne. 
One could find in these texts the usage of the word ‘genre’ referring to ‘kinds’ in gen-
eral, for example, as in the expressions: ‘le genre de Peinture la plus considerable’24; 
‘différents genres de la poésie’,25 or ‘en aucun genre’.26 In all these expressions, ‘genre’ 
does not explicitly refer to the specific class of painting mentioned above.
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The use of the term ‘peinture de genre’ is a peculiar one, in which the word 
‘genre’ refers to subject matter located at the very bottom of generic hierarchy, or 
falling outside it altogether. Slightly prior to Diderot’s art criticism, one could 
find the term ‘peinture de genre’ in the seventh volume of the Encyclopédie, edited 
by Diderot and by d’Alembert in 1757, in the article ‘Genre (Peinture)’, written by 
Claude-Henri Watelet.27 Hence, one may narrow the localization of the forma-
tion of the specific classification ‘Genre painting’ to around 1750. The formation 
of this term is synchronous with the beginning of the Salon exhibitions (from 
1746 onwards) and the development of public discourse surrounding them. This 
cultural process included the development of the practices of the amateurs, col-
lecting affordable paintings, an occupation demanding new categories of classi-
fication and reference to paintings that were unclassifiable according to pregiven 
iconographical, canonical systems of subject matter.28
Thereafter, one finds in the writings of Diderot the term ‘peintres de genre’ as 
an independent expression. Here is Diderot’s definition:
One calls genre painters [peintres de genre], without distinction [indistinc-
tement], those who busy themselves with flowers, fruits, animals, woods, 
forests, mountains, as well as those who borrow their scenes from common 
and domestic life [de la vie commune et domestique]; Teniers, Wouwermans, 
Greuze, Chardin, Loutherbourg and even Vernet are genre painters.29
For Diderot, the term peinture de genre refers to those seventeenth- and eight-
eenth-century painters depicting all subject matter which is not historical or the-
ological. In fact, the above definition appears in the place were Diderot discusses 
a terminological dyad which is relevant to our trail of inquiry: it is the dyad of 
genre painting versus history painting.30 In the framework of this discussion Di-
derot explicitly recalls the classical literary generic model when noting that ‘[i]t is 
the quarrel between prose and poetry, between history and epic poem, between 
heroic tragedy and bourgeois tragedy, between bourgeois tragedy and gay com-
edy’.31 Thus Diderot implicitly suggests the following scheme, which amounts to 
a philological trail of sorts:
Prose → history → heroic tragedy → bourgeois tragedy
versus
Poetry → epic poem → bourgeois tragedy → gay comedy
Genre painters are occupied with habitual themes, those considered as comic in 
the Aristotelian sense, and therefore are classified according to the specific sort 
of ‘things’ depicted in their painting, rather than by the ‘history’ they recount. 
350 Adi Efal
Diderot protected the status of genre paintings, and even affiliated these with 
the work of philosophy. According to Diderot, both practices, genre painting and 
philosophical investigations, seek to represent the ‘true’.32
It was the proliferation of the unclassified subject matter of mundane, habitual 
reality, correlative to the widening of the art public, that lead to the eighteenth-
century usage of the concept of genre, and which, according to Diderot, coincided 
with the task of philosophical thinking. Diderot used the term ‘peinture de genre’ 
in a framework of a critical polemic against historical painting which adheres to 
the classical, Aristotelian academic hierarchy of genres which was still retained, 
as noted above, by the French academy of the seventeenth century.
The term peinture de genre continued to be effective also in the following cen-
tury, when artistic theory and discourse proliferated, with the writing and teach-
ing of the history of art. 33 In Germany, the term became accepted during the 
nineteenth century; around 1830 one can find the term Die Genre-malerei in the 
art-historical surveys of Karl Schnasse and Franz Kugler.34 Moreover, genre paint-
ing served as a model for the ‘Realist’ nineteenth-century critics and  authors.35
Though seeming to entail a deviation from classical hierarchies of genres, the 
modern concept of peinture de genre continued to lean on the Aristotelian dif-
ferentiation between the tragic and the comic, the serious and the habitual. The 
change particular to the modern period since the eighteenth century is that ha-
bitual subject matter has been gradually given a central role to be equaled and 
sometimes surpassing in importance historical and theological subject matter.
Still, the use of the concept of ‘genre painting’ in artistic vocabulary stands as a 
philological riddle: Must one, as Jakob Burckhardt did 1874, refer to this term of 
‘genre painting’ as merely ‘accidental’ or arbitrary?36 In my opinion the history of 
the etymon ‘genre’, and its affiliation with habitual subject matter is not accidental 
but rather informative. Moreover, it points to the capacity of the concept of genre 
to continue to serve as a methodical tool in the humanities. This suggestion could 
be enhanced by a return to the Aristotelian meaning of the term genos. Indeed a 
long tradition of transmission exists between Aristotle’s thought regarding the 
genos and the various definitions of genre theory in modernity. Regarding the 
twentieth century’s criticisms of ‘genre’, which I mentioned at the outset, one may 
ask: is genre classification, as its twentieth-century prosecutors argued, indeed a 
stiff grill of separations, that is inadequate to account for the complexity and sin-
gularity of historical reality? Perhaps genre could rather be viewed as a methodic 
mechanism enabling a localization, or definition of a work, be it provisory or 
transitory? All generic classification places a work within a preexisting diachronic 
line of types, corresponding primarily to the work’s subject matter. Now let us 
take a brief look at the Aristotelian beginning of generic classification.
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 Generic classification and genre as the ‘matter’ of forms
The insistence of the methodic centrality of the concept of ‘genre’ could be viewed 
as one of the central suggestions of the Aristotelian orientation throughout the 
centuries. The genos was placed by Aristotle as a complementary and supplemen-
tary concept to the Platonic eidos. Instead of forms, Aristotle posed the genera as 
the primary means of classification. For Aristotle, the form (eidos) is a subdivi-
sion within the genos, a subdivision which is the outcome of a specific difference 
(diaphora) found within the genre. Hence: a genre + a specific difference supply, 
within a certain inquiry, what Aristotle refers to as the eidos, or the form of a thing 
in question. Genres include all actualized differences as a potentiality; and one 
achieves the definition, or the form, of a thing when recognizing both the latter’s 
genre and the specific difference. Thus one cannot achieve an understanding of a 
thing’s form without passing through an understanding of its genre.
The concept of genos, translated also as ‘kind’ or as ‘race’, comes up throughout 
Aristotle’s works: In the Categories, the two Analytics, in the Topics, in the biologi-
cal writings, in the Metaphysics, the Poetics and in the Rhetoric.
Here is the definition Aristotle gives to the genos in his Metaphysics Delta:37
The term genus, then, is used in all these senses: (a) in respect of continuous 
generation of the same type (εἴδους); (b) in respect of the first mover of the 
same type as the thing which it moves; (c) in the sense of material. For that 
which the differentia or quality belongs to is the substrate, which we call 
material (ὕλην).
This Aristotelian definition is applicable to the literary classification of genres. 
Indeed, Richard McKirahan has recently demonstrated a continuity and coher-
ence between Aristotle’s logical and metaphysical definitions of the genos, and 
his definitions of various forms of literature in the Poetics.38 Genres are, in Aris-
totle’s definition as well as in literary genre theory, recognized to exist in several 
exemplars during a certain period. And the generic series exhibits repetitions, 
articulations and variations of the genos. Indeed, a relation of hierarchy exists 
between genre and forms. Genos is to Form, what matter (hyle) is to shape (mor-
phe): Genos is a ‘matter’ from which specific forms are generated, released or 
distinguished; Genos is the hyle of definitions, a reservoir of potential forms.39 
Due to this basic layering, a generic system of classification must be, to some 
extent, a hierarchical one.40 In literary generic classical classifications, it is the 
subject matter of the work that determines its stylistic form, and the generic type 
supports and sustains, and in that sense entails the various realizations as poten-
cies; and the same is also true of the genos in the original Aristotelian definition, 
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which is denoted as a kind of matter regarding forms; it is a yet to be determined 
potentiality, as a matter from which forms and their differences are to be real-
ized.41 The genera are epistemological instruments enabling saying something 
about something else, an operation which is one of the most basic impulses of 
humanist inquiries. Naturally, generic rationality demands a certain amount of 
discipline: According to Aristotle, locating an inquiry within a certain genre is 
necessary for any proof process, and one should abstain from moving from genre 
to genre in the same demonstration.42 The two following sections examine what 
continuity can be demonstrated between the eighteenth-century transfiguration 
of the concept of ‘genre’ regarding painting and a modern epistemological under-
standing of ‘genre’.
Genre painting and the subject matter of modern art
Genre painting, as was demonstrated above, is essentially related to the comic 
‘genre’ of artworks, imitating subject matters belonging to habitual reality, not ex-
actly still-life, not landscape either, but rather minor human scenes located on the 
background of history, devoid of ideal nobleness. The rise of the comic through 
the new classification of ‘genre’ could be comprehended as the decisive change 
modern art, at least in literary and artistic discourse, has brought to the history 
of our etymon.
In the nineteenth century, ‘genre painting’ became prominent. From Gustave 
Courbet’s Realism, through Édouard Manet’s Impressionism, up to Édouard 
Vuillard’s Post-Symbolism, a large part of nineteenth-century avant-garde paint-
ing could not be thematically and stylistically understood without a recourse 
to the classification of ‘genre painting’ [Fig. 5]. Therefore, the concept of ‘genre’ 
should be considered as a key player in establishing the paradigm of modern 
art.43 Hence modern art and its associated discourse could be understood as a 
development within the long tradition of transfiguration of the Aristotelian liter-
ary ‘genre’ theory. And in the twentieth century it was physical, material reality 
itself that became primary and central,44 so that abstract art, dedicated to the 
articulation of physical characters of space, color, materiality, and corporeal ges-
tures, could be included in the story that is deployed here, driven as it is by the 
movement toward the ‘comic’ through the concept of ‘genre’ in the arts. To the 
claim that one cannot use thematic generic classification regarding nonfigurative, 
‘abstract’ art, one could reply that an artwork does not have to be figurative in 
order to be considered within a certain genre; the type of subject matter of the 
work can still, in most cases, be deciphered.45 On the other hand, clearly classical 
canonic iconographies, ancient as well as Christian, have been found in modern 
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times as too narrow and anachronistic to supply the exhaustive subject matter 
from which possible forms could be drawn. It is therefore physical reality as such, 
from its materials to habitual life in the city or the home, that make the modern, 
encompassing ‘genre’ of art. This was anticipated by the formation of ‘genre paint-
ing’ in the eighteenth century, and exemplified by philological rationality in the 
twentieth century, to which we now turn.
 Genre and philological habitude
We arrive now at the last station of our trail, gathering the various threads to-
gether, and considering their relevance to humanist inquiries at large.46 The mod-
ern use of the concept of genre in artistic discourse, epitomized by the concept of 
‘genre painting’, is not by sheer coincidence related to habitual subjects. Indeed, 
Diderot’s use of the term clarifies an aspect of the Aristotelian genos and its appli-
cation, which hasn’t been clear in previous usages of the term in traditional liter-
Fig. 5: Édouard Manet, Le Déjeuner sur l’herbe, 1862-1863, oil on canvas, 208 x 265.5 cm, 
Musée d’Orsay, Paris
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ary genre theory. It highlights the fact that generic examination is essentially and 
consistently occupied (1) with definitions and (2) with a hierarchical distinction 
between the comic and the tragic, or between the habitual and the heroic. Ge-
neric investigation considers human work as a result of serial repetition of types, 
and therefore as a constant process of distinction between the habitual, repeating 
‘comic’ details, and the tragic deviations from the generic web. A generic problem 
always involves the demand for a definition. It comes up when one seeks to define 
‘what’s that’ in a situation where some figure is not automatically classifiable un-
der accepted iconographies. In the twentieth century, in the history of art, Erwin 
Panofsky practiced such a generic, thematic history; occasionally he referred to 
this kind of inquiry as iconology.47 Iconology, as it was practiced by Panofsky 
and before him by Warburg, breaks the matter of history into themes and distin-
guishes genres of classification inside those which already exist; it locates a work, 
through the definition of its theme, within the already existing schemes of generic 
categories. In that sense, it is less interested in history as such.
A late-modern kind of generic inquiry, taking both Aristotle and Diderot into 
account, would understand historical reality as a result of habitual repetition and 
variation, not as tragic historicity. History would then be considered to be woven 
out of repetition and rehearsal of generic themes and types. The task of a genre-
oriented study of art would then consist in locating a work, or some detail of a 
work, within a classificatory thematic category, which should be demonstrated 
to exist in a continuous trail of repetition across a certain segment of history. 
Generic classification locates a work within a genre, yet a one which would not 
be too wide (see Bergson’s complaint mentioned at the outset) but rather as wide 
and as weighty as the work in question can carry. Leo Spitzer attested to the 
tragic-comic nature of philological inquiry, in his 1948 introduction to Linguistics 
and Literary History:
[T]he philological, the inductive way, seeks to show significance in the ap-
parently futile. [...] Philology, which deals with the all-too-human, [...] the 
attempt to discover significance in the detail, the habit of taking a detail of 
language as seriously as the meaning of a work of art – or, in other words, 
the attitude which sees all manifestations of man as equally serious – this 
is an outgrowth of the pre-established firm conviction, the ‘axiom’, of the 
philologian, that details are not an inchoate chance aggregation of dis-
persed material through which no light shines.48
A generic investigation demands from the researcher to rethink and rehabilitate 
his own habituated system of classifications, thus carrying a potential for new 
forms to be generated on the charts of history.
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6.3 The Recognition of Cave Art in the Iberian 
Peninsula and the Making of  
Prehistoric Archeology, 1878-1929
José María LanzaroTe-Guiral
In May 1921, the Exhibition of Spanish Prehistoric Art (Exposición de arte pre-
histórico español) opened its doors in Madrid. Hosted by the National Library 
and inaugurated by King Alphonse XIII, the exhibition presented prehistoric 
cave art as the first chapter of the Spanish art tradition, placing the peninsula 
at the cultural origins of Western civilization. This exhibition was conceived of 
to showcase the work undertaken by Spanish scholars in this field since 1902, 
when cave art was recognized as such by the international scientific community. 
Moreover, the organizers did not miss the chance to highlight that it was ‘foreign’ 
prehistorians, particularly French ones, who had first denied the authenticity of 
those figurative representations discovered in a Spanish cave in 1878. Inspired 
by an essentialist conception of national history, this exhibition contributed to 
define a constructed object of study, ‘Spanish prehistoric art’, which was elevated 
to the status of national heritage and played a strong role for national identity 
definition from then on.
In order to better understand the role of cave art research in the making of 
prehistoric archeology I shall deconstruct this hybrid object: What was the in-
tellectual and social process that led to the definition of ‘Spanish prehistoric art’? 
And in order to answer this question, this paper is concerned with the process of 
configuration of scientific categories and it is divided in two main sections. The 
first one analyzes the construction of the concept ‘prehistoric art’ between 1878 
and 1902, paying particular attention to the Altamira affair, namely the discov-
ery, early rejection and definitive recognition of the first prehistoric decorated 
cave. In a chronological continuity, the second part is devoted to the social and 
intellectual making of Spanish prehistory in the first decades of the twentieth 
century. As I shall demonstrate, this process is marked by a strong drive for the 
nationalization of humanities and sciences fostered by state initiative, which 
materialized in the creation of research institutions and the organization of 
 public exhibitions.
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In analyzing this process, this paper reflects the role of cultural transfers 
across European borders in the shaping of cognate disciplines such as prehistory, 
anthropology and art history. It also analyzes from a comparative perspective the 
contribution of those different fields of study to the making of ‘national heritage’. 
Combining these approaches, I use the case of prehistoric cave art to argue in 
favor of a histoire croisée of the humanities.1
 The question of cave art and the making of prehistory
The origins of prehistory as a field of study are marked by two dates; after its ‘birth’ 
commonly designated as dating from 1859, when a critical sector of the scientific 
community arrived at a consensus on the deep antiquity of humanity,2 in 1867 
the new field of study was presented in Paris at the Exposition Universelle. In-
between those two dates a community of ‘prehistorians’ began to form and become 
aware of itself through the creation of institutions such as museums for vernacular 
antiquities, specialized periodicals and a stable pattern of international congresses. 
Borrowing methods and theoretical grounding from natural and historical sci-
ences, those self-proclaimed prehistorians established the foundations of a new 
discipline.3 Due to its relevance for the question of human origins, prehistory was 
suspected of heterodoxy and associated with evolutionary anthropology; it be-
came enmeshed in philosophical, social and political debates, particularly on the 
role of science and religion in society. All these elements were present in the con-
troversy about Altamira representations that emerged in the late 1870s.
The cave of Altamira was discovered in 1878 by Marcelino Sanz de Sautu-
ola (1831-1888), a local erudite scholar from Santander in Northern Spain. The 
cave contained depictions of cold faunal species such as European bison, which 
were technically remarkable; they were naturalistic, in some cases adapted to the 
irregular surface of the rock adding a three-dimensional effect and had been ex-
ecuted with a combination of colors, a range of pigments using carbon and ochre. 
The similarity of these representations with the engravings on stratigraphically 
dated Paleolithic objects that Sanz de Sautuola had seen in Paris at the Exposi-
tion Universelle in 1878, led him to conclude that the paintings also dated back 
to the Stone Age.4
Subsequently Sanz de Sautuola informed the scientific institutions in Spain 
about his discovery and he got the support of Juan de Vilanova (1821-1893), chair 
of geology at the University of Madrid. In line with his Catholic beliefs and crea-
tionist standpoint, Vilanova considered the representations as the first examples 
of fine art produced by men, and therefore the proof that humanity was created 
by God with full intellectual and spiritual capacities. Vilanova decided to present 
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the new discovery to the international community at the International Congress 
of Prehistoric Anthropology and Archaeology to be celebrated in September 
1880 in Lisbon. However, the Altamira paintings met with skepticism from the 
majority of the congressmen and the discussion on this cave was set aside in favor 
of other debates, such as the question of the Tertiary man.
In the following years, Vilanova tried to raise the issue in several scientific 
meetings, but again he met with skepticism. Finally, an article published in the 
pages of Matériaux, the leading journal in the field, at the time directed by Émile 
Cartailhac (1845-1922), settled the question: the paintings could not date back 
to the Paleolithic, so they had to be a forgery.5 As he revealed years later, Car-
tailhac followed the advice of his mentor, the leader of the materialist school 
within French anthropology, Gabriel de Mortillet (1821-1898), who suspected 
that Altamira’s paintings had been planted by Spanish Creationist scholars in 
order to trick French prehistorians. In the hands of De Mortillet, prehistory 
became a weapon of social combat, as it was brandished in an attempt to reduce 
the influence of religious ideas in society and advance the cause of materialist 
philosophy.6
Moreover, this rejection can be explained by a combination of scientific and 
social factors. First of all, De Mortillet’s interpretations were influenced by uni-
linear evolutionary anthropology, which led him to think that prehistoric men, 
as modern ‘primitive peoples’, did not possess symbolic thinking and therefore 
were not capable of producing fine art. Secondly, even for those scholars who 
did not share his viewpoint, the idea of prehistoric art was hard to conceive of, 
even if some prehistoric objects that had been found in caves did have natu-
ralistic representations. These were considered just ornamental depictions on 
tools at best, comparable to ‘crafts’ but not to high forms of fine art. In the eyes 
of nineteenth-century specialists, Altamira representations were either ‘art’ for 
their technical proficiency or ‘prehistoric’ for their location and what they rep-
resented, but could not be both; the combination of those categories at the time 
was unthinkable.7
In 1870 the French scientific divulgator Louis Figuier (1819-1894) had pub-
lished a plate titled ‘The Forerunners of Raphael and Michelangelo’ [Fig. 6]; al-
most as a caricature, even if it was not intended as such, the illustrator Émile-
Antoine Bayard (1837-1891) presents two sitting sculptors carving statuettes, 
whereas a third standing figure is drawing a reindeer on a rock slab. Interestingly, 
this figure fits the stereotype of the artist in Western tradition as a painter in 
front of the easel. This was the way most nineteenth-century scholars thought 
of art: as a noble activity, born out of genius and creativity and formally based 
on mimesis. Neither this illustration, born from the imagination of a nineteenth-
century scientific divulgator and a contemporary artist (which was soon to be 
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Fig. 6: Émile-Antoine Bayard, The Forerunners of Raphaël and Michelangelo, or the Birth of the 
Arts of Drawing and Sculpture in the Reindeer Age, engraving from Louis Figuier, L’Homme 
primitif (Paris, 1870, first edition) 
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contested by the leading prehistorians of the time), nor the depictions from the 
Altamira cave, met with the idea that the scholars of the time could expect from 
the ‘primitive’ men of prehistory.8
The Altamira affair was settled for some years until new decorated caves were 
discovered in France, starting in 1885. Little by little the consensus was challenged, 
and finally in 1902 Cartailhac, one of the scholars that had most prominently 
denied the authenticity of Altamira, pronounced his mea culpa.9 His change in 
opinion was grounded in the redefinition of prehistory’s social and scientific cre-
dentials, and the shift in its epistemological paradigm after the turn of the centu-
ry. The unilinear evolutionism cherished by the materialist school was gradually 
substituted by the cultural-history paradigm, which led to an acknowledgement 
of regional differences within the archeological record.10 This, coupled with new 
approaches in the history of religion, led to a reappraisal of the intellectual and 
symbolic capacities of modern ‘primitive’ (and prehistoric) populations.11 Moreo-
ver, new ideas in art theory led to the appreciation of ornamental arts on the one 
hand, and to a renewed interest in the expressive force of primitive art manifesta-
tions on the other.12 Finally, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, prehis-
tory was gradually defused from its revolutionary potential; in trying to avoid 
what they considered partisan uses of knowledge, a new generation of scholars, 
among them some Catholic priests, strove to transform prehistory into a ‘neutral’ 
scientific field.13 And some of them converged in the study of prehistoric art, 
transformed after 1902 in one of the most promising fields within the discipline.
In the autumn of 1902 Cartailhac and the young Catholic priest Henri Breuil 
(1877-1961) visited Altamira, which they called the ‘Sistine Chapel’ of prehistoric 
times. Four years later, and thanks to the support of Prince Albert I of Monaco 
(1848-1922), they undertook the publication of a lavishly illustrated monograph 
on Altamira, the first of a series devoted to the principal decorated caves that 
were being discovered in France and Spain.14 From an epistemological point of 
view, this monograph inaugurated the religious interpretation of prehistoric art. 
They applied the ideas of Salomon Reinach (1858-1932), who translated the work 
of British social anthropologists as well as those of contemporary German art 
historians.15 This interpretation was pursued and developed by Breuil through-
out his career, which culminated with the publication of Four Hundred Centuries 
of Cave Art,16 in which he provided a general account of the evolution of prehis-
toric art. In this work he accepted the magical interpretation of cave art proposed 
by the Henri Begouën (1863-1956); according to whom, prehistoric art was sym-
bolic and had to be interpreted as the evidence of a religious practice, linked to 
propitiatory ceremonies for hunting.17 Breuil also introduced religious vocabulary 
to describe the decorated caves, such as ‘cathedral’ (cathédrale), ‘sanctuary’ (sanc-
tuaire), or ‘shrine’ (camarin) [Fig. 7].
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Breuil spent a life of dedication to the study of prehistory in the Institute of Hu-
man Paleontology (Institute de Paléontologie Humaine; IPH), established in Paris 
in 1910 by the Prince of Monaco. The new research center was formally linked to the 
National Museum of Natural History (Muséum Nationale d’Histoire Naturelle; 
MNHN).18 Along with Breuil, the IPH enrolled as professor another rising scholar 
in the field of prehistory: the German Hugo Obermaier (1877-1946); both were 
Fig. 7: Pierre Gatier, Prehistoric Ceremony in a Decorated Cave, Related to Henri Breuil’s Magic 
Interpretation of Prehistoric Cave Art, c. 1930, drawing, Bibliothèque Centrale du Muséum 
d’Histoire Naturelle, Paris (Fonds Breuil-Boyle, Br. 22). Reproduced in Noël Coye, Ed., 
Sur les chemins de la préhistoire : L’abbé Breuil du Périgord à l’Afrique du Sud. (Paris, 2006): 171).
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trained naturalists, and both were Catholic priests. Their career is to be understood 
as a process of rearming of Catholicism in science that started in the last decade 
of the nineteenth century. If their research had to be negotiated in terms of their 
double allegiance to both the principles of science and the dogmas of faith, the IPH 
allowed both of them to become leading prehistorians of their time.19
The new institution aimed at studying the origins of humanity and more par-
ticularly prehistoric cave art, and from the very beginning both professors set out 
to explore Spanish territory. While Breuil traveled all over the Iberian Peninsula 
in search of new art stations, Obermaier’s activities concentrated on the excava-
tion of El Castillo cave, situated not far from Altamira. El Castillo was considered 
as one of the best Paleolithic sites of Europe, due to its very complete strati-
graphic sequence, and also due to the association it presented of an outstandingly 
decorated cave and an archeological site.20
Even if the IPH was reputed as an international institution, it was also deeply 
rooted in French scientific structures. Indeed its creation implied a decisive move 
toward the institutionalization of prehistory and its professionalization by means 
of centralization in Paris. In this sense, the IPH opposed the large community of 
French amateur archeologists, scattered across the whole country and organized 
since 1904 in the French Prehistoric Society (Société Préhistorique Française; 
SPF). The excavation activities of a German-speaking Swiss scholar, Otto Haus-
er (1874-1932) in the prehistoric sites of the Dordogne, and the selling of human 
fossils and prehistoric artifacts, including artworks such as the Venus of Laussel, 
to German museums, confirmed the division between the two ways of conceiv-
ing prehistoric research. Alarmed by what they considered as the looting of the 
‘underground national archives’, official French scholars asked their government 
for a law on excavations to curtail the ‘freedom of excavation’ that the amateurs 
of the SPF proclaimed. Even if the law failed, the claims of those official scholars 
to control the field were satisfied, at least to some extent, with the creation of the 
IPH. After 1900, prehistory, up to then a scientific activity mostly in the hands of 
private entrepreneurial excavators, started to fall within a different domain, that 
of national heritage.21
 Searching for the origins of Spanish art
Since their first missions in Spain, the professors of the IPH encountered a coun-
try immersed in an intense process of renovation of its scientific structures, influ-
enced by the consequences of the 1898 colonial crisis. After the military defeat in 
the Spanish-American War and the subsequent loss of the last colonies, Spanish 
intellectuals had insistently demanded an official effort to redraft scientific policy, 
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oriented toward the ‘regeneration’ of the country. In this wave of renovation the 
idea of ‘Europeanizing’ Spain became central, implying the emulation of scientific 
achievements of the leading European imperial nations. This policy led to the re-
form of the university system and to the creation of new institutions, such as the 
Board for the Extension of Studies ( Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios; JAE) 
in 1907. This well-funded superstructure for advanced research was made up of 
different centers and it promoted academic exchange by awarding scholarships to 
both students and professors to undertake studies abroad.22
This trend of renovation affected sciences and humanities alike. The study of 
human sciences was promoted in the Center of Historical Studies (Centro de 
Estudios Históricos; CEH), created in 1910, and made up of different sections 
concerned with philology, history and archeology.23 Art history was promoted 
within the latter section by Manuel Gómez Moreno (1870-1970) and Elías Tormo 
(1869-1957), two scholars who became instrumental in the consolidation of art 
history as a fully fledged academic discipline in Spain. Their work focused on the 
characterization of the Spanish school of painting and was marked by a process 
of strong nationalization; in line with the Spanish elaborations of Karl Krausse’s 
German idealism in the second half of the nineteenth century, they considered 
fine art as the emanation of the ‘national spirit’.24 At the same time, they were also 
influenced by Unamuno’s concept of ‘intrahistoria’, or the idea that the national 
essence was to be found in the people, translating in a renewed interest in ver-
nacular manifestations of crafts and folklore.
This was not at all contradictory with the desired ‘Europeanization’; as Una-
muno put it, ‘Spain is waiting to be discovered, and only Europeanized Spaniards 
will discover it’.25 Spanish tradition and Europeanization were thus two sides of 
the same coin in the drive for modernization. Given the high relevance that art his-
tory had for national identity in Spain (as in other European countries),26 it is not 
surprising that competing nationalist projects within the state, such as the Cata-
lan, fostered with similar strength the study of artistic manifestation that spoke 
of the ‘primitive’ origins of the nation. For instance, since the turn of the century, 
Romanesque art from Catalonia and neighboring areas was extensively collected 
and studied by the economic and cultural elite of Barcelona, which also fostered a 
parallel drive in the institutionalization of research in archeology and art history.27
Situated in between the sciences of culture and those of nature, the study of 
prehistoric cave art did not fall within the province of the CEH but in that of 
a new institution, the Commission of Prehistoric and Paleontological Research 
(Comisión de Investigaciones Prehistóricas y Paleontológicas; CIPP). This was 
created in Madrid in 1912 under the initiative of Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, 
chair of geology at the Universidad Central, who had just benefited from a schol-
arship to visit the Muséum in Paris, at the precise moment in which the IPH 
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started its activities. Upon his return, he proposed the creation of an institution 
within the National Museum of Natural Sciences (Museo Nacional de Ciencias 
Naturales; MNCN),28 which mirrored the organization and the research objec-
tives of the Parisian Institut: the study of archeological sites and cave art from 
the Quaternary.29
Hernández-Pacheco became the academic director (jefe de estudios) of the new 
center, whereas a ‘grand amateur’ of archeology, Enrique de Aguilera y Gamboa, 
Marquis of Cerralbo (1845-1922) was chosen as the president. As the leader of the 
Traditionalist Party, Cerralbo was also a key political figure. In fact, the marquis 
was welcomed at the JAE, which was accused of being ideologically dominated 
by progressive thinkers, as his participation evinced that the JAE’s scientific and 
patriotic goals went beyond specific political choices. Moreover, by using his posi-
tion as senator, Cerralbo had contributed largely to the drafting of the Archeo-
logical Excavations Act (Ley de Excavaciones Arqueológicas), passed in 1911. This 
legal text defined a protectionist framework for the practice of archeology and 
limited the right of non-Spanish citizens to become owners of the discoveries 
or to export them. In this manner, the law was a crucial step in the definition of 
prehistoric and paleontological remains as Spanish national heritage.30
The passing of the Excavations Act in 1911 and the creation of the CIPP in 
1912 are the expression of a desire to regulate archeological activity and to cre-
ate scientific structures for its development. Furthermore, its members justified 
their existence as a defensive effort against ‘foreign science’. In this way, Spanish 
prehistorians used the rhetoric of nationalism to legitimate their discipline and 
to consolidate their academic position vis-à-vis the archeologists who came from 
abroad. This strategy paid off in a context of high sensitivity toward what some 
called ‘scientific imperialism’, in the aftermath of the colonial crisis, as it had also 
worked in the French case with the Hauser affair, in the context of rising anti-
Germanic feelings. Singling out ‘foreigners’ as the antagonist allowed the creation 
of a group identity, surpassing the social or ideological cleavages between those 
who constituted the emerging prehistorian community in Spain, whether noble-
men or commoners, official scholars or amateurs, conservative or liberal.
For all these reasons, Spanish scholars perceived the IPH’s activities with a 
mixture of admiration (for its scientific proficiency and economic means) and 
mistrust (for their leading role at an international level). If at the outset the re-
lationship between IPH and CIPP was cordial – there were some attempts to 
establish formal links between them – the discord finally came to a head in 1913 
as a personal dispute between researchers. The break between the institutions 
deepened in the context of the First World War, when, archeological activities by 
IPH scholars ceased or were severely reduced: Breuil was drafted into the French 
army, and combined his work as researcher with propaganda activities in Spain 
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in favor of the Allies. In turn, Obermaier, a German citizen working in a French 
institution, lost his position. When the war broke out in summer 1914, he was 
digging in El Castillo; invited to join the CIPP by Hernández-Pacheco, from then 
onwards his career developed within Spanish research structures.
The war provided neutral Spain with a chance to catch up with Europe in scien-
tific terms; as a result, Spanish prehistorians could affirm their leadership, while 
fostering the definitive shaping of prehistory as a patriotic discipline.31 Speaking 
in front of the Spanish Association for the Advancement of Sciences (Asociación 
Española para el Progreso de las Ciencias) in 1915, Hernández-Pacheco exposed 
the results of the last years’ effort to investigate ‘Spanish prehistory and paleon-
tology’. In his intervention, Hernández-Pacheco established a narrative in which 
the shortcomings of the nineteenth century were contrasted against the ‘rebirth of 
national science’ in the twentieth, and claimed a protagonist role for Spain in the 
field of prehistory on account of the fact that it ‘constitutes the world’s museum 
of prehistoric art’. He did not miss the opportunity to recall that the artifacts dis-
covered in the excavations led by the IPH had been taken to Paris, and accused 
its researchers of conquering the Peninsula for the benefit of ‘French science’ by 
the physical and intellectual appropriation of its past. He concluded affirming 
that ‘the archive of the primitive civilizations, which fortunately for Spanish sci-
ence, belongs to our homeland, and which, as Spaniards and cultivated people, we 
ought to preserve and study’.32
Those ideas were staged in 1921 at the Exhibition of Spanish Prehistoric Art, 
already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter [Fig. 8]. The exhibition was 
organized by the CIPP with the support of the aristocratic members of the Span-
ish Society of Art Amateurs (Sociedad española de amigos del arte), including 
the aforementioned Professor Elías Tormo. The annual exhibition organized by 
this Society at the National Library every spring since 1912 was a social event 
in Madrid and fostered the appraisal of lesser known kinds of Spanish arts and 
crafts. Much less acknowledged though was the contribution of the Parisian IPH, 
although the exhibition featured a good number of sketches of cave art depictions 
that had been carried out by Breuil, and that were loaned by this institution. Not 
surprisingly the exhibition was conceived of by Hernández-Pacheco as a show-
case of the achievements of the Spanish CIPP and only recognized the achieve-
ments of ‘foreign scholars’ with reservations:
[T]he study of those remote paintings was done, chiefly, by Spaniards; in 
some cases they were on their own, and, although the material means were 
scarce, they excelled in enthusiasm and ideals, in the wish to discover the 
unknown and the wonderful, and in the determination to study these as-
tonishing monuments; in some other cases the research was conducted in 
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Fig. 8: Francisco Benítez Mellado, printed poster for the Exhibition of Spanish Prehistoric art
(Exposición de arte prehistórico español), May-June 1921, Madrid
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partnership with foreign researchers, which excelled in material means and 
set out on the scientific conquest of the oldest artistic manifestations of 
primitive humanity.33
Hernández-Pacheco not only expressed the idea that the foreign scholars had 
conquered the Peninsula scientifically thanks to their material means, but he 
also insisted on the intellectual honesty that had guided their Spanish coun-
terparts. For this reason, the exhibition paid tribute to the Spanish ‘pioneers’ 
that had contributed to the discovery and recognition of prehistoric art in the 
nineteenth century, Sanz de Sautuola and Vilanova. The display was inspired 
by a long history of national unity, and avoided dealing with sensitive issues 
such as the ongoing scientific debate on the ethnic division of the Peninsula in 
prehistoric times.
The collaboration of the two institutions at the exhibition was possible due 
to the mediation of Obermaier. As a member of the CIPP, he had researched 
intensively on the geology and prehistory of the Iberian Peninsula during the 
years of the war. In his monograph El Hombre Fósil (1916), he drew on his previ-
ous knowledge and digging experience in Central Europe and France to insert 
the prehistory of Spain into that of the Continent.34 Even if his relations with 
Hernández-Pacheco deteriorated to the point that he quit the CIPP, by the end 
of the First World War, Obermaier had developed close ties with aristocratic pa-
trons and members of the Spanish intelligentsia, particularly those who admired 
the achievements of German science. Finally, in 1922 he was given the first chair 
of prehistory in Spain at the University of Madrid.
His designation was not achieved without resistance, notably by Hernán-
dez-Pacheco, who held a chair in the Faculty of Sciences and impeded the crea-
tion of a new position in this faculty. Thanks to the support of Elías Tormo, 
dean of the Humanities Faculty, Obermaier’s chair was established in the latter 
under the name ‘Primitive History of Man’ (Historia Primitiva del Hombre). 
This confirmed the disciplinary shift of prehistory from natural sciences to 
humanities that the study of cave art, among other factors, had fostered. Ober-
maier acquired Spanish citizenship in 1926, and became the authority on the 
Peninsula’s Stone Age at home and abroad until 1936, when the Spanish Civil 
War again forced him into exile. After 1922 cave art became an important sub-
ject in his career and he conducted research on Altamira at a time when deco-
rated caves started to become, not just national monuments, but also touristic 
attraction.35
A poster from Barcelona’s 1929 Universal Exhibition gives a graphic synthesis 
of the process of configuration of ‘Spanish national art’, while also paying tribute 
to the host city [Fig. 9]: the composition is made up of a bison from Altamira, 
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Fig. 9: Francesc d’Assís Galí i Fabra, printed poster for the International Exhibition of 
Barcelona(Exposición internacional de Barcelona), Barcelona, May 1929-January 1930
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a Romanesque sculpture of Christ on the Cross of Catalan provenance and the 
imperial city of Toledo in the background. In it, the primitive art of prehistory 
and the ‘primitive’ art of medieval times are brought together to illustrate the 
cultural origins of modern Spain. Prehistoric artifacts and artworks figured in 
the exhibition titled España Primitiva, which was one of the sections of the larger 
exhibition El Arte en España on display at the National Palace, the symbolic core 
of the event. If the main exhibition was curated by Gómez Moreno, the so-called 
‘Primitive section’ was curated by Pere Bosch Gimpera (1891-1974), leading Cata-
lan archeologist of his time, who defined the objects exposed there as ‘the first 
foundation of the Spanish civilization, in which are to be found the roots of many 
of the phenomena that later on made up the cultural values that Spain has created 
for the world’.36
 Conclusion
The making of prehistoric archeology in Europe in the nineteenth and the twenti-
eth centuries resulted from a complex interplay of scientific, social and economic 
interests, and was inspired by both academic internationalism and the constraints 
of the nation-state building process. For this reason, the alleged ‘scientific coloni-
alism’ performed by European scholars in Spain appears as a narrative construct 
of those Spanish prehistorians who strove to consolidate their field by means of 
legal regulations, institutions and the conversion of archeological artifacts and 
sites into national heritage. Furthermore, those scholars, in alliance with leading 
art historians, transformed prehistoric cave art into a mighty element for national 
definition; in doing so, they contributed to a historiography that praised Spain’s 
painting tradition as one of its most relevant contributions to Western civiliza-
tion, which compensated for what was perceived of as a less decisive achievement 
in scientific terms.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, a time when the rhetoric of 
the ‘discovery’ invaded cultural and political language, the ‘invention’ of paint-
ing by the primitive men of prehistory, the discovery of the Americas by the 
Castilians at the end of the medieval period or the discovery of prehistoric 
art by Spanish researchers in the nineteenth centuries, were all historical pro-
cesses interpreted as elements in the same essentialist national history based 
on the achievements of talented individuals, a narrative that was to provide a 
source of pride and an example for the regeneration of the country by the new 
generations.
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7.1 Between Sciences and Humanities
Aesthetics and the Eighteenth-Century ‘Science of Man’
Maria SeMi
 Introduction
The sciences and the humanities have a long tradition of cultural crossings and 
reciprocal influences; this interwoven history, however, has been first somehow 
minimized and downplayed during the nineteenth century, and then simply 
slipped into a far corner of our memories – feeding on contemporary hyperspe-
cialization and high disciplinary boundaries – until recent scholarly work evi-
denced how our narrow contemporary perspective was compromising a thorough 
understanding of the modern era. Positivism and the professionalization of aca-
demic disciplines brought about a very critical attitude toward the intellectual 
syncretism of the foregoing centuries. This had several consequences as, as well 
described by Richard Olson,
nineteenth-century practitioners of the human and social sciences virtually 
stopped reading and giving serious consideration to their eighteenth-cen-
tury predecessors, taking literally the Comtian notion that knowledge of 
the human interactions in society attained the status of positive knowledge 
only in the nineteenth century. In this perception, they were cutting them-
selves off from their roots in a way that has persisted into the late twentieth 
century.1
One of the many topics that surely suffered much from this historical denial and 
repression is the eighteenth-century notion of a ‘science of man’ (sic), a project 
which aimed at a global view and interpretation of man, considered as a sensible 
being.2 The topic I wish here to tackle is how aesthetic questions raised by the 
new ‘science of man’ studies of the eighteenth century were used both from a 
scientific and a humanistic perspective to enrich the reasoning on mankind. In 
this article I wish to show in particular, through the example of two eighteenth-
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century British authors, the significance that aesthetic issues held in the project 
of the science of man, and also show what rendered aesthetics – during the 
eighteenth century in Britain – an ideal bridge between the sciences and the 
humanities.
The change of man’s image between the seventeenth and the eighteenth cen-
tury ‘from homme machine to homme sensible’, following Moravia,3 and so the 
call into question of the iatromechanical model to describe man, brought about 
an interest for a scientific enquiry of sensibility and sensitivity. In this context 
sciences and humanities converged naturally, finding their focus on the same ob-
ject, mankind, and thus exchanging ideas, lexicon, and mutually enriching each 
other. ‘Aesthetics’ as such did not exist in eighteenth-century Britain. However, 
I will use this term by the same reasoning Gary Hatfield used for the term ‘psy-
chology’, which declined to our purpose would sound like this: if we agree that 
‘aesthetics’ may be defined as the science of perception, then we can consider the 
questions pertaining to this discipline as part of what the early modern period 
called ‘natural science’ or ‘natural philosophy’.4 Before the birth of the so-called 
cognitive sciences, much of the subject matter of aesthetics could be found in 
the realm of natural philosophy, where the interest in man’s intellectual pleas-
ures could find some basic and fundamental notions about the workings of that 
complex being which is man. Even if during the eighteenth century in Britain 
the word ‘aesthetics’ was not used, its subject matter was actively pursued in 
a way that was soon to be lost in the – eminently German – development of 
nineteenth-century aesthetics: ‘aesthetics’ was practiced in a way more consist-
ent with one of the definitions Alexander Baumgarten gave it: a ‘science of sensi-
tive cognition’ (cognitio sensitiva), which proved fully consistent with the British 
empiricist tradition. According to many important figures of that period (such 
as Hutcheson, Hume, Reid, Smith, Hartley, etc.) the interpretation of the artis-
tic principle of imitation, or the understanding of the pleasure mankind experi-
ences thanks to the works of art, passes through the examination of the mental 
faculties of man (the science of mind), but also of his body, as we will see in 
Hartley’s case and his theory of vibrations. Thus, the eighteenth century bears 
witness to a particularly fruitful interaction between natural philosophers and 
humanists in the field of the art appreciation: new understanding of the func-
tioning of the human mind (for example, the discovery by Locke of the principle 
of the association of ideas), and of the human body (the role played by nerves) 
was used to develop a new way of thinking about the arts, their perception, and 
how they affected man.
In the sketch I wish to outline here, perception finds itself in a specific posi-
tion: right at the crossroads between body and mind, it also represents a pos-
sible bridge between the sciences and the humanities, between the supposed 
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objectivity people usually associate with the word ‘science’, and the subjectivity 
of sensation. Between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, with the 
development of experimental science and of the philosophy of mind, perception 
gains a foreground status, as sensation is considered the cornerstone upon which 
we build our ideas, which we afterwards connect together through the principle 
of association. Philosophers (both ‘plain’, and natural philosophers) focus on the 
connection between what we perceive and what we think or believe; they are 
interested in the bodily and mental processes that govern thought. Thus analysis 
of the brain’s functioning becomes the starting point of theories as disparate as 
Adam Smith’s theory of moral sentiments, Hume’s theory of human belief, or 
David Hartley’s theory of intellectual pleasures. Aesthetics enters the scene at 
this point as during the period we are referring to the issue of ‘taste’ was much 
debated, and it often cropped up in contexts that we would nowadays find awk-
ward. It so happens, for example, that in an essay devoted to the constitution 
of man, such as Hartley’s, we find an extensive discussion on the intellectual 
pleasures of the imagination (elicited by appreciation of the Fine Arts). It also 
occurred that one could find in John Gregory’s A Comparative View of the State 
and Faculties of Man, with Those of the Animal World (1765) a chapter on ‘the 
foundation of taste in music’, or that the arts were discussed in an aesthetic 
context ‘as they affect the mind’, as witnessed by the title of James Beattie’s essay 
‘On Poetry and Music, as They Affect the Mind’ (1776). These are just a few ex-
amples which I bring here in order to emphasis that in a century, the eighteenth, 
which sought to develop a theory of man, humanities and sciences could (and 
had to) communicate at large, because the study of man as a whole needed both 
perspectives. Besides, even today the studies on perception show that human 
perception is always the result of both a quantitative and objective stimulus, 
which can be scientifically described (e.g., for the perception of sound, we can 
talk about the sound waves in terms of frequency, amplitude, etc.), and our men-
tal elaboration of the stimulus, which communicates a different sensation to 
each and every man.
 Two examples: Hartley’s and Darwin’s theories of  
pleasure given by the arts
David Hartley (1705-1757) was educated at Jesus College (Cambridge) where he 
studied medicine. His principal work is Observations on Man, His Frame, His 
Duty, and His Expectations, published in 1749, where he expounds his theory of 
vibrations and associations. As effectively resumed by Barbara Bowen Oberg:
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Hartley conceived of vibrations as movements backwards and forwards of the 
infinitesimally small particles, first of the nerves and then of the brain. Their 
movements were initiated by the impression of external objects upon any of 
the five senses. Excited and supported by the ether, these vibrations seemed 
at times for Hartley to become identical with pure sensation. And the nerves, 
spinal marrow, and medullary substance of the brain served as the instru-
ments of sensation. Hartley alternated between the detailed inquiry of the 
neurologist puzzling out the working of the brain and the nervous system, 
and the task of a more traditional British empiricist philosopher tracing the 
progress from sensation to idea. Vibrations, the physical movement, and as-
sociation, the mental phenomenon, were both important to him.5
Now, this treatise devoted to the topic of the progress from sensation to idea 
and to the explanation of the voluntary and involuntary movements of our body 
in terms of vibrations and nerves impulses, not only leads to a discussion on the 
‘Six classes of intellectual pleasure and pain’, but was in fact occasioned by the 
desire to explain the idea that ‘it was possible to deduce all intellectual pleasures 
and pains from association principles’,6 an idea that Hartley derived from the dis-
sertation of Reverend Gay of Sidney Sussex College, Concerning the Fundamental 
Principle of Virtue or Morality (1730). In his treatise, Hartley includes a chapter 
on ‘The Pleasures and Pain of Imagination’, which is further divided into ‘The 
Beauties of the Works of Art’, ‘The Pleasures Arising from Music, Painting, and 
Poetry’, ‘The Pleasures Arising from the Study of the Sciences’, ‘Wit and Hu-
mour’, etc. Hartley is interested in demonstrating how intellectual pleasures and 
pains are generated by way of association: a mechanism which has the peculiarity 
of being used by each and every man, but with different results. Speaking of as-
sociation, Hartley writes that:
The influence of association over our ideas, opinions, and affections, is so 
great and obvious, as scarcely to have escaped the notice of any writer who 
has treated of these, though the word association, in the particular sense 
here affixed to it, was first brought into use by Mr. Locke. But all that has 
been delivered by the Ancients and the Moderns, concerning the power of 
habit, custom, example, education, authority, party-prejudice, the manner 
of learning the manual and liberal arts, etc. goes upon this doctrine as its 
foundation.7
The influence of the associationists’ theories on the topic of taste in eighteenth-
century Britain is a matter that is impossible to overestimate: Francis Hutcheson, 
Edmund Burke, Lord Kames, Hogarth, Alexander Gerard, and Archibald Alison 
383Between Sciences and Humanities: Aesthetics
all wrote treatises in which the theory of association was used, albeit differently, 
to discuss taste. This theory was always combined with theories of sensation and 
perception, as it was in the end the association elicited by perception which gave 
birth to pleasurable and painful ideas. Of these, every form of intellectual pleas-
ure was to be examined, or, as it was often called, every form of ‘pleasure of the 
imagination’.8 What is at work here is in fact an example of a fruitful communi-
cation of knowledge. Men of letters such as Kames and artists such as Hogarth 
read philosophical and medical treatises, in order to find material that was useful 
to their own considerations. Association, for example, provided one of the best 
means to develop theories that would respond to the challenge of the multiplicity 
of individual tastes, without obliging theorists to renounce the existence of some-
thing as a ‘standard of taste’. There may in fact be a sort of objectivity in matters 
of taste, granted by factors such as unity and variety, symmetry, or the perception 
of quantitative relations. But the influence of experience and thus the diversity 
of associations, which these same objective factors generate in the human mind, 
could easily explain why it is so difficult to agree upon matters of taste. But the 
usefulness of this communication can also be seen the other way round, as mat-
ters pertaining to aesthetics gave topics and real ‘case studies’ to men of science, 
guiding their research through the questions they raised. This can be seen, for 
example, in those medical treatises which took interest in awkward ‘musical phe-
nomena’ like the cure of the tarantula bite, or in all the medical uses of music 
which we nowadays call ‘music therapy’.
The second example I wish to bring comes from a very well known book of the 
late eighteenth century: Erasmus Darwin’s Zoonomia (1794-1796). In the preface 
to the book Darwin states his intentions, and explains that his aim is to describe 
animal life by an analytical method in order to give birth to a theory founded on 
nature that would display the laws of organic life. This theory, according to Dar-
win, would – among many other advantages – be useful to men in the perspective 
of the ‘knowledge of themselves’9: medical and moral interest are here bound. But 
what has Darwin’s classification of the classes of motion to do with aesthetics? 
The answer lies in a section of Darwin’s work, the 22nd, entitled: ‘Of Propensity 
to Motion, Repetition and Imitation’ [Fig. 10].
Darwin gives in this part of his work his interpretation of the pleasure which 
we receive from music in relation to time, repetition and a melodious succession 
of notes. He connects the analysis of these phenomena to the principles at the 
core of his theory of animal causation. The repetition of some stimulus at uni-
form intervals of time is agreeably perceived by our body ‘because the sensorial 
power of association [...] is combined with the sensorial power of irritation10; 
that is, in common language, the acquired habit assists the power of the stimulus’, 
thus:
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Fig. 10: Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia; or, The Laws of Organic Life (London, 1794)
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To the facility and distinctness, with which we hear sounds at repeated 
intervals, we owe the pleasure, which we receive from musical time, and 
from poetic time. [...] There is no variety of notes referable to the gamut in 
the beating of the drum, yet if it be performed in musical time, it is agree-
able to our ears; and therefore this pleasurable sensation must be owing to 
the repetition of the divisions of the sounds at certain intervals of time, or 
musical bars. Whether these times or bars are distinguished by a pause, or 
by an emphasis, or accent, certain it is, that this distinction is perpetually 
repeated; otherwise the ear could not determine instantly, whether the suc-
cessions of sound were in common or in triple time.11
The four classes of motion belonging to life identified by Darwin (irritative, sensi-
tive, voluntary, associate) and object of his treatise are used to explain why our body 
responds to music and rhythm in a way – similar to the one developed by Hartley 
– that considers both physical stimuli (irritation of fibers) and mental associations:
[B]esides these little circles of musical time, there are the greater returning 
periods, and the still more distant choruses, which, like the rimes at the ends 
of verses, owe their beauty to repetition; that is, to the facility and distinct-
ness with which we perceive sounds, which we expect to perceive, or have 
perceived before; or in the language of this work, to the greater ease and 
energy with which our organ is excited by the combined sensorial powers 
of association and irritation, than by the latter singly. A certain uniformity 
or repetition of parts enters the very composition of harmony. Thus two oc-
taves nearest to each other in the scale commence their vibrations together 
after every second vibration of the higher one. And where the first, third, 
and fifth compose a chord the vibrations concur or coincide frequently, 
though less to than in the two octaves. It is probable that these chords 
bear some analogy to a mixture of three alternate colours in the sun’s 
spectrum separated by a prism. The pleasure we receive from a melodi-
ous succession of notes referable to the gamut is derived from another 
source, viz. to the pandiculation or counteraction of antagonist fibres. [...] 
If to these be added our early associations of agreeable ideas with certain 
proportions of sound, I suppose, from these three sources springs all the 
delight of music, so celebrated by ancient authors, and so enthusiastically 
cultivated at present.12
So we have a purely physical pleasure, in the case of harmony’s perception, which 
is dependent on the coincidence of vibrations, caused by the principle of irritation; 
a pleasure given by rhythm, due to the pleasure we derive from repetition; and fi-
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nally the power of association grants us the third kind of pleasure, where our early 
musical experiences melt together with new ones, influencing their perception.
As we have seen these scientific discourses touch some particular fields related 
to the humanities, and especially the field of aesthetics – intended as the study 
of perception and particularly the perception related to arts – together with oth-
ers I have not here dealt with (first of all morals). This communication between 
sciences and humanities, which is not a characteristic of the eighteenth century 
alone, gains in the British context a particular significance as it partakes in the 
project of a ‘science of man’ and brings about a new way of looking at mankind 
and its history. The eighteenth century sees ‘the first explicit inclusion of hu-
mans in a comprehensive classification of natural organisms’13 – which appeared 
in Linneus’s Systema Naturae sive Regna Tria (1735) – in the same century Lord 
Monboddo looks at orangutans as specimens of precivilized men, ‘living experi-
ments’ such as accounts of wild children were used to develop a historical account 
of human nature developed in a series of stages: thus physical, anthropological, 
linguistic enquiries all contribute to the forging of a conjectural history and an 
actual ‘theory’ of mankind.
It must be said that, although I have drawn all my examples from scientific 
works, the fruitful communication between sciences and humanities can also be 
seen the other way round. That is: not only did the arts foster the sciences with 
many an interesting question and case study, but the sciences themselves gave 
back to the arts words, ideas, theories. One of the primary ideas related to sci-
ence, the idea of the ‘experiment’, and the lexicon of sciences are to be found in 
eighteenth-century literature and painting: let’s just think about Joseph Wright 
of Derby’s An Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump, or A Philosopher Giving 
a Lecture on the Orrery in Which a Lamp Is Put in Place of the Sun, where the 
painter depicts a man of science explaining and demonstrating physical or as-
tronomical theories, Swift’s many descriptions of the functions of the brain as, 
for example, when in Gulliver’s Travels (chap. 6) he describes a new system of 
government which should intervene when ‘Parties in a State are violent’ and that 
evoke an operation to be performed on a damaged brain,14 or again, many of the 
exhilarating scenes in Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, as, for example, when he tries to 
explain Uncle Toby’s confused reasoning by means of Locke’s theories [Fig. 11]. 
Further examples of this use of scientific or philosophical language or theories in 
the domain of art can also be found in the poetical works of Wordsworth, which 
have been read this way by Noel Jackson in his interesting Science and Sensation 
in Romantic Poetry,15 and also in musical treatises and histories, as I have tried to 
show in a former work.16
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 Conclusion
These examples should give our theme a lot of topics for consideration. I will 
here conclude by singling out just two of them. First of all: the inquiry on man-
kind needed and still needs the perspective of humanists and scientists alike. 
The history of aesthetics, intended primarily in this context as the science of 
perception, furnishes many good examples of this need, and of the fruitful out-
comes of this collaboration. When we deal with topics as ‘taste’, the beautiful or 
the sublime ( just to name some of the most discussed topics of the eighteenth 
century), we speak both of external objects of appreciation, and of the feeling 
excited by these objects (works of art, natural scenes, etc.). This means we need 
to examine, study and describe the external objects as well as to examine, study 
and describe our feelings, and then try to understand how these two are con-
nected. As man is made up of flesh, bones and mind, in order to understand the 
phenomena in which he is involved, we need – as was done in the eighteenth 
century, but obviously with research tools adapted to the twenty-first century 
– to consider all these aspects together. From this point of view, the eighteenth-
Fig. 11. Joseph Wright of Derby, An Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump, 1768, oil on canvas, 
183 x 244 cm, National Gallery, London
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century attempt to establish a ‘science of man’ can be considered a very ambi-
tious project.
In the last decades many important researchers have devoted themselves to 
the study of the ‘science of man’17 and brought back to life a whole world, whose 
light is appealing to us precisely because of its syncretism and capability to pursue 
some great humanistic ideals, which our actual environment does not seem able 
to think any longer, let alone to pursue actively. Much of this rediscovery of the 
project of a ‘science of man’ is due to a debate occasioned by Michel Foucault and 
by his well-known – and much discussed – work The Order of Things.18 In the 
final part of this work Foucault states that:
no philosophy, no political or moral option, no empirical science of any 
kind, no observation of the human body, no analysis of sensation, imagina-
tion, or the passions had ever encountered in the seventeenth or eighteenth 
century, anything like man; for man did not exist (any more than life, or 
language, or labour); and the human sciences did not appear when, as a 
result of some pressing rationalism, some unresolved scientific problem, 
some practical concern, it was decided to include man (willy-nilly, and with 
a greater or lesser degree of success) among the objects of science – among 
which it has perhaps not been proved even yet that it is absolutely pos-
sible to class him; they appeared when man constituted himself in Western 
culture as both that which must be conceived of and that which is to be 
known.19
The perspective promoted by the French philosopher was questioned by many 
scholars, among whom the figure of Jürgen Habermas stands out prominently, 
with his critique of Foucault’s thought in his The Philosophical Discourse of Mo-
dernity.20 The secondary literature I here refer to in the footnotes contributes 
to the questioning of Foucault’s interpretation of the eighteenth century by 
giving detailed analysis of how natural history, the study of language, medicine, 
conjectural history, the science of mind all converged into a project of a ‘science 
of man’. My contribution, however modestly, inserts itself in this context, and 
I hope to have shown that the two crossed questions proposed to us by the 
organizers of the series of conferences on the ‘ The Making of the Humani-
ties’ – i.e., what can we say about the ‘making of the humanities’, and how, in 
this context, should we examine the relationship between the ‘sciences’ and the 
‘humanities’ – find an interesting case study precisely in the ‘science of man’ of 
the eighteenth century.
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7.2 Melting Musics, Fusing Sounds
Stumpf, Hornbostel, and Comparative Musicology 
in Berlin
Riccardo MarTinelli
 Naturalism and musical otherness
Observations on the peculiarities that distinguish the music of various popula-
tions always raised the interest of philosophers and musicians. Ancient Greeks 
used to assign ethnic names such as Doric, Phrygian, Lydian, etc., to their differ-
ent scales, but curiosity as to the variety of the exotic musical systems remarkably 
increased in the modern age. Geographic discoveries face the Europeans with 
puzzling forms of musical otherness, and some attention begins to be paid to 
the repertory of the domestic barbarians living in the countryside of cultivated 
Europe.1 Yet, it is only by the beginning of the twentieth century that a systematic 
discipline with genuine scientific ambitions eventually begins its process of insti-
tutional recognition under the name of comparative musicology.2
A major role in this process is played by Carl Stumpf and his pupil Erich 
Moritz von Hornbostel, who initiated the so-called Berlin School of vergleichende 
Musikwissenschaft [Fig. 12].3 As they clearly recognized, technological progress has 
an important part in this development. Until then, the study of exotic music had 
relied upon the haphazard and amateurish transcriptions into the Western no-
tational system made by missionary fathers or musically educated travelers. The 
possibility of recording music on Edison phonographic cylinders permanently 
changed this state of affairs.4 Primitive as they may appear today, phonographic 
recordings allow preservation, promote objectivity and provide a general idea of 
timbre and other performative characteristics of the recorded items.
Yet, intellectual factors must be also considered in the development of com-
parative musicology. As I shall argue, Stumpf ’s attitude toward the phenomena 
of music perception are among them. With his theory of ‘tonal fusion’, Stumpf 
demonstrates an anti-naturalistic and yet scientifically minded attitude, which he 
consciously opposes to Hermann Helmholtz’s physiological explanation of the 
true foundations of music. In my view, Stumpf ’s rejection of Helmholtz’s natural-
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ism explains and justifies his interest toward extra-European and folk music as 
legitimate and autonomous objects of scientific study.
A short definition of what ‘naturalism’ means in this context is now appropri-
ate. Naturalism is probably the mainstream in the history of philosophy of music, 
from the Pythagoreans to Zarlino, Rameau, Euler, Helmholtz and many others. 
Despite obvious differences, these thinkers share the general view that a convinc-
ing explanation of music should insist on the nature of sound, its mathematical 
or physical properties, whose structures are somehow reflected into musical facts 
by virtue – at least for modern naturalists – of the physiological structure of the 
ear. Helmholtz himself stresses the continuity between Pythagoras’  ‘enigma’, as he 
says, and with Rameau, d’Alembert and Tartini, and his own solutions.5
Although this definition of naturalism may appear rather loose and generic, 
it will serve its relatively modest present scope. It should be noted, in fact, that 
naturalism allows and sometimes suggests an objective criterion for the classifica-
tion of musical systems. In other terms, a frequent corollary (sometimes explicit, 
sometimes not) of naturalism is that Western tonal music satisfies the require-
ments of a ‘perfect’ musical system much better than any other form of music. 
This does not necessarily mean that naturalists ignore, dismiss or despise other 
forms of music. They aren’t necessarily more Eurocentric than their adversaries 
Fig. 12. Georg Schünemann and Carl Stumpf Recording Tatar Singers, 1916, photo, The Sound Archive 
of Humboldt University, Berlin (HZK Bilddokument ID8249, 
Sammlungszugehörigkeit Lautarchiv, Inventar-Nr. Sign. Pn. 1003/5)
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or the average of their times. Helmholtz, who has a good knowledge of exotic 
musical systems, insists that the path toward perfect intonation has still to be ac-
complished even within Western tonal music.6 But naturalists sometimes incline 
to underestimate the differences among musical systems, perhaps in the ecumeni-
cal attempt of including all forms of music within their paradigm. Jean-Philippe 
Rameau, for instance, is deeply convinced that every people of the world actually 
uses tonal triads, at least in a melodic disposition, and that the savages sing using 
our same intervals or, as he says, ‘aussi juste que nous’.7 In his time, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau had been able to distinguish the differences between musical systems 
with more precision; in Helmholtz’s time, it was Stumpf who recognized them 
most clearly and felt the need for an independent science devoted to that subject.
 The Berlin School
Stumpf ’s anti-naturalistic philosophical assumptions, then, have had a strong 
influence upon the origins of comparative musicology in Berlin. This link has 
been often neglected in literature, and surely not by accident. For opposite rea-
sons, both musicologists and historians of philosophy often pay little attention 
to these marginal areas. The more so in the case of Stumpf, whose work is still 
nowadays relatively underestimated.8 Let us begin with a brief sketch of his life 
and work. Born in 1848, young Carl Stumpf plans to devote himself half-pro-
fessionally to music until he meets Franz Brentano, whose impressive intellec-
tual figure leads him to philosophy. Stumpf later studies with Hermann Lotze 
in Göttingen, where he also attends Wilhelm Weber’s lessons on physics. In 1873 
Stumpf begins his academic career: he is appointed professor in Würzburg, then 
in Prague, Halle, Munich and finally in Berlin, where he resides from 1894 until 
his death in 1936. Erkenntnislehre, his two-volume work published posthumously, 
demonstrates that Stumpf, who retired in the 1920s, remained an active thinker 
and writer until the last days of his long life.9
Although Stumpf follows Brentano’s phenomenological (more precisely: de-
scriptive) program in psychology, he also diverges from him in many aspects. 
Most notably, he has a deeper commitment in experimentation and in empirical 
science. Stumpf devotes a considerable amount of his time in the investigation 
of sound perception. He publishes his results in 1883 and in 1890 in two volumes 
entitled Tonpsychologie (Psychology of Sound).10 In Berlin, as a teacher and head 
of the Institute for Psychology, Stumpf has an important part in the birth of 
Gestalt psychology. Actually, the theories of Wertheimer, Koffka, and Köhler 
diverge from many of Stumpf ’s ideas; yet, his attitude toward phenomenological 
observation and experimental activity undoubtedly influences the Gestaltists’ 
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scientific program.11 Stumpf didn’t aim at establishing an orthodoxy. Perhaps 
for this reason, the Berlin group (also including Kurt Lewin and, for a while, 
Robert Musil) respected him deeply, as manifested by the celebratory issue of 
the journal Psychologische Forschung on his 75th anniversary.12 Had not the Nazis 
dispersed the human and scientific heritage of the Berlin School, Stumpf ’s pio-
neering work in many fields of research would have been more widely remem-
bered and recognized.
As far as ethnomusicology (as one would currently say) is concerned, Stumpf 
begins his career in Halle in 1885 with a study on the songs of a North American 
Indian tribe.13 At that time Stumpf doesn’t have a phonograph yet: his first re-
cording occurs in Berlin, in 1900.14 In the same year, Stumpf sets up the Phono-
graphic Archive (Phonogramm-Archiv), a collection of Edison cylinders whose 
direction is taken up by Hornbostel from 1905 to 1933. A Phonographic Ar-
chive aiming at recording both musical and spoken linguistic items had already 
been established in Vienna in 1899. Yet the Berlin collection, focused on music, 
became the largest and most important in the world from this point of view. 
Stumpf and Hornbostel prompted their Berlin colleagues involved in expedi-
tions to record music and songs of the visited countries. During the First World 
War, Stumpf could record songs of war prisoners from all over the world; a pro-
gram of exchanges with Franz Boas also enriched the archive with many more 
cylinders and later also gramophone recordings.15
 Mixed sensations: Stumpf on tonal fusion
In which sense, then, did Stumpf ’s philosophical stance influence and foster his 
interest toward exotic and folk music? Let us first consider Stumpf ’s key con-
cept of ‘tonal fusion’ (Tonverschmelzung) as illustrated in the second volume of his 
Tonpsychologie. According to Stumpf, the basis of consonance lies in a tendency 
of the perceived tones to ‘fuse together’. The more two given tones do so, the 
more they are perceived as consonant. Musical consonance is then the surface of 
a deeper psychological phenomenon, i.e., fusion. The definition given by Stumpf 
is the following:
Fusion is that relationship of two sense-perceived elements in which they 
form not a mere sum but rather a whole. The result of this relationship is 
that with greater levels of fusion the overall impression, under otherwise 
identical circumstances, approaches closer and closer to the one of a single 
perception, and becomes increasingly difficult to break down.16
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As Wolfgang Köhler later recognized, Stumpf ’s speaking of the ‘whole’ in this 
passage represents a step forward in the direction of Gestalt theory.17 More signif-
icantly, however, Stumpf ’s ideas must be read in the light of ancient philosophical 
theories and their nineteenth-century developments. In the treatise concerning 
sensation in the Parva naturalia, Aristotle notes that mixed sensations, if com-
pared with pure ones, are less easily perceived. This happens, for instance, in 
the case of wine or honey, but also for colors and sounds.18 In Stumpf ’s times, 
these ideas of Aristotle’s had been experimentally confirmed by the physiologist 
Ernst Heinrich Weber, to whom Stumpf had been introduced by his brother 
Wilhelm Weber, who was his teacher in physics.19 In a famous series of experi-
ences concerning the sense of touch, which later also inspired Gustav Theodor 
Fechner’s psychophysics, Ernst H. Weber had demonstrated that weighing two 
given bodies successively, with the same hand, improves our ability to discern 
the differences. By contrast, the simultaneous evaluation with both hands easily 
misleads us. In this case, Weber argues, the two sensations tend to ‘mix’ and then 
to confound the subject.20
Stumpf, who explicitly quotes Ernst H. Weber,21 does little more than apply-
ing this well-tested model to tonal perception. The two simultaneous sensations 
of tone (Tonempfundungen) mix and thus mislead the subject, who believes he 
is hearing one single tone. Thus, this error is the key to the whole phenomenon. 
According to Stumpf, systematic errors are of utmost importance in psychology, 
since they show how the perceptual system actually works.22 Stumpf experimen-
tally determines five degrees of tonal fusion: the octave, the fifth, the fourth, the 
thirds and sixths (major and minor) and all the remaining intervals.23 However, 
we don’t need to provide further details here. Despite being harshly criticized,24 
Stumpf ’s idea of tonal fusion seems to still be attractive to psychologists and 
musicologists.25
It is remarkable that Stumpf consciously conceived tonal fusion as an alterna-
tive to the prevailing naturalistic approach of Hermann Helmholtz. In his Lehre 
von den Tonempfindungen (1863), Helmholtz offers an innovative and convinc-
ing explanation of musical perception. He shows that a complete set of fibers 
of different lengths that are located in the inner ear correspond to each audio 
frequency.26 Helmholtz draws on the classical comparison between the inner ear 
apparatus and a piano, whose strings are set free to resonate. Consonance thus 
originates from the physical and mathematical affinity of sounds. Many scholars, 
including, most notably, Ernst Mach, found this explanation partially inadequate: 
Helmholtz’s liberality in admitting single resonating fibers and the correspond-
ent specific nervous ‘energies’ seemed excessive.27 However, whereas Mach aims at 
correcting and ameliorating Helmholtz’s theory, with tonal fusion Stumpf offers 
a radical alternative to it, thus diverging from the mainstream of his time.28
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A remarkable consequence of Stumpf ’s researches is that music becomes pos-
sible through a sort of illusion, a failure of the perceptive system. Far from faith-
fully grasping the acoustic world by virtue of the analysis of sounds performed in 
the inner ear, music originates for Stumpf from a perpetual filter, which is perma-
nently imposed upon human hearing. Tonal fusion is the scientific measure of this 
inertial force. As previously noted, Weber had shown the way human sensibility 
works: on the basis of his experimental work, he could ascertain the appropriate 
function (curve) for each sensory field. Similarly, Stumpf ’s experiments on fu-
sion show the way human sensibility works whenever a multiplicity (Mehrheit) of 
simultaneous tones is involved.29 These aspects are capital to Stumpf ’s phenom-
enological approach, and help distinguishing it more clearly from naturalism.30 
Whereas in his opinion tonal fusion introduces a gap between sound as natural 
phenomenon and the perception of music, naturalists like Helmholtz tend to see 
a smooth transition from sound perception to the appreciation of music with its 
aesthetic content, suggesting that our ears provide us with a faithful picture of 
what is going on in the acoustic world. For Stumpf, by contrast, music becomes 
possible just because we (partly) fail to perceive the physical reality of acoustics 
as it is. As we all know, other forms of art, including cinema, are likewise based 
upon an illusion, a deception of the visual system which is unable to distinguish 
single frames in quick succession – as the Gestalt theorists knew very well. But 
music, with its sometimes almost inebriating effect, is perhaps more reminiscent 
of the Aristotelian example of a blended wine, whose mixing flavors would be ir-
remediably lost for a merely analytical sense of taste.
 Stumpf as ethnomusicologist
We have now a better overall view, enabling us to appreciate Stumpf ’s interest in 
exotic music and to interpret it correctly. As early as 1883, in the preface to the 
first volume of Tonpsychologie,31 Stumpf includes the ‘comparison of peoples and 
times’ among the auxiliary methods of general psychology, and observes that their 
integration succeeds particularly in psychology of music. Two years later, in 1885, 
in the above-mentioned study on North American Indians, Stumpf underlines 
the value of comparative research not only for the purposes of historical inves-
tigation, but also for those of psychology in general and for aesthetics.32 Con-
versely, Stumpf stresses the importance of music for anthropology: a common 
patrimony of music systems or songs can bear witness of the common origin of 
distant human groups. In September 1900, in Berlin, Stumpf studies and records 
a royal orchestra coming from Siam (Thailand). Stumpf provides a detailed and 
accurate report on musical instruments, their tuning, the performed music and 
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reports some experiences on some of the most gifted musicians’ musical ear. This 
allows him to confirm Alexander Ellis’s hypothesis that the musical scale adopted 
by Siamese musicians consists of seven equal intervals within an octave. Stumpf 
ends this exemplary essay with some methodological remarks. The utility of com-
pared musicology for ‘general ethnology and the history of humankind’ is surely 
out of question; yet, Stumpf insists, it also represents a fruitful task for the psy-
chologist or the aesthetics scholar who is ready to abandon the ‘parlor of scholars’ 
(Gelehrtenstube) and the method of self-observation, and wishes to ‘widen his 
horizon by means of an objective study of human thinking and feeling [Denkens 
und Fühlens] in other times and spaces’.33 The more so, Stumpf concludes, since 
these forms of music presently die off as a result of the Europeans’ cultural pres-
sure: it is time to collect and to preserve them. His foundation of the Archive in 
the same year serves precisely to this scientific scope.
In 1910, together with Hornbostel, Stumpf exposes his ideas and results to his 
colleagues at the Fourth Congress on Experimental Psychology of Innsbruck. He 
contrasts the old Herbartian introspective method with the open-mindedness 
of Theodor Waitz, a philosopher and psychologist who turned to ethnological 
research and wrote the monumental Anthropologie der Naturvölker.34 Psychology 
should open its doors to ethnological research and reconnect them with experi-
mentation: both disciplines will profit from this process. The ideal path from 
tonal fusion to ethnomusicology is justified within the frame of a clearly stated 
and frequently reaffirmed scientific program.35
 Hornbostel: Music and culture
Stumpf ’s younger friend and follower as director of the Archive, Erich Horn-
bostel, echoes these general ideas. Given his further achievements, he actually 
deserves Jaap Kunst’s definition of  ‘facile princeps among all those who have made 
of ethnomusicology the chosen subject of their study’.36 Whereas Stumpf is per-
manently engaged in many different undertakings and academic commitments, 
Hornbostel intensively and primarily attends to comparative musicology, partly 
in cooperation with Otto Abraham and Georg Schünemann. Together with Curt 
Sachs, he devoted much effort to the study, the collection and the classification of 
musical instruments.37 With his friend Max Wertheimer, who himself studies the 
music of the primitive Weddas of Ceylon, Hornbostel especially investigates the 
psychological problem of perceiving the sound direction.38
In an essay from 1910, Hornbostel underlines the close relation of musicology, 
ethnology and psychology.39 In analyzing the causes of the widespread intellec-
tual resistance against comparative methods, Hornbostel keenly observes that 
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many researchers are still convinced that music is everywhere a ‘natural universal 
language’ which deserves much more attention than any of its ‘dialects’. Moreover, 
many are convinced that the so-called ‘savages’ are not able to bring out anything 
but ‘noise and ugly uproar’, which one should reasonably compare to animal cries 
and not to our music. Hornbostel is then much more explicit than Stumpf in his 
criticism of naturalism and of its Eurocentric implications.
Also in his case, a robust set of theoretic assumptions forms the background 
of his interest in comparative musicology. Rather than adopting Stumpf ’s tonal 
fusion, Hornbostel eventually develops an original theory of auditory perception 
of his own. His theses and results have been often criticized by psychologists and 
musicologists. In any case, Hornbostel is much closer than Stumpf to the Ge-
staltists’ ideas. He pays special attention to two themes: the unity of senses and 
the holistic aspects of music perception:
What is essential in the sensuous-perceptible is not that which separates 
the senses from one another, but that which unites them: unites them 
among themselves, unites them with the entire (even with the non-sensu-
ous) experience in ourselves, and with all the external world that there is to 
be experienced.40
Even more decidedly than Stumpf, Hornbostel thus rejects naturalism and con-
ceives of music as cultural phenomenon. He also provides a gestalt-oriented in-
terpretation of cultural phenomena. In his view, sensible and intellectual gestalts 
form a net, whose knots are joined together in different manners or ‘styles’ within 
different cultures. The musicologist aiming at reconstructing and interpreting 
styles should consider each element – a melodic or harmonic construct, a rhyth-
mic figure, and so on – as a part in this net of interwoven ‘wholes’. Some elements 
come from the composer’s personality, some other from the historical and cul-
tural context he belongs to. Surely not by chance, in this 1930 essay Hornbostel 
adds some conclusions concerning melting cultures and races: ‘[T]he crossing of 
races originates new races; the fusing of cultures (Kulturverschmelzung) leads to 
new cultures. In both cases, new styles arise. This generates something totally 
new, not a “hybrid”’.41
Three years later, identified by the Nazis as a ‘half-Jew’ (Halbjude), Hornbostel 
was relieved of his post and had to leave Germany, sharing the destiny of many 
other members of the Berlin School. He first moved to Switzerland and to the 
United States, and eventually reached Cambridge where he died two years later, 
at the age of fifty-seven. Needless to say, Hornbostel’s interests and views were 
radically opposed to the plan to restore the supremacy of a purely German art 
over degenerate music. The Archive was transferred and went through difficult 
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times. After the postwar recovery of its material legacy of wax cylinders, it is 
time to reconsider the virtuous link of philosophical ideas and scientific practice 
which gave rise to that enterprise.
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7.3 The History of Musical Iconography and the 
Influence of Art History
Pictures as Sources and Interpreters of Musical History
Alexis Ruccius
 Introduction
Musical iconography is a prime example of a research field that emerged through 
the affiliation of two disciplines from the humanities. Over a period of 150 years, 
musicologists had already turned to art works in search of visual evidence to 
guide in the reconstruction of musical instruments and historical performance 
practices. Understood as being fundamentally representational in nature, pictures 
were used as reliable historical sources, by Julius Rühlmann or Hugo Leichten-
tritt, for example. In the twentieth century, under the influence of the Warburg 
School, this field of study expanded into an independent research field known as 
‘musical iconography’. Aiming at more that the mere reconstruction of historical 
instruments, the ideological content of musical representations now came into 
focus. Pictures were analyzed as artifacts capable of revealing insights into the 
history of ideas, for instance, a period’s understanding of music. With the intro-
duction of iconography and iconology into the discipline, the connection between 
musicology and art history became firmly established.1 The core methods of mu-
sical iconography derive both from musicology (musical theory and organology) 
and from art history (iconography and iconology). Musical iconography is hence 
founded upon an interdisciplinary relationship between these two humanities 
subjects.
This interrelation is emphasized by most definitions for ‘musical iconography’, 
the last part of which is composed of grapheín, the Greek term for ‘describing’, 
and eikón, meaning ‘picture’.2 In 1984, Reinhold Hammerstein (1910-2010) defined 
musical iconography as a field in which two disciplines merge: musicology and art 
history. In his words, it is a sector marked by the ‘relationship between the world 
of beholding and that of hearing in general’.3 In 1997, Tilmann Seebaß (1939- ), 
editor of the first journal of musical iconography, Imago Musicae, summed up the 
difficulties of the field as follows:
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Musical iconography requires both art-historical and musicological exper-
tise. Whoever doesn’t possess both will encounter analytical difficulties, be 
it because he misjudges the idiosyncrasies of the visual medium, or because 
he lacks the necessary organological, terminological, or socio-historical 
knowledge.4
Seebaß therefore concluded that one should follow the intrinsic clues of the art-
work by applying the methods and expertise of musicology and art history. Oth-
erwise, he warned, the artwork’s meaning could not be fully grasped.
At the time of its emergence, the eventual title of the research field, ‘musical 
iconography’, had not yet been coined. One of its later subsectors, the reconstruc-
tion of musical instruments and historical performance practices with the help 
of visual representations, in fact evolved within the research field of organol-
ogy. With the development of the term ‘Musikwissenschaft’ (musicology) and the 
establishment of the first professorships for music in 1826 in Germany, studies 
dealing with musical iconography became increasingly common in organology.5 
For instance, in Guido Adler’s classification of musicological subdisciplines of 
1885, they are listed in the historical block under the section ‘History of Musi-
cal Instruments’.6 The introduction of the composite term ‘musical iconography’ 
signalizes the gradual institutionalization of the subject. It was first used in 1922 
by William Barclay Squire in reference to a collection of musicians’ portraits.7 
In 1954, Albert G. Hess applied the term to a collection of pictures that was 
meant to function as an ‘important documentary source’ for performance prac-
tice and instrument reconstruction.8 Since 1971, the year in which the Répertoire 
international d’iconographie musicale was founded as the first institution devoted 
explicitly to musical iconography, the term has been more broadly defined to also 
include iconographical and iconological studies.9
 Establishment under the umbrella of organology:  
Pictures as sources
Julius Rühlmann (1816-1877) devoted himself to the reconstruction of bow in-
struments with the aim of reacquiring the musical knowledge of a period and per-
forming historical pieces in the original manner.10 In his posthumously published 
Geschichte der Bogeninstrumente (1882), he depicted bows and bridges of string 
instruments, which he had copied from historical manuscripts, prints, and paint-
ings. For example, he virtually took the bow of a fiddling angel from Raphael’s 
Coronation of the Virgin (1502-1504) out of its hand in order to use it as a histori-
cal source in his book, where he depicted it in isolation from its original context 
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[Fig. 13]. Rühlmann concentrated his efforts strictly on the form and its devel-
opment. ‘In the second period, we observe that the strongly arched shape of the 
stick has been maintained, but already shows signs of a frog and a head. The 
latter begins to develop from the other two forms in the fifteenth century’.11 By 
means of this extraction from visual sources, Rühlmann tried to gain insight into 
the construction of musical instruments in different centuries and to trace their 
formal development. In doing so, he interpreted pictures as blueprints for his 
reconstructions.
Taking an approach similar to Rühlmann’s, Hugo Leichtentritt (1874-1951) at-
tempted to reconstruct historical performance practices. In his article ‘Was leh-
ren uns die Bildwerke des 14.-17. Jahrhunderts über die Instrumentalmusik ihrer 
Zeit?’ (1906), he analyzed paintings, prints, and manuscripts. Leichtentritt lists 
a large number of artworks and comments on them. For instance, he describes 
the depiction of St. Cecilia on the Bartholomew Altar (around 1501-1503). With 
her right hand, she plays a portative, while she presses the bellow with her left 
to elicit a sound from the organ pipes [Fig. 14]. According to Leichtentritt, the 
painting proves the existence of a transitional period between the solo song per-
formances of the twelfth century and the accompanied songs of the seventeenth 
century.12 Leichtentritt interpreted the picture as a reliable historical source, just 
Fig. 14. Master of the Bartholomew Altar, 
Bartholomew Altar, c. 1500-1510, oil on oak, 
129 x 161 cm, Alte Pinakothek, Munich, Nr. 
11863 (central panel, detail with Saint Cecilia)
Fig. 13. From Julius Rühlmann, Geschichte der 
Bogeninstrumente (Braunschweig 1882), p. 144 
(detail)
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like  Rühlmann had done, using the artwork as a blueprint for a historical perfor-
mance practice.
However, in Rühlmann’s as well as in Leichtentritt’s publications, the strength 
of the image shimmers through. A double page in Rühlmann’s book shows bridg-
es of various string instruments [Fig. 15 below]. Rühlmann identified a series 
of stylistic periods and categorized the bridge shapes according to their alleged 
developmental stages. The climax of this evolution in form is Stradivari’s bridge 
[Fig. 15, lower right].
The final perfection is only achieved in a seventh period of the bridge, at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century [...]. [T]he high point, which could 
not be superseded, is [reached] with Ant. Stradivari [...]. The latter has 
hence remained the exemplary [style] and is still in use today.13
Rühlmann’s study of the different shapes of musical instruments was guided by 
the assumption that paintings, prints, and manuscripts depicted them natural-
istically. The musical instruments themselves he considered independent works 
of art belonging to certain styles. Rühlmann established a sequence that alleg-
edly revealed the evolutionary development of form and thereby historically con-
firmed the unique sound of a Stradivari. The instrument makers became artists 
designing instrument shapes. In Leichtentritt’s essay, a first iconographical ap-
proach appears rather incidentally. He surmises that the depictions of St. Cecilia 
result from a misinterpretation of the biblical text. Despite the sound of the roar-
ing organ, ‘she sang a song in her heart, a song to God’.14 Leichtentritt points to 
the possibility that the text was understood ‘as if she [St. Cecilia] [indeed] sang to 
the sound of the organ’.15 Thus Leichtentritt offered a first reading of the painting 
that transcended a mere reconstruction of performance practice and understood 
the painting itself as an interpreter.
 Iconography as the driving force of institutionalization: 
Pictures as interpreters
By integrating the iconographical and iconological method of the scholars in 
the circle around Aby Warburg (1866-1929), musical iconography began to 
develop into an independent discipline.16 Pictures were understood as inter-
preters. An analysis in this broader sense investigates the relationship between 
sound and image, conceived as an entity in the history of thought as related to 
music. Leo Schrade’s (1903-1964) Die Darstellung der Töne an den Kapitellen der 
Abteikirche zu Cluni (1929) must be considered a milestone in this regard. In the 
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Cluny Abby, two capitals show figurative representations of the church modes. 
According to Schrade, this was not only a way of visualizing the modes. He 
understood them as a symbol of the conception of music prevalent at the time 
of their origin. For this reason, he not only dealt intensively with musical theory 
but also with its forms of representation and their symbolic content. The sec-
ond mode, for example, is depicted as a female figure [Fig. 16]; she is playing the 
cymbals, while her body is leaning slightly to the left. Schrade claims that this 
is meant to represent the vexationes, which symbolize the melodia anfracta. Ac-
cording to contemporary musical theory, this would imply a melody in the sec-
ond church mode, which, as Guido of Arezzo noted, contains leaps (anfractis).17 
By applying his expertise in musical theory, Schrade convincingly interpreted 
the posture of the female figure as a figura anfracta. Schrade’s essay revealed 
the argumentative force of an analysis that unites musicological and art-histor-
ical methods. Receiving its impetus from iconography and iconology, his essay 
gave the impulse for other scholars, like Willibald Gurlitt (1938) or Reinhold 
Hammerstein (1959),18 which lead to the institutionalization of the research 
field in 1971 with the foundation of the Répertoire international d’iconographie 
musicale, and Imago Musicae, the first periodical dedicated  entirely to music 
 iconography.
Fig. 15. From Julius Rühlmann, Geschichte der Bogeninstrumente (Braunschweig, 1882), p. 138-139
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One of the first major music-iconographical works to be broadly received in 
art history, thus achieving a reflux of theory from musicology into art history, was 
Hammerstein’s 1974 book, Diabolus in musica.19 The climax of the book is his analy-
sis of the Musicians’ Hell by Hieronymus Bosch. The right wing of Bosch’s triptych 
The Garden of Earthly Delights (around 1500) shows a gigantic lute with six strings 
standing on a music book [Fig. 17]. A harp is stuck into the side of the lute and a 
naked man is hanging in its strings as if crucified. Another man is bound to the neck 
of the lute, with his hands on his back. Bosch enlarged the musical instruments to 
use them as instruments of torture. The motif of the Musicians’ Hell was commonly 
ascribed to Bosch’s imagination.20 Hammerstein, however, was able to relate the 
motifs to existing models and traditions, while he at the same time succeeded in 
accentuating Bosch’s personal reinterpretation. The harp, for instance, was at the 
time considered a heavenly instrument; by misappropriating the harp as an instru-
ment of torture, Bosch not only used contemporary musical concepts as a basis 
for his painting, but also introduced his own interpretation. According to Ham-
merstein, Bosch’s musical scenes are ‘accusations and part of a call for penitence in 
times of deep arousal and skepticism, expressions of a crumbling belief in any kind 
of prestabilized harmony of the world’.21 Hammerstein understood the picture as an 
independent entity and as an interpreter of the musical conceptions of a historical 
period. The
attempt to introduce the iconography of music [...] as an independent re-
search field into musicology [...] is motivated by the conviction that relevant 
evidence from the visual arts does not possess a mere accessory, adorning, 
and illustrative character for the music historian, but that, correctly un-
derstood, it conveys essential and novel facts with regard to music and the 
musical conceptions of a period.22
By this time, pictures had become established as idiosyncratic interpreters in the 
discipline of musicology, thanks to the advances made in musical iconography.
Today this field has continued to be a prolific part of the present discus-
sions, like the question about the exchange between cultures.23 The case history 
of musical iconography shows that, at the time when the humanities emerged, 
an exchange between two disciplines produced a new and independent field of 
study. The immanent strength of pictures was a main driving force behind the 
research field’s foundation. Musical iconography helped scholars to fruitfully 
analyze artifacts from a fresh perspective and with a broader horizon, allowing 
them to describe the pictures more exactly, contextualize them within a certain 
cultural sphere, and thus produce more substantiated interpretations by means 
of combining musicological expertise with an art-historical approach.
409The History of Musical Iconography
Fig. 17. Hieronymus Bosch, The Garden of 
Earthly Delights, c. 1500, oil on panel,  
220 x 389 cm, Museo del Prado, Madrid  
(right panel, detail)
Fig. 16. From Leo Schrade, Die Darstellung 
der Töne an den Kapitellen der Abteikirche zu 
Cluni (1929), Fig. 2b
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8.1 The Making of Oriental Studies
Its Transnational and Transatlantic Past1
STeffi Marung and KaTja NauMann
While some disciplines of the humanities struggle with a seemingly waning at-
tention, both within academia as well as at the interface with politics and society, 
the opposite is the case for the fields falling under the rubric of regional studies 
or Oriental studies. There are increasing efforts to come to terms with its past, 
including its intellectual shape, its institutional position, and its political baggage. 
Likewise, new visions of Oriental studies are drafted that better suit the needs 
of our time. Although much ink has been spilled over the challenges of the latter 
attempt, less has been done on the intellectual traditions. Still, there is a growing 
body of research that seeks to historicize the field.
Two predispositions, however, impede such efforts at providing historical con-
text. First, this research is as yet markedly West-centric; by and large the focus is 
on Germany, France, and Great Britain, as well as partly on the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, and Austria.2 Second, a nationalizing perspective dominates. Single histor-
ical developments often stand disconnected side by side. When shared patterns 
are highlighted, then this is being done without asking for common origins.3 Both 
tendencies originate from the period of profound nationalism in which modern 
academia with its disciplinary divisions was created. Throughout the twentieth 
century, both inclinations were fueled, particularly during and following the Cold 
War that some interpreted as the victory of the West with the vanishing of the 
Second World. The degree to which the current state of the art reproduces these 
earlier world orders is remarkable. Two serious flaws accompany the scholarship: 
a disregard that Oriental studies existed also outside of Western Europe and the 
United States, maybe even to a larger degree, and the failure to address the inter-
national dimension of the field.
Without doubt, the field of Oriental studies was established in the eighteenth 
century by a network of scholars from various countries who shared a cosmopoli-
tan outlook and were embedded in the international Republic of Letters. In the 
nineteenth century, mutual observation and exchange were promoted, which came 
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with the global competition that the various academic systems were engaged in. 
This global history, however, is much richer and reaches far beyond the nineteenth 
century. Concepts and organizational structures were also borrowed and appro-
priated later owing to the fact that the founding fathers and their successors lived 
transnational careers in a cross-boundary community of Orientalists. Colleagues 
abroad were known personally as their research projects served as mutual and con-
stant reference points. These contacts had sweeping effects. With the knowledge 
and methods of these traveling scholars, intercultural experience and sensitivity 
for cultural differences circulated among different expanses of academia.
We argue that an international dimension was a core feature of the discipline 
when it was created, which was not lost in the twentieth century. To illustrate 
this, we will sketch the landscapes in which Oriental studies scholars in the So-
viet Union and the US undertook their research, focusing on the period between 
the 1920s and 1960s and on the entanglements between both. With the juxta-
position of these cases, we want to question the strikingly similar judgment of 
both fields: Soviet Oriental studies are generally presented as isolated from in-
ternational trends while its US-American counterpart is also said to have been 
inward looking and parochial, stemming from vain self-interest. If one takes a 
closer look, however, one finds an astonishing history of interaction that mirrors 
the new global order after World War I, namely the rise of the US as a global 
power, the establishment of the Soviet Union as a competing model for social and 
political organization, and the incipient decolonization. Russian Oriental studies 
had been internationally leading, especially for scholars from the United States, 
up until the late 1910s. But even after the October Revolution and the Bolshevik 
reorganization of the higher education system, the discipline did not turn in-
wards. Its international scale changed in the patterns of its architecture without 
losing its significance. Soviet scholarship became important for others, for exam-
ple, scholars from East-Central Europe and from what came to be known as the 
Third World. US-American Oriental studies have a similarly surprising past. In 
fact they originated largely abroad, with ‘abroad’ meaning Russia and countries 
further east rather than Germany and France. We believe that recalling this trans-
atlantic or trans-Pacific history, in fact a global history, of Oriental scholarship is 
worthwhile as it helps to decentralize it and to contextualize its ‘Western’ variant.
 Soviet Orientalists
For a long time Soviet Oriental studies were treated marginally within Western re-
search agendas, although this is fortunately changing thanks to several recent excel-
lent studies on the topic.4 Still, they appear somewhat peculiarly in comparison to 
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its Western counterparts. This is due to Russia’s close entanglement with the ‘East’,5 
which did not necessarily represent its ‘other’6 but rather a part of its ‘self ’.7 This 
resulted early on in an intense commitment to Oriental studies, which pushed Rus-
sian Orientalists to criticize Western claims of superiority over the Orient and pos-
itively appreciate its contributions to Russian history. Furthermore, scholars from 
the ‘Orient’ were also integrated into the academic system. With Russia’s unique 
geopolitical location, the Orient reached from Northern and Eastern Africa to the 
Middle East, Central, Eastern, Southern and South East Asia, while the equivalent 
Western conception of the Orient centered on the Middle East.8
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Russian Oriental studies were 
in some respect avant-garde. Its disciplinary breadth included history, philology, 
geography, literature, religion and philosophy, a constellation quite innovative 
for nineteenth-century Oriental studies. However, the Russian Orientalists also 
remained firmly rooted in philology, as were their German and Austrian coun-
terparts. At the same time they systematically integrated other humanities dis-
ciplines into their approaches, in particular history, ethnology, cultural studies, 
and religious studies. Reflecting this setup, the St. Petersburg Faculty of Oriental 
Languages, founded in 1855, remained a unique academic institution until the 
beginning of the twentieth century – unrivaled, as thanks to its size and breadth 
it covered the whole ‘Orient’ from Islamic societies in Central Asia to Buddhist 
nations in East Asia.
A stronger interdisciplinary cooperation between the humanities and the so-
cial sciences was institutionally enforced in the early 1920s under new political 
conditions, for instance, when the St. Petersburg Faculty for Oriental Languages 
was reorganized in 1921 and, after it had to merge with the Department of His-
tory and Philology and the Department of Law, became a Section of Ethnol-
ogy and Linguistics in the Social Science Department.9 In this manner, what has 
been described as an academic innovation of area studies in the US after the 
Second World War, namely the inclusion of and subsequent focus on the social 
sciences, had been implemented in the Soviet Union two decades earlier, even 
though this was a project conducted by the political elites, not one driven by 
internal academic motives. Russian Orientalists who migrated to the US during 
the 1920s carried their experiences of such an interdisciplinary cooperation with 
them, thereby making an impact on developments in their host country. This 
often underestimated transfer will be examined more closely below, focusing on 
the example of Serge Elisséeff.
As a highly transnational endeavor from its early beginnings in the eighteenth 
century – with a considerable import of German scholars into the Russian acad-
emy system10 – Russian pre-Revolutionary Oriental studies remained closely en-
tangled with the Western academic community both through mutual study visits 
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as well as through a network of international academic organizations. Its excellent 
reputation was particularly epitomized by the Arabist Viktor Romanovič Rozen, 
dean of the St. Petersburg Faculty of Oriental Studies from 1893 to 1902, who re-
mained influential after 1917 like many of his colleagues and pupils, such as Vasilij 
Vladimirovič Bartol’d, Sergej Fedorovič Ol’denburg and Nikolaj Jakovlevič Marr.
The above-mentioned marginality of Russian Oriental studies may suggest 
that the October Revolution of 1917 erased these transnational and international 
networks, and led to the disappearance of its traditions behind the Iron Curtain. 
On the contrary we argue that Soviet scholars continued to be profoundly inter-
national, yet their preferences and strategies changed. A more relevant caesura 
with regard to the scholars’ outward orientation emerges in mid-1920s when Sta-
lin’s distrust against everything ‘foreign’ infected large sections of Soviet society.11 
To substantiate this claim, preliminary results of an investigation into patterns of 
transnational and international networks of Soviet Orientalists after 1917 will be 
presented. A quantitative analysis shall provide first observations, complemented 
with exemplary accounts and biographies.
For the quantitative analysis, the regularly updated biographical encyclopedias 
edited by Sofia Miliband were evaluated, the latest edition appearing in 2008.12 
These comprise approximately 3000 Soviet Orientalists, mainly those active after 
1917. Focus was placed on the generations that graduated in the decades up until 
1953, i.e., immediately after the October Revolution, during the Second World 
War and under Stalin’s regime. Of these a sample of two hundred persons was 
analyzed in more detail. The period after 1953 demanded separate attention as 
the domestic and global context changed dramatically – both in the production 
of knowledge about the world as well as in the contacts with it.13
The analysis (Table 1) reveals a clear tendency: 95% of the 200 scholars in 
focus had experiences abroad, as teachers, researchers and members of interna-
tional scientific organizations, or involved in activities outside academia as jour-
nalists, diplomats, or staff members of Soviet companies. The career paths rarely 
followed either the academic track or the ‘practice’ one; rather these two aspects 
were often intertwined. Most of the scholars went abroad after their studies, usu-
ally in Leningrad or Moscow, and mostly turned to the regions of their specializa-
tion. They went as scholars or consultants, collected information for the govern-
ment or helped building institutions in the higher education sector in Asia and 
Africa. The older pattern of going abroad for studies to England, France and 
Germany almost disappeared. Under these new circumstances basic education 
was achieved at home, while research and practical projects were developed after-
wards in the regions of specialization. Western European institutions no longer 
appeared as the source for gaining necessary expertise, although this pattern did 
not vanish completely.
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Table 1 Careers of Soviet Orientalists
Orientalists Number Percentage
graduating after 1917 with experience abroad 60 32%
thereof during their studies 3 5%
thereof after their studies 55 92%
thereof in the region of their specialization 42 70%
thereof outside the region of their specialization 20 33%
both within and without 10 17%
Total sample: 190
The new geography of these contacts was shaped by a clear preference for the 
‘Far East’ and South Asia, particularly for China and India [Fig. 18]. Second 
ranked the Middle East and Central Asia, reflecting the Soviet interest in its 
‘near abroad’. For diplomats as well as researchers, Turkey and Iran were the most 
frequent destinations.14
A certain continuity in the scholars’ international orientation can be traced; 
however, their stays abroad had been postponed to later stages in the academic 
career. Furthermore, the linkages with the areas of specialization were strength-
ened; international research and travel were no longer directed toward Western 
Europe but to the regions of academic interest. In this regard, the profound re-
shaping of society under Bolshevik rule was tangible. A more radical caesura in 
academic careers was nevertheless the Second World War in combination with 
the Stalinist purges of the late 1930s. While the generation born in the decades 
of the 1920s and graduating in the late 1940s/early 1950s represents more than 
50% in the investigated sample, those born in the first decade of the century and 
graduating in the second half of the 1920s/early 1930s account for only 15%, and 
the cohort born between 1910 and 1919, graduating in the mid- and early 1940s, 
amounts to just 7%.
Certainly the quantitative analysis can only provide a general impression of 
much more complex patterns, which have varied considerably for individual 
scholars. The cohort taken into account here reflects diverse backgrounds and 
career paths. The first Soviet Orientalists were manifold with regard to their 
temperaments and interests as they followed diverse paths into the discipline and 
conceived of their subject differently. This shall be illustrated with three exem-
plary figures, reflecting divergent career patterns, strategies of internationaliza-
tion and interaction with their region of expertise.
The Sinologist Vasilij Mikhailovich Alekseev15 embodies the passage from the 
czarist to the Soviet regime. Born in 1881, graduating in 1902 from the Faculty of 
Eastern Languages in St. Petersburg, he not only studied in England, France and 
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Germany, but since 1906 also in China for a three-year research trip. Specializing 
in Chinese literature, he promoted cooperation between historiography, philology, 
literature, and other disciplines to develop a nuanced concept of Chinese culture 
and society.16 This conception seemed to have been congruent with the views of the 
new political elite, which helped Alekseev pursue his career successfully as a pro-
fessor at the newly founded Faculty for Oriental Studies at Leningrad University 
from 1918 onward and a full member of the Academy of Sciences from 1929. Up 
until the mid-1920s he held lectures in France, England and China, and became a 
member of the American Academy for Political and Social Sciences in Philadel-
phia in 1923. During Stalin’s Great Purges, when some members of his research 
team were executed or deported, he went underground, restarting his career in 
the 1940s. Thus for him, the Stalinist purges as well as the subsequent campaign 
against ‘cosmopolitanism’ marked a more considerable caesura than 1917.17
While Alekseev, educated in czarist Russia, represented the old academic elite, 
Dmitrij Alekseevičh Ol’derogge was a part of an intermediate generation.18 Born 
in 1903 into a noble Russian family of German origin, he started a military career 
in his youth and was recruited into the Red Army after 1917. After the Civil War 
he completed ethnological and linguistic studies at Petrograd University in 1925. 
In 1926/1927 he was sent to Germany to study with the renowned German Ori-
entalist Diedrich Westerman, where he was commissioned to gather information 
about German ethnographic museums to improve the collections in Leningrad. 
As one of the first to teach African languages in the Soviet Union, he became 
Fig. 18. Soviet Orientalists Abroad
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the ‘patriarch’ of Soviet African studies. Since 1946 he held the chair of African 
studies at the Faculty of Oriental Studies at Leningrad University and enjoyed 
a venerable reputation not only in the Soviet Union – as a corresponding mem-
ber of the Soviet Academy of Sciences since 1960 – but also in the West. This 
was reflected in his memberships of international academic organizations, for 
example, in Great Britain, France, Poland, and the German Democratic Repub-
lic. Ol’derogge navigated the dangerous watersheds of the October Revolution 
as well as the Stalinist purges and his reputation transformed from a purported 
‘bourgeois’ into one of the founders of the new Soviet disciplines. The strength of 
his international networks east and west of the closing Iron Curtain made him a 
decisive mediator in the international academic community.
Ivan Izosimovičh Potekhin was the same age as Ol’derogge but born into a 
farmer’s family in Siberia.19 He joined the Communist Party in 1921 and was sent 
to Leningrad University in 1930 where he dedicated himself with Ol’derogge to 
African studies. He became a teacher at the Communist University of the Toilers 
of the East (KUTV) in 1932 where he got in close contact with anti-colonial Af-
rican elites. Since 1960, as the first director of the newly founded Africa Institute 
of the Academy of Sciences, he traveled frequently to African and Western coun-
tries, including the US, Italy, and the United Kingdom, promoting the academic 
agenda of Soviet African studies. Potekhin represents a generation that, on the 
one hand, profited considerably from the newly opened opportunities for upward 
social mobility, but, on the other hand, faced hardship during the Stalinist years. 
Combining both political and academic paths, his international career started ‘at 
home’ at KUTV with students coming from Africa and Asia.
 Oriental studies in the United States
The general interpretation, mentioned at the beginning, that US-American Ori-
ental studies were by and large parochial, needs some qualification, first of all 
because it is based on two convictions that do not stand closer inspection.
First, the origins of academic studies of the ‘non-Western’ world as we know 
it today are often dated to the end of the Second World War. ‘Non-Western’ cul-
tures and societies became firmly anchored in higher education and research with 
the establishment of area studies – designating a particular concept of Oriental 
or regional studies established in the mid-1940s in order to distinguish between, 
on the one hand, the traditional disciplines (Sinology, Indology, etc.) that pre-
dominately analyzed languages, literatures, and ancient histories and, on the oth-
er, newly conceptualized interdisciplinary fields such as Chinese or South Asian 
studies which were more focused on the present, interested in the nineteenth 
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and twentieth centuries, and combined philological-historical approaches with 
questions and methods from the social sciences, especially economics, political 
science, and sociology.
Second, the geo-political context of the Cold War is usually emphasized in 
the development after 1945, which served the argument that Oriental studies and 
area studies were in essence instruments to ‘know the enemy’, particularly with re-
gard to research on Russia. Such studies also related to inquiries of non-Western 
cultures as they were regarded as eminently important for winning hearts and 
minds in these regions in the ideological competition with the Soviet Union.20
While not denying the relevance of the political context, we argue that this is 
only half the story. Postwar Oriental studies were firmly rooted in a tradition of 
studying the world that dates back to end of the nineteenth century, which only 
accelerated after World War I. The 1890s saw the opening of ‘Departments of 
Semitic Languages and Cultures’, the foundation of anthropology and archeology. 
Well before the First World War, the three strands – philological, ethnographi-
cal, and archeological research – had a small but safe base in US academia. Their 
position would expand in the 1920s, within the university and through the crea-
tion of research institutes like the well-known Oriental Institute in Chicago.21
Although the founding phase of Oriental studies was shaped by the charac-
teristics of the US-American higher education system, it was part of a broader 
trend to investigate the world. Academic studies of foreign cultures began in 
many places at that time. Accordingly, American scholars examining foreign so-
cieties traveled, exchanged knowledge, and borrowed organizational patterns. 
They were strongly linked to scholarship from abroad and the geography of their 
careers spanned large distances. This state of affairs persisted in the second half 
of the twentieth century, albeit under different circumstances, as was the case in 
Russia following the October Revolution. This is evident in the biographies of 
leading figures of the field. The two we chose to present are especially illuminat-
ing in terms of their transatlantic linkages.
In the late 1920s, Oriental studies in the US was in the middle of a process of 
differentiation. After Indology had taken shape, Far East (or Asian) studies was 
given contours out of which China and Japan studies were crafted. In parallel, 
Byzantine studies, which at first was regionally and temporally concerned with 
the Eastern Roman Empire, was later broadened to include the Caucasus and 
Western Asia. The Second World War initiated another expansion of the field, 
now as Middle Eastern studies.22 Among the main actors of this period were 
Serge Elisséeff and Robert B. Blake.
Elisséeff is often portrayed as the first professional Japanologist in the US. 
Indeed he helped to build Japanese studies both at his home university (Harvard) 
and beyond by introducing the study of living Asian languages and bringing Rus-
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sian and French research traditions to the US, from which the US Oriental stud-
ies gained its intellectual shape. It is telling that his work was also appreciated in 
the Soviet Union.23
Born in St. Petersburg in 1889, Elisséeff had witnessed the Russo-Japanese 
War as a young adult, which stimulated his interest in the East. Even before he 
passed his A-level studies, he introduced himself to Sergej Ol’denburg, the doyen 
of Russian Oriental studies at that time.24 After Ol’denburg suggested studying 
in Japan, Elisséeff went to Berlin to study with Eduard Sachs and soon after to 
Tokyo Imperial University. When he returned to St. Petersburg in 1914 he was 
familiar with the German and Japanese state of the art, allowing him to easily 
pass the exam to become a Privatdozent at the St. Petersburg Imperial University. 
He immediately returned to Japan to work on his dissertation, which he defended 
in Tokyo in 1917. Shortly after he had returned home, the Russian Revolution 
changed what could have become a decent academic career at home. His fam-
ily lost almost all its property and he his position at the university, which was 
instantly restricted. It is interesting that his colleagues Ol’derrogge and Alekseev 
did not meet the same fate. For some, 1917 meant a break for their scholarly work, 
for others the interruption came later.
The few opportunities to publish, together with a job at the Oriental Library 
of the Russian Academy of Sciences, did not provide enough money to live on and 
so in 1920 Elisséeff left for Paris. The move was challenging, but he soon secured a 
teaching post at the Sorbonne and established connections with the Japanese em-
bassy, the Musée Guimet, and the International Committee for Intellectual Prop-
erty of the League of Nations. In these years he met and worked with many of 
the leading French Sinologists, among others Henri Maspero, Antoine Meillet and 
Paul Pelliot. These contacts paid off. In 1930 he was appointed Maitre de Conference 
at the École des Hautes Études; two years later he advanced to become director of 
the Oriental division. While it looked as if he had settled within French academia, 
a visit to Harvard University in 1931 proved to be consequential. In Cambridge, the 
newly founded Harvard Yenching Institute – an independent institute for human-
istic and social science research on China, continental Asia, and Japan, in which 
scholars from the Bejing-based Yenching University and their Harvard colleagues 
collaborated – was in need of a director. Initially it was hoped to have Pelliot take 
the position; however, he suggested his younger colleague Elisséeff, who accepted 
the double invitation to run the institute and to teach as a professor at the Depart-
ment of Semitic Languages. Both positions provided the social and financial space 
of manoeuvre to establish the barely existing study of China and Japan at Harvard. 
Being able to use the internal mechanisms of a university for his own ambitions, 
Elisséeff accomplished much in a short time. In 1936 he founded the Harvard Jour-
nal of Asiatic History and the year after the Department of Far Eastern Languages.
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Within a decade he had gathered the resources to establish nine university 
research and teaching positions, publish a book series, hold international con-
gresses, and to build a well-organized library. The results of these activities 
went well beyond Cambridge. The doctoral program he created trained many 
of the later East Asianists, while the American Association of Asian Studies 
owes its existence also to him. When he retired in 1956, Chinese and Japa-
nese studies had a firm and stable place at Harvard and within US-American 
academia. Besides his organizational influence, he had an intellectual impact 
that was decisively shaped by his education in Russia and Japan as well as his 
research in France.
Similarly, Byzantine studies came into being through the hands of someone 
profoundly influenced by Russian scholarship. Robert B. Blake, born in 1886, 
went to Freiburg and Berlin to prepare his dissertation, where his teacher, Ed-
uard Meyer, encouraged him to go to St. Petersburg to study under Michael 
Rostovtzeff.25 Russian Byzantine scholars were seen at that time as interna-
tionally leading in the field. Deeply impressed by the wide range of courses 
offered at the Faculty of Oriental Studies at St. Petersburg Imperial Univer-
sity, where one could learn all important languages of the Near and Far East, 
Blake resolved to build up a similar program at home. During his time at St. 
Petersburg, he tried to gain as much knowledge as he could in ancient history 
and Byzantine studies, and learned Arab, Armenian and Georgian. Fascinated 
by the history of the Caucasus, he focused his dissertation to the region. For 
administrative purposes, he returned to the US to defend the thesis, but since 
the conditions for further research were much better in Russia, shortly after 
he returned to St. Petersburg, passed the exam to be a university lecturer and 
gained a travel stipend from the Russian Academy of Sciences to do archival 
work in Tbilisi. His plans were interrupted by the Russian Revolution as well, 
which prevented him from returning to St. Petersburg. He successfully applied 
for a chair in church history at Tbilisi State University. He taught and studied 
there for five years before returning to the US, to Harvard, where he took up 
his initial idea in establishing Byzantine studies similar to and at the same level 
as the discipline in Russia.26
In the first years he was involved in creating East-Asian studies together with 
Elisséeff, but he also invested tremendous efforts in institutionalizing his own 
field of expertise. For example, the establishment of the first chair of Central 
Asian history in the History Department was largely due to his merit.27
Elisséeff and Blake do not account for the development of the whole field, 
but the biographies of their colleagues – Harley F. MacNair in Chicago, Martin 
C. Wilbur at Columbia University, and Edwin Reischauer in Cambridge – also 
display a lot of international experience and connections.28 These were of a dif-
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ferent kind, though, since the strong linkages between US-American and Russian 
Oriental studies are typical for the founding period only. Later on, Russia lost 
its position as the prime training place and intellectual frame of reference for 
US scholars. Their international orientation, however, persisted. Oriental studies 
practiced in the regions of expertise itself became the main reference point, es-
pecially after the Second World War. Telling in this regard are several surveys on 
area studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s. More than 50% of area studies spe-
cialists had worked at least two years in the region they were investigating. More 
than a third had stayed for three years, and no less than a fifth drew from the ex-
perience of five years of living and researching in the ‘non-Western’ world.29 This 
again could not but leave an imprint on their research, on how they approached 
their subjects and which questions they asked. The knowledge they produced was 
profoundly shaped by encounters they made during their stays abroad and by the 
material they collected there. Returning home they brought new insights, hith-
erto unknown research concepts, and unfamiliar arguments the US. Ideas and in-
tellectual traditions thus traveled from Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and 
Africa to North America; cultural transfer shaped and changed Oriental studies 
at all the places involved. That did not prevent interpretations that are nowadays 
highly problematic– for example, the claims of the modernization theory – but 
these became increasingly questionable, an unease which culminated in current 
reconsiderations of the intellectual and political underpinnings of area studies 
mentioned at the beginning.
 Conclusion
The disciplines of Oriental studies in the US and in the Soviet Union have a 
transnational and transatlantic past. In the development of both fields, a pro-
foundly international dimension was a core feature, lasting well beyond the Rus-
sian Revolution into the early years of the Cold War. Along the way and due to 
the changing circumstances, patterns and strategies of involving the wider world 
took shape. With the progress of decolonization and the heating up of the Cold 
War, relations with the regions that were investigated were fostered while the 
entanglement across the Atlantic was cut off for the time being. These develop-
ments are one layer in the changing geography of the field’s connectivity. It has as 
yet been scarcely explored.
There is still few systematic and comparative research regarding the non-West-
ern humanities, let alone about transfers from ‘East’ and South’ to the ‘West’, and 
even less from ‘East’ to ‘East’ and ‘South’ to ‘South’. While, for instance, Russian Ori-
entalists obviously observed their Western counterparts and considered how to be 
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part of, or compete with, this academic community, at the same time they integrated 
learned ‘native’ scholars into the Russian and later Soviet academic systems. Here, 
a transfer in the opposite direction must be assumed; yet this remains, for now, a 
question for further investigation. The presence of ‘native’ scholars in the respective 
academic systems might be an excellent starting point for such a line of scrutiny; 
the encounters of Russian and US scholars with their ‘native’ counterparts during 
their fieldwork travels might be another. One could then trace in more detail how 
the ‘Orient’ was studied in various parts of the world and how concepts and ideas 
developed in Asia or Latin America influenced the disciplines in Europe and North 
America. One could compare the specific interdisciplinary composition of Oriental 
studies across the continents, i.e., how the approaches of philology, history, and the 
social sciences were combined and balanced. And one could follow the respective 
rhythms of intellectual shifts. After all, what was conceived, constructed, and re-
searched as the ‘Orient’ changed and differed depending on where scholars and their 
own societies positioned themselves. The first steps that we have taken here on the 
path toward the global history of Oriental studies show, if anything, how much the 
usual national and ‘Western’-centric accounts leave out.
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8.2 The Emergence of East Asian Art History in  
the 1920s
Karl With (1891-1980) and the Problem of Gandhara
Julia Orell
 East Asian art and art history
Late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Europe saw an increasing interest 
in non-European art from Africa, Pre-Columbian America, Asia, the Pacific Is-
lands and elsewhere. Private collectors and museums eagerly collected, exhibited, 
and published such works, often in competition with each other in the context of 
colonization.1 In addition to museums and collectors, artists developed a great in-
terest in non-European art and artifacts since at least the mid-nineteenth century, 
ranging from Japanese woodcut prints to African masks, often summarized under 
the problematic category of primitivism. The academic discipline of art history, 
however, was slow in responding to the broadening range of images and objects 
that became available for study. In German-language academic art history, the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a formative period with regard 
to the field’s methodological foundations, with major centers at the universities 
in Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Basel, and Vienna among others.2 Non-European 
art and artifacts rarely made their way into academic art-historical research; the 
newly emerging specialists in these fields were philologists, ethnologists, and ar-
cheologists in addition to museum curators, collectors, and private scholars.3 One 
case in East Asian art was Otto Kümmel (1847-1952), who was appointed curator 
of the newly established Department of East Asian Art at the Berlin Museums 
in 1906. His academic background was in classical philology and archeology be-
fore he started to familiarize himself with East Asian art, learned Japanese, and 
became one of the most influential figures in German art history of East Asia in 
the early twentieth century.4
It was at the Vienna Department of Art History, where Josef Strzygowski 
(1862-1941) established the Section for East Asian Art History in 1912 – the first 
institution where research in East Asian art history was officially conducted and 
supported. Karl With (1891-1980), whose scholarship will be the focus of this es-
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say, was among the first of Strzygowski’s students in East Asian art and finished 
his dissertation on Japanese Buddhist sculpture in 1919.5 His work in the early 
1920s presents an interesting case study to explore the emergence of East Asian 
art history as an academic field: With combined an art-historical academic train-
ing, that lead to his specialization in Asian art, with ideas about art as a universal 
language that circulated among artists, collectors, and intellectuals at the time. 
This paper explores With’s scholarship in relation to that of his adviser Josef 
Strzygowski and takes into account With’s work for the private collectors Karl 
Ernst Osthaus (1874-1921) and Eduard von der Heydt (1882-1964).
 Josef Strzygowski and non-European art
In the preface to Karl With’s dissertation, Josef Strzygowski claimed that the 
‘East Asian section in the Department of Art History at the University of Vienna 
was founded in 1912, though with very limited means’.6 While Strzygowski may 
have exaggerated when he called the activities at his department pertaining to 
East Asian art a section or program (Abteilung), the statement illustrates his am-
bition to open up art history to non-European art.7 In a short pamphlet, The Art 
History Department at the University of Vienna (1913), Strzygowski outlined the 
structure and activities in more detail.8 In order to account for ‘the artistic crea-
tions of all mankind as a whole’, art history needed to expand its focus eastward 
and to free itself from the historical-philological method. The department was 
thus to be divided into the three sections (1) History, (2) Systematics, (3) Neigh-
bor disciplines (such as ethnology, prehistory, and human geography) and the 
first, historical section was further subdivided by region: (1) Austria, (2) Western 
Europe, (3) Eastern Europe, (4) West Asia, and (5) East Asia (including India, 
Central Asia, China, Japan, South and South-East Asia).
With regard to the current activities of the East Asian group, Strzygowski 
reported that one member had been dispatched to the Museum of East Asian 
Art in Cologne to work on cataloguing the collection, two members had traveled 
to Japan,9 a seminar on Indian art had taken place, and a group was studying 
Japanese Yamato-e painting. Strzygowski’s expansion eastward attracted many 
students, some of whom would go on to pursue distinguished academic careers.
Only recently has the role of Strzygowski in the formation of non-European 
art history come to the attention of art historians in relation to current debates 
about ‘global art history’.10After having been more or less expelled from the histo-
ry of art history after the Second World War because of his racist ideologies and 
support of the Nazi regime, Stzrygowski’s work has been reevaluated in the past 
two decades. Besides acknowledging his contribution to broadening art history’s 
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geographical scope of inquiry – primarily with regard to the art of late antiquity, 
early Christian and Islamic art in Eastern Europe and the Near East – the linger-
ing attraction of some of his ideas and their dangers have been pointed out as 
well: Jas Elsner has addressed the importance of Strzygowski’s book Rome or Ori-
ent (Rom oder Orient [1901]) and its methodological kinship with the much more 
appreciated Alois Riegl, whose Late Roman Art Industry (Spätrömische Kunstin-
dustrie) was also published in 1901.11 Johann Konrad Eberlein has depicted Strzy-
gowski as the ultimate modern art historian and has drawn attention to what he 
perceives to be current threats to the discipline of art history that are manifest 
in Strzygowski’s work, among them a thinking in terms of continents as an early 
form of globalization, the opening of disciplinary boundaries, assumptions about 
the spread of cultural streams as if they were independent entities, and a false 
belief to be free from ideologies by using scientific concepts.12 Yet other schol-
ars have addressed Strzygowski’s involvement with anthropology, including the 
French avant-garde journal Documents,13 and the impact of his work on emerging 
national art histories, especially in Eastern Europe.14
Strzygowski’s motivation to extend the scope of his scholarship to include 
Asia, especially East Asia, should be understood as part of his anti-humanist and 
anti-historical-philological project that had begun with his attack on the privileg-
ing of Roman-Greek antiquity in art-historical narratives, as well as of methods 
largely relying on textual sources.15 Asia became part of this project, in order to 
counter prevailing assumptions that classical antiquity, or the influence of the 
Mediterranean, had extended as far as India, China, and Japan. Instead, the study 
of Asian art should, according to Strzygowski,
force us to finally bridge the gaps between East and West and between 
South and North and to realize that the center of dispersing power is not 
to be found in the Mediterranean alone, but that the movement instead 
generates from a number of sources and a great number of canals that con-
nect these original streams.16
While arguing for independent artistic developments in Asia, Strzygowski was at 
the same time eager to prove the existence of a different kind of relationship be-
tween the arts of Europe and Asia based on shared racial heritage. His narrative 
aimed at foregrounding the achievements of ‘Northern man’ (Nordmensch) and 
to point out a common Indo-Germanic basis for Eurasia in these achievements. 
Strzygowski believed that there was an ‘Aryan axis’ – he alternatively called it the 
‘Indo-Germanic axis’ – that connected Central Europe with the Caucasus and the 
Caspian Sea, reaching further to Central Asia, Iran, and India. As Susanne Leeb 
has pointed out, Strzygowski thus followed popular myths about the common 
434 Julia Orell
Indo-Germanic heritage of large parts of Europe and Asia.17 It appears obvious 
that Strzygowski took on doctoral students to study South Asian, Central Asian, 
and East Asian art in order to further his own agenda and to supply him with 
materials and arguments in his attack on mainstream art history.
 Karl With’s career in art history, work for private collectors, and 
museums
According to Karl With’s own memory, his first fascination with Asian art arose 
when he received a collection of photographs of the Javanese Buddhist monu-
ment Borobudur, which lead him to explore Asian art in museums and to con-
sider studying it academically. An anecdote from With’s autobiography illustrates 
that pursuing this interest was not easily to be realized at the time. Albert Grün-
wedel (1856-1935), curator for India at the Ethnological Museum in Berlin, re-
jected With: ‘When I asked his advice how to go about studying Indian art, he 
jumped up from behind his desk, shouted at me that he would throw me out if I 
would ever again dare to speak of Hindu sculptures as works of art’.18 After failing 
to find a professor in Germany, With was recommended to Josef Strzygowksi, 
who accepted him as his student.
With had studied art history in Freiburg, Munich, and Berlin before he came 
to Vienna in 1912, and had also been connected to artistic circles in Munich and 
Berlin as well as to private collectors who combined an interest in the European 
avant-garde with a predilection for non-European art. Karl With would never 
focus on East Asian art alone but retained a strong interest in contemporary art 
and design that would continue to shape his career after he left Vienna. Among 
With’s early mentors was the prominent collector Karl Ernst Osthaus, for whom 
he first worked in the summer of 1911. Osthaus’s collection, which would become 
the basis for the Folkwang Museum in Hagen (and later in Essen), included 
works by artists such as Vincent van Gogh, Paul Cézanne, Paul Gauguin, Henri 
Matisse, Aristide Maillol, Christian Rohlf, and Emil Nolde, but also Persian min-
iatures, ancient Egyptian sculpture, Chinese ceramics, Japanese Noh masks, and 
African sculpture.19 Through his contact with Osthaus, With met many artists, 
such as the architect and designer Henry van Velde, and he accompanied Osthaus 
to Paris in 1912. Here, With would encounter art dealers of Asian art and was 
first introduced to Victor Goboulev, a Russian aristocrat and collector of Asian 
art who recommended him to Strzygowski. After having finished and published 
his dissertation, With worked for Osthaus’s newly founded Folkwang Publishing 
House and was editor of the series Asia’s Spirit, Art, and Life (Geist, Kunst, und 
Leben in Asien). He then became the director of the Folkwang Museum from 1919 
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to 1921 – still a work in progress at the time – for which he organized two exhibi-
tions after Osthaus’s death in 1921. At that time, he had also started to work for 
Baron Eduard von der Heydt, a banker and collector of European avant-garde 
art, who had begun to build a collection of Asian and African works.20 With 
first catalogued parts of Von der Heydt’s Asian art collection, mostly East and 
South-East Asian Buddhist sculpture, in 1923.21 The early 1920s were With’s most 
productive time as a scholar of Asian and East Asian art but he also published 
on contemporary European art, such as a small booklet on Marc Chagall.22 In 
1925 he started working in Cologne, first as lecturer at and later as director of 
the Werkschule (School for Applied Arts and Design), and starting in 1928 also 
as director of the Kunstgewerbe-Museum (Museum for Applied Arts), where he 
developed a new concept for exhibiting the collection.23 His focus shifted away 
from East Asian art at that time and his publications on Asia decreased. After 
the Nazis came to power in 1933, With lost his positions and after a few years he 
went to Switzerland, where he worked again on Von der Heydt’s collection while 
staying at his estate on Monte Verità in Ascona. He emigrated to the US in 1939, 
where he became professor of art history at the University of California, Los An-
geles, in 1950, after some years as a lecturer and working for a variety of museums. 
Here he built up the art history program and developed the so-called ‘integrated 
art course’. East Asian art did not play a prominent role in his later career, but 
at UCLA he continued to promote a very broad notion of art history, not only 
in geographical terms but also by including design, film, and other subjects that 
were not widely acknowledged to belong to the discipline.
 With’s dissertation on Japanese Buddhist art under Strzygowski
After having begun his studies in Vienna under Josef Strzygowski, Karl With had 
the opportunity to undertake research in Japan during a trip in 1913-1914 that was 
financed by his fellow student, Oskar Vonwiller.24 During his stay in Japan, he fo-
cused on exploring Buddhist sculpture in temples and museum collections and as-
sembled rich photographic documentation that would serve as the basis for his 
dissertation. The completion of the dissertation was delayed when the First World 
War broke out and With was drafted to serve in the German army. After the war he 
returned to Vienna and completed the dissertation, which was published in two vol-
umes as Buddhist Sculpture in Japan until the Beginning of the Eighth Century in 1919.25
The dissertation focuses on a rather limited time period of roughly a century 
and a limited region, in order to provide, in With’s own words, ‘the detailed sty-
listic analysis that is indispensable for a sincere understanding’ and to ‘foreground 
the material itself by showing it as comprehensively as possible and to represent it 
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photographically in a way that allows an adequate perception’.26 The photograph-
ic documentation was indeed the very core of the published dissertation and the 
primary reason for its success: the separate volume of illustrations includes more 
than 200 photographs of sculptures dating from the seventh to the early eighth 
century, housed in temples in the Nara and Kyōto region – among them Hōryū-
ji, Daigo-ji, and Kōryū-ji – but also from several museum collections such as the 
Ueno-Museum in Tokyo. With’s photographs isolate the individual sculptures 
from their surroundings and usually show at least a frontal and a side view, as in 
the example of the famous Yumedono Kannon in Hōryū-ji temple [Fig. 19 left 
and Fig. 20 right].27 Often, he adds photos of further points of view and of details, 
as if dissecting the sculptures photographically.
The text volume of the dissertation is, as announced in the introduction, an 
attempt to carefully describe the formal properties of the individual sculptures, 
to compare them with each other, and to thus group them according to stylistic 
categories and to trace stylistic developments over time. For the example of the 
Yumedono Kannon, With describes formal properties characteristic for the Tori 
style28: basic geometric forms of oval and triangle as the underlying structure and 
the creation of a silhouette that is developed out of a two-dimensional plane and 
thus dissolves the core of the sculpture. Such a formalist approach and categori-
zations are dominant throughout the dissertation and not unusual for the time. 
To apply this approach to a relatively short time frame of Japanese Buddhist 
art, however, must have challenged prevailing essentialist views about Buddhist 
art or East Asian art more generally. Rather than attempting to explain what 
Japanese Buddhist art was in essence, With treated his subject with the same 
attention to detail and historical change that had previously been afforded to 
European art.
Contextual considerations, such as about Buddhism in Japan, the ritual func-
tion of the sculptures, or their architectural framing, are hardly considered in 
With’s dissertation except for some general points mentioned in the introduc-
tion. Neither does he consider iconographic issues nor the different materials 
and techniques, such as bronze, wood, or lacquer, even though these did, at least 
partially, determine formal features. While one may detect a reference to Strzy-
gowski’s method in these choices, i.e., disregard for textual sources and historical 
context, With acknowledges the lack of iconographical analysis and consideration 
of materials as shortcomings.29 In addition, he points out that he did not fol-
low Strzygowski’s systematic method, because he considered it dangerous ‘to ap-
proach a foreign inventory of art by using a strict, systematic terminology that is 
primarily formed and evaluated based on the appearances of Western European 
art’.30 At the same time, With explicitly situated his work within the framework 
established by Strzygowski for the study of East Asian art by emphasizing the 
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Fig. 19. Yumedono Kannon, first half of the seventh 
century, wood and gilt lacquer, height: 178.8 cm,  
Horyu-ji, Nara prefecture (frontal view); after Karl 
With, Buddhistische Plastik in Japan (Vienna, 1919),  
vol. 2, plate 15
Fig. 20. Yumedono Kannon (see fig. 
18) (side view); after Karl With, 
Buddhistische Plastik in Japan 
(Vienna, 1919), vol. 2, plate 16
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importance of ‘scientific art research’ (wissenschaftliche Kunstforschung, i.e., Strzy-
gowski’s term for his systematic approach):
It was of decisive significance (for scientific art research) to free itself from 
the tyranny of a one-sidedly conceived idea of development that understood 
the forms of archaic art production only as the primitive precondition for an 
art shaped according to natural observation. To recognize that in this case it 
was a fundamentally different drive to make art [Kunstwollen], and not just 
one single, continuous developmental scheme, it [i.e., scientific art research] 
lay the basis for research that was able to encompass the entire field of ar-
tistic expression and to understand its laws. It will contribute especially to 
broadening Western European consciousness toward a truly human one.31
While With’s work did not support Strzygowski in furthering his arguments 
about racial connections across Eurasia, he did emphasize the independence of 
developments in Japanese art and defended formal features that may not conform 
to European ideas of naturalism as being artistically superior. Strzygowski highly 
valued With’s work, as can be seen in his evaluation of the dissertation, where he 
states that:
With has collected early Japanese sculpture since the appearance of Bud-
dhism and offers through individual photographs insights that we hardly 
had for Italian art. After having overcome the influences from India, China 
and Korea, Japan rises to great prosperity under the great masters of the 
Suiko and Hakuho periods, and With attempts to grasp these develop-
ments by examining the essence of the individual artworks.32
Strzygowski would also take up With’s work later on, especially in his The Visual 
Arts of Asia (Asiens Bildende Kunst [1930]), probably his most ambitious publica-
tion in terms of the historical and geographical range of materials covered. He 
includes some examples from With’s dissertation, e.g., to point out that Japanese 
art was equivalent in its achievements to the art of Central Europe: ‘[T]here ex-
isted at the time in Japan the same movement of art for art’s sake as in, for exam-
ple, Quattrocento Italy’ and that certain formal features appear  ‘as if in East Asia 
there was a movement in artistic creation that was scientifically grounded, similar 
to the so-called Gothic and Early Renaissance in Italy’.33
To prove the independence of East Asian art and its formal developments 
is the point in which Strzygowski’s and With’s arguments come together most 
closely. More concretely, this independence is identified as an independence from 
the art of Gandhara, i.e., Buddhist art from what is today northern Pakistan and 
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eastern Afghanistan during the first to fifth centuries with obvious Hellenistic 
influences. It is tempting to link the two scholars’ insistence on the independence 
of Indian, Chinese, and Japanese art to the emerging national art histories that 
opposed colonial narratives. For instance, in the 1920s Ananda Coomaraswarmy 
was developing similar, yet much more detailed and historically sound arguments 
about Indian Buddhist art predating Gandharan examples in his well-known 
study ‘The Origin of the Buddha Image’ (1927), which highlighted indigenous 
traditions as opposed to Hellenistic models.34 Yet neither Strzygowski nor With 
were interested in arguments about national independence or indigenous artistic 
achievements; instead their main aim was the rejection of Hellenistic influences, 
though their reasons differed.
 The problem of Gandhara
Gandharan sculpture first became known to a wider audience in Central Europe 
during the Vienna World Exposition in 1873. The works suggested that Indian 
and, by implication, Asian Buddhist art, derived from Greek models, yet without 
having achieved their ideal standards. Gandhara posed a problem to Strzygowski, 
because it seemed to confirm a far-reaching dependence on Hellenistic influences 
throughout Asia. This, of course, opposed his narrative that downplayed the im-
portance of Greek and Roman art and Gandhara became an instance in Strzy-
gowski’s ‘struggle against Rome’:
Just like Rome, supposedly the giving party everywhere in the Occident, so 
Hellas supposedly takes on the same role everywhere in Asia. The falsity 
of such an assumption is not recognized, because artistic research sits com-
fortably in its European nest and has not freed itself from the assumptions 
of historical research.35
The dismissal of Gandharan art and the emphasis on autochthonous develop-
ments in Buddhist sculpture of China and Japan became an important part of 
Karl With’s research as well, although his motivation differed from Strzygowski’s, 
as will be pointed out below.
With’s dissertation displays a striking rhetoric of purity and independence, es-
pecially if one considers his otherwise formalist approach. To return the example 
of the Yumedono Kannon introduced above, With ends his formal analysis with a 
surprising, almost abrupt, statement that this sculpture presented a counterpoint 
to Gandharan Buddhist art. According to With, Gandharan art, despite its abstrac-
tions, remained always bound to a Southern sensuality and to a naturalistic notion 
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and materiality. The Yumedono Kannon demonstrated in With’s understanding 
that the Japanese Tori style was indebted to an early Chinese ‘national’ style that was 
already fully independent from Indian models. With argues that even if one was to 
accept that early Chinese and Japanese sculptors ‘had indeed derived their forms 
from Gandharan works, then we can only admire their forceful, artistic will that 
transformed such provincial, naturalistic works into a new and deepened expres-
sion appropriate to the Buddhist spirit’.36 Several threads of a larger argument are 
combined in this statement. First of all, Gandharan art is dismissed as Southern, 
provincial, sensual, and naturalistic, i.e., With considers geography in relation to 
form and questions naturalism as the end to formal developments in sculpture. Sec-
ondly, With does not neglect the influence of Gandhara on Chinese and Japanese 
Buddhist art, but argues that Chinese Buddhist sculpture freed itself from it and 
developed a ‘national style’ that would then be further refined in Japan. Thirdly, the 
Chinese and Japanese examples that became independent from Gandhara display 
in With’s view a more properly Buddhist approach to sculpture.
The first point takes up Strzygowski’s division between Southern naturalism 
and Northern idealism in art. Whereas Strzygowski further linked these proper-
ties of artworks to racial categories in juxtaposing Semitic naturalism with Aryan 
idealism, With did not subscribe to these ideas. Instead, he sought to reevaluate 
an observed lack of naturalism in Buddhist sculpture to religious concepts of 
transcendence. The second point about the development of a Chinese national 
style can be illustrated by the comparison of two Buddha heads from Eduard 
von der Heydt’s collection. According to With’s analysis, one of the heads still 
belonged to the late phase of a declining art with formal features close to ‘Central 
Asian composite art’ (zentralasiatische Mischkunst) [Fig. 21]. Its characteristics are 
naturalistic, curly hair; irregular lower-eye contours; weak and bloated cheeks; a 
sensual heaviness in the lower part of the face disproportional to the narrow fore-
head; and a generally saturated and sedate expression.37 The second Buddha head 
is dated only slightly later, to the mid-fifth century and shows in With’s narrative 
how rapidly China purged foreign forms and found its own style during the Wei 
Dynasty (386-534 AD) [Fig. 22].38 Characteristic for this  ‘sincere Wei style’ are 
the massive, rectangular head; simple lines; and the frontal, architectonic struc-
ture. Further following With, the head’s expression is solemn, oriented inward, 
nonsensual and at the same time sculpturally alive, displaying a mysterious smile. 
It thus fulfills With’s requirements for transcendental monumental sculpture in 
the Chinese national style.39
This comparison already hints at the third point, namely that the Chinese na-
tional style and subsequent Japanese examples were more properly Buddhist than 
their Gandharan predecessors. With states this explicitly in the same catalogue 
of Von der Heydt’s collection:
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The province of Gandhara, however, formed the center of a late Hellenistic 
provincial art that made use of Buddhist motifs while completely ignoring 
the Buddhist spirit. This art is characterized by an unpleasant decline, or, 
alternatively put, a dependent composite art. Its weak and bloated, bodily 
and individualized forms have nothing to do with the transcendental spirit 
of Buddhism.40
In his work on Buddhist art, Karl With was searching for a spirituality that he 
understood as emerging from the dialectics of transcendence and body. If Bud-
dhism was based on a transcendent concept of god and thus required an artistic 
form that departed from the empirical world, sculptors had to resolve an inherent 
contradiction caused by the focus on the historical Buddha and the human figure. 
Gandharan art had not been able to do this, according to With, as it adhered to 
naturalistic principles of representation in the Hellenistic tradition. The Chinese 
national style, however, had developed a fully sculptural form that rendered the 
physical presence of the Buddha while embodying transcendence in less natural-
istic, basic three-dimensional forms. In With’s account, formal features in Chi-
Fig. 21. Head of a Buddha, 
c. 500 AD, limestone, 
previously collection 
Von der Heydt; after Karl 
With, Bildwerke Ost- und 
Südasiens der Sammlung 
Yiyuan (Basel, 1924), 
plate 20
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nese and Japanese Buddhist sculpture are thus tied to religious concepts, and 
both are shown to depart from Gandharan models.
With’s argument was not confined to Asian Buddhist art. Instead, he related 
it to the artistic and intellectual concerns of his own time when he repeatedly 
pointed out that only now the appreciation of Buddhist art had become possible:
It was only the search of the soul of our own age, it was the artistic longing 
that urges away from constrictions or chaos toward a clarity of sculptural 
greatness, it was only the cosmopolitan attitude that opened the paths to 
appreciate the genius of sculptural creation in China.41
These ideas relate to the concept of ars una – that there is only one art – as pro-
moted by With’s mentors Osthaus and Von der Heydt, as visible in their homes 
and exhibitions that displayed European avant-garde art in dialogue with non-
European art [Fig. 23].
The connection that Karl With saw between Asian Buddhist art and the ‘soul-
searching’ of his own time demands further exploration, extending to the role 
Fig. 22: Head of a Buddha, Wei 
Dynasty (fifth century AD), 
sandstone, previously collection 
Von der Heydt; after Karl With, 
Bildwerke Ost- und Südasiens der 
Sammlung Yiyuan (Basel, 1924), 
plate 22
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Fig. 23: Albert Renger-Patzsch, Second hall in the Folkwang Museum, Essen, view into the big gallery 
with paintings by Paula Modersohn-Becker and Erich Heckel, with Franz Marc’s “Grazing Horses IV” 
and with non-European sculptures and objects, around 1930 (© Museum Folkwang Essen) 
that Buddhist art played in European collections and to the more general spir-
itual interest in Buddhism and other world religions among scholars and intel-
lectuals at the time. One connection between ancient Asian Buddhist art and 
early twentieth-century avant-garde sculpture that With himself made by way 
of terminology, appears with regard to his favorite contemporary sculptor Mois-
sey Kogan (1879-1943), a friend from his student days in Munich and a protégé 
of Karl Ernst Osthaus [Fig. 24]. In an article on the occasion of an exhibition of 
Kogan’s work in Germany, With summarizes the effect of Kogan’s sculpture as a 
‘silent transcendence’.42 This implies a formal and spiritual relation between the 
transcendental forms of Buddhist art that he found in Chinese and Japanese Bud-
dhist sculpture and what he referred to as the urge toward ‘the clarity of sculp-
tural greatness’ of his own time.
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 Notes
1 For instance, colonial powers sent out expeditions to Central Asia to excavate ancient 
sites and to bring back artifacts. Among these were several German expeditions starting 
in 1902, lead by Alfred Grünwedel and Albert von Le Coq to Turfan. The British govern-
ment sent Sir Aurel Stein to Dunhuang in 1907, and shortly thereafter he was followed 
by the French Paul Pelliot. Earlier, the Swedish government had sent Sven Hedin in 
1896 and again in 1899 to excavations in the Taklamakan desert. On the discovery of 
the Dunhuang caves by Western explorers See, e.g., Roderick Whitfield, Cave Temples 
of Mogao: Art and History on the Silk Road (Los Angeles: Getty Conservation Institute 
and the Getty Museum, 2000). For a non-academic account, see Peter Hopkirk, Foreign 
Devils on the Silk Road: The Search for the Lost Cities and Treasures of Chinese Central 
Asia (London: Murray, 1980). 
2 To name just a few of the scholars active at the time, whose work is still widely read and 
taught in historiography courses: Heinrich Wölfflin (1864-1945), who taught in Berlin, 
Munich, Basel, and Zurich; Aby Warburg (1866-1929), who was active in Hamburg until 
his death; the Vienna school of art history with Alois Riegl (1858-1905), Franz Wickhoff 
(1853-1909), and others; and Erwin Panofsky (1892-1986), who taught in Hamburg until 
he emigrated to the United States.
Fig. 24: Moissey Kogan, Female Figure; 
after Karl With, ‘Kogan besucht 
Deutschland’, Das Kunstblatt 6.11 
(1922)
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3 A few exceptions were art historians initially trained in European art who then shifted 
their focus to East Asian art, such as Otto Fischer (1886-1948). He wrote his disserta-
tion on Northern European painting under Heinrich Wölfflin in 1907 and subsequently 
focused on East Asian art with a Habilitation on Chinese landscape painting in 1912. 
Fischer contributed the volume on the arts of India, China, and Japan to the Propyläen-
Kunstgeschichte in 1928 – marking a point when Asian art had arrived in the art-historical 
canon of German art history. 
4 For the history of the East Asian art department at the Berlin Museums see, e.g., Lothar 
Ledderose, ‘Collecting Chinese Painting in Berlin’, in Ming Wilson and John Caley (eds.), 
Europe Studies China: Papers from an International Conference on the History of European 
Sinology (London: Han-Shan Tang Books, 1995), 175-201. For biographical information 
on Otto Kümmel, see, e.g., Hartmut Walravens, Bibliographien zur ostasiatischen Kunstge-
schichte in Deutschland 3: Otto Kümmel (Hamburg: C. Bell, 1985).
5 Karl With, Buddhistische Plastik in Japan bis in den Beginn des 8. Jahrhunderts (Vienna: 
Anton Schroll & Co., 1919). Besides Karl With, there were many better-known students 
of Strzygowski working on Asian and East Asian art, who would continue their careers in 
these fields. Among them were Stella Kramrisch (1896-1993), who finished her disserta-
tion on Indian art in Vienna in 1919 and would become professor in Calcutta and later 
curator at the Philadelphia Museum of Art and professor at the University of Pennsylva-
nia. Alfred Salmony (1890-1958), who studied in Vienna in 1919-1920, was a specialist 
in Chinese art, who worked at the Museum for East Asian Art in Cologne and became 
professor at the Institute of Fine Arts at New York University after his emigration. 
6 ‘Die ostasiatische Abteilung des Kunsthistorischen Instituts der Universität Wien wurde 
1912 gegründet, freilich mit sehr beschränkten Mitteln’. Karl With, Buddhistische Plastik 
in Japan bis in den Beginn des 8. Jahrhunderts (Vienna: Anton Schroll & Co., 1919), vol. 1, 
7.
7 Strzygowski provides a short list of materials and activities of his new East Asian section: 
a collection of photographs of Indian monuments donated by the collector Victor Gobou-
lev, another collection of photographs of Javanese monuments donated by Karl With, 
the Japanese art journal Kokka provided by Otto Kümmel in Berlin, and a research trip 
undertaken by With together with Oskar Vonwiller to Japan, China, Java/Indonesia, and 
Egypt in 1913 that would result in With’s dissertation and from which he brought back 
more photographs as well as Japanese woodblock prints. Further mentioned is that With 
taught a seminar on early East Asian Buddhist sculpture in 1914 based on these materials.
8 Josef Strzygowski,  ‘Das Kunsthistorische Institut der Wiener Universität’, Die Geisteswis-
senschaften 1.1 (1913/14), 12-16. 
9 These members were, as pointed out above, Karl With and Oskar Vonwiller. Vonwiller 
was financing the journey. For an account, see With’s autobiography: Karl With, Auto-
biography of Ideas: Lebenserinnerungen eines außergewöhnlichen Kunstgelehrten (Memoirs 
of an Extraordinary Art Scholar), ed. Roland Jaeger (Berlin: Mann, 1997), 67-85.
10 For instance, Christopher Wood has addressed Strzygowski’s ‘global map of art history’ 
and warns against the danger of repeating Strzygowski’s mistakes, not because they were 
rooted in the racist and imperialist ideologies of the nineteenth century but rather be-
cause of their implicit ‘idealist fallacy’ that privileged a visual comparative approach to 
artifacts of uncertain date and origin without documentation in textual sources in order 
to draw conclusions about the people who had (supposedly) produced them. See Chris-
topher Wood, ‘Strzygowski und Riegl in den Vereinigten Staaten’, Wiener Jahrbuch für 
Kunstgeschichte 53 (2004), 225 and 231.
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11 Jas Elsner, ‘The Birth of Late Antiquity: Riegl and Strzygowski in 1901’, Art History 25.3 
( June 2002), 358-379. 
12 Johann Konrad Ebelerlein. ‘Josef Strzygowski: Gedanken über die Zeitlosigkeit eines Ty-
pus’, in Lukas Madersbacher and Thomas Steppan (eds.), De re artificiosa. Festschrift für Paul 
von Naredi-Rainer zu seinem 60. Geburtstag (Regensburg: Schnell und Steiner, 2010), 81-93. 
13 Julia Kelly, ‘Discipline and Indiscipline: The Ethnographies of Documents’, Papers of Sur-
realism 7 (2007). For a general account of anthropological perspectives in early world art 
history and Strzygowski’s involvement, see Susanne Leeb, Die Kunst der Anderen. Welt-
kunst und die anthropologische Konfiguration der Moderne (Frankfurt, Oder: Universitäts-
bibliothek der Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt, 2013), 239-243. Online resource: 
http://opus.kobv.de/euv/volltexte/2013/80/ (accessed 6 November 2013). 
14 Ernö Marosi, ‘Josef Strzygowski als Entwerfer von nationalen Kunstgeschichten’, in Ruth 
Heftrig et al. (eds.), Kunstgeschichten im ‘Dritten Reich’. Theorien, Methoden, Praktiken 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2008), 103-113.
15 For an analysis of these aspects in Strzygowski’s scholarship, see Suzanne L. Marchand, 
‘The Rhetoric of Artifacts and the Decline of Classical Humanism: The Case of Josef 
Strzygowski’, History and Theory 33 (1994), 106-130.
16 ‘[D]aß sie uns zwingen, endlich einmal die Brücke zwischen Ost und West, Süd und Nord 
zu schlagen und uns bewußt zu werden, daß das Ausbreitungszentrum der Kraft nicht nur 
am Mittelmeere liegt, die Bewegung vielmehr von mehreren Quellpunkten und sehr vielen 
diese originellen Ströme verbindenden Kanälen ausgeht’. Josef Strzygowski, ‘Ostasien im 
Rahmen der vergleichenden Kunstforschung’, Ostasiatische Zeitschrift 2.1 (1913), 8. 
17 Leeb, Die Kunst der Anderen, 240. In addition, Strzygowski clearly articulated the political 
implications of these views for his own time, when he declared that German dreams of world 
domination were simply an expression of a repressed former racial bond with the world. See 
Josef Strzygowski, Die Bildende Kunst des Ostens. Ein Überblick über die für Europa bedeu-
tungsvollen Hauptströmungen (Leipzig: Verlag von Dr. Werner Klinkhardt, 1916), 71. 
18 With, Autobiography of Ideas, 60. 
19 On the history of the Folkwang Museum and its collection, see Hartwig Fischer (ed.), 
‘Das schönste Museum der Welt’ – Museum Folkwang bis 1933: Essays zur Geschichte des 
Museum Folkwang (Göttingen: Steidl, 2010). 
20 On von der Heydt see, e.g., the most recent publication: Eberhard Illner et al. (eds.), 
Eduard von der Heydt. Kunstsammler Bankier Mäzen (Munich, London, and New York: 
Prestel, 2013). On his collection of non-European art, see Sabine Fehlemann (ed.), Asien, 
Afrika, Amerika und Ozeanien. Eduard von der Heydt als Sammler aussereuropäischer 
Kunst (Wuppertal: Von der Heydt Museum, 2002).
21 Karl With, Bildwerke Ost- und Südasiens aus der Sammlung Yi Yuan (Basel: Schwabe & 
Co., 1924). 
22 Karl With, Marc Chagall (Leipzig: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1923). For a complete list of 
With’s publications, see Karl With, Autobiography of Ideas, 389-400. 
23 This aspect of With’s career is currently explored by Marie Yasunaga in her dissertation at 
the University of Tokyo which focuses on Karl Ernst Osthaus’ and Karl With’s exhibition 
concepts and aesthetics in relation to their respective interests in non-Western art. 
24 The trip to Japan and the return journey via China, Indonesia, and Egypt is described in 
With, Autobiography of Ideas, 67-85. 
25 Karl With, Buddhistische Plastik in Japan bis in den Beginn des 8. Jahrhunderts (Vienna: 
Anton Schroll & Co., 1919). The dissertation is dedicated to Karl Ernst Osthaus and 
Oskar Vonwiller. The publication was an unexpected success, primarily because of the 
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photographic documentation of sculptures previously unavailable in European publica-
tions, and a second and third one-volume edition with a shortened text came out in 1920 
and 1922.
26 ‘[ J]ene stilistische Kleinarbeit (zu ergänzen), die unerlässlich für ein aufrichtiges Verstehen ist 
[...]. Dafür versucht sie das Material selbst in den Vordergrund zu stellen und in möglichster 
Vollständigkeit aufzuzeigen und photographisch so wiederzugehen, dass eine gewissermassen 
adäquate Vorstellung möglich wird’ (With, Buddhistische Plastik in Japan, 11).
27 This sculpture – like many others studied by With – is today listed as a National Trea-
sure and believed to be the oldest extant wooden sculpture in Japan. The Yumedono Kan-
non was ‘discovered’ by the American scholar Ernest Fenellosa, who worked for the Japa-
nese government, in 1884. Before, it had been covered up in the temple and is until today 
usually hidden from view and only revealed on specific holidays. For Ernest Fennellosa’s 
discovery, see his Epochs of Chinese and Japanese Art: An Outline History of East Asiatic 
Design (London and New York: Heinemann and Stokes, 1913), vol. 2, 50. For more recent 
research on the sculpture, see, e.g., Lucie R. Weinstein, ‘The Yumedono Kannon: Prob-
lems in Seventh-Century Sculpture’, Archives of Asian Art 42 (1989), 25-48. 
28 The term ‘Tori style’, after the sculptor Tori Busshi (active late sixth to early seventh cen-
tury), was not invented by With and is still used today to identify features of Japanese 
sculpture related to Chinese Northern Wei Dynasty (386-534 AD) Buddhist sculpture. 
Interestingly, similar categories of stylistic categorization are still applied, for instance, 
when describing Tori-style bodhisattvas that are ‘frontally oriented, have slender bod-
ies, oval faces, and drapery that terminates in a zigzag pattern on both sides of the skirt’ 
(Weinstein, ‘The Yumedono Kannon’, 30).
29 With, Buddhistische Plastik in Japan, vol. 1, 198. 
30 ‘[E]s schien mir gefährlich mit einer festgelegten, systematischen Terminologie, die doch 
zum wesentlichen an den Erscheinungen der westeuropäischen Kunst ausgebildet und 
bewertet ist, an einen fremdländischen Kunstbestand heran zu treten...’, (ibid., vol. 1, 
199). 
31 ‘Es war für sie (die wissenschaftliche Kunstforschung) von entscheidender Bedeutung, 
dass sie sich von der Tyrannie des einseitig aufgefaßten Entwicklungsgedankens frei-
machte, der in den Formen archaischen Kunstschaffens nur die primitiven Vorstufen für 
eine im Sinne der natürlichen Anschauung gebildete Kunst sah. Mit der Erkenntnis, daß 
es sich hier um ein prinzipiell anders geartetes Kunstwollen und nicht nur um eine einzige 
durchlaufende Entwicklungsreihe handle, legte sie den Grund für eine Forschung, die das 
Gesamtgebiet künstlerischer Äußerungen zu umfassen und in ihrer Gesetzmäßigkeit zu 
erkennen im Stande ist. Sie wird vornehmlich dazu beitragen, das westeuropäische Be-
wußtsein zu einem wahrhaft menschlichen zu erweitern’ (ibid., 10).
32 ‘With hat die frühjapanische Plastik seit dem Auftreten des Buddhismus gesammelt und 
bietet durch seine Einzelaufnahmen einen Einblick, wie wir ihn bisher kaum für die ital-
ienische Kunst kannten. Nach Ueberwindung der Einflüsse von Indien, China und Korea 
her schwingt sich Japan unter grossen Meistern der Suiko- und Hakuho-Periode zu einer 
grossen Blüte auf, der With durch Untersuchung der Wesensart der einzelnen Kunst-
werke beizukommen sucht’. The original evaluation of With’s dissertation signed by both 
Strzygowski and Max Dvořák is available online from the University of Vienna, URL: 
http://www.univie.ac.at/geschichtegesichtet/images/vertreibung/With/_MG_3247.jpg 
(Accessed 1 November 2012).
33 ‘[D]ass damals in Japan die gleiche Bewegung, Kunst um der Kunst willen, bestanden hat, 
wie etwas in Italien im Quattrocento [...] als wenn in Ostasien in der Zeit seiner Blüte 
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eine ähnliche, geradezu auf wissenschaftliche Begründung des künstlerischen Schaffens 
losgehende Bewegung bestanden hätte wie in der sogenannten Gotik und Frührenais-
sance in Italien’ (Strzygowksi, Asiens Bildende Kunst, 69 and 70).
34 Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, ‘The Origin of the Budhha Image’, Art Bulletin 9.4 ( June 
1927), 287-329. 
35 ‘Wie im Abendlande überall Rom der gebende Teil sein soll, so in Asien überall Hellas. 
Die Verkehrtheit einer solchen Annahme wird nur deshalb nicht empfunden, weil die 
Kunstforschung behaglich in ihrem europäischen Neste hockt, und sich nicht von den 
Anschauungen der Geschichte freimacht’. Josef Strzygowski, Die Krisis der Geisteswissen-
schaften, vorgeführt am Beispiele der Forschung über bildende Kunst: Ein grundsätzlicher Rah-
menversuch (Vienna: Schroll, 1923), 317. Strzygowski had brought up similar ideas earlier; 
an almost identical sentence can, for instance, be found in Josef Strzygowski, ‘Ostasien im 
Rahmen der vergleichenden Kunstforschung’, Ostasiatische Zeitschrift 2.1 (1913), 6.
36 ‘[I]hre Formen wirklich von den Gandhara Bildwerken abgeleitet hätten, so können wir 
nur ihren mächtigen, künstlerischen Willen bewundern, der jene provinziellen wirklich-
keitsnahen Bildwerke auf einen neuen, dem buddhistischen Geiste entsprechenden und 
vertiefteren Ausdruck gebracht haben’ (With, Buddhistische Plastik in Japan, 48). Similar 
statements can be found throughout With’s work on Buddhist art from the early 1920s, 
for instance, in an article on Chinese sculpture in the municipal gallery in Frankfurt (to-
day’s Liebighaus), where he accuses previous scholarship of having falsely chased the 
‘ghost’ of Greek and other influences in Asian sculpture instead of devoting itself to the 
independent values of a foreign aesthetic and spirit. See Karl With, ‘Chinesische Plastik 
in der Frankfurter Städtischen Galerie’, Städel-Jahrbuch 1 (1921), 6.
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8.3 Cross-Cultural Epistemology




European sinology since Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), founder of the Jesuit mis-
sion in China, was occupied with interpreting the Chinese classics, unpacking 
the learned worldview of the elite that adhered to them.1 However, the Swedish 
explorer Sven Hedin’s late-nineteenth-century rediscovery of ancient hidden cit-
ies buried along the Silk Road unleashed a new wave of sinology [Fig. 25]. The 
magnificent collections of Silk Road material that Paul Pelliot, Aurel Stein, and 
Albert Grünwedel then plundered provided European scholars with previously 
unknown source material that the Chinese themselves could not easily consult. 
Hedin’s find sparked a modern direction in sinology and inspired Western sinol-
ogists to travel east for more discoveries. In the same time it sent Chinese scholars 
going the opposite direction.
For a thousand years the Chinese examination system created scholars for 
service in the administration of the empire. The knowledge required prescribed 
a hierarchically ordered world based on relations and personal virtue. But in the 
early twentieth century the sudden fall of this two-thousand-year-old imperial 
system also brought the demise of this regime of knowledge. Before 1905, when 
the examination system was abolished, radical intellectuals had been involved 
in a tug of war with conservative scholars. With the May Fourth Movement 
political demands became clearly coupled with a cultural politics that wanted to 
displace everything old and Chinese. Scholars like Lu Xun and Hu Shi elevated 
the culture and language of the people, reforms that helped the Chinese to im-
agine the nation in a more Western manner.2 The reforms would, of course, also 
radically challenge the formerly exclusive position of the educated elite. With 
this process arrived the formation of a modern humanities based on a secular 
scientific study of man – academic disciplines similar to those in existence al-
ready in the West.
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That many Chinese intellectuals under pressure of Western imperialism dis-
avowed their history and tradition is understandable; but it had its dire effect 
on cultural heritage. The material archive of the Chinese state – the treasures, 
libraries, and document collections relating to the previous six hundred years of 
Ming and Qing rule – came under serious threat. Antique porcelain and other 
valuables were pawned for providing money to run the imperial household and 
then sold off at auctions.3 Eunuchs stole priceless treasures from within the 
vermilion walls while the last emperor himself smuggled out precious impe-
rial objects.4 Even the Inner Chancery archives of the Ming and Qing dynas-
ties were threatened. These priceless documents were stolen, sold, even used as 
scrap papers, until first the antiquarian, Luo Zhenyu, and then the historian 
Fu Sinian intervened.5 In these precarious times neither politicians nor intel-
lectuals could see the value of documents that were pertaining to the history of 
dynastic rule. The empire had become the abject Other for the Chinese mod-
ernizers and in 1928 a member of the Republican government even tried to pass 
a bill to ‘Abolish the Palace Museum and sell or auction off all of the objects 
in the former palace in lots’.6 The proposal was hotly debated and a committee 
was set up to deal with what was regarded as the ‘illicit property’ of the former 
imperial house.7
Fig. 25: Leaders of the Sino-Swedish Expedition studying a map (c. 1927-28): Xu Bingchang 
(also known as Xu Xusheng), professor of history and archaeology at Peking University (left), 
Sven Hedin, the Swedish explorer (center), and Yuan Fuli, a geologist (right). Photo at a private 
collection / The Bridgeman Art Library
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The New Culture Movement that raged from the years of the failed republic 
to the mid-1920s wanted to get rid of old China. Scholars like Gu Jiegang con-
sequently tried to deconstruct the Chinese master narrative. But things were 
about to change. With the catchphrase of zhengli guogu or ‘reorganizing the 
national past’ a countermovement to this iconoclasm appeared. Thus China’s 
history became significant again for the intellectuals. To reconnect with older 
scholarly traditions, national studies (guoxue) institutes were established at a 
number of universities in the early 1920s. This ambivalent manner of both dis-
carding and reviving the tradition is reflected also in its treatment of European 
sinology.
This article evaluates the role of Western sinology for the incorporation of 
the methodology and institutional practices of academic humanities in China. 
Because of a certain politics of knowledge this connection has been occluded. 
With American dominance in the Cold War this sinology with its tradition of 
philology and immersion in other cultures was supplanted with a social science-
oriented area studies.8 For China studies the question of modernization was 
highlighted. First the idea was that the Western challenge set China on the path 
to modernization.9 The Vietnam War ushered in a reaction, bringing forward 
a similarly binary but China-centric approach seeking the roots of moderniza-
tion in internal Chinese factors.10 Postcolonial scholarship now instead focuses 
on the circulation of ideas and practices inside such a colonial modernity and 
breaks down the binaries into a more fluid reality of cross-fertilization of ideas 
and approaches.11 However, postcolonial writers have simultaneously shared the 
Cold War social sciences scholarly movements’ critique of sinology, discarding 
it as simply part of a Western Orientalist project; racist and biased.12 In reality 
sinology served as an important epistemological bridge between cultures. Euro-
pean sinology was the cross-cultural space where an indigenous Asian cultural 
tradition could fuse with Western scientific standards, then be safely repatriated 
and put to service in the project of providing cultural legitimacy to a rejuvenated 
Chinese state.
In the following we will trace how a Chinese anxiety concerning foreign incur-
sions escorted appreciation of the groundbreaking sinological research coming 
from Europe. We will then outline how this challenge was met with ‘national 
studies’ research centers and with scholarly organizations protesting against 
Western research expeditions in China. Finally we will discuss the implementing 
of laws on archeology and the export of antiques, as well as the significance of the 
Academia Sinica’s Institute of History and Philology (IHP) in returning to the 
Chinese scholars their lost prestige.
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 From European sinology to national studies
As Europeans during the disorderly 1920s were pursuing scholarly aims in the Far 
East young Chinese scholars were going the other way. Japan was geographically 
and culturally their closest choice but in the interwar era many also studied in 
Europe. Berlin had a thousand Chinese students in 1924; coming there not solely 
out of scholarly considerations but because inflation made living on a Chinese-
currency scholarship relatively cheap. Others, like Liu Fu and Xu Xusheng, went 
to Paris, which at the time was the world’s capital for sinology.
Some of these students were to become important Chinese historians. Al-
though starting out with natural sciences while studying in Europe they often 
drifted toward sinology and other areas of Oriental studies. The historian Yao 
Congwu studied with the sinologists Otto Franke and Eric Haenisch and also 
worked at the Oriental Institute in Bonn.13 Another remarkable historian, Chen 
Yinke, cooperated with the Orientalists Friedrich W.K. Mueller. Back in China, 
Chen became associated with the French sinologist Paul Pelliot while learning 
more Sanskrit from Baron Stael von Holstein.14 Fu Sinian, the most important 
of the Chinese scholars in shaping the modern humanities in China, also assisted 
Western sinologists. He had set out to study psychology in London but ended up 
studying Tibetan in Berlin. Together with Chen Yinke, Fu Sinian also took sev-
eral courses with the German sinologist Herbert Franke. Eventually, just like his 
compatriots Chen Yinke and Yao Congwu, he returned to China as a historian.15 
So why were these Chinese scholars drawn to study sinology while in Europe?
The first decades of the twentieth century saw the zenith of European colo-
nialism. With the many Western dominions in India and East Asia, Oriental 
studies flourished. European powers needed more knowledge about the foreign 
countries they were set to administer and therefore universities in the European 
capitals founded new positions in Asian languages and culture. The archeological 
sources, libraries, and archives brought from various Asian dominions helped to 
bring about a revival in Oriental studies. Surprisingly then, the Western metrop-
olises of a Paris, London, and Berlin became centers for studying the East. The 
Asian scholars who came there looking for the essence of Western learning were 
simultaneously exposed to the forefront of scholarship about their own countries, 
cultures and civilizations.
While studying abroad many of the Chinese scholars, of course, found out 
how good European sinology had become. In contrast to the financially poor and 
institutionally isolated Chinese scholars, European sinologist had modern meth-
ods and were supported by their universities and museums at home. During the 
chaotic period between the fall of the empire and the full-scale Japanese invasion, 
Westerners also gained access to Chinese source materials. Collecting new source 
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materials and reinterpreting China’s past the European sinologists became a for-
midable threat to native scholars committed to a nationalist cause.
The Chinese scholars finally banded together to protest against this situation. 
They were, however, not just opposed to Westerners conducting research in China 
and of their spiriting away of historical and other artifacts from the country. They 
were also dismayed by the treatment they received from their own government. The 
main reason for setting up the National Scientific Union, for example, was certainly 
to a large extent the dire situation of Chinese researchers themselves. Xu Xusheng 
describes the situation for him and his fellow scholars in the mid-1920s:
Not only did no one support them, but they were even hindered from do-
ing research. At the same time, foreigners came and with their superior 
resources, took what they wanted of our research material! They forcefully 
removed from our country limitless amounts of rare items. If this were not 
stopped, then the future of our ability to undertake national studies [guox-
ue] would suffer inconceivable damage.16
The interest Westerners paid to China’s history had an unforeseen effect. The 
New Culture Movement at first strove to get rid of the Chinese tradition. Now 
appeared a culturalist revival, a return to the purported core of China’s civiliza-
tion and a desire to rethink what actually made up this Chinese nation under 
threat of foreign aggression. An effort of zhengli guogu, of ‘ordering’ or ‘setting 
right’ of the country’s past, was launched. It appears paradoxical at first that many 
of the radical iconoclasts of the May Fourth Movement were involved in this proj-
ect. But as Hu Shi, head of the Qinghua National Studies Institute, explains, the 
zhengli guogu movement wanted to ‘do research like the Western sinologists and 
the Japanese sinologists [zhinaxue] who had learned from the West’.17
It was the radical anarchist turned educational reformer, Cai Yuanpei, who set up 
the first institute for guoxue research. Right after he took position as head of China’s 
first university he turned to the old scholar and mentor of the last emperor, Luo Zhen-
yu for advice. Luo’s only suggestion was to establish an institute for the research of 
antiques (guwu) aimed at halting the exportation of ancient books and antiquities out 
of China.18 Two years later, in 1922, Cai established the first Chinese research institute 
ever, and it was exactly the kind of institute for national studies that Luo had requested.
The Beijing University School of National Studies that Cai Yuanpei set up 
was constructed around five areas. While one concerned the important archives 
of the Ming and Qing dynasties, all the others were on subjects where European 
sinologists had recently proved very successful: First was linguistics, where Bern-
hard Karlgren’s research on Chinese historical phonology – via ancient rhyme 
books and modern dialect studies – was already legendary. Second was archeol-
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ogy, where Johan Gunnar Andersson had recently made the decisive discovery of 
the first ever known Chinese Stone Age culture. Ethnography and folk songs, in 
which the Frenchman Marcel Granet had excelled, became the other two fields 
researched in the Beijing University School of National Studies.19
This dependence on European sinology also shines through in naming prac-
tices. In translations, the center as well as its scholarly journal is denoted with the 
term ‘sinology’. The front page of their bulletin thus featured, below the name in 
Chinese, the subtitle Bulletin de l’institut de sinologie. The Beijing University School 
of National Studies moreover relied heavily on the assistance on European sinolo-
gists and Western institutes of Oriental studies. All except one of the advisory 
scholars of the institute were foreigners. Their bulletin furthermore ran a large 
number of path-breaking works of European sinology in Chinese translation.20
Another famous New Culture figure, Hu Shi became the director of the sec-
ond-most important of these guoxue centers: the Qinghua College Institute of 
National Learning. Just like the Beijing University School of National Studies, 
this institute was run by people returning from Europe with high hopes of the 
nationalist movement. Avant-garde institutions like these two in Beijing were 
thus staffed by a small number of foreign-educated, elite intellectuals with the 
mission to create the China scholars of tomorrow.
In reality then, modern Chinese humanities came about – via European sinol-
ogy – in the form of guoxue, or ‘national studies’. The first classes that Chen Yinke 
taught at the Qinghua College Institute of National Learning were on Buddhist 
Sanskrit texts and a bibliographical course on Western sinology. The first class in 
phonology that linguist Qian Xuantong gave at the Beijing University School of 
National Studies, in 1922 when the school was founded, relied on translations of 
Bernhard Karlgren’s research.21
Facing the competition from Europe, what had originally been an iconoclast 
movement returned to its own semi-sacred historical traditions. So it was that 
when research and education institutes in national studies had been set up in 
China even such anti-classicist scholar as Fu Sinian decided to come back home.22 
His return would prove decisive for the delivery of the new Chinese humani-
ties through the creation of the Institute of Philology and History at the newly 
founded Academia Sinica.23 Its first priority was to challenge the foreigners.
 The Chinese humanities
One of the most important singular events in what would lead to the creation 
of the Academia Sinica, must have been the 1920 discovery of a Chinese Stone 
Age culture by Johan Gunnar Andersson [Fig. 26].24 Based on scientific meth-
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Fig. 26: Johan Gunnar Andersson in China, 1920, photo, East Asian Museum, 
Stockholm
ods and the search for new source material, this archeological discovery promised 
an ‘underground twenty-four dynastic histories’ to some and the possibility to 
finally reorganize China’s early history to others. 25 But at the same time Anders-
son’s theory that the Chinese had come from the west greatly disturbed Chinese 
scholars.26 They themselves lacked the unique new sources that Western scholars 
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like Andersson possessed and could not easily dispute anything. Therefore they 
were helpless in front of new theories on their own civilization that scholars like 
Andersson brought forward.
A second, very important event in the prehistory of the Academia Sinica 
came with the expedition Sven Hedin and German Lufthansa tried to launch 
in early 1927. The Beijing University School of National Studies led a number 
of Chinese scholarly and culture organizations in protests against what they 
suspected to be an attempt to expatriate more source material related to China’s 
history. They finally managed to force Hedin to finance the inclusion of a num-
ber of Chinese scholars in his ten-year project. For the Chinese, this became 
a traveling university where for the first time indigenous scholars could learn 
fieldwork, which in turn gave the budding Chinese scientific community a great 
sense of confidence.27
Only months after the protests against Hedin’s expedition, a Chinese research 
academy was also established. The former president of Beijing University, Cai 
Yuan pei, was chosen as the first director of this Academia Sinica. Cai had, as we 
remember, earlier set up the Beijing University School of National Studies. As all 
this was taking place, Fu Sinian was directing a department for history and phi-
lology at the nationalist stronghold of the Sun Yatsen University. Hearing about 
the Academia Sinica, Fu traveled to Shanghai to see Cai, advising him to include 
also an Institute for Philology and History.28 Fu Sinian had initially been against 
 guoxue on the grounds that it was too concerned with textual exegesis. But as 
has been argued in recent scholarship, Fu was also strongly impressed by Parisian 
sinology.29 Although he regarded the greater part of the Western sinologists as 
charlatans, he highly admired scholars like Paul Pelliot and Bernhard Karlgren.30
When Fu Sinian selected his Academia Sinica staff for an Institute of His-
tory and Philology they were all from Beijing University’s and Qinghua College’s 
Institutes for National Learning. So not only were the research areas that Fu 
Sinian choose for his section of the Academia Sinica the same as those of guoxue 
institutions, but the Institute of History and Philology was actually made up of 
people from such backgrounds as well. Chen Yinke thus took position as head of 
the History section and Zhao Yuanren the Philology section. Both were from the 
Beijing University School of National Studies. Li Ji, who came to head the impor-
tant Archaeology section had worked with the American sinologist Carl Whiting 
Bishop but also taught at the Beijing University School of National Studies.
Under Fu Sinian’s leadership and with generous funds provided by the Nanjing 
government, the Institute of History and Philology became a renewed, better-
funded version of the Beijing University School of National Studies. In contrast 
to its predecessor it was able to launch the kind of source-gathering scientific ex-
plorations that had earlier been the prerogative of Western and Japanese research 
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institutions. In the distraught times Chinese scholarship found itself in the ideas 
of positivism and Quellenkritik had turned into an obsessive occupation with the 
sources themselves. Fu Sinian had been influenced by Rankean Quellenkritik as 
well as positivist ideas when he spent most of his time in Berlin studying Ernst 
Mach. He carried this reverence for the sources when he returned home and Fu’s 
directorship at the Academia Sinica was all about securing new sources.31 With 
the IHP of the Chinese Academy up and running, Fu Sinian managed to secure 
funding to enable Chinese scholars to compete with Western sinologists for ac-
cess to new source material. But a second step was needed in order to limit the 
Europeans’ freedom to scour China for material. The Chinese scholars needed 
to get exclusive right to collect materials in order to research their own cultural 
heritage.
Fu Sinian openly connected the faith of the Chinese nation with how well 
Chinese historians could win back the momentum by controlling the source ma-
terial.32 If the Chinese scholars did not control the sources – which for Fu and 
most positivist Western historians at the time was history – then the West with 
its modern scientific methods and its hold on new sources, would reinterpret 
China’s history to their own liking.33 Fu Sinian expressed the fear of such a situ-
ation in the very program declaration of the Institute for History and Philology 
he was running for the Academia Sinica. Thus the introduction of the first issue 
of their Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology reads:
China is rich in sources on history and philology but the way Europeans 
strive to have them they might soon be difficult to access for us. Despite 
this we have just been sitting with arms crossed watching them getting ru-
ined and disappear in front of our eyes. We are certainly not happy with 
this situation. We are certainly not appreciating how, not just any material 
sources, but scholarly source material is being brought out, sometimes even 
stolen by the Europeans. We decided to engage some fresh approaches to 
deal with this problem, and to secure source material. We have therefore 
set up this Research Institute for History and Philology.34
The young and newly trained archeologist Li Ji shared the concerns of Xu Xu sheng 
and Fu Sinian about how Europeans were acquiring precious Chinese source ma-
terial. However, with his experience of working together with the Smithsonian 
and Carl Whiting Bishop, he centered in on the organized Western collecting of 
material from China. In his memoirs Li Ji thus writes the following on the foreign 
research organizations that had arrived in Beijing during the feeble rule of the 
Beiyang Army:
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Forceful as they were, these organizations became increasingly unre-
strained. With the sole exception of the Geological Survey these enter-
prises were all run by foreign research organizations. These foreigners were 
all richly supported, financially and materially, and they had acquired new 
and accurate methods. Not only did they go after and remove, bit by bit, 
specimens for the natural sciences but also historical, archeological, and 
other source material related to the human sciences fell prey to their eager 
attention. Determinedly, they stormed China, to investigate our language, 
measure our bodies, excavate our as-yet-unearthed antiques, and examine 
our traditional customs. These ‘scholarly sources’ are day after day ‘brought 
out, sometimes even stolen by the Europeans’!35
In the contract that the protesting Chinese academics had forced the explorer 
Sven Hedin to sign, it was stated that all archeological and other material should 
stay in China to be studied by the Chinese. 36 This was an important first step 
for the repatriation of sinology. When Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang 
Army regained control of China and set up a government in Nanjing, a state 
organization for protecting cultural heritage was also established.37 Named the 
Central Commission for the Preservation of Antiquities, it proved quite efficient 
in dealing with some of the well-known plunderers like Sir Aurel Stein, but many 
problems remained with foreign buyers, Chinese tomb raiders, and local attempts 
at excavation.38 Li Ji’s idea of coming to grips with the remaining problems was to 
lobby for a new law about cultural heritage and archeology. From the late 1920s 
he worked hard to bring about regulations to this effect, and in 1930 the ‘Legisla-
tive Yuan’ passed such a decree.39 The ‘Law on Protecting Antiquities’ covered 
historical and archeological artifacts plus fossil remains of plants and species, 
and it made clear that ‘everything buried in the earth, including those parts that 
protrude from the earth, entirely belongs to the state’.40
 Conclusion
Early-twentieth-century European sinology engaged with the Chinese tradition 
but in a context of modern academic humanities and furthermore based their 
scholarship on new sources found inside China. In this way it came to play an 
indispensable role in the establishment of a postimperial discipline of ‘national 
studies’. The national studies institutes of China were staffed with people re-
turning from abroad and they relied on European advisers. These institutes also 
published the works of European sinologists for use in their teaching. The Beijing 
Institute of National Studies was therefore not only the first modern research in-
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stitute in China, but from it – via European sinology – also arose the modern hu-
manities as an academic discipline. It could thus be argued that modern humani-
ties in China were not formed directly by the integration of Western learning in 
the form of academic disciplines like history, philosophy linguistics, etc. Instead, 
it built upon, and then challenged, a European sinology, which was already in 
itself a mix of Western and Chinese scholarship.
Fu Sinian imagined that the European sinologists had begun to despise the 
Chinese scholars, and therefore decided that his institute would become world-
leading in Chinese studies.41 He furthermore argued that although the Western-
ers, together with Japan, excelled in Orientalist studies, the Chinese themselves, if 
only they could control and monopolize the sources, had a chance to reach the for-
eigners’ level and even control research in history, philology, and linguistics.42 The 
IHP under Fu became the synthesis of, on the one hand, a modernist iconoclastic 
positivism and then, on the other, the more classicist zhengli guogu movement. The 
IHP’s focus was on restoring the ties with the past plus protecting Chinese histori-
cal remains, and interpretations, from Western dominance. It had for the first time 
also at its disposal the resources and the will to carry out scientific expeditions for 
new source material. Thus, with Li Ji in the lead, the IHP undertook the Anyang 
excavations, rejecting the ‘doubting the old’ claims of Gu Jiegang, proving there had 
been a Shang Dynasty after all. Other archeological projects that were undertaken 
disputed Andersson’s theory of the western origin of the Chinese civilization.
 With China under the threat of being carved up by the aggressive imperialist 
powers of the day its very history and cultural identity was at risk of expatriation. 
Source material had been shipped away en masse to Europe where Western sinol-
ogists were now chipping away at tradition to create a revised version of Chinese 
history. National studies was a first step in countering this trend and out of it 
grew the IHP. It has been argued that IHP, with its Anyang excavations, was the 
most successful section of the Academia Sinica.43 It brought back to the Chinese a 
national narrative based on a long unbroken history and cultural uniqueness. The 
IHP also launched modern humanities in China, modeled on European academic 
disciplines. Not least importantly, it had taken up the challenge of Western sinol-
ogy, and won. The Chinese scholars had put laws in place claiming the state as the 
owner of archeological and other sources relevant to writing China’s history. The 
indigenous scholarship had at the same time modernized into a row of academic 
disciplines in the humanities, that soon began competing with and surpassing 
European sinology. No longer was China under threat of being represented sci-
entifically by a West in sole possession of crucial source material. In 1932, after 
only four years in existence, Fu Sinian could therefore proudly report back to 
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9.1 Historical Roots of Information Sciences and the 
Making of E-Humanities
Charles van den Heuvel
 Introduction: The making of library and information sciences
Information scientist Christine Borgman in Scholarship in the Digital Age distin-
guishes between data used by natural scientists, social scientists and humanities 
scholars and discusses the implications hereof for their research practices. The 
analysis of these practices in combination with information technology must in 
her view result in an infrastructure for digital scholarship to facilitate distributed, 
collaborative, multidisciplinary research and learning that relies on large volumes 
of digital resources.1 The distinction in data that Borgman mentioned has been 
used as one of the arguments to explain why scholars in the humanities and social 
sciences make less use of digital infrastructures and tools than those in the natu-
ral sciences.2 However, the roots of library and information sciences that emerged 
as disciplines from the end of the nineteenth century onward can be found in the 
humanities and social sciences. Whereas there is a vast bibliography of the his-
tory of information science and technology, only recently a research project was 
set up to uncover the history of computing in the humanities by interviewing 
prominent members of this scholarly community.3 However, a systematic study of 
the e-humanities, similar to one of the humanities by Rens Bod or in ‘The Mak-
ing of the Humanities’ series of which this publication makes part, still lacks.4 It 
goes beyond the scope of this chapter to write such a study. This chapter focuses 
on shifts in the relation between the history of the information sciences and of 
the e-humanities and their common roots.
One of the first historiographical accounts of library science by Henry Evelyn 
Bliss opens with the line: ‘This book should be of interest, we think, to edu-
cators, and philosophical readers who recognize the intellectual and the social 
values of what is termed the organization of knowledge’.5 And according to the 
well-known American philosopher, psychologist, and pedagogue John Dewey, 
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who wrote the introduction to this historiography: ‘It includes questions of psy-
chology concerned with effective, growing assimilation of knowledge and the 
logical and philosophical questions involved in the problem of unity, interrela-
tions and classifications of science’.6 We will demonstrate how in library sci-
ence by the end of the nineteenth century multidimensional representations of 
knowledge rooted in humanist disciplines were gradually reduced and translated 
into more pragmatic terms to serve information retrieval. Furthermore, the im-
pact of methods of the information sciences on the humanities will be discussed. 
Finally, the renewed interest in the information science and in software devel-
opment for more inclusive hermeneutic approaches of the humanities will be 
briefly addressed.
 Classification of the sciences
From Bliss’s historiographical study it becomes clear that the development of 
library science at the end of the nineteenth century was shaped by three inter-
related debates: debates on the classification of the sciences, on evolution and on 
atomist theory.7 For our analysis of changes in the relationships between the li-
brary and information sciences on the one hand and the humanities on the other, 
we just will briefly touch upon the classification of the sciences. The debate on 
the classification of the sciences goes back much further in history, but it got a 
new impetus in nineteenth-century philosophy in reactions to the statements 
of the positivist thinker Auguste Comte. Comte came up with a hierarchy of 
sciences, that historically were depending on each other, running from math-
ematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology to a new discipline, social 
physics (sociology), of which he is considered to be one of the founding fathers. 
Critics such as Herbert Spencer opposed to such a linear and historical sequen-
tial representation of the evolution of sciences and argued that sciences are so 
complex that the relationships can only be explained in a multidimensional way.8 
The discussion on the evolution of the sciences stood in a wider context of the 
nineteenth-century debate on (biological and organic) evolution. Studies in the 
emerging discipline of psychology (Baine, Wundt, Fouillée, Bergson) tried to 
include the evolution of mental order and explored the internal dimension or 
‘psyche’ of man.
Here, we introduce one of the pioneers of modern knowledge organization, 
the Belgian Paul Otlet (1868-1940), whose work stands in tradition of positiv-
ism and who was a close follower of the ideas of Herbert Spencer and Albert 
Fouillée. Moreover, the case of Otlet is interesting because it allows us to follow 
the increasing impact of the natural sciences in library science and classification 
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at the beginning of the twentieth century, in which the focus from knowledge or-
ganization and classification based on philosophical arguments gradually shifted 
toward information retrieval based on mathematical logic.
 Paul Otlet:  
Knowledge organization of ideas and retrieval of facts
Paul Otlet (1868-1940) wanted to bring all the knowledge of the world together in 
order to create a better society, or in his own words a universal civilization. Aware 
of the enormous increase of information, he proposed to replace the system of 
many duplicates of books by microfilms that could be distributed from one cen-
tral office, The Mundaneum, combining a World Library, a World Museum, a 
World Archive, World University and a World Headquarters for International 
Organizations, to smaller units in a global network of documentation. The book 
in codex form would be gradually replaced by other media, in his time especially 
radio, that expressed ideas more conveniently. Otlet suggested that scholars all 
over the word extracted the most valuable information in books and other docu-
ments on bibliographic cards. To this end he, and his colleague Henri La Fontaine 
(1854-1943), founded in 1895 an International Office (later Institute) of Biblio-
graphy. Its first aim was to create a bibliographic database, the Universal Biblio-
graphical Repertory. It grew from about 400,000 entries in 1895 to 11,000,000 
in 1914 and was soon augmented by a Universal Iconographic Repertory and an 
Encyclopedic Repertory of Dossiers.9 To order these databases, Otlet, together 
with La Fontaine, developed on the basis of Melvil Dewey’s (1851-1931) famous 
Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC), the Universal Decimal Classification 
(UDC). Similar to Dewey’s classification, the UDC divided all knowledge into 
ten main classes, numbered from 0-9, instead of using alphabetical orders or let-
ter symbols. This way problems related to semantic differences between natural 
languages could be avoided. Whereas Dewey had developed his classification as 
a practical book-shelving system, Otlet and La Fontaine saw it as a way to un-
derstand and communicate scientific knowledge: The UDC could form a kind of 
universal language of numerical codes,
a veritable new language whose [figures] translate ideas absolutely common 
to the entire scientific world and express them in universally understood 
signs – numbers. In this twofold way the Decimal Classification actually 
constitutes an international scientific language, a complete system of sym-
bolization for science.10
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Different from DDC, the ten classes of the UDC had more subdivisions which 
orders could be changed. Moreover, by using auxiliary signs various relations 
between concepts could be expressed. The result was a nonlinear classificatory 
language. In his article ‘On the Structure of Classification Numbers,’ Otlet wrote 
that: ‘Classification numbers will [...] be complex numerical expressions made up 
of different factors whose respective meanings when juxtaposed will express a 
complex idea after the fashion of compound words in spoken languages’.11
In several studies Otlet has been put forward as a forerunner of the World 
Wide Web. His reseau universel de documentation that aimed at connecting all 
knowledge institutions on a global level has been compared to the Internet, his 
ideas about knowledge production by scholars to that network has been com-
pared to Web 2.0 and his interpretation of the UDC as a multidimensional, non-
linear classificatory language has been compared to hypertext.12 There are indeed 
similarities, but Otlet’s ideas on knowledge organization can be better understood 
within the context of positivism, neoscholasticism, and encyclopedism, which he 
used in a typical nineteenth-century eclectic way. In Paris he studied the modern 
philosophies of the Comtean Positivists and was particularly interested in the 
Synthetic Philosophy of Spencer and Fouillée’s synthetic principle of idée-force. 
In his diary Otlet wrote in 1889: ‘I believe in the great principles of positivism and 
evolution: the formation by evolution of things – the relativism of knowledge and 
the historical formation of concepts’.13
However, despite the fact that Otlet’s views on knowledge organization and clas-
sification are deeply rooted in the nineteenth-century paradigms of the universe of 
knowledge and the order of sciences, they also express his will to go beyond their 
metaphorical meaning and to use the sciences as active instruments to order infor-
mation. Although Otlet adhered as most classificationists of his time to a certain 
hierarchical order of the sciences – ranging in his case from the general science of 
being, ontology, to the science of divinity, theology – his interest herein was not just 
philosophical or theoretical, but foremost instrumental. This becomes clear from 
Otlet’s very early work Something on Bibliography (1891-1892) in which he outlines 
models for bibliographies of law and the social sciences and explains that methods 
from the natural sciences can be useful for fact finding and formulating scientific laws:
The views of natural scientists on the constitution of man and the world, on 
the laws of their organization and development, are no less extensive or less 
imaginative than those of economists and sociologists. But the difference 
between them is that in the natural sciences speculation and interpreta-
tion are secondary and are hardly ever made a-priori. [...] The results of the 
natural sciences are grounded in millions of carefully observed, analysed, 
and catalogued facts.14
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In fact Otlet sees in the empirical approach of the natural sciences a means to 
restore in the future the old scholastic ideal of a vast synthesis of universal knowl-
edge, experience of the human reason and the proper principles of faith that he 
deemed not possible anymore:
The famous Summa of Saint Thomas should be mentioned here as an ex-
ample. It sets forth a complete exposition of all the questions which the 
philosophers of the Middle Ages posed and formulated and answered for 
each question according to the state of knowledge then. Summae are no 
longer possible. The a priori is too far in the past and the empirical method 
has not yet produced enough facts for us to attempt today a new and defini-
tive synthesis.15
Otlet tried to produce sufficient facts by the involvement of scholars and me-
chanical extraction of information from multimedia documents. Scholars would 
work together, assisted by machines, to carry out the complementary operations 
of analysis and synthesis by means of which these elements could be extracted, 
recorded on cards, ordered and recombined mechanically. His view of processing 
information led Otlet to formulate what he called the ‘Monographic Principle’ ac-
cording to which documents are dissected into their informative elements. Otlet’s 
search for the smallest particles of knowledge must be seen in relation to develop-
ments in the sciences at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth century. He stood in direct contact with the Nobel Prize winner for 
chemistry, Wilhelm Ostwald, famous for his atomist debate on the substance of 
the universe with Ludwig Boltzman. Otlet’s Monographical Principle was in fact 
based on Ostwald’s Monographieprinzip, which the latter had described as ‘the 
principle of the independent preservation of smaller pieces of thought’.16  
According to Otlet, the form of book did not correspond with the one of ideas. 
The book was just was just a container of ideas that might be conveyed more ef-
ficiently.17 He envisioned the emergence of a future format of the book in which 
‘each intellectual element, in corresponding to a physical element, will create a 
structure such that any combination of ideas, notions and facts will be possible’.18 
Mechanical operations do not only play a role in flexible (re)ordering knowledge, 
but as well in the retrieval of what we call nowadays data:
Documentation is not limited to recording information but will allow its 
automatic retrieval at any moment it is required; [documentation is] a vast 
intellectual mechanism designed to capture and condense fragmentary and 
scattered information and to disseminate it wherever it is needed.19
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Otlet realized that the reconceptualization of the book also had implications for 
his classification. In effect, the replacement of the book by a database of cards 
required new ways of linking related information chunks (or facets) that were 
dispersed over various cards. The possible links were complex and could in Ot-
let’s view only be organized in multidimensional orders. A poster of April 1916 
with the title Elements de schématique reveals how Otlet is experimenting with 
processes of dissecting books and of multidimensional classification to create a 
semi-mechanical, rotating polygonal card system.20
Otlet is thus describing a new process of flexible information search and 
retrieval that allows for multiple points of contact between cards and the in-
formation inscribed on them, which for him are encoded in the notation and 
combinatorial processes of the UDC as a nonlinear, multidimensional classifica-
tory language. However, there was also the realization that the sheer amount of 
possible combinations hindered information retrieval and that the complexity of 
thought could never be completely captured.21
 Dimension reduction:  
Multidimensional thought and one-dimensional search
Otlet’s experiments with information retrieval in multidimensional displays of 
polygonal cards revealed the complexity of search in a nonlinear way. The In-
dian mathematician Ranganathan, developer of the Colon Classification, another 
multidimensional faceted classification system, described the problem as follows:
Thought is multi-dimensional. But we are one-dimensional beings – that 
is, we still prefer all things to be handled to be arranged in one-dimension. 
[...] This means that classification is essentially a transformation of a many-
dimensional universe into a uni-dimensional, uni-directional one. The ma-
chine tools are expected to perform this transformation.22
The solution to this problem was dimension reduction. In his manuscript ‘Theo-
rie schématique de la Classification’ of 14 December 1908, Otlet describes and 
visualizes the multidimensional reduction of the content of books to one line 
[Fig. 27].
Otlet was well aware that the reduction of dimensions had implications for 
his synthesis. An unpublished manuscript from 1927 in the archives of the Mun-
daneum in Mons (Belgium) reveals that Otlet was studying the implications 
of notions of events in time and space (and in space-time) in the work of the 
philosophers/mathematicians Samuel Alexander, Bertrand Russell and Alfred 
471Historical Roots of Information Sciences
North Whitehead for a synthesis of the knowledge. It was clear to him that the 
universe of ideas and the universe of documents could not be fully integrated yet 
in one synthetic classification.23 This might be the reason why Otlet outlined in 
1928 a kind of shadow classification of knowledge ‘Structure and Classification of 
Knowledge: General Considerations and Synoptic Table’ in which he differenti-
ated between objects, beings, ideas and facts. The distinction between the uni-
verse of ideas and of documents becomes apparent when he describes the purpose 
of the table. Otlet does not want to include this classification of knowledge in the 
UDC, or ‘documentary classification’ as he calls it in this context, but it could be 
used in ‘preparation of its revision’.24
Despite the fact that Otlet realized that vast developments in the sciences 
hindered a synthesis of knowledge, he never gave up his universalist ideals. In 
fact, he believed that the sciences, in particular mathematics, would not just be 
Fig. 27: Visualization from Paul Otlet’s manuscript Theorie schématique de la classification, 14 
December 1908
472 Charles van den Heuvel
instrumental to reach higher levels of abstractions, but would become: ‘a producer 
of concepts that allow us to reason about unperceivable objects and that will spir-
itualize us unceasingly and free us from our senses, to get higher and further’.25 
In short, Otlet was not just interested in mathematical methods of dimension 
reduction to cope with the complexity of his knowledge representations, but be-
lieved that one day mathematics would liberate the human spirit in order to cre-
ate an universal civilization.
 Denial of philosophical conceptions of classification
The most important biographer of Paul Otlet, Boyd Rayward, rightly warned 
not to overestimate the influence of philosophy on Otlet’s work.26 Otlet was cer-
tainly no philosopher and very eclectic in the combination of theories and ideas. 
However, he strongly believed in the need to understand the principles of sci-
ence underlying his classification to come to a synthesis of knowledge. From that 
perspective, the explicitly nonphilosophical interpretation of the UDC by one 
of Otlet’s closest collaborators and leading experts of this classification comes 
somehow as a surprise.27 In his article ‘UDC, What It Is and What It Is Not’, Frits 
Donker Duyvis (1894-1961) argued that Otlet had been eager to give full credit 
to Dewey as the source of the UDC, but that he had changed it fundamentally. 
Those changes to the concept of DDC implied according to Donker Duyvis ‘that 
no philosophical or scientific system could longer be recognized as underpinning 
the UDC’.28 In fact, Donker Duyvis ignored that important characteristics of this 
classification of knowledge, such as universality, multidimensionality, hierarchy, 
dynamics were not just practical, but were underpinned by theoretical, sometimes 
philosophical arguments, based on Otlet’s views on universalist thought and the 
unity of the sciences. Otlet, as we observed, had studied the texts of Comte and 
Spencer on the hierarchical order and evolution of sciences; he had studied the 
ideas of Russell and Whitehead on events in time and space and had tried to as-
sess their implications for a synthesis of universal knowledge.
The denial of the philosophical argument and the reduction of conceptual-
izations of human thought to one dimensional, linear methods in information 
retrieval became more and more apparent in library science, but was also criti-
cized. The early guru of human computer interaction Joseph Licklider observed 
in his Libraries of the Future that most studies of topological and metric space 
analogies (for the greater part written in the domain of information retrieval) 
had focused so far on linear methods, and ‘have little or no consensus even about 
the dimensionality, much less about the identities of the dimensions, of any such 
thing as “information space” or “semantic space” or the “space of knowledge”’.29 
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This dimension reduction in the information sciences did not only affect library 
and information sciences, but would also have an impact on the humanities, 
especially when computer-assisted methods were introduced, and philosophical 
arguments gradually made place for more pragmatic ones.
 Dimension reduction in the humanities
After the computer had proved its capacity in the sciences to analyze large quan-
tities of information and to make complex calculations in a couple of seconds, 
it also gradually made its way in those disciplines in the humanities that were 
looking for meaningful patterns in texts or were trying to support their observa-
tions with quantitative and statistical methods. The Jesuit priest Roberto Busa, 
convinced IBM’s director Thomas J. Watson in 1949 to produce a machine read-
able corpus and concordance, the Index Thomisticus, of the work of St. Thomas 
Aquinas that could be searched using punch cards.30 This way the pioneer of 
computational linguistics fulfilled to some extent the old dream of the pioneer 
of knowledge organization, Paul Otlet, to create a machine-readable Summae 
on cards. In history, quantitative and statistical methods were especially used in 
historic-demographic research and socio-economic history.
Historiographical accounts of these disciplines that became known as historic 
informatics or cliometrics often open with a famous quote from a 1968 essay by the 
French historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie: ‘Dans ce domain au moins l’historien 
de demain sera progammeur ou il ne sera plus’.31 Although many promoters of the 
digital humanities indeed claim nowadays that practitioners in these disciplines 
should be trained in xml code and other software languages, Le Roy Ladurie’s pre-
diction did not come true. Right from the start of the use of computers for quantita-
tive research in history there was severe resistance. The well-known historian Carl 
Bridenbaugh, for instance, formulated in his presidential address to the American 
Historical Association in 1963 his dislike of quantitative approaches in history: ‘The 
finest historians will not be those who succumb to the dehumanizing methods of 
social sciences. [...] Nor will the historian worship at the shrine of that Bitch god-
dess, QUANTIFICATION’.32 But twenty years later even a supporter of computer-
assisted history, Bernard Bailyn, lamented the fact that historians had forsaken the 
general goals of history for ‘severely vision-limiting’ technical problem solving.33
Resistance of historians against the use of computers was followed by pleas 
of practitioners of computer-assisted historical research not to resist any longer 
against the hard methodologies of the sciences. This development is, for instance, 
recognizable in changing attitudes toward the use of geographical information 
systems in historical research. Kemp and Mostern proposed that users of Geo-
474 Charles van den Heuvel
graphic Information Systems (GIS) in historical research followed the example of 
environmental modeling by ‘asking scholars to change their methods to suit tech-
nology, rather than making the technology work for them’.34 Jack Owens turned 
the question regarding the demands of technology around by asking, ‘What do 
historians want from GIS?’, but still recommended that historians experiment 
with the use of algorithms and fuzzy logic. By doing so, they would acquire more 
rigor in their methods to handle the ambiguity and uncertainty in historical re-
cords.35 In a more recent study on the use of GIS in future humanities schol-
arship, David Bodenhamer seeks for the enhancement of this technology with 
spatial multimedia and gaming tools. Such changes in technology would allow: 
‘for an open postmodern scholarship, an alternate construction of history and 
culture that embraces multiplicity, simultaneity, complexity, and subjectivity’.36 
Book artist and digital humanities expert Johanna Drucker suggests that human-
ist scholars give up the visualization techniques borrowed from the natural and 
social sciences all together and develop their own graphic language.37
 Epilogue: Digital hermeneutics and the making of e-humanities
Technology-driven quantitative methods of computational humanities are more 
and more complemented by computer-assisted qualitative approaches that are in-
clusive and embrace complexity, subjectivity, ambiguity and uncertainty as typical 
characteristics of humanities research. After historic informatics and cliometrics 
with their statistical and quantitative methods, we are entering a phase in digital 
history with a comprehensive approach that is labeled as digital hermeneutics. It 
is hardly surprising that this shift is supported by digital historians as becomes 
clear from the digital-born initiative: Writing History in the Digital Age.38 How-
ever, digital hermeneutics does not only belong to the domain of the e-humanities 
or e-history; it is also making its way into the theory and practice of information 
and communications technology. One of the most important advocates of digital 
hermeneutics, the information scientist Rafael Capurro, tries to raise the atten-
tion of IT researchers for hermeneutics, which in his view has both theoretical 
and practical relevance. Digital hermeneutics answers, according to Capurro,
to the call of the digital by making explicit its ontological presuppositions. 
As a philosophic discipline it does not place itself outside history but tries 
to understand the factual present situation in which human existence and 
human thinking is located. It looks for a radicalization of the process of 
self-understanding of human societies that interact with natural and tech-
nical networks and construct complex hybrid living systems.39
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It is probably this complex understanding of human societies that drive large 
companies to include the inclusive, hermeneutic approaches in their software de-
signs. Steve Jobs wrote: “[T]echnology alone is not enough. It is technology mar-
ried with the liberal arts, married with humanities, that yields us the result that 
makes our hearts sing.”40
And IBM started recently a collaboration with the Royal Netherlands Acad-
emy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), the University of Amsterdam and the VU 
University Amsterdam for the creation of a Center for Humanities and Tech-
nology (CHAT) that “combines a set of major challenges in the fields of digital 
humanities and cognitive computing into an ambitious public-private research 
agenda. Its goal, briefly put, is to develop a new generation of computer technol-
ogy that is able to truly ‘understand’ products of the human mind, and past and 
present human activities.” 41
To conclude, classificationists and other early practitioners of library and in-
formation sciences had rooted their theories in the humanities and social sciences. 
When technical information retrieval methods became predominant, philosophi-
cal and social arguments became less prominent or were even silenced. Humani-
ties scholars collaborating with information and communications specialists, es-
pecially in the early computer era, were gently persuaded to follow the rigorous, 
often exclusive methods from the sciences. Only recently have e-humanities re-
searchers questioned reductionist approaches of the sciences and pleaded for the 
development of holistic methodologies standing in a hermeneutic tradition in e-
humanities research. At the same time large players in ICT development try to in-
corporate the complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty of humanities data, methods, 
and practices in their software designs. Both will contribute to the use of digital 
methods and new interpretations in the humanities. It is a prelude of a new phase 
in the making of the humanities, recently described as Humanities 3.0.42
 Notes
1 Christine Borgman, Scholarship in the Digital Age: Information, Infrastructure and the In-
ternet (Cambridge, MA, London: MIT Press, 2007), 31 and 179-226.
2 See, for instance, American Council of Learned Societies Commission on Cyberinfra-
structure for the Humanities and Social Sciences, Our Cultural Commonwealth (2006). 
Available at URL: http://www.acls.org/cyberinfrastructure/OurCulturalCommon-
wealth.pdf. 
3 Julianne Nyhan and Anne Welsh, ‘Uncovering the “Hidden Histories” of Computing in 
the Humanities, 1949-1980: Findings and Reflections on the Pilot Project’, in Digital Hu-
manities 2013: Conference Abstracts University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 16-17 July 2013 (Center 
for Digital Research in the Humanities, 2013), 326-329. Available online at URL: http://
dh2013.unl.edu. 
476 Charles van den Heuvel
4 Rens Bod, A New History of the Humanities: The Search for Principles and Patterns from 
Antiquity to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
5 Henry Evelyn Bliss, The Organization of Knowledge and the System of the Sciences (New 
York: H. Holt and Co., 1929), preface, xi.
6 Ibid., introduction, vii.
7 For relations between library and information science and atomist theory, see Charles van 
den Heuvel and Richard Smiraglia, ‘Concepts as Particles: Metaphors for the Universe 
of Knowledge’, in C. Gnoli and F. Mazzocchi (eds.), Paradigms and Conceptual Systems in 
Knowledge Organization: Proceedings of the Eleventh International ISKO Conference, 23-26 
February 2010 (Rome, 2010), 50-56; Richard Smiraglia and Charles van den Heuvel, ‘In-
teractions between Elementary Structures in Universes of Knowledge’, in Proceedings of 
the International UDC Seminar Classification and Ontology: Formal Approaches and Access 
to Knowledge (The Hague, 2011), 25-40. 
8 Herbert Spencer, The Classification of the Sciences: Which Are Added Reasons for Dissent-
ing from the Philosophy of M. Comte (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1864), 26.
9 W. Boyd Rayward (ed.), International Organisation and Dissemination of Knowledge: Se-
lected Essays of Paul Otlet (Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, Tokyo: Elsevier, 1990), 3-4.
10 Henri La Fontaine and Paul Otlet, ‘Creation of a Universal Bibliographic Repertory: A 
Preliminary Note, 34’, in W. Boyd Rayward (ed.), International Organisation and Dissemi-
nation of Knowledge: Selected Essays of Paul Otlet (Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, Tokyo: 
Elsevier, 1990), 25-50. Originally published as ‘Création d’un Répertoire Bibliographique 
Universel: note préliminaire’, IBB Bulletin 1 (1895-1896), 15-38.
11 Paul Otlet, ‘On the Structure of Classification Numbers’, in W. Boyd Rayward (ed.), Inter-
national Organisation and Dissemination of Knowledge: Selected Essays of Paul Otlet (Am-
sterdam, New York, Oxford, Tokyo: Elsevier, 1990), 51-62, esp. 52. Originally published 
as ‘Sur la structure des nombres classificateurs’, IIB Bulletin 1 (1895-1896), 244-249.
12 W. Boyd Rayward, ‘Visions of Xanadu and Hypertext’, Journal of the American Society for 
Information Science 45 (1994), 235-50; C. van den Heuvel, ‘Building Society, Constructing 
Knowledge, Weaving the Web: Otlet’s Visualizations of a Global Information Society and 
His Concept of a Universal Civilization’, in W. Boyd Rayward (ed.), European Modernism 
and the Information Society (London: Ashgate Publishers, 2008), 127-153; Charles van den 
Heuvel, ‘Web 2.0 and the Semantic Web in Research from a Historical Perspective: The 
Designs of Paul Otlet (1868-1944) for Telecommunication and Machine Readable Docu-
mentation to Organize Research and Society’, Knowledge Organization 36.4 (2009), 214-226.
13 W. Boyd Rayward, The Universe of Information: The Work of Paul Otlet for Documentation 
and International Organisation, FID 520 (Moscow: VINITI, 1975), 20.
14 Paul Otlet, ‘Something about Bibliography’, in W. Boyd Rayward (ed.), International Or-
ganisation and Dissemination of Knowledge: Selected Essays of Paul Otlet (Amsterdam, New 
York, Oxford, Tokyo: Elsevier, 1990), 11-24, esp. 11. Originally published as ‘Un peu de 
bibliographie’, Palais (1891-1892), 254-271.
15 Paul Otlet, ‘Something on Bibliography’, 18.
16 Thomas Hapke, Wilhelm Ostwald, ‘The ‘Brücke’, and Connections to Other Bibliograph-
ic Activities at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century’, in M.E. Bowden, T. Bellardo 
Hahn, and R.V. Williams (eds.), Proceedings of the 1998 Conference on the History and 
Heritage of Science Information Systems (Medford, NY: Information Today), 139-147.
17 Paul Otlet, ‘La Fonction et les Transformation du Livre. Résumé de la Conférence faite 
à la Maison du Livre (14 Novembre 1908)’, Publication XI (Bruxelles: Musée du Livre, 
1909), 23.
477Historical Roots of Information Sciences
18 Paul Otlet, ‘L’Avenir du Livre et de la Bibliographie’, IIB Bulletin 16 (1911), 275-296, esp. 
291.
19 Paul Otlet, ‘Documentation’, IIB Bulletin 12 (1907), 11.
20 Charles van den Heuvel, ‘Multidimensional Classifications: Past and Future Conceptual-
izations and Visualizations’, Knowledge Organization 39.6 (2012), 446-460.
21 Compare: ‘Indeed there is divergence, inexactness, and incompleteness. [...] The Mind 
does no know everything, language does no express everything and the document does not 
register everything. But they intend to do, or should to do so’ (Paul Otlet, Monde. Essai 
d’ Universalisme. Connaissance du Mode. Sentiment du Monde. Action organisée et Plan du 
monde [Brussels: Editiones Mundaneum 1935], xxii).
22 Shiyali R. Ranganathan, ‘Colon Classification and Its Approach to Documentation’, in 
J.H. Shera and M.E. Egan (eds.), Bibliographic Organization: Papers Presented before the 
Fifteenth Annual Conference of the Graduate Library School, July 24-29, 1950 (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1951), 94-105, esp. 96.
23 Mons, Mundaneum, EUM Farde 9 N 63, ‘Relations fondamentales’, 9 April 1928.
24 The Hague, National Library, Archives of FID, Box 95, ‘Andere classificatiesystemen’, MD 
25.49, Paul Otlet Note 2197.
25 Otlet, Monde, 31.
26 Rayward, The Universe of Information, 27. 
27 Charles van den Heuvel, ‘The Dutch Connection: Donker Duyvis and Perceptions of 
American and European Decimal Classification Systems in the First Half of the Twen-
tieth Century’, in T. Carbo and T. Bellardo Hahn (eds.), International Perspectives on the 
History of Information Science and Technology: Proceedings of the ASIS&T 2012 Preconfer-
ence on the History of ASIS&T and Information Science and Technology (Medford, NJ: 
Information Today, 2012), 174-186.
28 Frits Donker Duyvis, ‘The UDC: What It Is and What It Is Not’, Review of Documenta-
tion 18.2 (1951), 99-105: esp. 100.
29 Joseph C.R. Licklider, ‘Council on Library Resources: Bolt, Beranek and Newman Inc.’, in 
Licklider, Libraries of the Future (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), 77.
30 Tony McEnery and Andrew Wilson, Corpus Linguistics: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 20.
31 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Nouvel Observateur, 8 May 1968.
32 Carl Bridenbaugh, URL: http://www.historians.org/info/AHA_History/cbridenbaugh. 
htm. Quantification in capitals by Bridenbaugh.
33 Bernard Bailyn, ‘Annual Meeting American Historical Association’. For these quotes of Briden-
baugh and Bailyn I am indebted to Jan Kok, Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands.
34 Karen K. Kemp and Ruth A. Mostern, First COSIT Workshop on Spatial Vagueness, 
Uncertainty and Granularity (Ogunquit, ME, 2001), 1, available at URL: http://www.
geokemp.net/papers/svug.pdf. It is important to note that such statements about the 
need to adapt historical research to the methodology of the ‘hard’ sciences must be seen 
in context of that period and that the authors might have different opinions nowadays on, 
for instance, the role of technology.
35 Jack B. Owens, ‘What Historians Want from GIS’, ArcNews 29.2 (2007), 4-6; Jack B. 
Owens, ‘Towards a Geographically-Integrated, Connected World History: Employing 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS)’, History Compass 5.6 (2007), 2014-2040.
36 David Bodenhamer, ‘The Potential of Spatial Humanities’, in D.J. Bodenhamer, J. Cor-
rigan, and T.M. Harris (eds.), The Spatial Humanities: GIS and the Future of Humanities 
Scholarship (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 28.
478 Charles van den Heuvel
37 Johanna Drucker, ‘Humanities Approaches to Graphical Display’, Digital Hu-
manities Quarterly 5.1 (Winter 2011), URL: http://digitalhumanities.org/dhq/
vol/5/1/000091/000091.html.
38 Frederick W. Gibbs and Trevor J. Owens, ‘The Hermeneutics of Data and Historical 
Writing’, in J. Dougherty and K. Nawrotzku (eds.), Writing History in the Digital Age 
(2011). URL: http://writinghistory.trincoll.edu/data/hermeneutics-of-data-and-histor-
ical-writing-gibbs-owens/.
39 See for these quotes: Rafael Capurro, ‘Digital Hermeneutics: An Outline’ (2010). Avail-
able at URL: http://www.capurro.de/digitalhermeneutics.html. For the implementation 
of digital hermeneutics in humanities and cultural heritage, see, for instance, Chiel van 
den Akker, Susan Legêne, Marieke van Erp, Lora Aroyo, Roxane Segers, Lourens van der 
Meij, Jacco van Ossenbruggen, Guus Schreiber, Bob Wielinga, Johan Oomen, and Geertje 
Jacobs, ‘Agora Digital Hermeneutics: Online Understanding of Cultural Heritage’, Pro-
ceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Web Science (WebSci’11) (Koblenz, 2011). 
Available at URL: http://www.cs.vu.nl/~guus/papers/Akker11a.pdf. 
40 Walter Isaacson, Steve Jobs (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 527.
41 Sally Wyatt (KNAW) and David Millen (IBM) (eds.), Meaning and Perspectives in the 
Digital Humanities. A White Paper for the establishment of a Center for Humanities and 
Technology (CHAT), (Amsterdam: KNAW, IBM, University of Amsterdam, VU Univer-
sity Amsterdam, 2014), 5.
42 Rens Bod, Het einde van de geesteswetenschappen 1.0. Oration: University of Amsterdam, 
14 December 2012. URL: http://www.oratiereeks.nl/upload/pdf/PDF-1433Weboratie_
Rens_Bod_-_def.pdf. 
9.2 Toward a Humanities of the Digital?
Reading Search Engines as a Concordance 
Johanna Sprondel
 Introduction
In their seminal paper ‘The Verbal Concordance to the Scriptures’ from 1974, 
R.H. and M.A. Rouse characterize concordances to the scriptures to be ‘not only 
one of the earliest but probably the most important [technical aid], because its 
system of reference, its method of compilation and its successful application of 
complete alphabetization were used by generations of later tool-makers’.1 To what 
extent this holds true for more recent inventions, such search engines, and more 
specifically web search engines, is the question I shall address in this paper: Can 
we consider Google & Co. as concordance?
I will begin by examining the term ‘concordance’ (1), the use of which has 
increasingly broadened over the last centuries. Deriving from the Latin con-
cordare (to agree, be united, harmonize), the implications of ‘concordance’ 
moved from Samuel Johnson’s definition ‘a book which shows in how many 
texts of Scripture any word occurs’2 toward a more extensive meaning. Today, 
the term is commonly used in disciplines such as law, politics, cosmology, ge-
netics, mathematics, psychology, medicine, linguistics, and grammar. I shall 
concentrate on the implications of the term following from Johnson’s above-
quoted definition and what we would commonly refer to as a concordance in 
philology, theology and literary studies. What unites all these usages through-
out the disciplines, however, is a sense of harmonization, reflecting the term’s 
Latin roots with respect to content, interests, ideas, data or methods.3 In a 
second step, I will focus on search engines (2). Although the history of com-
puterized search engines is a recent one, I will show how the pattern of search, 
the harmonization of information, and the idea behind search engines is on 
the one hand congruent with that of concordances, while on the other hand 
it significantly differs from the latter (3) and will conclude with some brief 
remarks on how, nevertheless, comparisons like this might give us insights 
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on the understanding of digital developments and should encourage a critical 
comparison of practices (4).
 Concordance and the idea of harmony
Johnson’s definition may be seen as an abbreviation of what we find in Alexan-
der Cruden’s preface to the first complete and perhaps best-known concordance 
to the Holy Scriptures in English, published in 1737,4 where he defines the term 
as
an Index to the Bible, wherein all the words used through the inspired writ-
ings are ranged alphabetically, and the various places where they occur are 
referred to, to assist us in finding out passages, and comparing the several 
significations of the same word.5
This definition characterizes the function as well as the capacity of a concor-
dance, also hinting at the incentive that made many authors write concordances. 
While we can see the finding of a passage by using a concordance as a direct func-
tion of it, it is the indirect function – the comparison and interpretation of dif-
ferent applications of a word – that makes concordances an indispensable instru-
ment for textual criticism in numerous fields of research and, as Rouse and Rouse 
remarked, a source for numerous systematic and methodological approaches. To 
understand the core meaning of the term, it seems advisable to approach it from 
an historical perspective.6 The term concordance was first introduced into the 
English language in 13877 when John of Trevisa translated Ranulf Higden’s Poly-
chronicon (1327 or 1343).
[Innocent IV] putte honest and noble persones in þe cardinales see þat were 
voyde. He made cardynal frere Hewe of þe ordre of Prechoures, þat ex-
pownede al þe bible, and made a greet concordaunce uppon þe bible (VIII. 
235)
These lines refer to what is assumed to be the first known concordance: most 
likely around 1244, a word index to the Vulgate, named Concordantiae Sacrorum 
Bibliorum was completed that began under the instructions of Hugh of Saint-
Cher (Frere Hewe). After providing a critical edition of the Bible (Sacra Biblia 
recognita et emendata, around 1236) and planning to write a commentary on the 
same,8 Hugh realized that an index of the words occurring and the places of their 
occurrence was required to compare different passages and to see whether the 
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meaning of the words altered in these.9 He produced a sheer word index, an index 
verborum: a concordance of the simplest kind.
To understand the implications of the term concordance though, it is note-
worthy that John of Trevisa not only translates, but coins the term concordance 
in a way that points to ‘biblical criticism’.10 In order to understand why, we need 
to look at what John of Trevisa translates as ‘concordance’: Ranulf Higden writes 
‘et magnas super bibliam concordancias compilavit’, what we might translate as 
‘and he has brought together many agreements all over the Bible’. A single concor-
dancia, a medieval formation of the participle concordare (to agree), is to be seen 
as a bundle of two or more passages where the same word appears in Scripture, 
making the plural a collection of these bundles in a book. And in this broad 
sense the term had in fact been used before, e.g., for the lists Langton prepared in 
his glosses and that he named concordantia.11 But differing from what the plural 
‘magnas [...] concordancias’ might suggest, John of Trevisa explicitly speaks of a 
single agreement, turning Hugh’s Concordantiae Sacrorum Bibliorum into a certain 
concordance.
Being merely a list of the words in the Bible with references to their location, 
when Hugh completed his work in 1244, John of Trevisa’s interpretation of the 
term would have seemed somewhat inept. But when John completed the transla-
tion of Hidgen’s work in 1397, the Concordantiae Sacrorum Bibliorum had indeed 
become a concordance, mainly owing to the work of three English monks who 
had not only revised and added quotes of the passages in question to the refer-
ences of the work of Hugh but had basically produced a new concordance the 
Concordantiae Anglicanae – that was nevertheless commonly received as a ‘second 
edition’ of Hugh’s work. Furthermore: John of Trevisa, knowingly or not, boarded 
a ‘hermeneutic-semantic’ train that, for example, changed the title of Gratian’s De-
cretum from Concordia discordantium canonum into Concordantia discordantium 
canonum.12 And it is idea that Cruden identifies as the gist of a concordance that 
moved more and more into the focus: ‘interpreting Scripture, namely [...] com-
paring one Scripture with another’.13
Starting with Hugh of Saint-Cher’s work, concordances to the Bible, both 
verbal and topical but also marginal, became increasingly common and were 
produced in almost every language considered ‘franca’. Along with this came a 
broader acknowledgement and awareness of the functions and possibilities that a 
concordance offered: a ‘key to the knowledge of the scripture’14 and a ‘higher truth’, 
an idea that is reflected throughout the history of concordances and perhaps in 
the most allegorical way by Isaac Nathan ben Kalonymus, who in the fifteenth 
century made a Hebrew Concordance of the Bible that he called not ‘Concor-
dance’ but Meïr Netib, which is Hebrew for ‘Light to the Path’.15 In the introduc-
tion (Petih. at Meïr Netib) Nathan explains that a Hebrew concordance was long 
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due to allow the Jewish to benefit from a system that made the central text of a 
whole culture (the Holy Scripture) and its information easier accessible and thus 
easier interpretable. He also explains that he chose to do a Hebrew concordance 
in order to be able to argue with his Christian adversaries more easily.16
Moreover, a reflection upon the method, its choice, and a justification of which 
words were chosen became part of most introductions. A critical and guiding sum-
mary is given by Kenneth McKenzie in his considerations upon concordances on 
the works of Petrarch and Dante:
[I]t must be borne in mind that the editor is not presenting the results of an 
investigation, but a work which will be referred to, whether incidentally or 
systematically, for certain information; hence he should keep his own per-
sonal judgment as much as possible in the background, and should arrange 
the material in the most natural and practical way. In a word, the arrange-
ment most convenient for practical use is the most scholarly. The editor 
should then introduce no system of classification except on a universally 
accepted basis, such as the order of the alphabet, or, as the case may be, the 
actual order of occurrence in the text.17
I shall not further depict the development of concordances in detail here, since 
the focus of this paper lies on the concept, method and idea behind concordances 
rather than on their historical development. It goes without saying that Johannes 
Gutenberg’s innovation around the year 1439 not only radically changed the ‘book 
market’ but also allowed concordances to be more widely spread, letting them be 
present in many churches – often ad usum communem – most monasteries and 
surely fostering exegesis. And in the course of political and social development of 
that time and especially during the Enlightenment, when the litterae humaniores 
became increasingly popular, it was suggested that not only Scripture should 
enjoy the privilege of being furnished with a concordance. Over two centuries 
the emphasis shifted more and more from clerical writings to other types of lit-
erature, and the conviction grew that not only the Bible and religious texts were 
books in which every word counted.
But while this widening of the ‘canon’ of works supplied with concordances is 
mostly of interest in terms of a change in the history of ideas, one might say that 
the next milestone in terms of the practices of composing a concordance is to be 
seen in the advent of computing and especially latent semantic indexing, devel-
oped by the French mathematician Jean-Paul Benzécri. Making a concordance 
became significantly easier, and works as well as authors that until then had not 
been recorded were provided with a concordance,18 but, of course, the ‘classics’ 
were among those who first were digitized and consequently furnished with con-
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cordances in the late 1960s.19 Scholars were quick to agree that digital concor-
dances offered a tremendous gain, and their multiple applicability surfaced with 
the turn in the so-called ‘Dead Sea Scrolls controversy’: Scholars were granted 
only limited access to the scrolls discovered in 1947. In 1991, Michael Abegg used 
a complete concordance of all Scrolls from the 1950s that lists every usage of every 
word appearing in the scrolls, including the words that flank it on either side and 
the name of the scroll where it appeared. By an invert use of this concordance, 
Abegg reconstructed the parts that, until then, had remained unpublished, pro-
gramming his computer to identify overlaps of ‘word strings’, and to assemble 
these into larger groupings.20 A work that would have taken Hugh and his monks 
years to complete, once the passages were entered into the computer, took Abegg’s 
Mac SE ‘less than 15 minutes’, as he explained.
As a preliminary conclusion, we may sum up the key characteristics of a concor-
dance in the following way: A concordance – and as the ideal type we shall define 
a complete concordance – is, first of all, a tool that enables us (a) to search for 
the occurrences of words or subjects in a text. It thereby allows us (b) easier ac-
cess to works. To support this, a concordance should (c) be based upon a system 
of classification on a universally accepted basis. We may use the results of our 
search (d) to identify certain passages and even writings. Also they grant us (the 
user) the possibility (e) to compare, upon this basis, dispositions of words and 
then (f ) to interpret the latter or even a whole work. Thus a concordance should 
(g) be objective and neutral. As for the subject matter of concordances, we may 
furthermore note that concordances mostly exist for (h) major works or major 
authors of a culture.
 Searching the Web: Index, corpus and engine21
The history of web search engines began in 1990, when the World Wide Web 
still consisted of a manageable amount of websites. A simple directory would 
then serve all purposes and the content of pages could be searched manually. 
With an ever-growing number of websites, documents, pictures and other data 
sets available online, search engines were needed that not only displayed all pages 
available, but also their specific content, making the latter a concern of the search. 
Furthermore, with the growth of the overall amount of data, searches that would 
fit the request of the user became more important, while also the time needed for 
an individual search became an issue (which is, for example, why a Boolean search 
that would list every single occurrence of a word turned out to be no longer man-
ageable).22 Also sign-n-grams23 are no longer a basis in web-based search engines, 
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which they were earlier and still are, for instance, in archives where manuscripts 
are scanned and converted to digital documents by OCR. We therefore have to 
face the fact that the results of a query may be detailed, but are never a complete 
record of what could be found – and what we find varies widely, also due to a 
highly unstable corpus.
Web-based search engines such as Google, Yahoo!, Bing and others used today 
operate in three steps – web crawling, indexing, and searching – and only in the 
last of these steps is the user involved directly. These operations, to put it simply, 
rely on two basic concepts: an (inverted) index24 and an algorithm. The World 
Wide Web is crawled regularly, that is, it is systematically browsed, and whatever 
the crawler (a.k.a. the spider) finds is stored in an index. While the inverted index 
is a record of all words existing in all documents available with a notation of their 
location, the algorithm takes care of these being interpreted in a relevant and (for 
the user) satisfactory way once a search is placed. This user query then results 
in a list of search results, the so-called hits, that are sorted following numerous 
heuristic factors, described in the case of Google by the term PageRank25; one 
might mention stochastic factors like the proximity of words searched and the 
number of their occurrence in a document or website, the number of links that 
refer to documents or websites available, the number of clicks a website or docu-
ment has received so far (documented in a ‘query log’), but also an estimation of 
the relevance of the site as a whole and other criteria, to most of which we remain 
ignorant. The aim of a search engine is to make results available as fast as possible 
and, at the same time, to match the query as close as possible, thereby following 
the ‘principle of least astonishment’ (POLA/PLA). The POLA is based on the 
idea that users already have a certain knowledge of what they are searching (oth-
erwise they would not search for it26) and therefore a search result should meet 
their expectations, which is one of the reasons why data of the users’ queries is 
saved and introduced as a factor to future queries.
The fulfillment of these aims demands several preconditions and concessions. 
One is the availability of an index server that keeps at hand all the information 
needed, so that the search engine does not have to search the World Wide Web 
itself for the information queried again and again but can fall back on a stored 
index. Considering that the World Wide Web is a constantly growing, neither 
already nor yet complete and thus unstable corpus, the problem of information 
stored on the server expiring or not being available is obvious. Another problem 
consists in limitations. Beyond the fact that a search result never covers every 
incidence of the word queried for, the words searched for are not necessarily iden-
tical to the actual keywords entered in the query: firstly, ‘stop-words’ (in, on, of, 
the, single numbers or letters and more)27 are ignored, i.e., not indexed; secondly, 
search engines rely on a so-called ‘similar words match’, based on the linguistic 
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method of stemming.28 Stemming is the (computer-)linguistic term for reduc-
ing (inflected) words to their stems or root forms and searching for these as well 
as for all its possible inflections and even derivative morphemes; e.g., the stem 
of ‘children’ would be ‘child’, possible results therefore might include ‘children’, 
‘childish’, ‘childlike’ but might also include ‘childless’ or ‘childe’ and are stored on a 
‘lookup table’ on the server. This not only implies a search for words beyond their 
grammatical setting but also leads to a broadening of the results that treats the 
different inflections and derivative morphemes synonymously.29 In contrast to a 
search engine working with a closed set of data that refers to a limited indexed 
corpus and therefore limits the field of results to the possible words, a stemming 
algorithm that is introduced to a corpus like the World Wide Web tends to be 
either over- or understemming words,30 owing to the fact that the algorithm does 
not necessarily retain stem words in the semantic relation to inflected word in its 
index.
Finally, it should be mentioned that search engines do depend on the user. 
Not only does a search engine save the queries of users and the choices they made 
from the results offered and learns from this. Also the correct use of operators by 
users leads to more detailed and exact results and therefore alters future results, 
helping the search engine to interpret (1) the user’s query and (2) the index in the 
light desired by the user.31
We may thus note the following key features for web-based search engines: 
Web-based search engines pursue the goal to (a) search the World Wide Web 
for a keyword or a set of keywords. They thereby (b) put the material available 
into an order. The search is (c) based on an index that is produced by the crawl-
ers that are part of the system of the search engine itself. The way the (d) index 
is searched and results are given relies on an algorithm that is not fully known 
to the user. Therefore (e) the user is not searching the index himself, recurring 
to his own means and criteria of interpretation, but (f ) the search engine is an 
agent. Keywords are furthermore (g) limited and (h) altered due to stemming 
and other processes. Search engines tackle (i) a constantly changing corpus but 
are ( j) able to ‘learn’, i.e., to implement information gathered from earlier search 
processes.
 Same but different:  
Retrieving knowledge, scraping information and sorting data
Against this background, and the two sets of key features in particular, several 
parallels can be drawn between concordances and search engines. First of all, we 
may state that the World Wide Web is, although it is not a major single work of 
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our culture, the most present medium of our times. If we understand the World 
Wide Web as a (possibly unstable) corpus, it would therefore deserve, we may 
argue, a concordance, ‘a book which shows in how many texts of scripture any 
word occurs’, to return to Johnson’s definition once again. As a matter of fact, the 
search engines that compile data since the 1990s (and in the way we know today 
since approximately the year 2000) surely allow us an easier access to works or 
information by enabling us to search for the occurrences of words or subjects, for 
the material available on the World Wide Web. As frequently proven, web-based 
search engines enable us to identify passages and even writings by entering key-
words.32 So they in many ways serve as a form of concordance already, allowing 
the user to use the results for further purposes, such as interpretation. Thus if 
we take into account what, on a surface level, search engines do, it appears that 
they are a concordance of the World Wide Web. If, furthermore, we consider that 
from the material available on the World Wide Web, most existent concordances 
and many others could be compiled by using search engines, it seems that we may 
even consider web-based search engines the concordance par excellence. Or, at 
least, a highly potential concordance.
Having said this, it is just as vital to point out the profound differences be-
tween concordances and search engines, some of which become clear if one con-
siders the operating methods of both, others if one looks at the idea underly-
ing their concept. Many of these differences might be seen marginal in everyday 
usage; however, when we ponder the question whether a search engine may be 
referred to as a concordance, these aspects require scrutiny.
I shall start with the limitations applied to the actual content of the query it-
self and the problems that arise from it. As pointed out earlier, search engines, by 
means of stemming or of not indexing stop-words, modify the search to improve 
its results. Unless put into inverted commas, the keyword is altered through 
stemming or even ignored when being a stop-word. Now, considering that one of 
the denotations of a concordance – and in fact the incentive for the very first one 
– was that the different usage of words throughout a work could be compared, 
we recognize this as a central disagreement between the two concepts. The same 
holds for the tackling of stop-words. Articles, particles, conjunctions and other 
small but often-used words would surely downsize the relevance of the results of 
a search-engine search. But historically, as we have seen before, and also semanti-
cally, they are essential.33 Moreover, it would be erroneous to think that a search 
engine allows us to search strings that are not presorted in a ‘lexematic’ or even 
‘semantic’ way. Yet again: if a concordance is an instrument for interpretation and 
answering questions on the text or the content underlying it rather then about it, 
the precision as much as the complete and equal representation of a corpus must 
be considered essential.
487Toward a Humanities of the Digital?
As for the resorting to an index listing all words and the pages on which they 
occur, we touch on another problem that leads us beyond the materiality of the 
search engine or the concordance itself, approaching the actual idea that is behind 
a concordance. We might state that the index that is retrieved by a crawler and re-
sorted to by the search engine when a user conducts a query can be understood as 
a concordance. But we have to be aware of the fact that this turns the search engine 
itself into a kind of intermediary between the index/data and the user (who enters 
the query). The task of this intermediary agent is then to interpret the query as well 
as the matches in the index, which at times – as with any intermediary agent – can 
be a challenge. In fact, it can be so in multiple ways: firstly, the bigger and more open 
to changes a corpus, the broader are its results and the more it is likely, in compari-
son to a search in a concordance that is applied to a single corpus or a limited field, 
to come up with numerous results that might not fit the query. While the ‘user’ of a 
traditional concordance might, for example, just search for the word ‘honor’ and its 
occurrences in Troilus and Cressida using a concordance of Shakespeare’s complete 
works, the user of a search engine is depending on the search engine to interpret his 
query in that intention and to show her twenty-two appearances of the word – in-
stead of an interpretation on the question of honor in the play, which is all that ‘my’ 
Google offers me for the first thirty-eight results. In fact, this makes obvious, again, 
the problem of displaying information that can be found in the text or the content 
underlying it as opposed to information about it. At the same time, an engine that 
corresponds to a large, ever-changing corpus is supplied with an algorithm that 
evaluates the user’s picks, and learns. So can the user: every search engine can be op-
timized by the user’s effort to learn how to use operators correctly and therefore get 
more detailed and exact search results. So overall search results can be ‘improved’ 
– which is, of course, not the case in a concordance, but there would be no need for 
it anyway, assuming it was sufficiently assembled and the canon established. And 
it would furthermore not be in the interest of a concordance to represent previous 
searches and filter the results in favor of these.
Secondly, the interpreting intermediary agent can be bribed, which neither 
the concordance nor its author nor its user are likely to be. The objective and 
universally transparent and understandable criteria mentioned before dictate a 
concordance to be sorted in an alphabetic order. The order of the listing of the 
passages would then be defined by the position of the occurrence in the book, 
etc. In web-based search engines, this is not the case. However, the intermedi-
ary agent may try to interpret the query and the index on a neutral basis, so the 
index is constantly under attack by external parties who try to improve their own 
presence in the search result rankings, due to the fact that the higher an entry is 
listed the more often it is clicked by a user.34 Search engine optimization (SEO) 
is a flourishing area of business. Therefore, in this respect as well, search engines 
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do not seem to be objective scholarly concordances but highly hierarchical ones. 
This, in a way, makes their use much less deliberate than we might wish it to be. 
Although this is only one aspect, it seems to be a substantial one.
From what has been said it also becomes clear that a web-based search en-
gine not only does not distinguish between primary sources and works that are 
already an interpretation, but Google’s latest developments, the so-called ‘knowl-
edge graph’, goes even one step further by actually conveying the user that this is 
‘the truth’: Offered as an extra search result, displayed in an emphasized way this 
search result seems immune to interpretation – an idea that stands in opposition 
to the concept of a concordance.
 The potential of reading search engines as a concordance
As of June 30, 2012, the number of World Wide Web users was calculated to 
be 2,405,518,376, which at that point equaled 34.3% of the overall population of 
the world. 67.7% of the online population were physically living in Asia, Europe, 
or North America, in the latter with almost 80% coverage in the population.35 
Given the fact that the indexed web contains at least 14.48 billion pages36 today 
and is continuously growing, it may appear that we are looking at an infinite, 
unsorted, unmanageable, and, even more important, not understandable amount 
of information. Thus it is hardly surprising that a search engine, namely Google, 
is by far the most visited website in global rankings, receiving over 2,000,000 
queries per minute,37 suggesting the impression that most of the world’s popula-
tion is hardly able to imagine using the World Wide Web without using search 
engines – maybe simply because they are overwhelmed by the amount of data and 
information available.
Such an interpretation in the face of new technologies has been dramatically 
declared by authors such as Neil Postman. The dissemination of information, ac-
cording to Postman, is nowadays (and this still holds today) no longer the problem; 
instead, he argues, the problem today is ‘how to transform information into knowl-
edge, and how to transform knowledge into wisdom’,38 knowledge being defined as
organized information – information that is embedded in some context; in-
formation that has a purpose, that leads one to seek further information in 
order to understand something about the world. Without organized in-
formation, we may know something of the world, but very little about it. 
When one has knowledge, one knows how to make sense of information, 
knows how to relate information to one’s life, and, especially, knows when 
information is irrelevant.39
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Besides brooding fears among scholars of vanishing paper work, libraries and 
corpora,40 the biggest problem that I see, however, seems to be connected to the 
‘users’ and a losing of the ability to make sense of what is left when there is ‘just’ 
data – or even information – and concerns understanding and making sense 
of information and turning it into knowledge. Applications as the ‘knowledge 
graph’ are actually supporting the approach that a search engine as an agent 
can supply information that seemingly lies beyond interpretation. That users 
accept this as factual knowledge might be a consequence of an increasing lack 
of procedural knowledge on how to retrieve, and critically review, the informa-
tion provided; for example, by applying long-learned practices of research and 
interpretation. But it may just as well be a lack of awareness that the results we 
are offered by web-based search engines such as Google are neither objective 
nor based on a fully transparent methodological approach. Moreover, there may 
be a lack of awareness of the fact that the search engine is already offering an 
interpretation of the listings found in an index: The search results represent a 
statistical harmonization rather than a harmonization reflecting the meaning or 
the content as a concordance would. Again, a simple example might come from 
Shakespeare: In his play Troilus and Cressida the word ‘lord’ comes up a hundred 
times, the word ‘honor’ twenty-two times, ‘ love’ appears fifty times, but ‘hier-
archy’ is not used once. As a result, it seems, the index in a concordance would 
possibly categorize the play as being mainly about a lord (or lords), about the 
experience of love, somewhat less about honor, and not at all involving hierarchy 
– an inaccurate assessment to be sure.
Without doubt, the World Wide Web is an outcome of the technologies that 
are as well a representation as an expression of our current culture. Of course, it 
is one of the basic ideas of cultural studies and the social sciences that the change 
of culture and society are connected to the change of technologies (Innis, Ben-
jamin). Media are no longer only instruments to spread or to bear information 
but ‘apparatuses’ (Benjamin), ‘codes’ (Flusser), ‘dispositivs’ (Foucault), ‘extensions’ 
(McLuhan), or Aufschreibesysteme (Kittler), to mention but a few approaches, 
and thus are themselves sources of cultural, scientific and social practice whose 
influence we can not ignore but approach in a way that valuates them as such. 
Criticism geared toward the digital humanities and the practices of the ‘digital 
age’ is mostly concerned with its methods, its phenomenological and psychologi-
cal impact, and the focus that is put on pure data rather than what one might call 
content; finally, many scholars question its reliability and sustainability (most 
prominently by Fish, Fitzpatrick and Ramsay). So far, however, neither the crit-
ics nor the champions of the field have exhaustively addressed the possibility 
that the effects of the digital technologies on the humanities and scholarship 
more generally their new ‘learned practices’ and ‘habits’, can be considered as no-
490 Johanna Sprondel
table features able to reflect the changes and impacts themselves. Precisely this, 
to compare the practices of the ‘traditional’ humanities to those of the ‘digital’ 
humanities in order to better understand the shifts and changes that the transi-
tion from one to the other produces, is an approach I think valuable if we want to 
grasp not only developments in a ‘digital age’ but also a ‘making of the humanities’ 
as we experience it today. Rather than merely celebrating out or criticizing the 
assumed potential of a great renewal that can counter the often presumed ‘crisis 
of the humanities’, the task might be to produce a genealogy of methods and their 
media. To me it seems promising to not only assume an ‘exceptional promise for 
the renewal of humanistic scholarship [...] enabled by networked, digital environ-
ments’41 but to approach new technologies using older ideas and concepts42 now 
hidden behind them in order to see both of them in a different light: Models and 
practices such as, for instance, concordance, but also, for example, source criticism 
have lost nothing of their significance. And they correspond to practices and tech-
niques on the Web and in digital technologies (such as search engines, the Text 
Encoding Initiative (TEI), topic models, stylometrics, to mention but a few); at 
the same time, however, they can serve to make problems and derivatives in meth-
odologies and interpretations of both, the digital humanities and the humanities, 
transparent. Turning around the convoluted project of the digital humanities and 
ask for a new ‘humanities of the digital’,43 comparing practices of the humanities 
with the altered forms that result from the mingling with digital practices and the 
influence of multifaceted technological innovations seems promising, also to ana-
lyze concepts of knowledge and understanding in the ‘digital age’.
My claim would be to approach new technologies using the idea behind, for 
example, a concordance as a vehicle. We may surely consider the results as bun-
dles that have been nicely brought together, each with a title and indication of the 
source, the webpage – ‘Google, qui magnas super World Wide Webem concordan-
cias compilavit’, we may say – but only to continue, putting the results into a rela-
tion to our query and interpreting and scrutinizing these bundles as carefully as we 
would the indices of Frere Hewe, Cruden and others; and from there, turn to the 
passages displayed and again start to search for meaning. Because that, the Erkennt-
nis des Erkannten (in the words of August Boeckh), will always be on us, the users.
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9.3 A Database, Nationalist Scholarship, and 
Materialist Epistemology in Netherlandish 
Philology
The Bibliotheca Neerlandica Manuscripta from 
Paper to OPAC, 1895-1995
Jan Rock1
The history of digital humanities may seem relatively short. The study of culture, 
history and humanity appears to have been affected by digital culture and net-
worked computers for only about two decades. That is why usually not the past, 
but the future of digital humanities is discussed, conversation being flavored with 
possibilities and promises: greater convenience for scholarly labor, and increased 
speed in the consultation of data, the massive accessibility of which would enable 
the humanities to deal with their scientific arrears.
Yet already in 1902, similar ideas incited the Belgian philologist Willem De 
Vreese to address the Royal Flemish Academy of Language and Literature in 
Ghent. He questioned the competence of most vernacular philologists in reading 
old types and hands. ‘Of course I do not intend to maintain’, he said to his fellow 
members,
that there would be no students of Dutch who can read Middle Dutch man-
uscripts. Enough of them are seasoned, as we all know. But their knowledge 
is a personal matter, that stands or falls with them, that perishes along with 
them, so that the prerequisite of an established science lacks, namely the 
handing down of a certain amount of knowledge to a next generation, for 
them to build on it.2
De Vreese formulated an ambition equally simple as naïve: he wanted to trans-
form the competence of reading old Netherlandish texts into proper scholarship, 
an ambition which could only be realized by an intergenerational tradition of 
knowledge. In order to secure such a tradition, he proposed a documentary in-
strument: a Bibliotheca Neerlandica Manuscripta.3 He conceived it as a card file 
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system containing descriptions of all medieval manuscripts in Netherlandish, to 
be collected and indexed by himself (and his family, as became clear later on). De 
Vreese expected his data collection to be particularly useful for training reading 
skills with original excerpts, but also for writing a history of medieval scribal 
culture in the Low Countries. In short, just like the most renowned German 
historians, De Vreese was convinced that having the Quellen at hand in the per-
sonal, even intimate setting of a seminar would improve objectivity in philologi-
cal studies.4 He acknowledged the advantages of a data collection, both practical 
and scientific, as much as other scholars of his time5 – as much as most scholars 
nowadays when they speak of digital data collections.
The discursive parallel between today’s expectations for digital humanities 
and De Vreese’s ideals of improved apprenticeship and assured objectivity is 
more than just the fiddling of some historian. There is more to say in favor of 
the Bibliotheca as a single historical case study. In his 1902 address, De Vreese 
referred to paleographic collections and manuals from abroad, to make clear what 
Netherlandish philology was missing. He mentioned publications from the 1870s 
onwards: those by Léopold Delisle and the École des Chartes, the Facsimiles by 
the Palaeographical Society (1873-1883), a Bilderatlas (1887) by Gustav Könnecke 
and Schrifttafeln (1874-1878) by Wilhelm Arndt, and Magda Enneccerus’s glitter-
ing Die ältesten deutschen Sprach-Denkmäler in Lichtdrucken herausgegeben (1897). 
His own discipline on the contrary was served by only one ‘small work’ (werkje), 
dating back to 1818, and by scattered facsimiles in scholarly text editions, which 
were mostly ‘unserviceable, because they are processed independently neither 
from the draughtsman’s greater or lesser degree of skilfulness and from his imagi-
nation, nor from the publisher’s intended purpose’.6 With this enumeration, De 
Vreese not only pointed at a documentary gap in Netherlandish philology, he also 
implicitly stressed the merits of his planned Bibliotheca. For unlike the models 
from abroad, his own paleographical study instrument would not be a book, but, 
as a modular collection accessible through indexes, an innovation in international 
paleography.
Later on, the Bibliotheca’s history appeared as no less pioneering: the data col-
lection was digitized as early as the beginning of the 1990s and it was made acces-
sible through a computer network in 1995. So this case began its public life in 1902 
and reaches as far as the breakthrough year of multimedia in personal computing 
and of the Internet. That is why the last three paragraphs of this article consist 
of a short history of the Bibliotheca. It starts with De Vreese’s initial collecting 
activity against the backdrop of major questions in the history of Netherlandish 
philology; it passes on to his death in 1938, after which the Bibliotheca was trans-
ferred to Leiden University Library and became publicly accessible; and finally, 
the Bibliotheca’s digitization serves as the closing episode.
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The case of the Bibliotheca thus proves to be more than merely a discursive 
parallel; it is relevant for a historical view on digital humanities because of its 
innovative forms. Its modular and searchable data organization in fact makes it 
a database, and as such an early manifestation of what would become, according 
to new media scholar Lev Manovich, the ‘symbolic form’ of computer age infor-
mation culture in the late twentieth century.7 That is why in the first paragraph 
the Bibliotheca, both in its paper and its numerical versions, is interpreted as a 
database according to the characteristics which Manovich considers distinctive 
for ‘new media’ (in The Language of New Media [2001], only recently confirmed 
as one of the ‘very few books on new media worth reading’).8 This interpretation 
will provide the sightlines for the following historical paragraphs. It foregrounds 
the public ‘narratives of value’9 which De Vreese and the successive keepers of his 
Bibliotheca attributed to the collection, throughout different periods and different 
contexts of information culture, scholarly organization and politics. By doing so, 
this article illustrates that phenomena similar to new forms in digital humanities 
can be traced back to even before 1995, and that digital humanities can be studied 
from a historical perspective, by taking into account continuities as much as dis-
continuities and promises for the future.
 A paper database between new and old media
Willem De Vreese’s Bibliotheca Neerlandica Manuscripta was innovative in three 
ways which Manovich in The Language of New Media calls distinctive for ‘new 
media’: its discrete representation of data, its multimedial character, and its ran-
dom accessibility through search indexes. In this paragraph some of Manovich’s 
insights in the functioning of ‘new media’ are applied to the Bibliotheca, in order 
to bring some new medial aspects of its history to the surface.
In fact, the Bibliotheca could have served Manovich well as an example in his 
study, where he chose to discuss cinema as the prehistory of ‘new media’. Not 
only does cinema more or less fit the Bibliotheca chronologically, starting at the 
end of the nineteenth century, with the 1910s as a ‘classical’ decade which set its 
language and forms for a century to come.10 The Bibliotheca, as a scholarship-
focused piece of information technology, also fits Manovich’s assertion that 
new media need not be studied as part of the fields of technology or economy, 
but as part of culture and the humanities. He describes cultural practices and 
patterns in new media in their relation to other manifestations of a broader ‘in-
formation culture’.11 He even explicitly parallels his record of the transformation 
of old media into new ones with Thomas Kuhn’s study of scientific paradigms.12 
The case of the Bibliotheca can be studied as a cultural history of informa-
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tion too, as a history not only of local productions of knowledge or as ‘ways of 
knowing’ (Pickstone), but also as a cultural history of information storage and 
 communication.
Such a cultural-historical study of the Bibliotheca will also confirm Manovich’s 
blurry distinction between ‘modern media’ and ‘new media’.13 Manovich found 
modern cinema to be an early form of new media, because some of its features be-
came associated with computerized culture forms later on.14 Cinematic technol-
ogy translates the continuities of everyday experience into a sequence of discrete 
elements, i.e., each frame of the film. Cinema also merged individual media into 
one multimedial object – in this respect being as ‘new’ as medieval illuminated 
manuscripts – while nineteenth-century cinematic machines already provided 
access to the discrete and multimedial representation of reality in nonlinear ways, 
thus making randomized access possible. All three features – discrete represen-
tation, multimedia, and random access – apply to the Bibliotheca on paper, too: 
it reduced the continuum of culture and reality to discrete elements, not only 
inevitable linguistic ones such as sentences, words and sounds, but also elements 
from the ‘bibliographic code’ of medieval texts15 – their authors, copyists, illumi-
nations, bindings, and depositories. These bindings appeared in the collection in 
pictural form as well: the Bibliotheca contained a collection of facsimiles, samples 
of copyists’ hands, photographs and rubbings of bindings. All these descriptions 
were searchable through different indexes on authors, titles, keywords, copyists, 
incipits, owners, themes, and motives of the stamps on the bindings. It is clear that 
the card files of the Bibliotheca share their randomly accessible, multimedial, and 
discrete characteristics with the ‘new’ forms of cinema and computers, and evi-
dently more so when the Bibliotheca was digitized in the early 1990s. Its data were 
no longer only discrete, but now also numerically represented, and hence suitable 
for automated handling. In short, a philological database can be considered as a 
partial form of new media, similar to Manovich’s interpretation of cinema.
How can such an interpretation of an old paper database provide us with a 
meaningful account of its history? First, Manovich’s opposition between the data-
base and the narrative as cultural forms, in computerized culture as much as in 
the cases of cinema, the novel, and language in general, can be helpful.16 Since 
the Bibliotheca was conceived as a collection of paper card files and indexes and 
later on was turned into a ‘new’ database with logarithmic retrieval options, it 
had no narrative form apart from the search routes of librarians and individual 
philologists. Yet, its conception and its later use were closely related to powerful 
narratives, legitimizing the data project in different scholarly and political ways. 
Secondly, Manovich describes (following Benjamin and Virilio) the ongoing re-
placement of physical objects with interchangeable and mobile signs.17 This pro-
cess is accompanied by efforts to create a reality effect, using virtual technologies 
499The Bibliotheca Neerlandica Manuscripta
in such a way that they become universal conventions, obscuring the process of 
replacement itself. Again, this process is manifest in the case of new media, but no 
less in the case of the Bibliotheca. De Vreese’s scholarly teaching and gathering of 
objective evidence aimed exactly at such a replacement: in order to write a history 
of Netherlandish paleography, he wanted to have all paleographical data collected 
in one room. He himself would make several philological journeys throughout 
Europe during his lifetime, but only in order to confine his subsequent efforts to 
a simple consultation of the Bibliotheca. However, the Nachleben of his Bibliotheca 
proves that De Vreese’s ambition of replacing visits to libraries and archives with 
his own descriptions had an epistemological sting to it. Along with the Biblio-
theca’s oppositional place between various narratives, this sting will prove to be a 
key issue in the history of the Bibliotheca Neerlandica Manuscripta.
 The database in national thought and philological epistemology 
(1895-1938)
The following short history of the Bibliotheca Neerlandica Manuscripta is based 
on existing historical accounts, most of which were published by its keepers much 
later, all of them specialists in bibliography, codicology and paleography and as 
such the database’s intended users. Invariably, they identify the Bibliotheca as a 
useful instrument in philological study and as the brainchild of De Vreese. They 
praise its author in the most romantic ways: the database was his ‘life’s work’ 
(levenswerk), expressing his ‘grandmastership’ (grootmeesterschap),18 even proving 
the creator to be ‘a man of genius’ (een geniaal mensch).19 The Bibliotheca itself 
has been called ‘a unique collection of material’ (een unieke materiaalverzameling), 
‘a true gold mine’ (een ware goudmijn),20 the merits of which become apparent 
when one takes into account the historical context: it was ‘a documentation sys-
tem which was relatively advanced in scope considering the period in which it was 
developed’.21 Jos Biemans, curator of Western manuscripts at Leiden University 
Library in 1987, stressed its importance for future scholarly developments: he con-
cluded that De Vreese ‘in fact has [...] provided the study of Middle Dutch codi-
cology with an entire new, modern foundation’.22 In short, historical accounts of 
the Bibliotheca have hitherto searched for its historical significance in De Vreese’s 
almost prophetical views on the future of academic disciplines.
It is, of course, a myth that De Vreese was able to foresee later developments 
in his discipline and in information culture; he only dealt with scholarly concerns 
of his own time and of previous decades. The historical significance of the Biblio-
theca indeed has to be looked for in the long-term history of vernacular philology 
in the Low Countries. In his 1902 address to the Flemish Academy, De Vreese 
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made clear that his database had to attain some of the goals that Netherlandish 
philology had been pursuing for decades, even centuries. He too wanted philo-
logical scholarship to have societal effects within a frame of national thought, and 
his database too had to meet the materialist epistemological requirements which 
had been extant in Netherlandish vernacular philology since the late sixteenth 
century.
It is particularly meaningful that De Vreese presented his plans at the Royal 
Flemish Academy of Language and Literature in Ghent. He had participated in 
its establishment a few years earlier, and would later on become its director. In 
his view – which he expressed more than once – the Academy not only had to 
facilitate the work of Netherlandish philology, but also improve the status of 
the Dutch language, literature and culture within the Belgian state.23 De Vreese 
indeed employed nationalistic frames to legitimize his own and his fellow mem-
bers’ study of old Netherlandish language and literature: the Academy had to be 
at the intersection of scholarly and social advancement of the Dutch language 
and its users. At the same time his contribution to the Academy attested his 
conviction that scholarship needed an infrastructure similar to that of learned 
societies. This ideal of nationalistic scholarship in learned societies was not new 
at all and not restricted to the Netherlands. The study of national literatures 
had always been practiced out of concern for the supposed singularity of local 
culture and by means of scholarly meetings and correspondence, public com-
petitions and in closed libraries.24 That was – obviously – true for the nine-
teenth century, with well-known national philologists like Jan Frans Willems in 
Belgium and Willem Jonckbloet in the Netherlands, but also in the preceding 
centuries, as demonstrated by the Society of Dutch Literature in Leiden, estab-
lished in 1766, and the Royal Academy in Brussels, established in 1772.25 Before 
these, in the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries, individual scholars had de-
fended the vernacular language and literature along with the Dutch Republic. 
One can think of Balthasar Huydecoper and Jan Wagenaar, but also of Hugo 
Grotius, and Petrus Scriverius and Janus Dousa at Leiden University. From this 
long-term perspective, De Vreese and his plans appear as the Belgian variant of 
a much older alliance of philological vernacular scholarship and national am-
bitions. Considering his plans to use the Bibliotheca for writing a history of 
scribal culture in the Low Countries, it becomes clear that the database not only 
contributed to an ideal scholarly training, but also had to support a nationalist 
narrative of history.
The persistent influence of earlier scholarly contexts is also clear in De Vreese’s 
concerns about the epistemological looseness of his discipline. In fact, such con-
cerns were the raison d’être of his Bibliotheca. Its ‘desirability, yes the urgent neces-
sity’ emerged in De Vreese’s opinion from the lack of a trustworthy factual basis. 
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Literary histories had been written, according to him, on the arbitrary base of 
literary value. A Middle Dutch dictionary was being compiled, based on ques-
tionable text editions – although ‘it is time for us, I believe’, as he spoke to the 
Academy,
to bring across to ourselves that the vast majority of our text editions is no 
longer of use, because they do not give us what is in the manuscripts. So-
called critical editions, in which the so-called grammatical errors made by 
copyists are said to have been corrected, present the image of an imaginary 
language, just like those in which the author’s original text is said to have 
been determined, often do not present more than an imaginary text. All of 
that is nothing but aesthetic dilettantism, totally unsuitable for linguistic 
research.26
Serious scholarship distinguished itself from ‘aesthetic dilettantism’ in its attach-
ment to the original manuscript, which guaranteed the original form of literary 
works and old words. In contrast, the philological instruments of his own time, 
mostly in book form, did not even meet the minimal requirements of scholarship, 
because the data they provided did not correspond with the sources.
Such epistemological complaints were old. Original manuscripts, with mate-
rial evidence of their age, had been the sole epistemological guarantee in Neth-
erlandish philology for decades. This had been demonstrated by some cases of 
forged medieval texts, in particular the supposedly thirteenth-century chronicle 
of Count Dirk of Holland by Klaas Kolijn, which had deceived scholars during 
most of the eighteenth century and which was still mentioned in philological 
debates during the nineteenth century.27 Only one generation before De Vreese, 
the supposedly early medieval Frisian chronicle Oera Linda had made its appear-
ance in the circles of Eelco Verwijs, one of his teachers in lexicography.28 In the 
case of Kolijn, the absence of an old manuscript meant the disclosure of the text 
as a forgery; in the case of Oera Linda the opposite was true: the fact that the old 
text showed up on parchment was puzzling. Both cases indicate how even before 
De Vreese’s complaints, philological knowledge could rely only on an accessible 
old manuscript. This simple epistemological demand was the philological equiva-
lent of the material proof that antiquarians had been mobilizing all over Europe 
against historical Pyrrhonism from the seventeenth century onwards.29 That is 
why in the early nineteenth century all of the scholarly societies started setting up 
collections of medieval manuscripts, and libraries with trustworthy, material evi-
dence readily accessible to their members. That is also why scholarly text editions 
were made: they supposedly gave access to old manuscripts through print. Again, 
De Vreese’s plan for the Bibliotheca, based on epistemological distrust, appears as 
502 Jan Rock
an equivalent of earlier concerns about reliable access to old texts. In short, the 
Bibliotheca Neerlandica Manuscripta was a new stick to chase a quarreling twin 
from the philologist’s study, the twin of accessibility and reliability of old textual 
material that would not leave.30
However, there was something new. De Vreese’s Bibliotheca was not a collec-
tion of physical manuscripts themselves, like in the learned societies’ libraries, nor 
of representations of only textual elements, like in previous scholarly editions. 
The Bibliotheca contained descriptions and facsimiles, and no material or textual 
objects, but mere data on such objects. It is in this way that the Bibliotheca indeed 
was a ‘modern’ database in Manovich’s terms: it replaced objects with signs. The 
epistemological impact of this process did not remain unnoticed, since one of the 
later keepers of the Bibliotheca remembered that during De Vreese’s life his “See 
my Bibliotheca Neerlandica Manuscripta” had the effect of a pronouncement’.31 Did 
the appearance of a philological database without physical links to material evi-
dence, indeed mean an epistemological shift away from the centuries-old materi-
alistic epistemology, toward one in which virtual collections could serve as a base 
for knowledge as reliable as the original material? As every shift in history, this 
one too was not linear and uncontested, as the vicissitudes of the Bibliotheca after 
De Vreese illustrate.
 The database in Leiden, a scholarly metropolis (1939)
In 1939, the Bibliotheca was sold by De Vreese’s widow to the state of the Neth-
erlands, which deposited it at the University Library in Leiden, to be taken care 
of by the curator of manuscripts and his assistants. The first one was Gerard 
Isaäc Lieftinck, appointed curator shortly after the acquisition of the Bibliotheca. 
Lieftinck recognized its value and shared some ideals with De Vreese, although 
he had seen that during the last years of his life De Vreese ‘actually has become 
a solitary man, as if entrenched in his fort, his vast arsenal of data, from which 
he could always draw and from which he derived his great authority’.32 After his 
death, the Bibliotheca revealed its ‘weak side’ (zwakke zijde).33 Browsing the card 
files, Lieftinck discovered that some of the descriptions were not written by De 
Vreese himself. ‘There are also many records, especially tables of contents, which 
are not from De Vreese’s own hand, maybe from students or from officials at the 
libraries in question’. It gave reason for concern: ‘Because one does not know who 
drew them up and since some of them were corrected in later times by De Vreese 
himself, there is every reason not to trust these data too much’.34 Lieftinck, like 
other philologists for centuries, did not think the evident benefits of easily acces-
sible philological data to outweigh their reliability.
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Lieftinck started to select and correct descriptions in the Bibliotheca and he 
substantially enlarged its collections of photographs and copies. These were no 
minor interventions, but – so he assured his colleagues at a congress for librar-
ians – history has proven that as a curator at Leiden University Library, he was 
in the right place to do so. ‘Owing to the rich book collection of the Maatschappij 
der Nederlandsche Letterkunde, which the [University] Library holds within its 
walls and the Academy’s venerable tradition as a cradle of Netherlandish philol-
ogy, Leiden actually has been a middle point already from way back’. And it was 
the right place too for a reordered, corrected, and expanded Bibliotheca, according 
to his own ambitions: ‘Such a valuable, internationally orientated apparatus as 
the [Bibliotheca Neerlandica Manuscripta] might turn Leiden definitively into a 
metropolis of Middle Dutch linguistics’.35 At Leiden, the Bibliotheca could make 
Netherlandish philology an international field of study. Lieftinck thus trans-
formed De Vreese’s equally scholarly and national aspirations for the Bibliotheca 
at the Flemish Academy into an image of Leiden as a scholarly metropolis. This 
image did justice to both the city’s century-old philological fame the Dutch na-
tion was proud of, and the international orientation of academic scholarship in 
his own time. Like other historians and intellectuals did in these decades, Lief-
tinck formulated a variant of the nationalist narrative to incorporate interna-
tional cultural horizons.36 According to him, the Bibliotheca would become truly 
metropolitan when it was accessible to scholars from the Netherlands and the 
rest of the world, and when its data were reliable.
 An automated database (1991-1995)
From 1991 onwards, the Bibliotheca was digitized at Leiden University Library. It 
was in particular André Bouwman who spoke in public about the plans and pro-
ceedings at conferences for medievalists. Whereas Lieftinck focused on the short-
comings of the Bibliotheca’s reliability, Bouwman’s discontentment concerned in 
the first place its accessibility. He depicted the database as a collection of ‘tens of 
thousands of index cards’ (tienduizenden fiches), ‘put away in card-index boxes’ 
(weggestoken in kaartenbakken), the consultation of which was only possible in 
Leiden ‘and is rather complicated’ (en is tamelijk ingewikkeld).37 And most of all: 
the ‘separate card-indexes left cross-references a feature to be desired’.38 Bouw-
man gave the impression that the database not only was hard to access itself, but 
that its modular structure in fact even complicated knowledge about the physi-
cal manuscripts – thus negating the creator’s intentions. But Bouwman saw new 
possibilities in digital times: ‘It became increasingly clear that only the computer 
would be able to bring relief, if at least some conditions are fulfilled’.39
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These conditions exactly met the shortcomings of the paper database Bouw-
man himself had diagnosed: it would have to be user friendly, and ‘accessible 
through electronic data traffic routes’ (via elektronische dataverkeerswegen toe-
gankelijk).40 It would have to present ‘better sorted information’ (beter geordende 
informatie),41 using standardized authority records and descriptions, and the 
photographs and rubbings too would have to be digitized. At the same time, 
an electronic system for data input would have to be implemented. In 1991, the 
semi-governmental Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) 
acknowledged the Bibliotheca as a ‘Center of Expertise’, making it possible to be 
subsidized for this digitizing project. The work was carried out in collaboration 
with PICA, a cataloguing system of Dutch scientific libraries. It became acces-
sible in 1995 as part of the Leiden University Library’s online catalogue (OPAC), 
which could be consulted through a Dutch library network, through a Telnet 
connection, or on the ‘World Wide Web [...] using a WWW navigator’.42 Access 
to the database started at a screen with seventeen search keys, such as ‘HSG’, 
‘DAT’, ‘HTI’, ‘AUT’, or ‘MAT’, or by starting a search action ‘from any screen, by 
filling in ‘z [search key] [search term]’, if necessary truncated’.43 All such codes 
could be consulted in ‘the extended helptexts’.44 In short, Bouwman stressed in 
many ways the increased accessibility of philological data in the Bibliotheca, now 
called e-BNM.
Besides that, Bouwman was optimistic about the changes made to the data-
base structure. The Bibliotheca would still consist of modular descriptions of me-
dieval manuscripts with references to literature, made accessible through search 
indexes, but they were once more reordered, on persons, corporations, and key-
words. New information was added too, based on published library catalogues. 
The new indexes also figured uniform descriptions, thus putting and end to the 
arbitrariness in the paper database (‘the key words of course [have to be] edited 
absolutely uniformly’ [de trefwoorden [moeten] natuurlijk volstrekt uniform geredi-
geerd worden]),45 and they were completed with authority records and families 
consisting of cross-linking descriptions. Bouwman was clear about their impor-
tance: they were not just new, elaborated entries to the descriptions. The nu-
merical uniform descriptions made the Bibliotheca electronic; the cross-references 
made the authority records ‘the nervous system of the electronic database’46 and 
each of them even a ‘crystallization point of knowledge’ (kristallisatiepunt van 
kennis).47 Automated searches and links between numerical data on philological 
objects gave the Bibliotheca a new function: it was no longer a didactic tool for 
reading old texts, nor the instrument for scholars in a learned society, nor a record 
of the nation’s forgotten scribal culture, it now renewed scholarship itself. Bouw-
man replaced De Vreese’s and Lieftinck’s narrative of national scholarship with 
a technical discourse on knowledge production (with by times anthropomorphic 
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metaphors). For him, the digitized Bibliotheca was in the first place exactly that: 
a new scholarly instrument, ‘an electronic database [which] may contribute to the 
development of new strategies in scholarship’.48
Was there in Bouwman’s computer optimism any trace left of the centuries-
old materialist epistemology and the framing nationalist narrative? At least in his 
public statements, Bouwman remained remarkably silent on both subjects. The 
Netherlands and Leiden appear to be nothing more than the accidental setting 
for scholarly innovations, not to be mentioned explicitly, not even in Lieftinck’s 
metropolitan way. For the Bibliotheca’s reliability he did not refer to the tradition-
al guarantees offered by physical manuscripts; he did not present the digitization 
as a new reditus ad fontibus. He seemed to consider its reliability guaranteed by 
the academic institutions involved. Data for input came from published library 
catalogues – notwithstanding Lieftinck’s doubts; the work done by collaborators 
of the University Library was unquestioned; access to the database was guar-
anteed by the OPAC network; and most of all, the Bibliotheca as a whole was 
certified by NWO. One could say that the Bibliotheca became not only a ‘new’ 
database in the sense of a discrete and multimedial, cross-referring, automatedly 
and randomly accessible set of data, but also in the sense that its reliability was 
attested by institutions of present-day science production.
 Conclusion
What does this single history of a philological database from the Low Coun-
tries, interpreted as a discrete, multimedial and randomly accessible form of 
data organization, demonstrate? In the first place that the Bibliotheca was more 
than a simple instrument to hand down philological knowledge to a next gen-
eration. From its creation by De Vreese in Ghent onwards, it materialized some 
of his scientistic and nationalistic aspirations, just as the Flemish Academy did. 
The Bibliotheca continued to materialize varying aspirations at Leiden Univer-
sity Library. The database thus had varying relations to successive institutional 
contexts and powerful narratives, which gave the database meaning and legiti-
mized it. That was initially the case on a documentary level: the Bibliotheca had 
to serve De Vreese in writing a cultural history of the Low Countries in the 
Middle Ages based on the developments in scribal culture, in other words a 
historical narrative based on paleographical data. It was also the case on a po-
litical level, since the Bibliotheca had to be integrated into the Flemish Academy, 
established to realize equally scholarly and national progress through the study 
of old Netherlandish language and literature. As such, the initial organizational 
infrastructure for the Bibliotheca included it in the historical and political nar-
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rative of the Flemish Movement. Yet, although the database had important rela-
tions to such narratives, it remained a genre of informational culture of its own, 
and because of that, it survived independently from the foundational narratives 
and was given a place in other wide views, such as scientific internationalism 
in the interwar era and optimism about the computer age at the close of the 
twentieth century.
Apart from a changing decor of narratives, the history of this database makes 
clear that the old tension between the epistemological ideals of accessible and 
reliable data remained high in both modern and digitized philological informa-
tion cultures. De Vreese aspired to replace the physical consultation of libraries 
and archives all over the world with a search action in his database. Doubts about 
the reliability of the data arose, however. Such doubts had proven to be of great 
influence in the earlier history of Netherlandish philology, and had resulted in 
materialistic requirements for scholarly certitude. Nevertheless, the database’s 
material base seemed to have become undiscussed in the age of its digitization 
at modern scientific institutions. The history of the Bibliotheca thus makes clear 
that fundamental aspects of a database in both its paper and digitized form, such 
as its epistemological basis or its connection to political narratives, can survive 
several decades and remain unchanged or can be forgotten along the way, when 
they are silenced permanently.
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9.4 Clio’s Talkative Daughter Goes Digital
The Interplay between Technology and Oral 
Accounts as Historical Data
STef Scagliola and Franciska de Jong
 Introduction
The introduction of the recording device at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury not only marked a major transition in communication technology, but also 
paved the way for a revaluation of the oral account in Western historiography. 
With the rise of early civilizations and the introduction of writing tools it had 
lost its central role in the transfer of meaning and identity. Centuries later, the 
spread of literacy and the invention of the printing press stimulated the consoli-
dation and appreciation of historical sources in textual form. Given the weight of 
this strong focus on text, the invention of a device that could capture and repro-
duce the human voice directly can be truly regarded as revolutionary. Most im-
portant, in the context of historical sources, is that accounts could now be stored 
and preserved in their original form: as sound. This development laid the ground 
for the practice that is referred to as ‘oral history’. Another series of transitions, 
decisive for the accessibility and contextualization of oral narratives, set in with 
the ‘digital turn’ at the end of the twentieth century. The purpose of this paper is 
to offer an overview of these transitions by showing how the interplay between 
technology and social-cultural change influenced the creation and appreciation of 
oral history interviews as sources of knowledge. What can be observed is a shift 
in appreciation of what is regarded as the most truthful and characteristic rep-
resentation of the oral account: the original sound recording or the transcribed 
interview.
Although the term ‘oral history’ has various meanings, most scholars agree that 
its purpose is to create spoken accounts on personal history in an interview set-
ting. A distinction can be made between collecting interviews to answer a specific 
research question, and documenting the experiences of a person as an archival 
effort with future listeners in mind.1 The first approach, with strong roots in 
Europe, bears a strong resemblance to academic practices in the social sciences, 
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and draws on a long tradition of investigative journalism. The second places oral 
history in the archival realm, and is strongly rooted in a tradition of nation-build-
ing, in which the state initiates projects that stimulate public involvement in the 
creation of shared cultural heritage. Researchers in the United States were the 
pioneers in using the method of oral history for this purpose.2
The paper starts off with a description of the change in status of oral sources 
in the late nineteenth century and the parallel technological innovation. The next 
stage presented is the early evolution of the practice of interviewing in relation 
to bearing witness to crises and conflict in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Then the emergence of the postwar social movement is described and its central 
role in developing a pluralist perspective on history by giving voice to minority 
groups through collecting life stories and making them public. The following sec-
tion discusses the impact of the digital turn and the introduction of the Internet 
on historical culture in general and on oral history in particular. The final section 
deals with the potential of information and communications technology (ICT) 
for the accessibility and analysis of digital oral history.
 Text defeats spoken word
Contrary to what one would expect, oral sources were regarded as quite reliable 
until the professionalization of history as an academic discipline was heralded by 
the nineteenth-century Rankean school of historicism. Ranke and his disciples 
confined the search for historical sources almost exclusively to written documents 
that were found in archives produced by the state and other institutions,3 and that 
were attributed the desired level of objectivity. They thereby rejected oral sources 
as a valuable asset of the historiographical paradigm, disregarding that, of course, 
many textual sources are the product of a sequence of witnessing, discussing, and 
passing on historical evidence to future generations.4
The retrospective oral accounts of sieges and battles documented by Herodo-
tus and Thucydides, the founding fathers of history, are a clear illustration of the 
oral origin of many written sources. At the same time the opposing positions of 
these Greek pioneers show how timeless the debate is on how to weigh the qual-
ity and validity of oral accounts. Herodotus would include myths, rumors and 
tales in his documentation on the Persian Wars and relied on oral accounts of 
events that had happened long before his time. He would sometimes offer differ-
ent versions of an account and ask the reader to choose. Thucydides, in contrast, 
did not regard himself as a ‘storyteller’, and based his accounts almost entirely on 
facts that he himself had witnessed or been told from firsthand witnesses and 
recorded:
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And with regard to my factual reporting of the events of the war I have 
made it a principle not to write down the first story that came my way, and 
not even to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was pres-
ent myself at the events which I have described or else I heard them from 
eyewitnesses whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as 
possible. (History I, 22)5
Thucydides acknowledged the importance of ‘pathos’ in a narrative as a technique 
to appeal to an audience. Nevertheless he chose to strive for truth and accuracy, 
for this would yield history having a long-lasting impact.
The evolving culture of documenting a phenomenon in all its details for the 
sake of a reliable historical record led to the development of history as an aca-
demic discipline with a distinct method of its own in the course of the nineteenth 
century.6 Moving from the pub and the marketplace to the lecture hall, a new class 
consciousness emerged that made ‘ordinary people’ less appealing as a historical 
source.7 Combined with the cumulative effect of three centuries of printing, and 
the central role attributed to historians in the process of nation-building, this 
profoundly changed the character of the profession. Historians were now trained 
to analyze what were perceived to be the building stones of academic history: 
printed and written documents. This came down to using sources that had been 
generated in the slipstream of the lives and policies of those who were the most 
influential and powerful.8
 Capturing the voice
At the beginning of the twentieth century developments in communication tech-
nology and transport increased the pace of interpersonal communication. As the 
telephone offered the opportunity to discuss issues that would previously have 
been communicated through letters, the social function of documents changed 
gradually in the course of the twentieth century. As new generations of histori-
ans made it clear that archives contained only a biased selection of hand-picked 
written sources intended to legitimize or advocate a pursued policy, history based 
exclusively on the meticulous study of official state documents and diplomatic 
sources lost some of its standing.9
The first scholars to embrace the potential of recording technology were not 
historians but ethnologists. Already in the second half of the nineteenth century 
the interest in recovering (and sometimes ‘inventing’) cultural traditions such as 
ceremonies, customs and folktales, had shifted from local amateur historians to 
professionals. The focus on cultural identity expressed in objects, dresses, lan-
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guage and music makes it easy to understand their interest in capturing sound and 
images and their pioneering role in modern oral history.10 The very first recording 
device, the phonograph, invented by Thomas A. Edison in 1877, would be taken 
along as equipment during research expeditions not only by ethnologists and lin-
guists, but also by medical doctors, missionaries and colonial officials. Although 
expensive until the 1920s, these recorders were simple to use and could be easily 
transported, not being dependent on electrical power.11 It is noteworthy that its use 
for documenting history was envisioned by Edison himself. In a long list of pos-
sible applications he also lists: ‘The ‘Family Record’ – a registry of sayings, remi-
niscences, etc., by members of a family in their own voices, and of the last words of 
dying persons’.12 The conditions for actually applying the phonograph by introduc-
ing an affordable version and improving its performance, were created by Chich-
ester Bell and Charles Sumner Tainter, with the introduction of wax cylinders.13
As always happens when new technology is introduced, there were reserva-
tions. Some writers even feared that the phonograph would be the beginning 
of the end of writing. An illustration hereof is a cartoon by Albert Robida that 
portrays Edison as a devil handing over a phonograph to Gutenberg.14 The Italian 
historian Benedetto Croce looked upon it as a folly:
I am convinced that the realism of the phonograph, this cunning attempt 
to physically grasp the past, will not contribute to the increase of historical 
knowledge, just as attempts to evoke the atmosphere and impression of a 
past life do not enrich our knowledge; that very life is dead as a doornail and 
should be understood, not evoked.15
In Croce’s view the peculiarities of the voice would distract and entertain, rather 
than increase the understanding of history. When listening to sound recordings 
or watching newsreels with speeches of Mussolini or Hitler today, we may be 
inclined to think that there is a kernel of truth in Croce’s observation. Many 
will find it hard to believe that these demagogues could hold such sway over the 
masses with their theatrical gestures and shouting voices. However, with only the 
texts of these speeches, it would be even more difficult to understand their per-
formative power and appeal to the masses. Still, it would take decades for many 
historians to appreciate that the original sound of spoken words reflects the hu-
man experience better than words transmitted in textual format.
The next step in technological innovation in recording human speech was 
the wire recorder invented by the Danish engineer Valdemar Poulsen in 1877. It 
would take until the Interbellum before its more successful successor, the tape 
recorder, was widely introduced. Both devices involve the use of a magnetizable 
medium that can capture sound waves and turn them into electrical signals.16
515Clio’s Talkative Daughter Goes Digital
 Personal experience with war and crisis
The dissemination of the practice of documenting and recording interviews 
should be seen in the light of the emergence of the social sciences as instruments 
for social engineering in the two World Wars. In this period bureaucratic struc-
tures came into existence meant to manage large numbers of conscripts that were 
sent to the military fronts in other parts of the world. Military personnel were 
separated from family members and spouses, and on their return had to reinte-
grate into society together with large numbers of displaced persons. This pressed 
the social sciences to offer solutions. Besides, the first massive involvement in the 
circumstances of war by citizens who could write letters to their loved ones led to 
a culture of giving testimony about extraordinary experiences. While paper was 
still the main carrier of such testimonies, many memories remained in the minds 
of the people to be captured only decades later.17
An example of a folklorist for whom the context of war created unique oppor-
tunities was the German teacher Wilhelm Doegen. Having been granted access to 
all German prisoner-of-war camps during the First World War, he began to sys-
tematically record the languages, music and texts of prisoners from other coun-
tries with the intent to create a collection for a future ‘Museum of the Sound’.18 In 
the United States the massive draft in 1917-1918 called for an adequate selection 
mechanism and interviewing became a method for psychological testing. This 
was repeated during World War II when more than half a million American sol-
diers were interviewed to document their mental and emotional lives.19
The connection between the social sciences and the Armed Forces was paral-
leled by that between history and soldiers’ experiences at the battle fronts in the 
Second World War. Anticipating the Army’s official history of the war, the US 
government initiated an extensive program that, in each theater of war, brought 
professional historians together to collect sources. One of these was the draft-
ed journalist S.L.A. Marshall, who introduced the practice of gathering troops 
shortly after their engagement in battle in order to conduct group interviews. The 
purposes served by this practice were multifold: providing additional testimonies 
to military unit journals to improve efficacy of operations, giving participants the 
opportunity to relate their experiences in battle, and creating a basis for popular 
monographs to explain the war to wounded soldiers and new recruits.20
One of the first war-related projects to record extended interviews from the 
perspective of victims was initiated right after the end of the war in 1946 by the 
psychologist David P. Boder, of Latvian Jewish origin. Trained in Germany and 
Russia and emigrated to the US in 1932, Boder was determined to document 
the impact of extreme suffering on personality. Using a state-of-the-art wire 
recorder he traveled to displacement camps all over Europe, interviewing 130 
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persons in nine languages. At his return he not only set out transcribing the 
interviews but also submitted them to analysis, and commented on terms and 
narratives, with the intent of developing a systematic coding system for the vari-
ous kinds of trauma. The transfer of knowledge on traumatic experiences to the 
broader American audience came in 1948, when he published a book, hoping 
that it would be helpful in advocating on behalf of the refugees for immigration 
to America.21
These pioneers in the archiving of oral sources illustrate the interest in captur-
ing the thoughts and actions of people in extreme circumstances such as war. The 
focus was primarily on using technology for the purpose of documentation and 
the derivation of knowledge from the sources as a basis for publishing books. The 
potential and motivation to convey the material to large audiences was limited.
 Pioneers in archives and academia
The pioneering role of the United States in the establishment of oral history as 
an archival practice is connected to a policy of social engineering that aimed at 
forging unity in a multiethnic society in times of crisis.22 Similar approaches can 
be found in other Anglo-Saxon immigration societies such as Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand.
It was Franklin Delano Roosevelt who introduced the Federal Writers’ Project 
as part of the New Deal to support writers and journalists during the Great De-
pression. Among the many who set out across the country, equipped with pencils 
and manual typewriters, to compile local and oral histories, were famous names 
such as John Steinbeck, Saul Bellow and Studs Terkel. Since the interviews were 
conducted at a time before tape recorders were widely available, writers had to 
rely on their exhaustive notes and memory to capture each history.23 The project 
led to the collection of more than 10,000 first person narratives, including ac-
counts by the last generation of slaves.24 Although much effort was put in creating 
this archive, only decades later would the full potential of this rich collection be 
exploited.25
An initiative covering the lives of the famous and powerful was the estab-
lishment of the Columbia University Oral History Research Office in 1948 by 
the political scientist Allen Nevins. Nevins took the initiative out of concern for 
missing important information from the top level of society, as the introduction 
of the telephone had led to a dramatic decrease in written correspondence among 
prominent figures in the political, cultural and economic realm.26 With his team, 
he set out to document life histories making use of first-generation wire record-
ers. It is striking that they treated the material as text, not as sound. In fact, the 
517Clio’s Talkative Daughter Goes Digital
officially catalogued date of the interview was that of publishing the transcript, 
not the one on which the interview had been conducted. Moreover, just as is usual 
with manuscripts before publication, the transcripts would be returned to the 
interviewees to check whether they contained mistakes or potential embarrassing 
or sensitive references. These were then taken out. The most radical intervention 
was the destruction of the original tapes, sometimes out of concern that the inter-
viewees would dislike the way they sounded.27 This tradition of arranging power 
to ‘speak’ for posterity was further institutionalized with the introduction of the 
‘Presidential Libraries’ program in 1961 by the National Archives, that included 
interviews with the higher ranks of a political administration.
In other parts of the world, and in Europe in particular, the practice of oral 
history emerged from a long tradition of traveling investigations that would, at 
the end of the nineteenth century, evolve into academic social research.28 For 
practitioners in this field, the focus was not on the elite, but on those who were 
poorly represented in written archives. When ‘oral history’ was introduced as a 
term for collecting oral accounts of past experiences, for this particular group it 
was just a new name for something that they had always been doing. What was 
new and coincided with the postwar political tide of activism, was putting their 
efforts at the service of history ‘from below’. Another fundamental difference with 
the American archival approach was the social historian’s exclusive relationship 
with the interviewees. While archival projects separated the creation of the in-
terview from the end use, social historians argued that only those who had cre-
ated the interviews should be responsible for their use and interpretation. This 
monopoly excluded other researchers from access to valuable sources, leaving the 
enormous potential for reuse unexploited. In the 1960s a heated debate evolved 
around this issue. During the founding meeting of the US Oral History Associa-
tion in 1967 the archivist Philip C. Brooks stressed the advantages of the archival 
approach: ‘The person who is collecting a stock of evidence for other researchers 
to use is almost by definition to be [sic] doing a more objective job than the one 
who is writing his own book, especially one that has a case to prove’.29 This stance 
does not take into consideration that the archival interview cannot anticipate the 
variety of research questions of future listeners. Of course, for the study of topics 
pertaining to the recent past, accounts collected in a setting with an exclusive re-
lationship between researcher and interviewee that offer the possibility to probe 
for certain details, may be preferred over interviews conducted by someone else 
with a less specific goal or topic list, that have been deposited in an archive. Yet 
this advantage of direct contact becomes irrelevant with the unavoidable disap-
pearance of generations of eyewitnesses. Oral accounts of the lives of the last 
American slaves and of the daily routine in the trenches of World War I, can now 
only be found in archives.
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The scholar to be accredited the pioneering role of facilitating the reuse of life 
stories is the social historian Paul Thompson, who led the first national oral history 
project in Great Britain in the early 1970s. He collected 537 interviews about family 
and work with so-called ‘Edwardians’, people living during the reign of King Edward 
VII between 1901 and 1910, and opened them up to other scholars. It was a decisive 
step that paved the path for the archival tradition in Great Britain, which would 
later be picked up by the Imperial War Museum and the British Library [Fig. 28].30
Despite the differences between archival and research-generated oral narra-
tives, in both approaches a traditional appreciation of the sources persisted. Out 
of defense against criticism from positivist historians, oral historians tended to 
regard their interviews as mere data from which the ‘objective’ historian extracted 
facts that could be tested for their accuracy, verifiability and representativeness.31 
This attempt to gain credibility did not convince the American historian Barbara 
Tuchman, who lamented that the ‘tape recorder is a monster with the appetite 
of the tapeworm that facilitates an artificial survival of trivia of appalling pro-
portions’.32 Her comments seemed to foresee what according to some would be 
brought about by the digital turn twenty years later.
 The memory boom, the cultural turn, and the digital turn
At the end of the twentieth century a paradigm shift in oral history occurred 
that was shaped by the interplay of three powerful social, intellectual and tech-
nological forces: the popularization and democratization of historical culture, 
Fig. 28: The British historian Paul Thompson among his books
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the postpositivist appraisal of sources as construction of meaning, and the digital 
revolution that set in the late 1990s.33
The first manifested itself in the proliferation of the production of person-
al memory and the interest raised in it.34 The combination of affluence, higher 
education, individualism and mass media fostered an historical culture that was 
no longer the exclusive domain of professional historians. This not only led to 
less visible hierarchies of authority but created a strong demand for personal-
ized history, turning identity into a commodity that can be consumed by anyone 
in leisure time.35 The economic component of this new demand created new job 
opportunities for academically trained historians, but at the same time problema-
tized their professional ethics. This process of democratization could draw on 
the firmly grounded position of ‘history from below’ that oral history had already 
established in the 1970s and 1980s.36
The second change that influenced the practice of oral history was the transfor-
mation from the search for information in the narratives into an appraisal of the 
narratives as constructions of meaning. Instead of objective information on the past 
they were now considered to be a type of data that merely offered an interpreta-
tion of the past conveyed through the agency of memory and language. Subjectivity 
and memory became key concepts in this new approach and the ‘objective observer’ 
was now expected to reflect on his role and influence in the interaction between 
interviewer and interviewee. This transformation was part of a much larger shift in 
paradigm, often referred to as the ‘linguistic turn’ or ‘cultural turn’, and had the effect 
that scholarly work in oral history moved from social history to cultural studies.37
With this new orientation the speaker’s subjectivity, his or her biases, failing 
memory and distortions, were no longer problematic, but clues to how people 
make sense of experiences of the past in the present. In the words of a leading 
theorist on oral history Alessandro Portelli: ‘Oral sources tell us not just what 
people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and 
what they now think they did’.38 Portelli argued for more listening and less read-
ing. In his view the practice of transcription denied the reality of oral sources, by 
not considering the value of tone, volume, range of sound and rhythm of speech.39 
The contemplative nature of this line of research reinforced the already existing 
multidisciplinary potential of oral history connecting it to disciplines such as bio-
graphical and literary studies, linguistics, communication and narrative studies, 
folklore studies and interdisciplinary work exploring the relationship between 
memory, narrative and personal identity.40
The effects of the cultural turn and considerations of the nature and impact of 
narratives were duplicated with the expansion of digital video recording as an op-
tion in the late 1990s. In combination with the disseminative power of the digital 
turn, this led to a third major shift in the practice of oral history.41
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Digitization and the World Wide Web made unlimited reproduction and dis-
tribution of oral history transcripts and sound files possible, bringing technologi-
cal and ethical issues regarding copyright, accessibility and control of data at the 
center of the debates on oral history.42 Direct online access to the original spoken 
narrative became possible, and by adding subtitles, access to videotaped oral his-
tory can even be offered across the borders of language. The most compelling il-
lustration of what multilingual video oral history has to offer is the Shoah Visual 
Archive with video narratives of 52,000 survivors of the Holocaust collected in 
fifty-six countries in thirty-two languages [Fig. 29 below].43
Although the advantages in terms of massive involvement in online oral history are 
evident, the wide range of online digital encounters with historical accounts and the 
diversity of personal narratives to be found online calls for some scholarly guidance 
in the form of digital source criticism. The boundaries between community engage-
ment, entertainment and carefully designed oral history projects that yield valuable 
sources for academics are not always clear. Moreover, when an appealing narrative 
that represents the view of an underprivileged group, although historically inaccurate, 
gains strong public support, the perspective of historians can lose authority. A criti-
cal stance should also be taken with regard to the dominance of state-funded oral 
history projects on the Web. Contextualization of digital oral sources is therefore 
vital to understand the current battle between memory and history.
 Immediacy and hidden layers
As indicated, novel means for online access to spoken content have entered the 
scene, and the emerging techniques for the automated unraveling of the multiple 
layers encrypted in narratives are likely to enhance the options for exploring the 
wealth of data that is available in digital format. They come along with other inno-
vations in the (digital) workflow that is now at the disposal of humanist scholars for 
handling their data. This new encounter of the humanities with technology is nur-
tured and closely monitored by industrial parties and ICT researchers alike, as they 
all have something to gain from mastering the complexity inherent to humanities 
data and practices.44 The promise for the oral history community is the develop-
ment of sophisticated software that can help to search, annotate, analyze, share and 
present oral histories in novel ways with no limits in terms of space, scale and time.
A number of pioneering initiatives for using the Internet as a stage for pre-
senting oral history were carried out in the past decade. These projects yielded 
recommendations for how to apply cutting-edge technology to online interview 
repositories at all conceivable levels: across online collections, within a collection, 
within a specific interview, or within a specific fragment.
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According to Michael Frisch, the paradigm emerging in the application of search 
technology to digitized oral history, is characterized by ‘a postdocumentary sensi-
bility’: away from text and sensitive to other dimensions of human expression than 
language, including the nonverbal and affective layers of speech (visual and non-
visual) and gestures, or in other words: the ‘full’ story. The nonverbal dimensions 
are also crucial for the interaction design of online platforms giving access to spoken 
word content. Audio content may be faceted (not just speech, but also sighs, laugh-
ter, hesitations, corrections, etc. ), and video narratives are inherently multifaceted, 
but user interfaces should also provide visual anchors, such as timelines, related 
image content and well-designed frameworks for the presentation of metadata and 
time-coded pointers to search results. Ideally, life stories can be played together 
with any relevant geographical and chronological context, and without dependency 
on information elsewhere in cyberspace. Figure 30 (see next page) contains an il-
lustration of the timeline visualization for retrieved fragments in the access portal 
for a collection of thirty-eight interviews with survivors from Camp Buchenwald.45
In addition to tools for search and navigation, analytical tools for the auto-
matic discovery of patterns in oral history data are gradually becoming available 
for scholarly use. The successful and rapid adoption of such tools in humanities 
disciplines such as ethnography, literature studies and media studies, calls for 
the exploration of their usability for oral history. The so-called ‘mining’ of speech 
Fig. 29: Home page of the Shoah Foundation Visual Archive
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data is mostly approached as a special instance of text mining (also known as 
text analytics), as for spoken word content the textual annotations layers, includ-
ing metadata and interview transcripts, can be used.46 Tools supporting content 
sharing are specifically relevant from the perspective of archives that deploy some 
form of crowdsourcing and that invite the general public or dedicated communi-
ties of amateurs to help enriching archival content.
How to benefit from the innovations described and illustrated above lies in the 
hands of scholars who are willing to embrace e-humanities and the challenges of 
engaging in collaboration with software engineers.47 Of course, the innovations 
have encountered skeptical responses, and in the field of oral history with its rich 
tradition of debates on how to appreciate new technology, one may expect that 
there will be recurring calls for rethinking the risks and virtues attributed to the 
digital humanities. Some of these attributions are expressed through concepts 
such as ‘distant reading’ (as opposed to ‘close reading’).48
The support for search and navigation in speech collections and the tools for 
pattern detection in spoken audio are likely to reach maturity in the coming years. 
For oral history this would lead to the paradoxical scenario that transcriptions 
are fully exploited, while at the same time the potential is created for direct access 
to oral sources without engaging in transcript reading. This is once again an il-
lustration of the ever shifting balance in the appreciation of the spoken word and 
transcripts that characterizes the field of oral history.
Fig. 30: Timeline visualization of retrieved fragments in the access portal for a collection of thirty-
eight interviews with Dutch survivors from Camp Buchenwald, Buchenwald, NIOD Instituut 
voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies, http://www.buchenwald.nl
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In comparison to the natural and social sciences, the humanities have received 
comparatively little attention from the analytic philosophy of science. This dis-
cipline has been concerned primarily with the sciences narrowly construed. In 
particular confirmation theory, the systematic study of theory evaluation, shows 
remarkable lacunas when it comes to the methodology of the humanities. But de-
velopments in the humanities and in conformation theory invite us to reconsider 
this situation. First, due to the fast uptake of empirical and computational meth-
ods in several humanities disciplines, the humanities are presently very much in 
flux, and much more amenable to methodological elucidation. Second, confirma-
tion theory has over the past decade significantly broadened its scope, and made 
contact with developments in mathematics and computer science. It is in a good 
position to take on new challenges.
The main idea of this paper is that confirmation theory can help to elucidate 
the introduction of new methods in humanities scholarship. In the context of 
this paper, it will not be possible to work out the confirmation-theoretic models 
in any level of detail. Instead I will discuss an example of the kind of challenges 
that arise where humanities scholarship is confronted with empirical and com-
putational methods. After some general considerations on the case study itself, I 
will sketch how we might engage with these challenges by means of confirmation 
theory. One goal with this is to expand the reach of confirmation theory, thereby 
contributing to the philosophy of science. But more importantly, I think there is a 
need within the humanities for a theory about the status and impact of empirical 
and computational results. I hope this paper can illustrate this need and suggest 
a possible direction for exploring the issues.
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 New methods and missing methodology
The last two decades have seen the fast growth of a number of new branches 
in humanities scholarship, centered on the application of empirical and com-
putational methods. We find these new methods in a wide array of humanities’ 
disciplines. They range from linguistics and cognitive musicology, in which re-
searchers simulate language production and musical hearing on a computer, to 
archeology, museology, philosophy, and the study of religion, in which empiri-
cal studies from psychology, ethnography, and sociology are brought to bear on 
more traditional ways of theorizing. These developments present us with new 
challenges and opportunities, and invite us to rethink the humanities as a dis-
cipline. How do the new methods relate to traditional humanities scholarship? 
What is the epistemic status of the empirical and computational findings and 
how do they bear on the theories and models that scholars in the humanities are 
entertaining? And where should we position the humanities in relation to the 
social and natural sciences?
The working hypothesis of this paper is that some answers to these questions 
can be found in the philosophy of science. A quick glance at history suggests that 
methodological analysis plays an important role in the definition and formation 
of scientific disciplines. Bacon’s Novum Organon set the stage for an experimental 
science of nature. Popper’s Logik der Forschung and Fisher’s Statistical Methods 
for Research Workers have provided the social sciences with a backbone, and even 
with a criterion of demarcation. For a research area that is undergoing fast chang-
es, like the humanities, a philosophical theory on evidence and the evaluation of 
theories is likely to be of great value. More specifically, an improved understand-
ing of how the humanities interact with empirical and computational methods 
will help the humanities to incorporate those methods on their own terms and 
integrate them with more traditional interpretative approaches.
In view of the pressures on academic research, humanities scholars may well be 
tempted to resort to methods from sciences whose societal or economic value is 
more easily established. The loss of scholarly approaches presents a real possibil-
ity, and potentially a risk. Moreover, it is not exactly clear what the humanities are 
supposed to hold on to if they resist this temptation. The disciplines that make 
up the humanities involve a wide array of methods, approaches, and intellectual 
sources. While these disciplines recognizably belong to the humanities, it is hard 
to say exactly what links them. They seem much less unified and homogeneous 
than the social or the natural sciences.1 In an attempt to remedy this, Bod calls 
for renewed historical and philosophical attention for the humanities, which he 
terms the ‘forgotten sciences’.2 He proposes to counteract the disunity by con-
ceptualizing the humanities as concerned with pattern recognition: patterns in 
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music, in discourse, in language, in art, and in history. By itself, this is a very wel-
come attempt to push the agenda of the humanities. However, for the purposes 
and concerns of this paper, Bod’s proposal is less attractive. Insofar as Bod gives a 
correct description of the humanities, empirical and computational methods can 
be integrated relatively easily. The introduction of empirical and computational 
methods is more likely to lead to tensions where humanities research does not fall 
under the header of pattern recognition. This paper is focused explicitly on cases 
in which tensions do arise, and addresses the question of why they arise and how 
they can be resolved.
Unfortunately, in the current analytical approach to philosophy of science, at-
tention for humanities methodology is scarce. As said, this may be partly due to 
the orientation of analytic methodologists to the sciences.3 In contrast, much of 
the research in the humanities is carried out by means of scholarly methods: close 
reading of texts, analysis of concepts, and interpretation of practices. In analytic 
philosophy of science, insofar as it is concerned with research methods and the 
justification they lend to scientific theories, these scholarly methods have hardly 
been targeted. In addition, the absence of an analytic and empiricist methodology 
for the humanities derives from the eclectic nature of humanities research. The 
empirical, computational, and other methods used in the humanities are often 
not home-grown. Rather, they have been taken over from neighboring fields of 
research, and hence accommodated to the specifics of their domain of application 
on a case-by-case basis.
More specifically, insofar as researchers from humanities disciplines employ 
quantitative empirical methods, they mostly rely on the methodology of the so-
cial sciences. The study of religion, for example, is routinely informed by psy-
chological and ethnographic research. But the statistical and experimental tools 
employed for such interdisciplinary work derive by and large from the social sci-
ences. This means that some presuppositions of the methods will be taken over 
into humanities research, for lack of an alternative methodological backbone. 
And this may have adverse consequences. For instance, in the social sciences 
there is little room for the exploratory nature of theorizing – hypotheses are 
fixed in advance and tested against the collected data – while in the humanities 
theory formation is deliberately done in tandem with data collection. In the 
same vein, available methods from the social sciences do not accommodate the 
possible incompatibility of theoretical concepts with the empiricist conception 
of measurement and fact. In short, the presuppositions of empirical research 
methods borrowed from the social sciences sit badly with particular aspects of 
humanities scholarship.
Of course, the present paper cannot fill these lacunas. The aim is rather to 
illustrate some methodological challenges with a particular case study, and to 
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offer a perspective on a resolution. The case study concerns the confrontation of 
empirical methods with more traditional scholarly methods from archeology and 
museology. More precisely, it features a project of the Drents Museum (Assen, 
The Netherlands), where visitor data is currently being collected and analyzed, 
with the aim of improving the match between visitor and collection and the man-
agement of the museum’s collection.
 Case study: The Drents Museum
The Drents Museum has recently obtained an infrastructure to trace visitors in 
real time, using radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology and an anno-
tated database of its collection. The movements and interests of visitors can be 
recorded using a simple chip embedded in the museum ticket.4 The museum now 
faces the challenge to provide the conceptual and statistical tools to fully employ 
this infrastructure, and to bring the resulting information system to bear on the 
traditional conceptions of collection and visitor. The eventual aim is twofold: to 
enhance the visitor experience by real-time feedback based on revealed interests, 
and to improve the management of the collection and the exhibitions.
In its traditional form, a museum displays objects from a heritage collection 
so that visitors can learn about them. But in the past century this idea had to 
be modified extensively. Rather than exhibiting things, museums engaged in an 
‘economy of experience’ and underwent so-called ‘McDonaldization’.5 According-
ly, museums saw the need to cater to visitors who vary strongly in their intentions, 
motivations, and attitudes when interacting with heritage collections. Moreover, 
where the old mode of information transfer is linear and unidirectional – think of 
a book – the Internet introduces an entirely new mode of operation for visitors. 
The roles of museum and visitor converge6; rather than following a given story 
line, visitors are predisposed to browse over a network of links, constructing their 
own narrative as they go along.
These shifts in the conceptions of museum and visitor present major chal-
lenges to museum management, which have only partially been met. Curators 
have learned to develop exhibitions with dramatic timing, latching onto people’s 
interests and natural attention span. Moreover, museums attempt to accommo-
date the diversity in the interests, motivations, and attitudes of their audience by 
the use of audio guides and other technological means. However, the informa-
tion provided in that way is hardly adapted to the nature of the museum visitor, 
as revealed by her behavior during the visit. Moreover, personalized interaction 
with the collection typically remains confined to the touchscreen of a PDA, 
focusing visitors’ attention to a handheld device rather than the physical en-
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vironment. And lastly, in all of this the curator remains the sole source for the 
available story lines.
Ideally, technology and heritage studies can work together to translate the 
experience of browsing the Web to the individual’s physical interaction with 
cultural heritage, leading to an entirely new conception of viewing and manag-
ing heritage collections. The eventual aim is an adaptive information system that 
presents visitors with selections of derivatives (short texts, films, photos) in con-
junction to the objects that hold their attention, and that provides personalized 
suggestions on how to continue the museum visit. Suggestions and selections 
can be made in real time, determined by earlier onscreen choices among objects 
and derivatives, as well as by measurements of the physical movements of visi-
tors. As an example, when seeing a excavated pot, the visitor who has previously 
looked at stone tools may be pointed to a film on prehistoric cooking and receive 
a suggestion to see weaponry next, while a visitor who just looked at stone figu-
rines is offered a text on the ornamental styles of pots and be invited to view 
jewelry from the same period.
Importantly, this is not just a technological challenge. It requires substan-
tive theoretical input from museology and heritage studies. The system yields 
a wealth of data on visitor behavior. Correctly analyzed and interpreted, these 
data provide invaluable information to the museum management, e.g., the time 
visitors spent at different items in the exhibition, the type of additional informa-
tion that they take interest in, the overall timing of the museum visits, and so 
on. With this information, the museum can inform key decisions on exhibition 
management. Moreover, by recording the patterns of choices and interests of the 
visitors, the information system can enrich the annotated database with seman-
tic structure: robust patterns in visitor behavior will suggest new perspectives 
on objects in the collection. For instance, if many people whose revealed interest 
is paintings also look at certain prehistoric items, this may lead to a reconcep-
tualization of these items in aesthetic terms, and their inclusion in a suggested 
itinerary for art lovers.
In terms of the case study, we can now revisit the challenge outlined in the 
foregoing. How can we integrate the computational and empirical results with an 
understanding of the collection based on museology and heritage studies? In the 
Drents Museum project, the risk is that the information system will be developed 
independently of the scholarly study of the collection. As an illustration of the 
larger aims referred to above, the following will zoom in on the task of deter-
mining how empirical findings on visitor behavior might square with theoretical 
ideas about heritage management.
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 Exploring the relation between visitor data and heritage studies
Below we consider the relation between visitor data and museological theory 
from the point of view of confirmation theory. Of course, this relation is many-
sided, and in fact impossible to capture in a single confirmation-theoretic model. 
In this section I first explore a number of perspectives on the relation between 
visitor data and heritage studies in the Drents Museum project. The main goal 
with this is to convey the many-sidedness of this relation, and thereby to enrich 
our understanding of the analysis provided further down.
Let us say that the museum establishes some kind of information or knowl-
edge transfer from collection to visitor. Three influential philosophical view-
points on knowledge then come to mind: it is interactive, embodied, and dynamic. 
More precisely, knowledge is a construction emerging from the interaction of a 
subject or a group with its environment, rather than a neutral representation of 
that environment.7 Second, the nature of knowledge is essentially connected to 
the physical nature of the interaction between knowing subject and object, or in 
short, cognition is embodied.8 And third, knowledge is characterized by dynamic, 
and not by static qualities. The nature of knowledge is given not by fixed founda-
tions, but by rules about revision in the light of evidence. All these ideas about 
the nature of knowledge provide a particular perspective on the relation between 
visitors and cultural heritage, which reflects back on the relation between visitor 
data and heritage studies.
If those ideas about knowledge seem a bit far-fetched, notice that the infra-
structure at the Drents Museum establishes an embodied and dynamic interac-
tion between the museum’s collection and the visitors. Consider the interactive 
museum guide. The traditional structure of knowledge is hierarchical and linear, 
leading to a conception of knowledge transfer that is unidirectional from source 
to receiver. But at the Drents Museum the visitor will eventually be able construct 
her own stories from the collection, by physically browsing it. In the interactive 
museum guide we can therefore identify the contours of both constructivism and 
embodied cognition. The former emphasizes the role of the receiver in the con-
stitution of knowledge, while the latter views knowledge as the result of physi-
cal interactions with an environment, as opposed to passive recordings thereof. 
Finally, the idea that knowledge is essentially dynamic is also made concrete. The 
fact that patterns of visitor may suggest new perspectives on items in the collec-
tion makes concrete that the nature of knowledge depends on its dynamics, in 
this case its interactions with museum visitors, rather than its static foundations 
in archeological findings and source material.
Among these perspectives, I believe that the constructivist aspects merit spe-
cial attention. One reason for this is that the constructive nature of the knowledge 
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contained in a heritage collection connects naturally to methodological ideas that 
stem from community-based archeology. Although not universally embraced, 
many archeologists and historians have started to involve the wider community 
in their research agenda.9 Interaction with the people that have cultural ties to 
the research topics may in fact help to shape research questions, identify precon-
ceptions, and improve the interpretation of results.10 In the context of museums, 
involvement of local communities in archeological research comes down to giving 
museum visitors, as receivers of archeological research results, a say in the de-
sign of exhibitions and in the information they obtain. Indeed, the project at the 
Drents Museum may stimulate an approach to heritage management that directly 
involves the general public.11
As a second reason to focus on constructivist ideas, the information system cur-
rently installed at the Drents Museum presents unparalleled research opportunities 
in the area of social epistemology. Within social epistemology the use of computa-
tional techniques has seen a sharp increase in the last decade. But the application 
of these trends in social epistemology to themes from social constructivism has 
not been properly undertaken. The museum presents a wonderful opportunity to 
see the process of ‘knowledge construction’, happening when visitors collectively 
interact with the collection in the museum, at work. The information system at the 
museum allows us to follow this process of knowledge construction experimentally, 
and thereby provides a quantitative, empirical and computational perspective on 
philosophical ideas of constructivism (e.g., the actor-network theory of Bruno La-
tour). The Drents Museum offers a rich experimental environment for it.
This constructivist perspective presents interesting avenues for further re-
search. However, in what follows we will first and foremost investigate certain 
confirmation-theoretic aspects of the relation between data and theory in the 
museum project or, more precisely, the evidential bearing of visitor data on the 
scholarly study of the museum collection. To keep matters simple, we will by and 
large ignore the idea that knowledge about the collection is partly constructed by 
the interaction of visitors with the collection. This will only feature briefly at the 
end of the next section.
 Fuzzy evidence and incompatible conceptual schemes
We focus on two aspects of the relation between visitor data and museological 
theory: the phenomenon of incompatible conceptual schemes and the phenomenon 
that empirical data may hold fuzzy evidential relations to theory. Before providing 
a sketch on how confirmation theory might accommodate those aspects, it will 
be insightful to show their broad relevance to humanities methodology and make 
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them more concrete in the case study. At the end of this section I will briefly re-
turn to how these aspects relate to a focus on constructivist ideas.
The phenomenon of incompatible schemes can be encountered in any human-
ities discipline that harbors multiple vocabularies. Consider, for example, the dif-
ficult relation between archeological findings as physical objects and as artifacts 
that served a purpose in prehistoric society and culture.12 Establishing this rela-
tion requires us to confront the empirical archeological facts, written in a mod-
ern and empiricist vocabulary, with ideas from anthropology and cultural theory, 
written in a language determined by the culture under investigation. Similar con-
frontations of theoretical frameworks can also be found in the study of religion. 
Findings from the psychology and the sociology of religion are typically cast in 
the empirical vocabulary that matches the ontology of quantitative social science, 
while the content of those findings pertains to experiences and events that are 
normally recorded in a wholly different vocabulary, e.g., of magic or religion.13
With respect to fuzzy evidence, the key observation is that in the humanities 
there is often only a weak confirmatory relation between empirical findings and 
theory. Partly this is because the empirical facts are still amenable to a variety of 
interpretations, each associated with their own confirmatory value for the empir-
ical facts at issue, and partly this is because the theories may themselves be subject 
to fuzziness in content, owing to the fact that the theories have not been spelled 
out in full detail or operate with incompatible conceptual schemes. To date, there 
is no comprehensive understanding of empirical confirmation in settings where 
evidence is fuzzy in these ways.
The claim here is not that the themes of incompatible concepts and fuzzy 
evidence exhaust the problem domain of a confirmation theory for the humani-
ties. However, these themes address genuine theoretical problems that apply 
widely across the meeting ground of new methods and humanities scholarship. 
Moreover, they seem particularly relevant for disciplines in the humanities. The 
confirmatory practice of the natural and social sciences is comparatively straight-
forward, often consisting of data collection and hypothesis testing against a fixed 
background of theory and terminology. The humanities, by contrast, employ a 
wider variety of confirmatory relations, which are often set against an imprecise 
and contested theoretical background. Conceptual change is more frequent in the 
humanities than in other disciplines. It is high time that these characteristics of 
the humanities are brought to the attention of the analytic philosophy of science.
With this more general motivation in place, consider how fuzzy evidence and 
incompatible schemes show up in the aforementioned museum project, in which 
we match a museum inventory to empirical facts on typical visitor profiles. The 
theme of incompatible concepts is immediately recognizable. A direct challenge 
for museums is to link patterns in visitor data, for instance, expressed in the 
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time spent in the vicinity of objects belonging to various categories like paintings, 
documentation, and archeological findings, to an understanding of the collec-
tion, which is typically structured according to different terms: historical periods, 
cultural significance, origin, owner, and so on. The introduction of new labels 
and terms in the analysis of visitor data is highly problematic: How do we adapt 
the analyses in response to, effectively, refinements and alterations of the possible 
visitor patterns? This concrete problem touches on technical issues,14 but also on 
deep conceptual issues with a wide appeal in epistemology and philosophy of sci-
ence, concerning language-relativity and theoretical continuity under revisions of 
conceptual frameworks.
Finally, consider the phenomenon of fuzzy evidence in the museum project. 
Formal epistemology is already acquainted with the idea that empirical fact does 
not always relate neatly to the theories that may be supported or falsified by it. A 
large body of literature researches epistemic update rules in which the empirical 
facts cannot be described in the straightforward observational terms, e.g., as in 
Jeffrey updating. In such update rules, the empirical facts are instead described 
by specific probabilistic constraints that do allow expression in the terms asso-
ciated with the theory. But the museum project seems to give rise to fuzziness 
of a different nature. While the visitor data is itself is perfectly clear, its impact 
on theory is not. Often the theories, which might concern particular cultural or 
aesthetic relations among items in the collection, will only have a vague empirical 
content. How do we bring evidence from visitors, whose behavior strings items 
in the collection together, to bear on these theories? Extant confirmation theory 
is quiet on this point.
Recall that I deemed the constructivist perspective particularly salient in the 
project of the Drents Museum. We can now return, albeit only briefly, to con-
structivism and relate it to the two aspects just outlined. It will be clear that a 
constructivist mindset means that we cannot preselect a vocabulary as primi-
tive or preferred when it comes to, e.g., an item from a heritage collection. This 
vocabulary genuinely depends on the person observing the item, in this case the 
visitor. To integrate all the different visitor experiences in a single data structure 
and analysis, we will need to make the vocabularies of different visitor types and 
curators meet. And this is what confirmation-theoretic models of incompatible 
schemes may help to achieve. Similarly, we might use visitor data for evaluating 
a claim about the collection. Simultaneously the visitors impact on the way in 
which the collection is being conceived. And this might in turn affect the content 
of theoretical claims about it. To accommodate such looping effects,15 the con-
firmatory relations between visitor data and theory has to allow for some degree 
of fuzziness.
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 Some first steps in confirmation theory
Confirmation theory, a subdiscipline of the philosophy of science, concerns the 
support that empirical and other evidence provides for scientific hypotheses. 
The focus lies on logical and mathematical models of scientific inference. Gen-
erally speaking, the inferences start in empirical fact and result in general state-
ments, or else predictions on future observations. In other words, the inferences 
run from data to some form of theory, or else from data to observations that are 
still to come. Confirmation-theoretic systems of inference have been the subject 
of academic study for almost a century now, with seminal contributions from 
Carnap, Reichenbach, Hintikka, Levi, Jeffrey, Skyrms, and numerous more re-
cent authors.
In the last two decades, philosophers of science have become increasingly 
aware of the fact that scientists use all sorts of nonempirical considerations when 
choosing between theories: causal structure, simplicity, coherence, novelty, and 
so on. In response, they have developed a large array of primarily probabilistic 
models to explicate and clarify the role of nonempirical, or theoretical, considera-
tions. Present-day confirmation theory consists of some lively debates on how to 
model coherence, variety of evidence,16 explanatory force,17 on how to detect and 
exploit causal structure18 or analogy,19 on how to weigh simplicity against predic-
tive performance when comparing models,20 and so on.
One of the messages of this paper is that we can break new and fertile ground 
for these developments in confirmation by focusing on new methods in hu-
manities scholarship. Applications to humanities scholarship will involve major 
changes in confirmation theory, requiring us to rethink some of the hard-wired 
assumptions of current confirmation-theoretic systems. But the potential ben-
efit and impact of improving confirmation theory is enormous. The systematic 
approach of confirmation theory will help to clarify the intricate relations that 
obtain between empirical studies and theories, as they appear in humanities dis-
ciplines. This will make humanities scholars aware of the dangers and opportuni-
ties associated with involving empirical studies in their research. And eventually 
the research will also inform scientists who hope to involve insights from the 
humanities in their science, for instance, in the medical humanities.
The general plan is to enrich confirmation theory with ideas from statisti-
cal model selection and probabilistic logic. But it will be clear that a full-scale 
development of new confirmation-theoretic models is not undertaken in this 
paper. The more modest goal is that fuzzy evidence and incompatible schemes 
will be related to some promising current developments in confirmation the-
ory. The central development is a change in the conception of theory, and an 
associated change in the conception of epistemic attitudes toward theory. The 
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point of departure for this change is Bayesian confirmation theory.21 This type 
of confirmation theory expresses our epistemic attitudes with regard to theory 
by degrees of belief, or probability functions, over a language or algebra. Sci-
entific and scholarly theories are supposed to be captured by sharp probability 
functions over empirical data, expressing that theories make probabilistic, yet 
fully specific predictions. The key point is that humanities theories are often 
represented more adequately by structured sets of probability functions over em-
pirical data.22 Relative to empirical data and various theoretical criteria, we do 
not merely choose the best fitting probability function as our best theory. Rather 
we choose between several sets of such functions, or in statistical parlance, we 
choose between models. The major advantage of representing the nature and 
evaluation of theories from the humanities in this way is that it provides more 
room for accommodating confirmation-theoretic phenomena like incompatible 
concepts and fuzzy evidence.
Now it might require some explanation that the central ideas here are appar-
ently gleaned from a statistical context. After all, in the humanities, evidence and 
theory are often not quantitative, let alone statistical in nature. Indeed, I readily 
concede that some humanities disciplines are primarily informed by methods of 
interpretation or hermeneutics,23 which seem to resist a formal and confirmation-
theoretic representation.24 Moreover, the rigidity and uniformity of statistical 
methods seems to be in stark contrast to the plurality of methods that we find in 
humanities disciplines. And finally, humanities research is often concerned with 
the unique and specific, and not, as are statistical methods, with the repeatable 
and generic. However, the goal of involving confirmation theory is certainly not 
to cover all theory evaluation in the humanities. The proposal is to employ confir-
mation theory for an assessment of particular approaches within the humanities, 
namely computational and empirical ones. It is undeniable that some humanities 
disciplines have recently seen the introduction of such empirical and computa-
tional methods. Our challenge is to integrate those new methods with an open 
eye for the specifics of existing humanities scholarship. And for this task, formal 
philosophical methods are certainly not far-fetched.
All of this is, of course, a far cry from designing a confirmation theory that 
fits the specific requirements of the museum project. This is not the place to 
lay out the probabilistic models in detail, but rather to sketch a development in 
confirmation theory, and the philosophical and methodological setting in which 
this development takes shape. The take-home message is simply that confirma-
tion theory can be made applicable to pressing methodological problems in the 
humanities, and that this breaks new ground for confirmation theory itself.
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 Conclusion
It will be clear from the foregoing that we are only seeing the start of the devel-
opment of a confirmation theory that can accommodate humanities scholarship 
as well as methods from the social sciences that have been imported into the 
humanities. However, at this point it deserves emphasis that such a project is 
timely, even urgent. It addresses developments that are presently transforming 
the humanities, and has the potential to be a key contribution to its methodology: 
it integrates an analytic and empirical mindset into a field formed by traditional 
scholarly methods, and it establishes a much smoother connection of the hu-
manities with the natural and social sciences. Finally, it will bring an entirely new 
perspective to the lively philosophical debate on scientific confirmation.
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10.1 Making the Humanities Scientific
Brentano’s Project of Philosophy as Science
Carlo Ierna
During the nineteenth century we witness an extraordinary progress and increas-
ing specialization in the natural sciences as well as the growth and professionali-
zation of universities in Germany.1 At the same time, after the deaths of Goethe 
and Hegel, the epoch of Romanticism and German Idealism had come to an end.2 
While the sciences diversified and emancipated from their philosophical past, 
philosophy itself fragmented into competing schools and currents,3 and in many 
respects, precipitated into an existential crisis.4 For a long time in the mainstream 
historiography of philosophy the nineteenth century was considered to harbor 
only epigones or predecessors.5 However, there certainly were central questions 
specific to the development of philosophy and the humanities in the nineteenth 
century: What makes science science? What would make philosophy science? 
What is or should be the relation between the natural sciences and the humani-
ties, the Natur- and the Geisteswissenschaften? The scientific status of philosophy 
became a mainstream issue at first in nineteenth-century philosophy6 and con-
cerned the demarcation of academic and institutional fields as well as the funda-
mental nature of scientific knowledge as such. Many prominent philosophers and 
psychologists now argued that philosophy needed to become scientific by taking 
the natural sciences as a model,7 while before the nineteenth century philosophy 
in general had been regarded as universal science and the sum of all knowledge. 
During the nineteenth century, scientists did no longer consider themselves to be 
philosophers and few, if any, philosophers could claim to be able to embrace the 
depth and breadth of the former ‘natural philosophy’. There certainly had been 
debates about the precise subject, method and demarcation of specific subdisci-
plines prior to the nineteenth century, but these were still considered as internal 
to philosophy as an encompassing whole, as the overarching quest for knowl-
edge. Before the nineteenth century, few felt the need to articulate the relation 
between philosophy and science as if these were two independent enterprises or 
to argue that philosophy would need to become more scientific. Indeed, prior to 
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the nineteenth century most empirical and experimental scientific research was 
considered to be part of philosophy.8 If philosophy was inspired by any models of 
rigorous science outside itself, those were geometry and mathematics rather than 
physics or chemistry.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, philosophy needed to 
reestablish its proper role and function: beneath, between or beyond the increas-
ingly diversified natural sciences. What options did philosophy have to become 
scientific? According to Hegel, philosophy would not really have a domain of 
its own, but rather a specific method to approach any domain, the method of 
speculation.9 Speculation would yield the concepts that would then determine 
the objects, not from experience, but a priori.10 The focus is on method and the 
form of reasoning, on building a top-down system that can account for the whole 
of reality in a holistic manner.11 In the second half of the century, however, the 
view that philosophy would instead have a domain of its own gained currency. 
The proper domain of philosophy would not be the physical world outside us, 
but the internal world of the psyche.12 A truly scientific philosophy would have 
to be based on a natural-scientific experimental psychology. This idea became 
so popular in Germany toward the end of the nineteenth century that philoso-
phy chairs were increasingly being offered to experimental psychologists,13 to the 
point that when the experimental psychologist Erich Jaensch obtained the chair 
of philosophy in Marburg in 1912, replacing the neo-Kantian Herman Cohen, the 
philosophers vehemently protested and sent around a petition to collect signa-
tures in all German universities containing a ‘Declaration against the occupation 
of philosophical chairs by representatives of experimental psychology’, request-
ing the institution of separate chairs for psychologists and the repristination of 
philosophical chairs previously assigned to psychologists.14
Many experimental psychologists, including Wilhelm Wundt (who is usually 
credited with founding the first psychological laboratory),15 argued that by study-
ing the relations between the external and internal world through experimenta-
tion, psycho-physics could establish the essential link between nature and con-
sciousness, and hence ultimately found the humanities on the natural sciences.16 
The view that the mind can be reduced to the brain remains widespread today 
not only among the general public, but also within the cognitive sciences and phi-
losophy of mind, leading to claims such as: ‘Intentionality is a biological feature 
of the world, on all fours with digestion or photosynthesis. It is caused by and 
realized in the brain’.17 But if the Geisteswissenschaften are in the end founded on 
the Naturwissenschaften, then what do they actually study? Since we already have 
a natural science that claims to study the mind and consciousness, i.e., experi-
mental psychology, can the Geisteswissenschaften even claim rightly that they are 
still studying the Geist? Or is this field restricted to studying merely the products 
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and expressions of the mind?18 Do we have to choose between either studying na-
ture with an unscientific, speculative method or ‘giving up the ghost’ and studying 
the expressions of a mind that ultimately is just an effect caused by the brain,19 
effectively becoming a branch of the natural sciences?
Franz Brentano’s project of the renewal of philosophy as science presents an 
interesting solution to this dilemma, by providing the best of both worlds.
It thus turns out that Brentano and Husserl offer us something that we 
cannot find among the two main streams of contemporary philosophy, gen-
erally classified as continental and analytic. Roughly speaking, the conti-
nentals reject the very ideal of philosophy as a science and perhaps even 
science itself, whereas the analytic philosophers do not as a rule allow for 
any other kind of science besides that which is exemplified in its finest form 
in physics. It is, to be sure, of great importance not to allow philosophy to 
decay into the dogmatism, relativism, and mysticism of the continentals. 
It is, however, of equal importance not to overlook a whole dimension of 
scientific inquiry. In spite of the many disagreements between Brentano 
and Husserl, their common concerns may well be the only ones that will 
ultimately prevail in a genuinely scientific philosophy.20
On July 14, 1866, Brentano stepped up to the pulpit to defend his thesis that 
‘the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences’.21 
This thesis became the north star of his school, rallying his first students to his 
flag,22 and remained a central and lasting concern for many of them.23 This thesis 
is part of a greater whole and actually follows from another thesis, namely that: 
‘Philosophy must deny that the sciences can be divided into the speculative and 
the exact; because if this is not correctly denied, then philosophy itself would 
have no right to exist’.24 Here a more general claim is made about the nature 
of science and philosophy: there is just one kind of science and philosophy is 
part of it. Philosophy is not done by speculative construction, but by humble, 
detailed investigation.25 As Brentano told his students some years later: ‘We are 
taking the first steps toward the renewal of philosophy as science’, not by conjur-
ing up ‘proud systems’ out of thin air, but by humbly ‘cultivating fallow scientific 
ground’.26 Thus Brentano instilled in his students a strong sense of scientific 
rigor and his students did not consider themselves to practice ‘armchair philoso-
phies’, but to do science.
There is no doubt anymore that also in philosophical matters no other 
teacher can be found than experience, and that it is not a matter of reveal-
ing the whole of a more complete Weltanschauung as a product of genius, 
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but that a philosopher, like any other researcher, can only make progress in 
his field conquering it step by step.27
Brentano explicitly addresses the question whether we are justified in applying 
the methods of the natural sciences to the problems of the human sciences. First 
of all, Brentano observes that the natural sciences, in all their variety, do not sim-
ply use one single method everywhere. The method always must be appropriate 
to the object of inquiry. While mechanics uses deduction from first principles 
and paleontology has historical elements, the ultimate source of knowledge is 
always experience. Direct experience is decisive.28 For Brentano, the true golden 
age of philosophy lies before us, if we manage to develop a method in analogy to 
the natural sciences.29 This depends on an analysis of experience and hence on 
the development of a new philosophical psychology as a science of consciousness.
Nowadays, what Brentano himself is probably still best known for is his rein-
troduction of the concept of intentionality into philosophy:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a con-
tent, direction towards an object [...], or immanent objectivity. Every men-
tal phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they 
do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, 
in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, 
in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic 
exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits any-
thing like it. We could, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that 
they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within 
themselves.30
Intentionality is also at the root of his methodology and of his claim that the true 
method of philosophy is that of the natural sciences. While philosophy would use 
the method of natural science, its main domain would not be natural, but mental 
phenomena: a full-blooded science of the mind that does not require a reduc-
tion to the physical in order to be scientific. Brentano defined his psychology as 
a descriptive science: empirical, but not necessarily experimental; subjective, but 
not introspective.
While the striving for scientific philosophy is of course something that 
Brentano and Husserl have in common with other philosophers, such as the 
logical positivists, it is to be noted that they differ from many of these others 
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insofar as they see consciousness as the subject matter of such philosophy. 
When we speak of science in English, what is primarily meant is natural sci-
ence. It may accordingly be difficult to understand how Brentano and Hus-
serl could have advocated or advanced scientific philosophy without seeing 
natural science as its foundation. As difficult as this is for the contemporary 
Anglo-American understanding, it must time and again be emphasized that 
consciousness, completely devoid of any sort of physicalistic reduction, is 
an object of science for Brentano and Husserl. This science, moreover, they 
regard as absolutely central to all the concerns of philosophy.31
Using intentionality as a criterion we can distinguish natural and mental phe-
nomena: physical phenomena and psychical phenomena, or in other words, phe-
nomena of external and internal perception. Physical phenomena would be color, 
tone, warmth, etc.; psychical phenomena would be the seeing of the color, the 
hearing of the tone, the feeling of the warmth, etc. Hence, the Geisteswissenschaf-
ten would be the sciences that deal primarily with the mind, with consciousness, 
with its acts, contents, objects and its expressions. This would also include most 
of the social sciences: ‘Clearly social phenomena belong among the mental phe-
nomena, and no other knowledge can be drawn upon as ordering authority but 
the knowledge of psychical laws, that is, philosophical knowledge’.32
While these broadly defined sciences, the Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften, 
each have their own domain, they are essentially founded on the same empirical 
method, again broadly understood, based on perception and experience and not 
on a priori metaphysics or speculation. Sciences are built bottom-up, not top-
down. By taking the experience of concrete phenomena as the foundation, Bren-
tano maintains the fundamental unity of science, while making a clear distinction 
between the sciences of physical and the sciences of psychical phenomena. Indeed, 
Brentano clearly distinguishes his descriptive psychology from the experimental 
study of psycho-physics, which he calls genetic psychology. Hence, psychology is 
not used to found Geist on Natur hierarchically and hence the Geisteswissenschaf-
ten keep their autonomy in their own domain.
Psychology is also confronted with another task [besides the formulation 
of laws that regulate the (causal) coherence of body and soul, which is the 
task of genetic psychology]: to give clarity about what inner experience 
shows immediately; hence not a genesis of facts, but at first only a descrip-
tion of the field. This part is not psychophysical, but purely psychological. 
We must know in advance, what the facts look like: and this is shown by 
the internal perception of the psychical. When we want to describe this, we 
summon phenomena through iteration of the physical stimuli; in this sense 
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we will also have to discuss the body. Otherwise only internal experience 
is considered.
 This field of psychology I call descriptive.33
Descriptive psychology, according to Brentano, identifies three natural basic 
classes of mental acts: presentations (Vorstellungen), judgments (Urteile) and 
phenomena of love and hate or emotions (Phänomene der Liebe und des Hasses).34 
All of these are intentional acts; no presentations without something presented: 
‘There is no psychical phenomenon which is not consciousness of an object’.35 
All mental acts would either be presentations or contain presentations in them: 
judgment and emotions essentially consist in a positive or negative quality added 
to a presentation.36 What is accepted or rejected in a judgment is the existence 
of what is presented.37 Perception, both internal and external, would be simply a 
case of judgment, where we positively accept the existence of what is given in the 
presentation. In this sense, internal perception is inherently superior to external 
perception. We can always doubt the existence of the objects of our external per-
ception, because we cannot exclude that we fall prey to illusions or hallucinations, 
that we are dreaming, etc. ‘Internal perception is actually the only kind of percep-
tion in the proper sense, while strictly speaking so-called external perception isn’t 
perception’.38 Due to the epistemic privilege of internal perception, Brentano con-
sidered his philosophical psychology to be an exact science. In the case of internal 
perception, I have a direct experience and immediate evidence of my own mental 
acts when I live through them. In this respect, Brentano sharply distinguishes 
internal perception from introspection, pointing out that inner perception can-
not become introspection or inner observation.39 We are directly conscious of our 
own mental acts while living through them, without the need for another sepa-
rate act directed at them that would ‘observe’ them, since this would introduce an 
infinite regress.
The science of mental phenomena would then proceed in the same fashion as 
the natural sciences: perception and description of concrete phenomena, formu-
lation of hypotheses, discussion based on further data, induction of increasingly 
general laws, deduction of increasingly specific cases, verification or falsification 
based on concrete experiences. In other words: pick a problem, consider all the 
possible explanations, reject all the false ones based on concrete counterexamples 
taken from experience, until in the end the correct theory remains.40
In this way, Brentano represents both an exception to and a culmination of 
the nineteenth-century concerns with philosophy as science, advancing a new 
paradigm that would make it possible to work in philosophy and the humanities 
scientifically without making them dependent on the natural sciences. Moreover, 
his theories and teachings turned out to be quite fruitful and influential in phi-
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losophy and other human sciences thanks to their further development by his 
students in the School of Brentano.
Brentano’s students adapted and spread his theories far and wide, holding 
important chairs in philosophy at major universities throughout the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and central Europe. Carl Stumpf, Brentano’s first student, 
taught at the universities of Göttingen, Würzburg, Prague, Halle, Munich and 
finally settled in Berlin, where he established a psychological laboratory and 
phonogram archive, founding the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology, influenc-
ing, among others, Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Köhler. An-
ton Marty spread Brentano’s philosophy for more than three decades in Prague, 
raising the second generation of Brentanists, among others Alfred Kastil and 
Oskar Kraus, and exerting a significant influence on the development of Prague 
Linguistics, since Vilem Mathesius studied with him and Roman Jacobson read 
his works already before coming to Prague. Alexius Meinong became professor 
in Graz, where he established a psychological laboratory and founded the Graz 
School of Gestalt psychology, including Stephan Witasek and Vittorio Benussi. 
Edmund Husserl’s works gave rise to the phenomenological movement, which 
inspired much of what is now called ‘continental philosophy’ and in various ways 
influenced existentialism, hermeneutics and French philosophy: Martin Hei-
degger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques 
Derrida, Paul Ricoeur, Alexandre Koyré, Jan Patocka, and Edith Stein, among 
many others. Kazimierz Twardowski moved back to his homeland Poland, es-
tablishing the first Polish psychological laboratory, and became the father of 
Polish Philosophy, propagating Brentanist ideas as the teacher of Tadeusz Ko-
tarbinski, Jan Lukasiewicz, Stanislaw Lesniewski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. Fi-
nally, Christian von Ehrenfels is still best known for his Über ‘Gestaltqualitäten’ 
(1890), which contributed to establishing and shaping Gestalt psychology. Other 
notable figures that studied under Brentano include Thomas Masaryk, Sigmund 
Freud, and Rudolf Steiner.41
The nineteenth-century idea of scientific progress as a collective achievement 
obtained through collaborative research42 led to a division of labor in the School 
of Brentano. Each of his students chose to mainly concentrate on and work out 
a philosophical position in a specialized field, either due to Brentano’s guidance 
or following their own interests, applying the Brentanist methods and principles 
of descriptive psychology to it and working it out as a part of the greater whole: 
Stumpf, the philosophy of sound and music; Marty, the philosophy of language; 
Meinong was originally meant to work mainly on the history of philosophy; 
Husserl started out by formulating a Brentanist philosophy of mathematics and 
then went on to develop philosophical logic as a general theory of science, before 
starting his own phenomenological movement; and so on. However, besides these 
550 Carlo Ierna
various pursuits, Brentano’s students were also still concerned with the overall 
project of the renewal of philosophy as science and, besides their work in episte-
mology, logic, and philosophy of science, they also discussed the scientific status 
of philosophy and its relation to other disciplines, both scientifically as well as 
institutionally, in various programmatic works.43
With such an extensive list of notable descendants in such a wide spectrum of 
fields, one would expect Brentano to be much better known and studied nowa-
days, but alas this is not the case. His theories spread mostly through his teach-
ings, the division of labor in his School obscured the underlying methodological 
unity, and the success of the schools and movements founded and influenced by 
his students overshadowed their common background and shared origin. These 
factors have led scholars to speak of ‘Brentano’s invisibility’.44
As we can see from the success and influence of his students and their schools, 
Brentano’s project of renewing philosophy as science has been very fruitful in 
highly disparate fields. Brentano’s ideal of philosophy as science is to all effects, 
‘a program for scientific research’ showing that it is possible to conduct scientific 
research in the humanities,45 that the Geisteswissenschaften can be understood to 
be indeed full-blooded sciences in their own right: unnatural sciences.46
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10.2 The Weimar Origins of Political Theory
A Humanities Interdiscipline
David L. Marshall
With a frequency that is quite remarkable, contemporary political theorists in 
the Anglophone world continue to speak of the Weimar Republic as a decisive 
point of origin for their field of inquiry. Of course, the field has many sources 
(some modern, some ancient), but ‘the Weimar origins of political theory’ is a key 
topos. Thus, in 1988, John Gunnell, perhaps the most relentless scholar on this 
issue, could write that ‘the contemporary estrangement of political theory from 
political science is in large measure the product of a quarrel that originated in the 
challenge to the values of US political science initiated by émigré scholars during 
the 1940s’.1 The issue was whether political science had to be value-neutral if it 
was to be counted as a science and whether something essential would be lost if 
the normative dimension of political inquiry were excluded. Even someone like 
Sheldon Wolin, who agreed that there was a tension between political science and 
political theory and yet denied that the Weimar émigrés were setting the agenda, 
cast his landmark 1969 essay on ‘Political Theory as a Vocation’ in the form of 
an homage to a German theoretical initiative forged in the context of Weimar’s 
birth.2 And, following the discontinuation of political theory from the graduate 
program in political science at Penn State in 2007, the science-theory tension, 
defined in significant ways by Weimar and its afterlife, has become highly con-
troversial once again.3
If one were to distill the various articulations of this ‘Weimar origins of po-
litical theory’ topos into the most compact sequence possible, one would emerge 
with something like the following conceptual narrative – which is oversimple but 
provisionally useful. Max Weber took the major challenge of modernity to be the 
increasing hegemony of rule-governed systems, and he then described politics 
under modern conditions as a kind of conundrum: unable to do without lead-
ers, modern systems had difficulty producing them, because the basic govern-
mental form of modernity – bureaucracy – was something like an attempt to 
render leadership superfluous.4 Carl Schmitt then proceeded to challenge the 
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self-sufficiency of posited, rule-governed systems, and he reoriented political sci-
ence to the study of a sovereignty that distinguished itself by determining when 
the rule was and was not in force. Thus, according to the well-worn Schmittian 
sentence, Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet (Sovereign is he 
who decides upon the state of exception).5 In turn, Leo Strauss accused Schmitt 
of falling prey to precisely the logic that Schmitt thought he had been critiquing. 
That is, liberal pluralism brought Schmittian decisionism into being by under-
mining tradition. The implication was that romanticizing the decision merely 
deepened what was for Strauss the central modern political problem – namely, 
pluralism and its purported corollary, relativism.6 Less explicitly but just as com-
pellingly, Hans Baron’s discovery of Florentine Bürgerhumanismus in the shadow 
of Weimar’s collapse responded to the charge of relativism by transforming ‘deci-
sion’ into ‘action’ and by giving action its own – now neo-Aristotelian, now neo-
Ciceronian – value as a form of human flourishing, that is, as a cultivation of 
‘the virtues of active life’ in the polis and in the Stadtstaat.7 Probably unaware 
of Baron, Theodor Adorno proceeded to replace the city-state and its rhetoric 
with the metropolis and Kierkegaardian aesthetic. Voguish ‘existentialism’ was 
a pseudo-politics, Adorno thought, a merely idealist retreat from the vita activa 
into a world of rentier inwardness. Avant la lettre, one might say, existentialism 
was not a civic humanism. Engagement did not translate virtù. What one needed, 
he concluded, was a Phantasie that would not merely think the particular but 
would in fact act into historico-political concretions by finding the gaps between 
their characteristics.8 Like tangents peeling off a historical arc, these initiatives 
show us a series of specific conceptual possibilities deriving from (but not bound 
to) Weimar Germany.
This is a rich and provocative sequence, but when I look at Weimar I see some-
thing different, something we have neglected. I see an alternative lineage defined 
by the sequence: Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Aby Warburg, and Walter 
Benjamin. To be sure, these are four more of the usual suspects in the Weimar 
canon. What I want to emphasize is the sense in which each of these four think-
ers was working at the intersection of political theory and rhetorical theory. Only 
recently has this cluster of interests received a degree of attention. Heidegger lec-
tured on Aristotle’s Rhetoric at the University of Marburg in the summer semes-
ter of 1924, and a number of scholars have taken this as an opportunity to think 
about Weimar’s sense of a republic’s existence in persuasion.9 Even as it is not 
as well-known as it should be, this work has been invaluable, but I would argue 
the initiative can be taken further. The particular Heidegger in whom rhetorical 
and political theory intersected is only one point of departure, one of several that 
need to be thought together if they are to be thought more fully. What I propose 
to do in this short piece is sketch the beginnings of an account of the Weimar 
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origins of political theory in which rhetoric plays a central role. The larger point 
– here simply exemplified rather than analyzed or established – is that even after 
the ‘rhetorical renaissance’ and before the ‘linguistic turn’ rhetoric was more than 
simply an art of persuasion. In fact, rhetoric could be a conceptually rich interdis-
cipline at the core of the humanities.
The richest point of departure for an account of the Weimar intersection 
of rhetorical and political theory is Heidegger’s summer semester 1924 lecture 
course on the basic concepts of Aristotelian philosophy. With extreme ingen-
iousness, Heidegger argued, in effect, that rhetoric had been at the center of 
the Aristotelian research enterprise. Tracing Grundbegriffe out from Book V of 
the Metaphysics into the biological and the logical works, he found those basic 
concepts intersecting in the Rhetoric. ‘Today’, he complained, ‘we have a primi-
tive conception of language or none at all’. In contrast, the Greek sense had been 
deeply original. And ‘the concrete proof of the originality of this understanding is 
the Rhetoric, in its entirety’.10 This being in language was always a being with oth-
ers in processes of taking up positions counterposed to phenomena, phenomena 
that were themselves in the process of being delineated. Being in language was an 
array of faculties understood as possibilities impinging upon the actual: aisthesis 
was, most basically, a kind of hearing, hören, a being disposed toward; phantasia 
was a situating of oneself sensuously among objects not present to the senses; 
pathēsis was a kind of conviction, a being held and a holding oneself in a particu-
lar position. Rhetoric, on this account, was not an art, not a technē, but rather a 
dunamis, which in Heidegger’s transposition was not a ‘faculty’ or ‘capacity’, not 
a Vermögen, but rather, a Möglichkeit, a possibility – a (my term) ‘living-in-the-
midst-of-the-risks-that’.11 Politics then became something like the most intensive, 
most encompassing, inseparability of all of these dispositions in the lives of hu-
man communities. Indeed, so Heidegger, ‘rhetoric makes the claim to be itself 
politics’.12 I am claiming that, for Heidegger – for the early Heidegger who was 
paraphrasing Aristotle – politics was the process in which a community became 
entangled in its own possibilities.
Thus, when Heidegger spoke of human being as a very particular form of 
Dasein, he meant that human being was always a being that was rhetorically and 
politically situated in a particular place and in a particular moment, with contigu-
ities in space and time that extended ahead and behind, into the past and into the 
future, and with discontinuities made proximate by means of imagination. Orien-
tations to the proximate and to the available-for-use were in fact rhetorical ori-
entations to the relatively immediate environment. The rhetoricians had termed 
this zero point, this here and now in space and time, kairos – the critical place or 
moment, the opportunity. And they subordinated much of rhetorical theory to 
the demands of kairos. Heidegger, in turn, described kairos as the intersection of 
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all intersections between past and future, a mean of means. ‘The mean’, he said, 
glossing the Aristotelian meson, ‘is nothing other than the kairos, the totality of 
circumstances, the how, when, whither, and about which’.13 In any given time and 
place, the situation would be defined by the coming together of a multiplicity of 
trajectories. But one’s exposure to a trajectory would be necessarily partial. Such 
an exposure might even be momentary. A political situation, for example, might 
be defined by a high-resolution photographic image in which one could not de-
tect even the slightest hint of a blur. The political task might be to infer a past for 
this moment (a cause) and a future (an effect). A series of hypothetical pasts and 
an array of possible futures thus defined the political situation. And, of course, 
the collective action would be calibrated to the directionality – that is, the sense 
of potential threat or opportunity – generated by those inferences.
In Sein und Zeit (1927), there was only one sentence that bore explicit witness 
to Heidegger’s articulation of the centrality of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the lectures 
of 1924. In §29, Heidegger noted that Aristotle’s Rhetoric must be understood 
as die erste systematische Hermeneutik der Alltäglichkeit des Miteinanderseins.14 
Miteinandersein here was not simply ‘being-with-another’; it was the sum total of 
all the sensibilities marking a political, or rather politicizable, community. In turn, 
this Alltäglichkeit was an ‘everydayness’ in which the majority of sense experiences 
went unregistered. That is, the so-called self-forgetfulness of being was habit. It 
was the inconspicuousness of sense data encountered on a daily basis, and it was 
the sclerosis of words used too often and too readily. But the inconspicuousness 
of the present was also a dimming down of past and future, because it was a de-
nial that the here and now was in fact a kairos. In this way, political capacity was a 
power of representing the present in ways that made it visible, conspicuous.
The one point at which scholars have clearly received the Heideggerean line of 
inquiry that I am laying out here is the emphasis he placed on Entscheidung, deci-
sion. Since at least Christian von Krockow’s famous 1958 grouping of Heidegger 
with Ernst Jünger and Carl Schmitt, we have often folded Heidegger into a kind 
of generic existential dramatization of the decision.15 And from there the road 
to an ever more merciless decidedness has seemed natural, inevitable even. Or, 
alternatively, noticing the moments in which Heidegger saw that the fetishization 
of decision was itself simply a form of Weimar Gerede (idle talk), we say that Hei-
degger turned, did an about-face, and preached Gelassenheit (serenity), in place 
of, or as a redescription of, Entschloßenheit (resolution). But, like the man himself 
in many ways, we have forgotten how he got to this point, and thus we have for-
gone an opportunity to think Heidegger’s thoughts in a different direction.
To some extent, Hannah Arendt certainly did think Heidegger’s thoughts, but 
in a different direction. Famously, it was the same Athenian world of logos – word 
and deed and being-with-others in a public realm – that Arendt placed at the 
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center of The Human Condition in 1958. And she did so in order to power a theo-
retical counterattack upon the form of politics (‘totalitarianism’ was, of course, 
her word) that Heidegger had, for a time, joined. This was ironic. But the irony 
was, I think, deeper than we have seen. Arendt’s problem was not that she had too 
much Heidegger. The problem was that she received too little. Or, more precisely, 
she took too little from the early Heidegger.
Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein as a kind of actualization within a contexture of 
possibilities was heavily invested in a reconceptualization of time. The distances 
that pushed out from the moment into the past and into the future were primar-
ily temporal distances. There were, it is true, crucial ways in which Heidegger’s 
project also reconceptualized space. And, what is more, Arendt did inherit the 
Heideggerean concern with the simultaneity of past, present, and future. Never-
theless, there is a real sense in which Arendt transposed Heideggerian interests 
from time to space. Her doctoral dissertation aimed at a critique of the Christian 
concept of neighborly love – a kind of geographic disposition. Her habilitation 
was an analysis of the acts of social distantiation undertaken by and encountered 
by the nineteenth-century Jewish salonnière Rahel Varnhagen. Her journalistic 
writings in the 1940s were often investigations of the bipolar and multipolar 
spaces that war and political negotiation brought into existence. And, of course, 
in The Human Condition, the distinctive human activity of action took place in 
what Arendt termed ‘the space of appearance’.
If one concentrates on the various spaces conceptualized by Arendt in these 
texts, one discovers that over time her treatments became flatter, more idealized, 
and less perceptive. Throughout her oeuvre, space was never something that could 
simply be assumed, and it was always in the process of being opened or closed, 
but in the early texts – up to 1950 or so – the depictions of spatial fissure and su-
ture had been far more exacting. In the Augustine and Rahel texts, space was the 
distance at which one held oneself from the world, or it was the distance at which 
one was held by the world. Where Augustine feared assimilation into the world 
(as a losing of oneself in the desires of the flesh), Rahel craved assimilation into 
Prussian society but failed to achieve it. In both cases, Arendt’s prime interest 
was how to describe non-assimilation. Space itself simply was non-assimilation, a 
combining of the distances established by the non-identity of persons. Elements 
of her early analytical acuity remained in the later treatments, but ultimately the 
space of appearance in The Human Condition – despite its conceptual centrality 
and apparent richness – was Olympian. It was the individual’s distinctiveness 
as ‘a who’ that dominated. Space was now a venue for performance. And in her 
characterization of Adolf Eichmann, she wanted to head in precisely the opposite 
direction: the modern biopolitics of extermination, she argued, had been made 
possible by Eichmann’s absolute indistinctness, by the non-existence of a space 
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separating him as ‘a conscientious exception’ from ‘the rule of law’. The late work 
on judging promised to renew the early investigation of the non-disappearance of 
the case into the rule together with the specific sensus communis brought thereby 
into being, but Arendt died before she could complete that book.16
In part, the simplifications of the late works were deliberate, politically moti-
vated, and understandable. But they also revealed Arendt’s truncated reception 
of Heidegger’s lectures on rhetoric. It was the University of Marburg summer 
semester 1924 lectures that had constituted the richest cache of terms and tactics 
for describing the space of distances between possibilities in which human politi-
cal community existed. Yet Arendt began to study with Heidegger in Marburg 
only in winter semester 1924-1925. Thus, she heard Heidegger’s lectures on Plato’s 
Sophist but did not have the Aristotelian rhetorical background from the Sum-
mer Semester lectures. Student notes of Heidegger’s lectures, including those on 
rhetoric, were circulating in Marburg, but we do not know if Arendt ever read 
them.17 I think it unlikely that she worked with the Mitschriften on rhetoric. Cer-
tainly, notes attesting to her 1953 reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (which we find in 
her Denktagebuch) have none of the explosive conceptual energy characterizing 
Heidegger’s 1924 gloss.18 And, in 1972, when Heidegger indicated that he had 
neither the manuscript nor any copies von der wichtigen Vorlesung SS 1924 über 
Aristoteles, Rhetorik, Buch II, Arendt could only report that these lectures were 
unfortunately not among the Nachschriften that had recently surfaced courtesy of 
Heinz Lichtenstein.19 Thus, she was working with an empty category when – in a 
text on the relationship between philosophy and politics composed in 1954 (and 
later revised) – she declared that for the Greeks ‘rhetoric, the art of persuasion’ 
had been ‘the highest, the truly political art’. ‘Rhetoric’ for her was only ever a husk 
word, one that she would use occasionally, without ever really knowing what it 
might mean.20 This is not something to be lamented. It is, I think, an opportunity. 
It is an opportunity to think Arendt’s thoughts anew, from the inside, this time 
with a richer sense of something that she herself regarded as central.
The movement from Heidegger to Arendt is natural, conventional even. The 
movement from Arendt to Warburg is not. I propose, however, that we can insert 
Warburg into the gap that we have discovered in Arendt. Where Arendt spoke of 
‘the space of appearance’, Warburg spoke of Denkraum (thought-space). On the 
one hand, a matrix of intersecting perspectives. On the other hand, a dislocation 
between inputs and outputs. Arendt spoke of the fullness of being that could be 
achieved in political energeia, that is, in the actualization of human being in po-
litical action. Warburg too spoke of energeia, but for him it was to be understood 
in the context of dunamis. That is, actuality was always embedded in possibil-
ity. And, for Warburg, this inextricability of stillness from motion was primarily 
visual. Just so, his great early discovery was that Renaissance art could be under-
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stood as a series of attempts to reinvent ancient approaches to the problem of 
how to represent motion in static works of art.
It is sometimes tempting to think of Denkraum as something like a space 
opening up between a thinking subject and a cognized object. This space then 
begins to look like freedom, indeed, like an enlightened exiting from the state 
of superstition. In fact, I would argue, it is more accurate (and more useful) to 
think of the term as marking out gaps between the various qualities constituting 
a phenomenon being perceived. Not all – indeed, very few (if any) – quality ag-
glomerations of this kind will be definitions of the class of which they are mem-
bers. Denkraum was the contingency manifested by relationships of non-mutual-
necessitation among predicates. Most important, therefore, were those points at 
which Warburg glossed Denkraum as Hemmung, as a hesitating.21 This, one might 
say, was the zone of imaginative continuation, in which trajectories perceived in 
or implied by the world were projected into possible futures. Hesitation derived 
from a multiplicity of possibilities and from an inability to decide. It was as if 
visual attentiveness, as if seeing something, was a kind of living in a variety of pos-
sible futures simultaneously. The space of thought, the Raum of Denken, was thus 
a space demarcated by the distances between these possible futures.
For Warburg, European cultural history had captured this Denkraum qua 
hesitation in a variety of ways. It was Medea in Ovid’s reworking of Euripides, 
where she was famously conscious of the possibility of the better even as she was 
enacting the worse. It was Lorenzo de’ Medici in Ghirlandaio’s Sassetti Chapel, 
where he held out his hand in a gesture that stood midway between greeting and 
holding at bay. And it was Claudius Civilis in Rembrandt’s historical painting, 
where the moment of swearing into a political conspiracy was saturated with in-
dividualized foreboding.22 The enemy of possibility was necessity. And necessity 
was indeed Warburg’s enemy. In 1917, in his talk on prophecy in the age of Lu-
ther, this involved an investigation of the human capacity for prostration before 
the goddess Fate. In 1923, in his famous talk on Pueblo Indians, this became the 
depiction of a primitive human tendency to assume that decisive moments were 
fully determined in the sense that each and every detail in such situations could 
bear interpretative scrutiny and that all such details were equally telling.
I would argue that, if we place Warburg in a sequence after Arendt, we gain an 
ability to think Warburg’s concepts more politically. And, indeed, the beginnings 
of such a repositioning are to be found among his papers in London. On my ac-
count, the ‘Mnemosyne’ project, the magnum opus left unfinished when he died 
in 1929, was a kind of visual training in equipoise. The image tables we find in the 
Mnemosyne Bilderatlas constitute a series of requests to adopt response-poses 
to the images on display. Equipoise was a kind of facility in running through re-
sponse-poses without losing one’s affective balance. Political capacity, one might 
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continue, was precisely this kind of talent in agile counterposing. And I think that 
this is why, when he thought about what the phrase restitutio eloquentiae might 
cover as a title for the Mnemosyne project, Warburg included not only style, pa-
thos, and ethos but also magnanimitas – for magnanimitas was the great early 
modern political virtue.23 It was ‘a greatness and capaciousness of soul’ that never 
lost its balance in the political world of multiple and rapidly changing possibili-
ties. And this, Warburg had said, was the defining feature of Lorenzo de’ Medici 
as a politician: affective range.24
At the center of Walter Benjamin’s work, I claim, there was a core interest in 
being drawn into a multiplicity of possibilities that was very similar to Warburg’s. 
In fact, one could narrate the sequence of Benjamin’s intellectual interests by 
tracing variants of actualization-caught-in-the-midst-of-possibility: Stillstand, 
Starre, Zögern, Unentschloßenheit, Entschlußunfähigkeit, Spannung, Schwanken, 
Spiegelung, Unendlichkeit, Vexierbild, Schwebezustand, Kontrapost, Debatte, Di-
alektik, Sophistik, Alarmbereitschaft, Geistesgegenwart. These were his terms, and 
they marked out a zone of core interests. And, indeed, the specific connections 
between Warburg and Benjamin have been the object of scholarly interest re-
cently – although, at this point, I do not think we have really understood this 
possible never quite actualized proximity. In 1928, Benjamin had his newly pub-
lished book on early modern German drama sent to the Kulturwissenschaftliche 
Bibliothek Warburg, hoping that it might gain him entry into the Warburg Circle 
in Hamburg. It did not. What was the point of possible connection? Briefly put, 
it was Dürer’s Melencolia I. In the gloss of the Warburgians, this was a depiction 
of the simultaneity of a gloomy situatedness in the middle of influence and an 
ingenious perspicacity with regard to the multiple possibilities fanning out from, 
and structuring, that situation.25 The anxiety of influence underwrote creativity. 
Ingenuity was freedom. And freedom here was being understood as an artifact 
of the imagination, not the will. For Benjamin, on the other hand, Dürer’s image 
glossed the early modern sovereign as represented in German Trauerspiele. The 
absolutist concentration of power opened up such an intense world of possibility 
that the monarch became immobilized at the moment of decision. This was a hy-
perconsciousness of the consequences, intended and unintended, of every move 
made – or not made. In this way, ingenuity generated an oversupply of freedom, 
at which point freedom became debilitating. This, one might say, was Hamlet.26
For Warburg, Denkraum had been a way of dislocating oneself from mono-
manias of sensory input and imaginative continuation, in fear and the like. For 
Benjamin, Schwebezustand – one of the terms he used for the state of uncertainty 
deriving from an equilibrium of proximate and incompatible possibilities – was 
a motif for politicization. Like the Aristotelian Heidegger and the Augustinian 
Arendt, Benjamin perceived a world around him in which attention, Aufmerksam-
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keit, was continually being overwritten by habit, Gewohnheit. His politics was a 
politics of politicization. That is, his task was simply deploying Aufmerksamkeit 
in such a way that the established modes of habit were called into question.
One sees this politics of politicization everywhere in Benjamin. One finds it, 
for example, in his manifesto for a children’s proletarian theater, written in col-
laboration with Asja Lacis. There, the task of educating the young for revolu-
tion became the task of showing children how to understand the statements they 
heard as implicit requests. And the twist was that one could only respond appro-
priately to a request if one demonstrated that one’s actual response to that request 
had been but one of several possible responses.27 One also finds this politics of 
politicization in Benjamin’s radio plays. The point of broadcasting a pair of peti-
tions for a pay raise in 1931 (one inept, the other cunning), for instance, was not to 
foster better bargaining practices in a working class struggling in the middle of a 
depression. The point was to highlight the differences between two possibilities 
in order to reveal not only structures of power in the workplace but also their 
contingency.28
The Heidegger-Arendt-Warburg-Benjamin lineage that I am laying out is 
not peripheral to Benjamin’s main interests. I am claiming that it runs directly 
through the center of his project. Take the ‘Kunstwerk’ essay, for instance, the 
most canonical of Benjamin’s canonical texts. What we have there, I would argue, 
is a sudden and brilliant consciousness of the opportunities provided by new 
media. It was not that photography and film were for Benjamin intrinsically bet-
ter media. They did not presage utopian political solutions. The crucial fact was 
simply that they were new. Film cut through sensory habituation, not because 
there could be no such thing as visual cliché and not because film could not it-
self constitute a training for and domestication of the senses, but simply because 
cinema was novel. New media provided new opportunities for Aufmerksamkeit – 
that is, for an awareness of how things were in the context of how they might be. 
This, I would argue, was a re-emergence of Kairos – or, as Benjamin termed it, 
the Zehntelsekunde, the tenth-of-a-second made visible by photography and film 
in slow-motion.29
Given the massive amount of scholarly attention that has been given to the 
intellectual legacy of the Weimar Republic, it might seem remarkable to propose 
that we have lost anything – let alone an entire vision of the rhetorico-political 
as a humanities interdiscipline. What we have lost, I would argue, is a vision of 
how philosophy, political theory, art history, and literary criticism (as they were 
instantiated by Heidegger, Arendt, Warburg, and Benjamin) might all partici-
pate in the description and analysis of human being as a series of actualizations 
saturated by – indeed, constituted by – possibility. To be sure, this particular 
interdiscipline never quite existed in Weimar itself. Ultimately, Heidegger did 
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not pursue the Aristotelian-rhetorical version of himself. And Arendt did not 
follow this line of inquiry on his behalf. Warburg never interpreted his interests 
in stasis and kinesis through Arendt’s analysis of love in Augustine. And, whereas 
Benjamin did take up Warburgian interests in melancholy, he did not thereby 
gain entry to the Warburgian community of inquiry in Hamburg. These things 
could have happened, but they did not. And, although each of these thinkers has 
been canonized as a titan of twentieth-century thought, we have not yet perceived 
them as a gestalt. What we have lost, therefore, is the possibility of seeing these 
thinkers together and the possibility of thinking their projects together. But this 
is not an irrevocable loss. Unlike political possibilities, intellectual historical pos-
sibilities remain possible.
By way of conclusion, a word or two on my presuppositions. When I say that 
intellectual historical possibilities remain possible, I mean that thoughts can be 
thought again and anew. A sentence can be thought again in the sense that one 
can suspend one’s disbelief and repeat a sentence in the mode of provisional asser-
tion at the same time as one – to a degree and only with great discipline – contex-
tualizes that sentence within an array of simultaneously asserted sentences. The 
‘meaning’ of these sentences is then to be understood in terms of their inferential 
consequences. Ultimately, it may be impossible to repeat the coming together of 
a contexture of sentences in inference with absolute precision. Often, there will 
have been too many sentences in play at any one time, and only some of them 
will have been brought together explicitly in the extant historical record. What is 
more, quarantining a certain set of sentences off from those other sentences that, 
at any given moment, historians might entertain as assertions is only an imprecise 
art. One can halt the inferential cross-pollination of sentences only with difficulty 
(although one can organize it). Nevertheless, the reconstruction and reenactment 
of inference is possible to a significant degree. In this sense (and to this degree), 
it is indeed possible to think thoughts ‘again’.
Furthermore, one can think a thought anew in the sense that, instead of sup-
posing that one may only contextualize the sentences of a particular author in the 
middle of other sentences by that same author (or in the middle of sentences all 
simultaneously authorized by that same author), one can propose more complex 
historical contextualizations in which, for example, Weimar-era sentences join 
with other Weimar-era sentences, constituting thereby inferential matrices. In 
this way, historically sensitive de- and recontextualizations become possible, for, 
just as one can decontextualize a sentence from Aby Warburg’s corpus of writings 
and recontextualize it in a tissue of Benjaminian sentences, so one can rethink a 
Weimar sentence, or a contexture of Weimar sentences, in post-1933 and post-
1945 contexts. Ultimately, one can say, ‘presentism’ is just another form of his-
torical recontextualization. As in all such cases, one can do this work with great 
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historical sensitivity or great historical insensitivity. Perhaps thinking the past 
in the context of the present is particularly fraught (because of the vividness and 
insistence of one’s actual, and not merely feigned, convictions), but it is not basi-
cally different from the general historical work of thinking conceptual afterlives. 
After all, to think a sentence is to think the range of its potential applications. 
And time is the great discoverer of potential applications. I conclude, therefore, 
that, although there will be distinctions between them, the history of thought and 
thought itself cannot be radically separated.30
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Max Weber’s Views on Explanation in the 
Humanities
Jeroen BouTerse
Max Weber is, of course, famous as one of the founding fathers of sociology. 
From the perspective of a threefold division of scholarly activity – natural sci-
ences, social sciences, and humanities – it might seem odd to devote focused 
attention to him in a discussion of the humanities.
However, the distinction between social sciences and humanities itself de-
serves historical attention: there is obviously some overlap both in the object and 
in the interests of those clusters of disciplines. They are both interested in what 
people do and have done, broadly speaking. They probably do so differently, 
constructing their research object in different ways and using different vocabu-
laries and concepts. But importantly, in Weber’s time the vocabularies pertinent 
to the study of human culture and society were subject to fierce debate. If in this 
context Weber developed a position that contributed more to twentieth-century 
social science than to the humanities, this does not mean that his position at the 
time was only relevant to a social-scientific perspective. These were categories 
still in the making.
This paper places Weber’s formulation of the position of the human sciences 
in relation to the challenge to their autonomy posed by the rise of psychology as 
a scientific discipline – a challenge that was not just intellectual but also institu-
tional: the question whether university chairs in philosophy ought to be given to 
psychologists as well was a live one, for instance.1 We will see how experimental 
psychology backed up its claim to belong the human sciences – and, in fact, to be 
the foundational human science; and we will see how advocates of humanistically 
oriented disciplines resisted the intrusion of such a psychology in their domain.
Before turning to Weber, we will look at two other attempts to counter the 
perceived threat that psychology posed to the autonomy of what can pragmati-
cally be called the humanistic disciplines: by Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich 
Rickert. The argument will be that while Windelband and Rickert responded 
by redefining the humanities as individualizing disciplines separated from the 
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search for regularities, Weber developed another way of meeting the challenge, 
in which interpretation and the search for lawlike patterns could be combined.
 Windelband and Rickert:  
Expelling psychology from the humanities
There were several traditions in dialogue with which Weber was to develop his pro-
ject for an interpretive sociology. Of these, the strongest intellectual influence on his 
own theoretical reasoning was the neo-Kantian school represented chiefly by Wil-
helm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert.2 From them Weber inherited the problem 
of the status of the ‘Geisteswissenschaften’, as well as part of the solution: they shared 
the opinion that the study of human culture should be qualitatively different from 
that of nature, but that the former was not necessarily inferior to the latter.
Windelband noted that a once plausible distinction between these two – based 
on a substantive difference between Natur and Geist – had lost its attractiveness, 
but that there remained a very important logical division within the empirical 
sciences: that between the search for knowledge of general laws on the one hand, 
and the search for individual knowledge on the other. This was the difference be-
tween ‘nomothetic’ and ‘idiographic’ sciences, a difference located not in the stud-
ied material itself, but in the treatment of that material.3
This logical distinction conveniently implied that psychology could be evicted 
from the domain of the Geisteswissenschaften, which were now identified as by 
definition idiographic: psychology was a science of the mind, but its treatment of 
the material had more in common with the natural sciences in that it, too, sought 
to formulate general laws: ‘the substantive differences are minimal compared to 
the logical identity which all these disciplines have with respect to the formal 
nature of their knowledge goals: they are always looking for the laws in events’.4
Windelband acknowledged that causal knowledge depended on general state-
ments but that individual personality withstood such a reduction to general cat-
egories: it was ‘causeless’, and therefore ‘free’.5 This reasoning would run the risk of 
leaving human action incomprehensible were it not for the possibility of intuitive 
understanding: only by reliving the past in its fullness could one avoid using the 
abstract concepts which were (according to Windelband) by definition inappro-
priate for the understanding of free action. This freedom together with intuitive 
understanding and the logical distinctness of the idiographic sciences served as 
barriers keeping ‘nomothetic’ psychology away from the study of human culture.
This self-definition of the sciences of man with psychology left out was devel-
oped further by Rickert. He, too, started from the assumption that the division 
of the sciences by their subject matter was outdated: the prime example was, 
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again, psychology, which happened to occupy itself with ‘mental being’ instead 
of physical nature, but which could not therefore claim to be anything else than 
a natural science.6 Psychology, Rickert recognized, might strictly be a Geisteswis-
senschaft for its subject matter, but it was not therefore a Kulturwissenschaft – and 
the cultural sciences embraced in practice ‘all objects of the study of religion, law, 
history, philology, political economy, etc., that is, that of all “humanities” with the 
exception of psychology’.7
Rickert warned that if these disciplines were grouped according to their oc-
cupation with human mental life, psychology would become ‘the principal basis 
of all cultural scholarship, understood in its elevated sense’.8 Such an intrusion 
of a discipline so strongly oriented toward the natural sciences was unaccepta-
ble. But what, then, were the cultural sciences? Rickert proceeded from the idea 
that reality was infinitely large and describable in infinitely many ways, and that 
therefore any attempt to grasp it conceptually had to be simplifying and selective. 
The nomothetic sciences did this by generalizing, and this was indeed one option. 
But Windelband’s idiographic sciences were originally defined by their ambition 
to describe a part of historical reality in its totality, which they could in fact never 
hope to do; so what was their principle of selection?9
Rickert concluded that it must be value-relatedness: the ‘essential’ was selected 
on the basis of the values of the historian – and according to Rickert, the attribu-
tion of cultural value to historical phenomena or persons was mostly based on their 
uniqueness, on those aspects that made the phenomenon or person in question a 
unique historical ‘Individuum’. By this supposition, cultural scientific interest was 
the logical complement to natural scientific interest, which was aimed at the gener-
al.10 Accordingly, the kind of ‘psychology’ relevant to the cultural scientist was quali-
tatively different from that advocated by representatives of scientific psychology.
As historians were occupied to a large extent with the mental life of their ac-
tors, it was understandable that they were supposed to be good ‘psychologists’,11 
but this had nothing more to do with scientific psychology than had the psycho-
logical intuition of artists.12 Rickert still distinguished between a general ‘concep-
tual’ grasp of the psyche, and an individual ‘intuitive’ grasp of it: the distinction 
between natural and cultural science, in that respect, went together with a dis-
tinction between explanation and understanding: Erklären and Verstehen.
We have to distinguish explanation [Erklären] and understanding [Verste-
hen]. We want to explain the nature of physical being, in so far as we search 
for its general laws. Mental life in history however we want to understand, 
as we re-experience it in its individual course. Once this distinction is clear, 
one will cease to think it self-evident that the historian should practice sci-
entific psychology in order to enhance his ‘psychological’ understanding, 
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and one will not consider the foundation of the historical sciences to lie in 
any science of the mind.13
That last remark was in explicit opposition to Wilhelm Wundt, the chief spokes-
man of scientific psychology, ‘who primarily wants’, said Rickert in his efforts to 
refute him, ‘to make psychology into the foundation of the humanities’.14
He seems not to have exaggerated Wundt’s ambition, for indeed a few years 
earlier, Wundt had defined the status of his scientific psychology in relation to 
the other disciplines precisely in the way that bothered Rickert so much and to 
which he was now formulating a coherent response. According to Wundt,
as the science of the universal forms of immediate human experience and 
their combination in accordance with certain laws, [psychology] is the foun-
dation of the mental sciences. The subject-matter of these sciences is in all cas-
es the activities proceeding from immediate human experiences, and their 
effects. Since psychology has for its problem the investigation of the forms 
and laws of these activities, it is at once the most general mental science, 
and the foundation for all the others, such as philology, history, political 
economy, jurisprudence, etc.15
For Wundt, these latter disciplines were primarily Geisteswissenschaften and thus 
supposed to sail under the flag of the most fundamental science of the mind; 
Rickert had now redefined them as Kulturwissenschaften and thus supposedly 
secured their independence from Wundtian psychology.
 Weber and the explicability of human action
We have seen that both Windelband and Rickert dismissed psychology in part 
because in their view the kind of knowledge relevant to the idiographic or cultural 
sciences could not be produced by the generalizing knowledge of psychology. In-
stead of this generalizing conceptual knowledge, both placed an ‘intuitive grasp’ or 
‘reexperiencing’ on the foreground. This approach was unattractive to Weber, for 
whom all science revolved around explanation, as we will see.
Weber wrote his most famous methodological essays after a period of severe 
mental troubles. The first of these essays was devoted to a critique of two of the 
most important members of the ‘historical school’ of political economy, Wilhelm 
Roscher and Karl Knies.16 Of these, the latter two (about Knies) are most impor-
tant for our current purpose. In Knies’ work, Weber found several errors that he 
considered to be so common that a lengthy general treatment of them was justi-
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fied – to such an extent that most of the dialogue turned out to be with other 
thinkers than Knies.
Weber frontally attacked Knies’ idea that free and purposeful human action 
was opposed to regularity. Weber connected this wrong opinion to the intuition 
that human action was in some sense specifically ‘creative’, as opposed to the me-
chanical causality of nature – a mistake that Weber identified in Wundt as well 
and to which he attributed Wundt’s overambitious claims on the status of psy-
chology. The notion of creativity was inherently value-laden, Weber maintained, 
and reading it as something objective (within the domain of an empirical sci-
ence) suggested that empirical disciplines could deliver value judgments, quod 
non. Wundt’s idea that there could be laws pertaining to the production of value 
and meaning amounted to this, and was therefore dangerous: psychology should 
not claim to provide a worldview.17
However, Weber’s criticism of the uses of psychology extended only to its mud-
dled relation with value judgments, and did not constitute a wholesale dismissal. 
Indeed, Weber’s intention was to improve psychology: ‘psychology as an empirical 
discipline only becomes possible through the elimination of value judgments’.18 Such 
a purified scientific psychology was potentially equipped for a fruitful search for 
causal explanations of whatever it would like to investigate. In fact, Weber openly 
invited psychology to deliver any explanation of human mental phenomena, pro-
vided, of course, that it could justify these explanations. How could he still refuse to 
acknowledge it as the foundational science for the study of human culture?
There was, of course, the logical argument that individual phenomena could 
never be deduced from general laws alone, and in another context Weber did use 
that argument: ‘even today the opinion is not completely eradicated that it would 
be the task of psychology to play a role comparable to mathematics with regard 
to the individual “humanities”’.19 But, he argued, even if by psychology or another 
science all possible causal relations had been discovered, in no way ‘could the real-
ity of life be deduced from these “laws” and “factors” [...] since for our knowledge 
of reality what matters is the constellation in which these (hypothetical!) “factors” 
[...] are found’.20 This observation drew on Windelband’s argument that individu-
al reality was always the product of general laws and individual initial conditions, 
and could therefore not be explained by exclusive reference to these general laws. 
21 However, we may note that this argument guaranteed only a limited amount of 
disciplinary autonomy for the cultural sciences. For comparison: even a positivist 
like Hempel would grant this point.22 There was more work to be done.
Returning to Knies, Weber coolly dismissed the latter’s view of the irration-
ality of human behavior: ‘in “lived” reality there is no question whatsoever of a 
specific “incalculability” of human action’.23 Did people not ‘take into account’ the 
reactions of others to their own actions? Granted, the actions of others could not 
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be predicted with full certainty or in toto, but was not the same true for the weath-
er? 24 When it came to a phenomenon in its total individuality, certain prediction 
was impossible – at best it could be said in retrospect that the phenomenon had 
not occurred in contradiction with the known regularities.25
There was a difference between the explanation of human action and that of 
natural events, Weber said, but it was not that human action was less ration-
al – on the contrary! Human action could not only be understood as ‘possible’ 
in relation to general laws, but was also accessible to understanding: ‘Verstehen, 
that is, establishing a concrete “motive” (or a complex of motives) that can be 
“internally” “reexperienced” and that we can attribute to it with more or less cer-
tainty depending on our source material’.26 Apart from possible, a historical action 
could be considered teleologically rational, adequately motivated, and as such be 
understood. ‘The “interpretability” [Deutbarkeit] here adds to the “calculability” 
[Berechenbarkeit) when compared to natural phenomena, which cannot be in-
terpreted’.27 To the extent that a historical person acted irrationally, his behavior 
could in theory still be explained by psychological laws, but then it was both less 
understandable and less free.28
Human action, then, in so far as it was not regulated by natural laws, was 
actually more explicable than natural phenomena; moreover, even if it could be 
consistently related to empirical rules, this in itself would not give us the feeling 
of having understood it adequately29 – ‘we will not possess this understanding as 
long as we do not also have the possibility of inner “replication” [Nachbildung] of 
this motivation in our imagination’.30 The kind of knowledge appropriate to hu-
man action, then, was closely related to the notion of Verstehen, considered as a 
kind of inner experience.
But, Weber hastened to add in a footnote, ‘we will see that one can only speak 
of “replication” in a very improper sense’.31 There was a trap that Weber did not 
want to fall into, and that was that emphasizing the difference between these two 
kinds of knowledge came close to separating them altogether – to concluding 
that the ‘objectifying’ and the ‘subjectifying’ method had nothing to say to each 
other.32 This was a position that Weber took very seriously, but that he judged 
to be fundamentally incorrect. In the patient argument against it that covered 
more than half of his two essays against Knies, Weber maintained that, on the 
one hand, there was something specific about interpretation that could not in any 
useful sense be reduced to scientific psychology, and that on the other hand this 
did not close the door to psychology but instead gave every discipline its proper 
place. According to this view, scientific psychology would be neither all-powerful 
nor irrelevant to the understanding of human action.
An opposing view Weber discussed was that of Hugo Münsterberg, who radi-
cally separated ‘direct “understanding”, that is, an empathizing with, reexperienc-
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ing, feeling, appreciating and valuing of “actualities”’33 from value-free, analytical 
knowledge. History, according to him, was a subjectifying discipline whose object 
and way of knowing had no relation to the methods of objectifying knowledge.34 
Weber objected that phenomena that could be considered to be irreducible to 
historical questions were not therefore necessarily out of reach of the objectify-
ing sciences; a psychological analysis of, for example, religious hysteria could very 
well increase our understanding of a historical phenomenon.35
It could also be the case, of course, that the results of experimental psychology 
did not exceed the understanding that could anyway be reached by common sense 
– especially the complexity of individuals, in whom an infinity of causal relations 
was combined, made this plausible.36 But in this, again, the mental domain was 
no different from the physical. Abstract laws could provide valuable insights – or 
not; and in that respect psychology was (a priori) neither more nor less relevant 
than any science.
The rules of experience of psycho-pathology and the laws of psycho-physics 
come into the consideration of history [as a discipline] only in precisely the 
same sense as physical, meteorological, biological knowledge. That is to 
say: it is ever dependent on the individual case whether history or political 
economy has cause to take note of the robust results of a psycho-physical 
nomothetic science [Gesetzeswissenschaft].37
The notion that psychology had a special status was dismissed, then:
[T]the assertion one sometimes hears, that ‘psychology’ [...] would have to 
be a universally indispensable ‘foundational science’ for history or politi-
cal economy, since all historical and economical phenomena go through a 
‘mental’ stage and have to go through one, is, of course, untenable.38
One could as well say that acoustics was the foundational science for the histori-
cal understanding of political speech. Psychological concepts, rules or statistics in 
so far as they could not be interpretively understood ought to be treated as simply 
‘given’ – and not therefore irrelevant, but also not satisfying a specific historical 
interest.
This historical interest Weber defined, like Rickert, in terms of values. Knowl-
edge of reality was knowledge of individual phenomena; but there were infinitely 
many of those, and any one of them was related to infinitely many causes.39 There 
was nothing in the phenomena itself which could govern the selection of a finite 
part of these.40 ‘In this chaos’, Weber said,
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order comes only from the circumstance that in every case only a part of in-
dividual reality has value and meaning [Interesse und Bedeutung] to us, while 
only that part stands in relation to the cultural values [Kulturwertideen] with 
which we approach reality.41
Phenomena were of scientific interest in so far as they related to cultural inter-
est – not, of course, in the sense that science was only about valuable phenomena; 
prostitution, money and religion could all be of equal interest; this simply meant 
that they were relevant to the cultural interests of the scientist.42
 Interpretation as explanation
In Weber’s view, interest in the study of cultural (value-related) facts as such was 
necessarily connected to understandable human action. 43 This, then, remained 
the legitimate and unchallenged domain of the historical sciences. That is, if Ver-
stehen was a scientifically legitimate business. Could it be? According to Weber it 
could, as long as it was disconnected from value judgments, as long as its results 
were treated as nothing more than intellectual statements, and as long as it served 
the intellectual goal of causal understanding of actions.
Weber recognized that interpretation (Deutung) could mean both the attribu-
tion of value and the understanding of motives, but these meanings had to be 
kept clearly distinct.44 Of science Weber demanded abstinence from value judg-
ments at all times – interpretation as valuing was by definition not a scientific 
act. Of course, a scholar could in his interpretation of a historical event or person 
make use of value-related concepts to which he, as a valuing human being, also 
took a stance – but this was a matter of Wertbeziehung, not Wertung; in service 
of objectifying knowledge, the use of value-laden concepts was not an act of Stel-
lungnahme, but of Verstehen.45
Further, the notion of Verstehen as a kind of ‘experience’ (Erlebnis) had to be quali-
fied. Too often the claim was made that the ‘inner’ experience of historical knowledge 
was in some way more reliable than the kind of experience on which natural scientific 
knowledge was based; that intuitive reexperiencing was a privileged kind of under-
standing with special certainty.46 Instead of embracing this view as an affirmation of 
the autonomy of the interpretive science, Weber demolished it completely.
Intuition was no prerogative of the historical sciences47 – mathematicians 
could also use their imagination as a starting point, for example.48 The point was 
that one’s own inner ‘experience’ in itself did not constitute understanding of the 
other – someone who tried to empathize with an acrobat felt neither what the 
acrobat actually felt, nor what he himself would feel in his place, but something 
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with an indefinite relation to this;49 and even that feeling was not ‘knowledge’, for 
it was something pre-conceptual. In order to become knowledge, it first had to be 
transformed into an articulate statement.
This process of transformation was required, for even one’s own experience could 
not be reproduced in thinking.50 Against the opinion that concepts were restricted to 
relations between things and that understanding of the individual things themselves 
was necessarily a-conceptual and therefore artistic and intuitive, Weber placed his 
view that an empirical science could very well create a Dingbegriff that was not an 
exhaustive Anschauung but an artificial product of thought – a concept of some-
thing individual.51 It had to create such artificial concepts, moreover, because only 
concepts could be elements in statements of which the validity could be judged.52
For most importantly, the validity of an interpretation was still only a hy-
pothetical matter which had to be subjected to empirical criticism, ‘just, from a 
logical perspective, like the hypotheses of the “natural sciences”’.53 Rationally un-
derstandable actions might possess more Evidenz than non-rational events, but 
this understandability should not be confused with empirical certainty,54 which 
could by definition only be reached by empirical means: ‘all “understanding” pre-
supposes (psychologically) “experience” and is (logically) only demonstrable as 
valid by reference to “experience”’.55
In this way, then, understanding was an intellectual business like all others. It 
had its point of departure indeed in ‘co-experience’ (inneres Mitmachen) or ‘empa-
thy’ (Einfühlung), but for the sake of knowledge, this had to be selectively articu-
lated, ‘a “co-experience” of teleologically selected elements’.56 The bridge between 
indefinite feelings and articulate judgments was constituted by values57 – value-
relations defined what was essential and could therefore serve as guides in the 
construction of historical units:
[T]he ‘historical unit’ [historisches Individuum], even in its special sense of 
‘personality’, can logically only be a ‘unity’ that is artificially constructed 
through value-relations, and therefore ‘valuing’ is the usual psychological 
stepping-stone for ‘intellectual understanding [Verständnis].58
One’s own values were ‘instruments in the service of understanding [Verstehen], 
which is here the causal interpretation of the actions of others’.59
For in its final goal, too, Verstehen resembled the treatment of individual natu-
ral phenomena:
the ‘interpretive’ investigation of motives by the historian is a causal attribu-
tion in a logically absolutely identical sense as the causal interpretation of 
some individual natural phenomenon, for its goal is the identification (at 
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least as a hypothesis) of a ‘sufficient’ condition [Grund], just as this is the 
only possible goal of the research of complex natural phenomena, if what 
matters are the individual elements of those phenomena.60
Verstehen was not something radically opposite to Erklären, it was a form of it – in 
the historical sciences an essential one – and was in principle subject to the same 
procedures as any other kind of explanation within the empirical sciences.61 It 
was a specific kind of explanation not because it was unscientific (that is, valuing, 
a-conceptual or noncausal), but because it concerned ‘meaningful’, value-oriented 
human action and worked by virtue of the fact that the scholar himself could (by 
means of his own value-orientation) interpret such meaningful action.62
It was an empirical question to what extent specific human action was actually 
meaningful, and as said before, psychological laws could provide a different kind 
of causal understanding if (and in so far as) it turned out not to be meaningful. 
This is best explained by the hypothesis of rationality: ‘interpretation through the 
categories of “goals” and “means”’.63 Action was most understandable if it was ‘tele-
ologically rational’: if the scholar could show that it served, given his knowledge of 
the ‘objective’ situation, as a means for the actor to reach a valued goal.64 Of course, 
people did not always behave completely rationally, so this ideal-typical construc-
tion of what would be rational behavior should be compared to empirical evidence, 
after which it also served to show the causal scope of irrational elements in some-
one’s actions,65 which were then open to scientific psychological explanation:
when our historical knowledge is confronted with behavior that is ‘irra-
tional’ in the sense of ‘not interpretable’, our need for causal explanation 
[kausales Bedürfnis] will often have to satisfy itself with a way of ‘grasp-
ing’ [Begreifen] oriented upon the nomological knowledge of, for example, 
psycho-pathology, or similar sciences.66
Verstehen and scientific psychology were neither reducible to each other, nor ac-
tive on incommensurable terrains; they were complementary methods serving the 
goal of the historical sciences, explaining different kinds of elements within the 
causal network of one reality.
 Conclusion
In contrast with the views of his neo-Kantian predecessors Windelband and 
Rickert, who tried to disconnect scientific psychology as a generalizing discipline 
from the historical or cultural disciplines arguing that their respective modes of 
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understanding were incompatible, Weber decided that as sciences, these disci-
plines were working on the same terrain and could not simply ignore each other. 
All empirical sciences had in common that they attempted to construct objective-
ly valid knowledge of aspects of reality, and for knowledge to be objectively valid 
meant for it to be value-free, conceptually articulate and empirically supported 
– there was no difference here between sciences occupied with the physical and 
the mental domain, nor was there a difference between generalizing and indi-
vidualizing sciences. ‘Scientific’ psychology had to be purified from value-laden 
or metaphysical concepts, but the same was the case for historical understanding.
For the notion of Verstehen, this meant that in the sense of a subjectifying, 
valuing, intuitive act it had no place in science. The cultural scholar could, how-
ever, identify the motives of agents as causes of their behavior, motives which 
were connected to value-related concepts, which he in turn could understand 
because of his own value-relatedness. When his empathic ‘feeling’ was translated, 
by means of articulate Wertbeziehung, into definite concepts, and made part of 
intellectual statements applicable to empirical reality, it could serve the goal of 
causal explanation of those aspects of reality that were considered relevant, which 
was the goal of all empirical sciences.
It should serve this goal, moreover, because human action distinguished itself 
from other events precisely to the extent that it could only be ‘understood’, not 
explained by laws. In so far as human action was purposeful, it was best explained 
by the purpose toward which it was directed – by the values toward which it was 
oriented; in this case, Verstehen was not only possible, but appropriate.
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11.2 Discovering Sexuality
The Status of Literature as Evidence
RoberT DeaM Tobin
Today, the study of sexuality brings together scholars from a wide variety of dis-
ciplines – history, politics, literature, religion, the arts, psychology, anthropology, 
medicine, and biology. At its best, this interdisciplinary work promotes critical 
self-reflection on disciplinary assumptions about sexuality and the data used to 
test those assumptions: Is there such a thing as a fixed sexuality and how would 
one prove its existence? Such questions have arisen ever since the emergence of 
the concept of ‘sexuality’ at the end of the eighteenth century. At the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, theorists regarded humanistic and literary sources as high 
quality evidence in analyses of sexuality. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
literary and humanistic sources seemingly took a back seat to biological data. 
A more nuanced analysis of this shift in the prioritization of evidence reveals, 
however, that it accompanied a changing emphasis: biological and medical in-
vestigations tended to focus on specific and immutable sexualities, understood 
as pathological, while humanistic studies tended to concentrate on universal and 
fluid sexualities, often understood as part of a healthy human experience.
Michel Foucault famously declares that the West replaced the ars erotica with 
a scientia sexualis.1 As Anna Katharina Schaffner has documented, science was 
always already indebted to the arts, at least in the realm of sexuality.2 Schaff-
ner’s essay focuses on the sexologists, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Alfred Binet, 
Havelock Ellis, and Iwan Bloch, all publishing in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The paradigms structuring the thinking of these special-
ists in sexuality have roots going back to the early nineteenth century, when the 
distinction between art and science was just emerging. Activists who advocated 
for the rights of people who sexually desired members of their own sex worked 
alongside these sexual scientists; their writings provide additional perspectives 
on the changing social attitude toward the truth claims of the humanities and 
the natural sciences in the realm of sexuality. A chronological analysis of the ap-
proach taken by these activists and scientists suggests that – at least among edu-
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cated bourgeois European men – literature came to provide a rhetorical home 
for a resistance to sexual identities, while the natural sciences bolstered faith in 
those identities.
 The 1830s: Heinrich Hössli and the truth of literature
In the 1830s, the Swiss milliner Heinrich Hössli published a two-volume de-
fense of male-male love called Eros: Die Männerliebe der Griechen: Ihre Bezie-
hungen zur Geschichte, Erziehung, Literatur und Gesetzgebung aller Zeiten (Eros: 
The Male Love of the Greeks: Its Relationship to the History, Education, Litera-
ture and Legislation of All Ages), which promotes one of the earliest consist-
ent arguments for an innate immutable sexual identity. The horrific execution 
of François Desgouttes, who was broken at the wheel in 1817 for the murder 
of his beloved Daniel Hemmeler, deeply shocked Hössli, who understood the 
murder as a crime of passion. Characteristically, he turned first to a literary 
author, Heinrich Zschokke, commissioning a short story to explain passionate 
male-male love, which appeared in 1821 under the title, ‘Der Eros’.3 Feeling that 
the result moralistically cemented readers’ prejudices against Greek love, Hössli 
detested the novella.
Bitterly disappointed, Hössli set to work on his own study. In it, he cites an-
thropological and historical studies of male-male erotic love, including Christoph 
Meiners’s 1775 essay, ‘Betrachtungen über die Männerliebe der Griechen’ (‘Obser-
vations on the Male Love of the Greeks’).4 He relies on progressive eighteenth-
century medical authorities, such as Johann Georg Zimmermann and Johann 
Friedrich Zückert.5 He makes use of the most recent scientific materials, quot-
ing a passage on ‘Sexualität’ from an 1835 issue of Rusts Magazin für die gesamte 
Heilkunde (Rust’s Magazine for All the Healing Arts).6 At that time, the terms 
Sexualität, sexualité, and ‘sexuality’, were new, having been introduced by Carl von 
Linné to botany, as a way of talking about the sex of plants. The passage Hössli 
cites continues in this tradition, referring to a person’s ‘sexuality’ as his or her 
masculinity or femininity. The vocabulary clearly carries a medical, biological and 
scientific inflection.
Much of Hössli’s data, however, comes from more humanistic sources, such 
as the three-volume study, Venus Urania: Ueber die Natur der Liebe, über ihre 
Veredlung und Verschönerung (Venus Urania: On the Nature of Love, on Its Re-
finement and Beautification), published in 1798 by the diplomat and aesthetician 
Friedrich Wilhelm Basilieus Ramdohr, otherwise known for his critiques of 
Caspar David Friedrich’s paintings.7 Hössli cites Wolfgang Menzel’s Literatur-
Blatt frequently, using that literary journal to access the most recent reviews 
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of dramas such as Sigismund Wiese’s 1836 Die Freunde (The Friends), which 
seemed overtly sexual to him. For Hössli, literature provides the strongest evi-
dence on human nature:
[T]he oldest, deepest and purest language, the sacred language of higher 
humanity, the flowery world of man’s invisible, his heavenly realm, is litera-
ture, poetic language, the glowing and thoughtful observation by the soul 
of itself and of the great phenomena of nature.8
Because for Hössli literary language is the most important source of evidence, he 
fills his apology for male-male love with passages from the classical literature of 
Persia, Greece, and Rome, including texts from Sa’di, Hafiz, Anacreon, Lucian, 
Theocritus, Horace, and Virgil. He regards these texts as voices and witnesses, 
‘scattered in our literary possessions, in the plantings of humanity’, concerned 
that
when we run into them individually – each separated from the other – in 
our wanderings in the realm of research and scholarship [Wissenschaft], we 
kick them into the mud as misunderstood weeds, with the contemptuous, 
thoughtless, inhuman arrogance of vandals, with derision or with supersti-
tious fear; we don’t realize that they are plants of pure humanity, we don’t 
realize that they belong to the psychological investigative records [zu den 
psychologischen Untersuchungsakten] of so many thousands of the innocently 
executed.9
Hössli’s extended botanical metaphor may reflect the tradition of discussing sex-
uality in terms of plants. In any case, it is significant that he envisions a scholar 
stumbling across poetry while pursuing Wissenschaft, which is nowadays often 
translated as ‘science’. In Hössli’s era, poetry qualifies as a ‘psychological investiga-
tive record’, as good as any psychological, forensic or criminalistic evidence.
 Mid-nineteenth-century homosexual emancipationists
Three decades later, in the 1860s and 1870s, the homosexual emancipationists 
Karl Heinrich Ulrichs and Karl Maria Kertbeny would steer clear of the literary 
evidence that Hössli finds so convincing. While Ulrichs commends Hössli on his 
commitment to the belief in the innateness of male-male desire, he objects to his 
reliance on literary sources, which in his mind prove very little:
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[T]the innateness of male love is for him [Hössli], as for me, the foundation 
upon which he bases his justification. Admittedly, this foundation is only 
asserted by him, not proven. At least, what he offers is no proof: urning love 
poetry from Greece, Rome, and Persia, etc. These prove only the uncon-
tested fact that male love exists. The entire scientific side [die ganze natur-
wissenschaftliche Seite] of the subject, namely the muliebrity [of the urning], 
is not touched.10
As Ulrichs’s critique of his predecessor suggests, this new generation of activists 
shared a faith in natural science (Naturwissenschaft) to explain sexuality.
The ‘muliebrity’, or femininity, of the urning is central to Ulrichs’s understand-
ing of sexuality. Ulrichs coined the term ‘urning’ to describe a person with a fe-
male soul within a male body (anima muliebris virile corpore inclusa). He also 
discussed ‘urningins’, whose male soul resides in a female body. In the tradition of 
the early botanical meaning of the word ‘sexuality’, Ulrichs focused on the femi-
ninity of men who desire other men and the masculinity of women who desire 
other women. Because Ulrichs understood urning desire as a product of innate 
gender inversion, he was predisposed toward biological explanations of sexuality. 
He was interested, for instance, in finding out the results of blood transfusions 
between urnings and non-urnings, suspecting that a change of blood would result 
in at least a temporary change of orientation.11
Ulrichs avoided heavy reliance on the classical texts because – pace Hössli – 
they did not support his vision of an innate, immutable sexual identity. Ulrichs 
was committed to the notion of fixed sexual identities that required society’s re-
construction in order to provide for the rights of people who had no other option 
but to sexually love members of their own sex. The classical texts, however, of-
ten suggest considerable malleability in sexual tastes. Privileged men in antiquity 
might beget heirs with their wives, consort erotically with alluring courtesans, 
and also fall passionately in love with attractive young men. Ulrichs knew these 
texts better than Hössli, having been thoroughly trained in the classics. In fact, 
after he stopped agitating on behalf of urnings in 1879, he devoted the remainder 
of his life to the resurrection of Latin.12
Ulrichs’s humanist background did not prevent him from having an impact 
on the legal and medical communities. In 1867, his public speech as an urning for 
urning rights at a conference of German legal experts in Munich did not go well – 
he was booed out of the hall and sodomy remained a crime in Germany for a cen-
tury afterward. His connections with scientists were more successful, however. 
Carl Westphal’s 1869 article ‘Die conträre Sexualempfindung’ (‘Contrary Sexual 
Feelings or Sexual Inversion’), which Michel Foucault cites as a plausible locus 
for the birth of the homosexual,13 relies heavily on direct quotes from Ulrichs. 
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Westphal provides thorough case studies of his two patients, but much of his 
theoretical discussion of gender inversion comes directly from Ulrichs.14 Early 
British apologists and advocates of same-sex desire knew of him: John Addington 
Symonds visited him in Italy in the 1890s, writing to Edward Carpenter, ‘there 
is a singular charm about the old man, great sweetness, the remains of refined 
beauty’.15 As we shall see, both Richard von Krafft-Ebing (who corresponded with 
the activist until his death) and Sigmund Freud reference Ulrichs.
In 1869, Karl Heinrich Ulrichs’s comrade in arms, Karl Maria Kertbeny, be-
came the first person in any language to combine the Greek prefix homo with the 
Latin term sexus in order to create a word – ‘homosexual’ – describing a person 
with a fixed sexual desire for a member of his or her own sex.16 He did so, not in 
a biological or medical context, but in a legal context, as an activist fighting for 
the decriminalization of sodomy in the legal codes proposed for the new North 
German Confederation, which would become the German Empire. In his open 
letters calling for the decriminalization of sodomy (where the words homosexual 
and Homosexualität first appear in print), Kertbeny refrains from citing literary 
sources as evidence concerning the phenomenon he named ‘homosexuality’. His 
arguments are legal, his evidence anthropological. Eventually, his terminology 
gained prominence when the biologist Gustav Jäger printed a number of Kert-
beny’s observations about homosexuality in the second edition of his book, Die 
Entdeckung der Seele (The Discovery of the Soul), which appeared in 1880. It would 
seem that Kertbeny too rejects literary sources as evidence regarding sexuality.
Although Kertbeny’s vocabulary became famous through sexological texts, he 
himself was no medical doctor. Instead, he was an homme de lettres who made a 
precarious living translating, critiquing and promoting Hungarian literature in 
German-speaking Europe and beyond, arguing that language and culture evinced 
the ‘national character’ of a people.17 Although Kertbeny claimed to have ‘a sharp 
eye for questions of race’,18 he seems to have believed that language and culture 
can express nationality in ways that outweigh biology. Thus, Kertbeny, who was 
born into a German family with the last name of Benkert, could become ‘Hungar-
ian’ through his deep knowledge of Hungarian language and literature. Similarly, 
while Kertbeny did at times rely on biological explanations for same-sex erotic 
desire, the essays that he sent to Jäger celebrate the cultural legacy of homosexual-
ity, especially as exemplified by more modern poets, artists and scholars, such as 
Shakespeare, Michelangelo, Winckelmann and Byron.
Ulrichs and Kertbeny were both humanists, deeply devoted to the study of 
language and literature. Nevertheless, they stepped back from Hössli’s reliance on 
literary sources, in part because they found biological explanations of sexuality 
more compelling. In both cases, their work was repackaged and widely distrib-
uted by medical experts and biologists such as Westphal and Jäger. Under the 
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aegis of science, their thinking about sexuality had wide and lasting resonance, 
which has led to the belief that homosexuality is a purely scientific, biological 
and medical category. In fact, however, interests in politics, literature and culture 
motivated the men who first conceptualized homosexuality.
 Richard von Krafft-Ebing and the late-nineteenth-century 
sexologists
Westphal and Jäger belong to the scientific tradition of sexology that includes 
Paolo Mantegazza in Italy, Auguste Tardieu in France, Havelock Ellis in Eng-
land, and Arnold Aletrino in Holland. Probably no sexologist had more impact 
in spreading a modern vocabulary of sexuality to the most remote corners of 
the Western world, however, than Richard von Krafft-Ebing, whose Psychopathia 
Sexualis (1886) informed countless readers of the existence of homosexuals, mas-
ochists, sadists and fetishists.
 As modern scientists, sexologists relied on empirical data collected in the clin-
ics, rather than literary texts. More than most sexologists, however, Krafft-Ebing 
devotes time to the question of the value of literary texts as data. While he is 
remarkably sympathetic to literature, he insists that ‘the poet will not discharge 
his arduous task adequately without the active cooperation of natural philosophy 
and, above all, that of medicine, a science which ever seeks to trace all psychologi-
cal manifestations to their anatomical and physiological sources’.19 Biology pro-
vides the ultimate answer, even for the poets.
When discussing conditions about the existence of which there can be little 
doubt in the minds of his readers, it doesn’t occur to Krafft-Ebing to mention lit-
erary sources. He laments that ‘the pathological love of married women for other 
men is a phenomenon in the domain of psychopathia sexualis which sadly stands 
in need of scientific explanation. The author has had the opportunity of observ-
ing five cases belonging to this category’.20 Krafft-Ebing could cite such famous 
adulterous women as Emma Bovary and Anna Karenina to prove the existence of 
this phenomenon, but clearly he believes that his readers will not doubt that there 
are women who love men other than their husbands.
On the other hand, Krafft-Ebing bolsters his arguments concerning homo-
sexuality and masochism with frequent references to literary texts, in case his 
readership needs more evidence on the existence of the conditions. About ho-
mosexuality, he writes: ‘That inversion of the sexual instinct is not uncommon is 
proved, among other things, by the circumstances that it is frequently the sub-
ject in novels. The neuropathic foundation of this sexual perversion does not 
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escape the writers’.21 As evidence, he lists several German texts, including Adolf 
Wilbrandt’s Fridolin’s heimliche Ehe (Fridolin’s Secret Marriage), as well as Petro-
nius’s Satyricon. Similarly, brief references to the Bible, ancient Greece, Rome and 
the Middle Ages serve as ‘proofs that congressus intersexualis feminarum took place 
at all times, the same as it is practiced now-a-days in the harem, in female prisons, 
brothels and young ladies’ seminaries’.22 Krafft-Ebing adds a series of contempo-
rary novels to this list of historical sources: ‘It is a remarkable fact that in fiction, 
lesbic love is frequently used as the leading theme’, whereupon he cites works 
by Diderot, Balzac, and Flaubert, among others. 23 Apparently abashed about his 
reliance on literary sources, Krafft-Ebing often hides his references to them in 
footnotes. Amusingly, the modern novels about male homosexuals are all Ger-
man, while those about female homosexuals are all French. In both cases it is 
clear, however, that he cites them explicitly to prove the widespread frequency 
and historical invariability of the condition, just as Hössli would.
Similarly, Krafft-Ebing augments his evidence on masochism with literary 
texts, beginning with those by the author Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, after 
whom Krafft-Ebing named the condition: ‘I feel justified in calling this sexual 
anomaly ‘Masochism’, because the author Sacher-Masoch frequently made this 
perversion, which up to his time was quite unknown to the scientific world as 
such, the substratum of his writings’.24 In addition to Sacher-Masoch, Krafft-
Ebing finds evidence for the existence of masochism in classical Indian and 
Buddhist literature, Russian literature and folktales, Shakespeare, Jacobsen and 
Zola.
In the cases of both masochism and homosexuality, Krafft-Ebing makes 
some methodological observations regarding the limitations of literature as 
data. He believes that generally literary texts sympathize with their subjects. 
In his foreword, while praising poetry as better than much other pre-scientif-
ic work, he also insists on its weaknesses: ‘ The poet [...] is swayed rather by 
sentiment than by reason, and always treats his subject in a partial fashion. 
He cannot discern deep shadows, because he is dazed by the blazing light and 
overcome by the benign heat of the subject’.25 Krafft-Ebing finds this critique 
particularly applicable to homosexuality. He brings up classical literary sources 
in the context of noting that ‘the majority of urnings are happy in their perverse 
sexual feeling and impulse, and unhappy only in so far as social and legal barri-
ers stand in the way of the satisfaction of their instinct toward their own sex’.26 
Given this acceptance of their situation and lack of interest in a cure, he notes 
that many urnings cite literature primarily to justify, rather than diagnose, their 
love. Krafft-Ebing concedes that in much of the classical tradition, homosexual-
ity comes off well: ‘From many other places in the classics the impression may 
be won that Uranic love attained a higher position even than her sister’.27 (The 
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translator’s term ‘Uranic’ is an adjectival form of ‘Uranian’, a frequently used 
translation for ‘urning’.)
In the discussion of literature around masochism, Krafft-Ebing takes a slightly 
different tack – rather than critiquing the literary texts for being too sympathetic 
with their subjects, he accepts that in this case literary authors frequently deline-
ate the nuances of nonpathological passions, while he as a physician must fo-
cus on the pathologically perverse. Thus, in one footnote, he cites a considerable 
body of literature (including Abbé Prévost’s Manon Lescaut, George Sand’s Leone 
Leoni, and Heinrich von Kleist’s Käthchen von Heilbronn) dealing with aspects 
of sexual love that approach masochism, but do not require medical treatment: 
‘Sexual bondage, of course, plays a role in all literature. Indeed, for the poet, the 
extraordinary manifestations of the sexual life that are not perverse form a rich 
and open field’.28
Repeatedly, Krafft-Ebing takes pains to distinguish pathological masochism 
from the normal travails of love. Discussing a text by Otto Zimmermann called 
Die Wonne der Liebe (The Bliss of Love), Krafft-Ebing criticizes Zimmermann for 
failing to make this distinction between normal and abnormal pleasure in suffer-
ing: ‘However, the domain of masochism must be sharply differentiated from the 
principal subject of that work, which is, that love contains an element of suffering. 
Unrequited love has always been described as ‘sweet, but sorrowful’, and poets 
speak of ‘blissful pain’ or ‘painful bliss’. This must not be confounded, as Zimmer-
mann does, with the manifestations of masochism, any more than should be the 
characterization of an unyielding lover as ‘cruel’.29
Krafft-Ebing returns to the topic in one more footnote with a lengthy observa-
tion on certain seemingly masochistic expressions that are commonly used to de-
scribe love, such as ‘slavery’, ‘to bear chains’, ‘bound’, ‘to hold the whip over’, and ‘to 
lie at the feet’. He argues that poets operate according to the logic of masochism 
when they use such metaphors:
Poetry has always recognized, within the general idea of the passion of love, 
the element of dependence in the lover, who practices self-sacrifice sponta-
neously out of necessity. The facts of ‘bondage’ have also always presented 
themselves to the poetical imagination. When the poet chooses such ex-
pressions as those mentioned, to picture the dependence of the lover in 
striking similes, he proceeds exactly on the same lines as does the masoch-
ist, that is, to intensify the idea of his dependence (his ultimate aim), he 
creates such situations in reality.30
Profoundly, Krafft-Ebing suggests that the poet and the masochist are engaged in 
similar activities, both relying on established tropes to create a fantasized reality. 
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As Schaffner paraphrases this passage, ‘the poet expresses symbolically what the 
pervert enacts literally’.31 Here too, Krafft-Ebing seems primarily interested in a 
nonpathological masochism, as his other comments about poetry do not suggest 
that he believes poetic activity is pathological per se.
Subsequent sexologists and homosexual emancipationists follow in Krafft-
Ebing’s footsteps, relying primarily on empirical scientific evidence. Indeed, most 
spend far less time than Krafft-Ebing considering the potential validity of literary 
passages as data. Magnus Hirschfeld worked tirelessly on behalf of homosexu-
als and other sexual minorities, editing one of the first journals devoted to the 
scientific study of sexuality and homosexuality, Das Jahrbuch für sexuelle Zwis-
chenstufen (Yearbook for Sexual Intermediary Types) (1899-1923) and founding Das 
wissenschaftlich-humanitäre Komitee (The Scientific-Humanitarian Commit-
tee), which advocated for homosexual rights. Importantly, he helped crystallize a 
homosexual rights canon by reprinting works by and about Hössli, Ulrichs and 
Kertbeny. Hirschfeld certainly took advantage of the prestige of literary authors, 
especially from ancient Greece, as indicated by the title of his first book, pub-
lished in 1898: Sappho und Sokrates, oder Wie erklärt sich die Liebe der Männer 
und der Frauen zu Personen des eigenen Geschlechtes (Sappho and Socrates, or How 
Can the Love of Men and Women to Members of Their Own Sex Be Explained). In 
general, however, Hirschfeld avoided literary texts in favor of case studies that 
supported his argument for the existence of a biologically based, innate, immuta-
ble homosexual orientation.
 The masculinists and the early twentieth century
One group of theorists, however, continued to rely primarily on literary texts as 
evidence in their analysis of sexuality. Members of this school have been called 
the ‘masculinists’ because of their effort to frame male-male sexual desire as a 
masculine, rather than a gender-inverted, phenomenon.32 They embraced pre-
cisely those assumptions about emerging sexuality from classical literary texts 
that the sexologists and emancipationists rejected. When they looked at classical 
Greek and Latin texts, they saw evidence for the universality and the fluidity of 
masculine desire for other men.
 Foremost among these authors was Adolf Brand, who founded a number of 
institutions that directly contrasted with Hirschfeld’s. Der Eigene (sometimes 
translated as The Special), a journal for ‘masculine culture’ that ran from 1896 to 
1933, stood in opposition to Hirschfeld’s Jahrbuch. Brandt’s organization, Die Ge-
meinschaft der Eigenen (The Community of the Special) split off from the Sci-
entific-Humanitarian Committee in 1903. While the Jahrbuch featured statistical, 
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sociological, ethnographic, psychological, biological and medical analyses, Der 
Eigene consisted primarily of short stories, poems, drawings and photographs. In 
Der Eigene, Brand uses literature as data to reject the notion that homosexuals 
constitute a specific, countable, discrete minority. The Gemeinschaft der Eigenen 
similarly cultivated an approach to sexuality that emphasized literature and the 
arts, rather than empirical scientific evidence.
John Henry Mackay, who despite his Scottish name lived in Germany and 
wrote in German, describes this universally fluid sexuality in his literary works, 
Die Bücher der namenlosen Liebe (The Books of the Nameless Love) (1913) and 
Der Puppenjunge (The Hustler) (1926). Repeatedly he focuses on young men who 
prostitute themselves in Berlin, without much concern for their own sexual iden-
tity or that of their clients. Mackay denounces the medical establishment, de-
crying in his 1913 novel, Fenny Skaller, that ‘physicians took over this love. For 
physicians, people are only valuable when they are sick’.33 Interestingly, Mackay’s 
protagonist Fenny maintains some respect for Krafft-Ebing, and his compendi-
um, Psychopathia Sexualis. Fenny
was still grateful to him, for what it [Psychopathia Sexualis] had told him 
first of all: that he wasn’t alone. But otherwise he was horrified by these 
shameless revelations of desperate and poor people, these revelations that 
a narrow-minded, albeit honest, mind had brought together, packed up, 
registered and labeled in the name of a new science.34
Mackay’s respect for Krafft-Ebing comes from the physician’s airing of same-
sex desire, while his contempt comes from the pathologizing impulse. He would 
certainly appreciate Krafft-Ebing’s endorsement of literary depictions of ‘the ex-
traordinary manifestations of the sexual life that are not perverse’.
Brand’s ally, Hans Blüher, author of the scandalous and wildly successful 
Die Rolle der Erotik in der männlichen Gesellschaft (The Role of Erotics in Mas-
culine Society) (1917-1919), insists that ‘in ancient Hellas, it was self-evident for 
any otherwise woman-loving man that he sometimes took a male youth for the 
pleasures of love’.35 Blüher argues that precisely this universal erotic bond be-
tween men provides the glue that holds society together. In no way does the 
sexual love of one man for another impugn the masculinity of either party – in 
fact, both the lover of men and the male beloved tend to be more masculine than 
those who eschew such practices. While Blüher does not cite literary sources as 
frequently as Brand, he does rely heavily on the classical tradition in his argu-
ments. In one essay, Blüher distinguishes between humanitär (humanitarian) 
and humanistisch (humanistic), setting apart his humanistic, artistic and literary 
approach from the humanitarian approach of more scientific sexological and le-
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gal activists like Hirschfeld and other members of the Scientific-Humanitarian 
Committee.36
Perhaps the clearest evidence for the role of literature in the masculinist writ-
ings on sexuality appears in Elisar von Kupffer’s collection, Lieblingminne und 
Freundesliebe in der Weltliteratur (Ardor for Favorites and Love of Friends in World 
Literature), which was published in 1900. Kupffer was a Baltic German who set-
tled in Minusio, near Monte Verita and Ascona, in the Italian-speaking district of 
Switzerland, where he wrote dramas and poetry, painted, and erected the Sanctu-
arium Artis Elisarion, a temple to beauty, which he believed was most purely in-
corporated in the image of the young man. The Elisarion featured enormous mu-
rals showing idyllic scenes of scantily clad young men playing the flute, swinging, 
playing ball, holding hands, and generally enjoying each other’s company. Some-
times called the first anthology of gay literature, Kupffer’s collection consists of 
literary texts from the classical Greeks, Romans and Persians, as well as more 
modern passages from authors such as Shakespeare, Byron, Platen and Verlaine. 
Although Kupffer does not see a need to justify his use of literature as evidence, 
these literary sources are in the service of an argument that male desire for other 
men is universal and general, not specific to a distinct minority of homosexuals. 
Moreover, it is masculine and manly, not gender inverted. Kupffer’s introduction 
to the collection is a manifesto for masculinist beliefs, arguing against gender 
inversion and for the manliness of man-loving men and rejecting the very term 
‘homosexual’ as pathologizing. He dismisses Ulrichs as ‘a brave and honorable 
character, although not really a circumspect thinker’, while directly denouncing 
Krafft-Ebing. Referring to Hirschfeld’s organization, he mocks ‘humane-scien-
tific circles’.37 Kupffer’s thinking was widely influential in his era: according to 
Marita Keilson-Lauritz, if one takes Hirschfeld’s Jahrbuch and Brand’s Der Ei-
gene together, Kupffer is the most frequently cited author in the publications of 
the time devoted to same-sex relations.38
 Conclusion
The sexological emancipatory view of sexual identity took deep root in Western 
society and has continued to flourish until today. The masculinist humanistic 
critique of sexual identity has been influential as well, too. A thorough analysis 
of Sigmund Freud’s use of literature as data is not possible here, but it is clear 
that psychoanalysis remained open to the use of literary sources as evidence for 
discussions of sexuality long after psychology and psychiatry had move away 
from this practice. Freud finds Sophocles’ Oedipus, Shakespeare’s Hamlet and 
E.T.A. Hoffmann’s ‘Sandman’ to be as valid sources of data about sexuality as 
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the case studies that he investigates. Arguably, he treats his case studies as liter-
ary texts, open to multiple, at times self-contradictory interpretations. Signifi-
cantly, Freud stands closer to the masculinists than the sexological emancipa-
tionists in many ways. Like the masculinists, he rejects the notion of fixed sexual 
identities:
Psychoanalytic research decisively opposes the efforts to separate homo-
sexuals as a special sort of group from other people. In studying sexual 
arousal other than the manifestly announced, psychoanalysis learns that 
all people are capable of same-sex object choice and have already made such 
a choice in their unconscious.39
He disavows Ulrichs and Krafft-Ebing by name, finding their theories of gender 
inversion naïve.40
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick asserts that many people in the modern world are 
comfortable with two, not entirely compatible, conceptions of sexuality: on the 
one hand, the universalizing notion that everyone – gay or straight – might have 
a homosexual side; on the other hand, the minoritizing belief that some people 
really are gay, while others are definitely straight.41 The brief overview in this es-
say suggests that the dichotomy Sedgwick identifies has roots almost as old as the 
vocabulary of sexuality itself. At least in nineteenth-century Central Europe, the 
scientific and medical approach increasingly took a minoritizing view of sexual 
identity, while the humanistic and literary approach increasingly took a universal-
izing view of sexuality.
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11.3 The Role of Technomorphic and Sociomorphic 
Imagery in the Long Struggle for a Humanistic 
Sociology
Marinus Ossewaarde
Since its inauguration as an academic discipline after the July Revolution, in 
the 1830s, sociology has had a lasting ambivalent relationship to the humanities. 
On the one hand, Auguste Comte, who in 1838 had coined the word ‘sociology’ 
in a footnote to the 47th lesson of his Course in Positive Philosophy (1830-1842), 
introduced the new science as a type of physics, ‘social physics’, patterned on the 
model of Newtonian physics. For Comte’s contemporary Alexis de Tocqueville, 
on the other hand, the ‘new science’ belonged to the humanities, in particular to 
political philosophy, theology, classical studies, rhetoric and history, inspired by 
sociological forerunners like Hobbes, Montesquieu and Rousseau. Conflicting 
views of the relationship between sociology and the humanities and the natural 
sciences have shaped sociology’s development.1 The key issue in the making of 
sociology, I argue, is the question of how to position sociology in the modern 
period, that is, in the context of modern civilization. Comte defined this civiliza-
tion as industrial civilization. Sociology, accordingly, was the science of indus-
trial civilization that theorized and shaped industrial progress. For Tocqueville, 
civilization was democratic civilization. Sociology was that peculiar branch of 
the humanities which theorized and shaped democratic progress. Historians of 
sociology have amply documented the conceptual, methodical and analytical dif-
ferences that characterize the making of sociology. What has not been narrated 
yet is the role of mythical imageries in the two sociologies, how myth continues 
now in the making of the Comtean and Tocquevillian sociologies in the modern 
period.
Considering the role of myth in sociology is an ambiguous practice. Sociology 
has often presented itself as a myth-busting enterprise. But since the publication 
of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment it has been 
accepted that science and myth are false opposites. Science has created its own 
myths, in particular the myth of progress.2 More than any other scholar, Ernst 
Topitsch has reimagined the relationship between science and myth.3  Science, 
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Topitsch points out, is not a self-sustaining logical process cut off from the wel-
ter of imaginative activity which in fact fills most of science. Myths, accord-
ingly, are a part of science; stories, imaginative visions and networks of powerful 
symbols shape the mental maps that enable scientists, including sociologists of 
whatever kind, to understand those parts of reality over which reason has only 
partial control. Scientists, according to Topitsch, attribute mythical imageries, 
which are analogous to real-world phenomena, to the forms (such as family, 
state, nation or science), formations (like the emergence of the nuclear fam-
ily, state formation, nation-building or scientific development), and transfor-
mations (the civilization process) that are under investigation. Such analogical 
reasoning is not necessarily a conscious process, and it is often veiled by the 
ambiguity of scientific language, yet, mythical imageries are observable in the 
thought patterns of scientists.4
Topitsch distinguishes between three mythical thought patterns – biomor-
phism, sociomorphism and technomorpism – that seem useful for my purposes 
of reconstructing the continuation of myths in sociology. Scientists attribute bio-
morphic imageries of some vital, procreative process, characterized by fertility, 
sexual energy, birth, growth and death, to account for the origin of the form or for 
the destination of the formation and transformation. In such pictorial representa-
tions no intentions can be attributed to the forms, formations or transformations. 
Therefore, Topitsch observes, modern scientists rarely attribute biomorphic fea-
tures to forms. When scientists attribute sociomorphic imageries to forms, the 
regularities, directives, laws and measures of the forms come to correspond to the 
norms that govern the world. The idea of the Stoic logos, Providence or Weltgeist 
are examples of sociomorphic imageries: the cosmic agent can interfere with hu-
man affairs either directly or by virtue of the events through which He realizes 
His will in the form, formation or transformation. In technomorphic thought 
patterns known technical achievements and craftsman features are attributed to 
forms, formations and transformations. Forms are imagined as the work of the 
craftsman. The idea of causality is technomorphic. In Aristotle’s theory of causal-
ity, the craftsman has the aim (final cause) to produce a form (efficient cause) of 
a preconceived and designed shape (formal cause) out of some matter (material 
cause).5
In the making of sociology different sociologists have made use of different so-
ciomorphic and technomorphic imageries. In Comtean sociology, technomorphic 
thought patterns appear predominant. Industrial civilization, with its central in-
stitutions of science (Newtonian physics) and technology (the product of phys-
ics), is the work of the craftsman. As in Newtonian physics, the technomorphic 
imagery of causality is key in Comtean sociology, even though Aristotle’s theory 
is highly impoverished: only the efficient cause, the mechanical production of a 
599The Long Struggle for a Humanistic Sociology
form, matters. Comte attributes technomorphic imageries to sociology itself, in 
the sense that the new mechanics is invested with craft procedures, such as me-
thodical observation, technique, inventiveness and organization.6 The aim of the 
new science is to know transformation, ‘starting from a condition barely superior 
to that of a society of great apes [...] to the present stage of European civiliza-
tion’.7 In his positivism, Comte believes that this transformation is real progress. 
The rise of industrial civilization is intentional in the sense that the new social 
forms are scientifically planned and technocratically organized for the benefit of 
humankind. In the modern period, human misery follows from the obstruction 
of the transformation by anti-scientific forces, including parliaments and demo-
cratic movements and publics.8
In Tocquevillian sociology, by contrast, sociomorphic imageries predominate. 
Democratic civilization, a historical condition characterized by equality of liv-
ing conditions that enables people to interact in publics (such as townships) and 
thereby develop democratic habits, is providentially governed and in agreement 
with natural law. He borrows from Augustinian theology (Tocqueville was in-
spired by French Augustinian thinkers like Bossuet and Pascal) the idea of Provi-
dence, to emphasize that God governed the big transformation in accord with His 
will. The march of democratic civilization is the unintended result of a series of 
events, discoveries, inventions, decisions, and actions that, ‘every fifty years from 
the eleventh century on [...] in all the Christian universe’, has somehow contrib-
uted, ‘as blind instruments in the hands of God’, to the democratization of social 
existence.9 Democratic forms, formations and transformation (democratization), 
are treated as problems of interlinkages between the civitas Dei and the civitas 
terrana. Tocqueville attributes sociomorphic imageries to sociology, in the sense 
that the new science is invested with a distinctive mindset and habits of the heart 
that would enable sociologists to grasp the meaning of the historical transforma-
tion. The aim of sociology is to grasp the ‘secret design of Providence’,10 so that 
democratic civilization can be prudentially governed in accord with natural law 
so as to uphold the European values of reason, self-government, rule of law and 
justice.11 Human misery follows from the attempt to arrest democratic transfor-
mation: ‘to wish to stop democracy would then appear to be to struggle against 
God himself ’.12
The contrasting views that have been instituted in sociology, and expressed in 
contrasting pictorial representations of both civilization and sociology, is not only 
manifest in the founding of sociology as a new scientific form. The entire process 
of formation and transformation expresses itself in contrasting understandings of 
‘enlightenment’ and mythical imageries. In the 1850s, Herbert Spencer – ‘the Eng-
lish parallel to Comte’ as H.G. Wells called him in his famous London School of 
Economics (LSE) lecture13 – develops a more systematic sociology than Comte.14 
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Spencer introduces the law of evolution in sociology, defined as the transforma-
tion of social forms, as dictating the progress of industrial civilization. Spencer 
attributes technomorphic features to evolution: transformation follows from the 
necessity to adapt to changing environments, via free enterprise and individual 
initiative. Human misery is the result of nonadaption. Human misery follows 
from the attempt to counteract the elimination of bad habits and reward of unfit-
ness and laziness. When, in the wake of the Civil War, sociology became for the 
first time institutionalized in the American academy, the technomorphic thought 
patterns of Comte and Spencer dominated the discipline in the making. These 
first academic sociologists, including Yale’s William Graham Sumner, Chicago’s 
Albion Woodbury Small and Columbia’s Franklin Henry Giddings, considered 
sociology as a new branch of political economy, that is organized for remedying 
the ills of laissez-faire capitalism.15 Similarly, when L.T. Hobhouse came to hold 
the first sociology chair in the UK, in 1907 at the LSE, his major sociological con-
cern was the place of the mind in governing the evolution of capitalism.16 That is, 
the aim of sociology is to inform enlightened or liberal social reforms for improv-
ing the capitalist environment.
In France, Comtean sociology developed in the shadow of the February Revo-
lution, the Franco-Prussian War, and the establishment of the Third Republic. 
In the 1850s, Frédéric le Play concludes that industrial civilization is the product 
of the transformation of family forms, the transition from the extended family 
into the nuclear family.17 In the 1880s, after the Paris Commune, Gustave le Bon 
and Gabriel Tarde state that revolutionary crowds of industrial works have come 
to block the progress of industrial civilization. The aim of their sociology is to 
uncover the obstacles to industrial civilization: unenlightened crowds are the so-
cial forms under sociological investigation.18 When in France the first sociology 
chair is established in 1895 at the University of Bordeaux, Émile Durkheim is ap-
pointed to develop sociology as a moral pedagogical science for the Third Repub-
lic.19 Like Tocqueville, Durkheim attributes sociomorphic features to democratic 
civilization, which he, in his sociology of civic morals, sees as the transformation 
(extension) of the consciousness of social forms – a consciousness that was nar-
rowed by capitalist competition.20 When Durkheim moved to Paris, a new so-
ciology chair was established at the Sorbonne in 1912, which was to become the 
leading department of French sociology.
In Germany, sociology developed in the aftermath of the foundation of the 
German state in 1871. A generation of sociologists including Ferdinand Tönnies, 
Max Scheler, Georg Simmel, Emil Lederer, Werner Sombart, Max Weber, Alfred 
Weber, Leopold von Wiese, Robert Michels, Ernst Troeltsch, and Franz Oppen-
heimer acted as a sociological movement to develop a new German science for a 
new Germany.21 These sociologists grounded sociology in German idealism, as 
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well as in the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche and Karl Marx, in sharp contrast with 
the materialism of French Comteanism and Anglo-Saxon Spencerianism. For 
them, sociology is a humanities, a Geisteswissenschaft, committed to Bildung and 
Kultur. Without exception, German sociologists attributed sociomorphic features 
to social forms: civilization was the cultural offspring of the mind (Geist). When, 
after the defeat in the First World War, the first sociology chairs are established 
in the Weimar Republic, in Frankfurt, Cologne and Munich, the aim of German 
sociology is clear. German sociology is to safeguard the German mind and its seat 
(Humboldt University). It is organized for criticizing and negating the nihilistic 
forces of cultural regress. German sociologists strongly identify cultural regress – 
the attack on the mind – with the principles of industrial civilization, including 
the division of labor, specialization, standardization, positivism, mechanization, 
team work, technology, bureaucracy, goal-rationality.
German sociologists in particular recognize that the First World War was a 
war of industrial civilization. And this civilization had become increasingly or-
ganized around oil, energy stations, home electronics and worldwide telecom-
munications. A new generation of American sociologists, including Chicago’s 
Robert Ezra Park, William I. Thomas, and George Herbert Mead, and Michi-
gan’s Charles H. Cooley, most of whom studied in German universities, come to 
criticize Comte and Spencer.22 Cooley, for instance, in a Tocquevillian fashion, 
criticizes Spencer for setting a low value on classical studies and the Greco-Ro-
man heritage. Manifesting a sociomorphic thought pattern, Cooley insists that 
‘Greece and Rome are our life-blood’.23 In Germany, the Frankfurt School of So-
cial Research, established in 1923, aims to negate the mass society of industrial 
civilization (including mass technology like the radio) and to promote positive 
ideals of democratic civilization for the Weimar Republic.24 By the 1930s, Ameri-
can sociologists no longer conceive of industrial civilization as something that 
benefits humankind. The Great Depression and the horrific event of 1933, when 
the Nazis came to power, revealed that the march of industrial civilization had 
resulted in the transformation of democracy into tyranny, the outbreak of a high-
tech total war, and the formation of an unprecedented barbarism. In 1939, Co-
lumbia sociologist Robert Wilson Lynd, in his Knowledge for What?, notes that 
‘our contemporary world is losing its confidence in the inevitability of Progress’.25 
Sociologists such as Lynd stress, like Tocqueville, the responsibility of sociology 
for democratic civilization: the aim of sociology is to combat the forces of totali-
tarianism.
During the Cold War, the making of sociology in the West was dictated by 
governments charged with the responsibility of postwar industrial reconstruc-
tion. Many new sociology departments were established while reconstruction 
was taking place. In the UK, former directed of the LSE (1919-1937) William Bev-
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eridge assigns to sociology a central place in the postwar development of the wel-
fare state. Thereby the relationship between sociology and social policy becomes 
intimate: sociology is now included in the power apparatus of the welfare state. In 
the UK, social policy sociologists like Thomas Humphrey Marshall and Richard 
Titmuss are leading the field. In the US, Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons 
comes to fill the intellectual space once occupied by Spencer and presents himself 
as the spokesperson of US sociology.26 Parsons enforces the technomorphic im-
agery of social forms as evolutionary systems in which four functional prerequi-
sites need to be fulfilled: adaptation to changing circumstances, goal-attainment, 
integration, and the maintenance of solidarity norms. Like Durkheim, Parsons 
claims that human misery follows from the breakdown of solidarity norms; it 
is the function of the welfare state, as the liberal apparatus of social reforms, to 
prevent this. Parsons also attributes technomorphic features to sociology, which 
he styles as a ‘building’:
I feel that the real job of founding was done in the generation from about 
1890 to 1920. We belong to the second generation, which already has foun-
dations on which to build. But as for the building itself, a post here and 
there, and a few courses of bricks at the corners, are all that is yet visible 
above the ground.27
Under Cold War conditions, especially after the Manhattan Project (‘Atoms 
for peace’), nuclear physics becomes the predominant science, to the point that 
the very meaning of the term ‘science’ is now narrowed down (for instance by 
the LSE’s Karl Popper) to cover only the physical sciences.28 With the develop-
ment of the new (post-Newtonian) physics by men like Albert Einstein, Niels 
Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger, Max Planck, and Louis de Bro-
glie, Comtean sociology comes to reimagine its relationship to physics and to 
industrial civilization. In 1944, John von Neumann, who, as a mathematician, 
participated in the Manhattan Project, introduced the mathematical founda-
tions of quantum mechanics in economics. In Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior, written with Princeton economist Oskar Morgenstern, Von Neumann 
attributes technomorphic features to social forms, to the point that social be-
havior (motivation, choices, strategies) is styled as machinelike and accordingly 
can be mathematically formalized. During the Cold War, Comtean sociologists 
tend to adapt such technomorphism. Comtean sociology is remolded according 
to the linguistic analogies of the new physics. Chicago’s James Samuel Coleman, 
in his Foundations of Social Theory, published at the end of the Cold War in 1990, 
reformulates the sociological canon in mathematical language, making it fit the 
techno-scientific era of the Cold War.
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In France, the Sorbonne’s Georges Gurvitch develops a new Comtean soci-
ology around the new physics, introducing the post-Newtonian insights into 
sociology.29 The new physics no longer attributes technomorphic features like 
Copernicus’s ‘ lamp’ and Newton’s ‘clockwork’ to nature because it identifies dead 
matter as a dynamic entity. Einstein’s relativity theory has done away with the 
Newtonian view of space and time as absolutes, so that it may seem that little, 
if anything, in this world would be really stable and certain. Bohr’s quantum 
theory eliminates the Newtonian dream of being able to control nature through 
accurate measurement: the dynamics of chaos is the law of nature. For Gurvitch, 
the dynamics of chaos is the law of nature governing industrial civilization, as 
the two world wars illustrate. Thermonuclear industrial civilization is a flow 
of opposing tendencies and unexpected shifts that cannot be domesticated: so-
cial forms, formations and transformations are fundamentally chaotic. Not only 
a new Comteanism but also a new Tocquevillian sociology emerges in French 
sociology. The Sorbonne’s Raymond Aron, in 1965, introduces Tocqueville in 
the sociological canon as a counterforce to a Comtean sociology that he finds 
unsuitable for combating totalitarianism in the Cold War era: the Soviet Union 
incorporates, besides Marxism, old Comteanism as a source of legitimacy for 
its planned and organized industrial civilization. Industrial civilization in the 
atomic age assumes a totalitarian character when a people tragically appears in-
capable of political freedom.
German sociology develops in the shadow of the Shoah in the sense that, dur-
ing the Cold War, it is mainly concerned with interpreting the rise of totalitari-
anism and anti-Semitism, the popularity and election of Hitler, the Holocaust 
and with the real possibility of a nuclear war. For most postwar German soci-
ologists, the sociomorphic imagery of the disastrous dialectic of enlightenment, 
introduced by Horkheimer and Adorno in 1944, dictates the making of sociology. 
Arnold Gehlen, in Man in the Age of Technology, originally published in 1949, 
observes that ‘the Enlightenment era appears to us at an end; its premises are 
dead. Yet its consequences are still with us, in particular a deeply rooted tendency 
to consider a certain number of things as obvious’.30 In One Dimensional Man, 
Herbert Marcuse notes that ‘the progress of civilization invalidates myth (this 
is almost a definition of progress), but it may also return rational thought to 
mythological status’.31 And similarly Norbert Elias, in his final major work, The 
Germans, notes that modern Europeans cherish the enlightenment myth of prog-
ress while they despair about their wars and genocides and the lack of European 
values (democracy, freedom) in industrial civilization.32
In the 1950s, Columbia sociologist Charles Wright Mills, like Lynd before 
him, poses the question ‘knowledge for what’, only to conclude that Parsons, the 
leading figure of US sociology, makes ‘mainstream sociology’ sustain the liber-
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al status quo in the battle with totalitarianism. In The Sociological Imagination, 
published in 1959, which, together with Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment constitutes the key text of postwar sociology, Mills mocks Par-
sons for his unquestioning acceptance of the enlightenment, liberal values and 
the welfare state – a power structure that is, in Mills view, fundamentally un-
democratic. Like Tocqueville, Mills promotes the sociomorphic imagery of the 
‘democratic society of publics’ as a pictorial representation of an ideal society that 
conforms to natural law dictates of reason and freedom.33 In The Coming Crisis of 
Western Sociology (1970), Mills’s heir, Alvin Ward Gouldner, gives a final blow to 
Parsonian sociology, which has grown out of touch with reality since the protest 
movements of the 1960s.34 More than any other sociologist, Gouldner calls for a 
‘reflexive sociology’ in which the ideological commitments of sociologists, and 
the power structures in which they operate, are contested. Gouldner’s call for a 
reflexive (Socratic) self-examination urges sociologists to live for sociology (not 
of sociology), in close tension with the social forms they investigate, assuming 
responsibility for the practical (political) ends that are manifest or latent in the 
sociology they are making.35
When the Cold War is over, neo-Darwinian biology or life sciences gains pres-
tige at the expense of nuclear physics. Instead of the atom, DNA, information 
and communications technology (ICT), and nano-machines become the key cul-
tural icons. As a consequence, sociologists come to reimagine their relationship to 
physics, biology and industrial civilization.36 Manuel Castells observes that, since 
the 1970s, ICT has come to define a new era, the ‘information age’ in which con-
stant flows of information through ICT come to restructure industrial civiliza-
tion.37 Anthony Giddens notes that with the advent of bio-industrial civilization, 
characterized by new biotechnologies like genetic engineering, assisted reproduc-
tion, regenerative medicine, stem cell technologies, technological implants, and so 
forth, humankind has come to live after ‘the end of nature’.38 In this new industrial 
condition, sociology becomes connected to biology: not only the environment 
but also the living species are subject to liberal reform. Comtean sociologists have 
become increasingly aware that sociology’s very survival could be imperiled if 
sociologists fail to connect with neo-Darwinian biology. While during the Cold 
War, the analogies of nuclear physics had been borrowed, in the information age 
and in bio-industrial civilization ICT and neo-Darwinian analogies are being 
embraced. Sociologists now come to attribute technomorphic imageries like net-
works, DNA and memes to social forms. Coleman had reformulated the socio-
logical enterprise to connect sociology with physics; Cambridge sociologist W.G. 
Runciman has reformulated sociology so as to relocate the discipline within the 
neo-Darwinian paradigm.39 Social change can be explained as an evolutionary 
process analogous but not reducible to natural selection.
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No new mainstream sociology develops out of this neo-Darwinian turn. In 
fact, sociology increasingly comes to develop itself in opposition to the neo-
Darwinian paradigm, in support of democratic civilization that is once again 
under threat. Ivan Illich introduces the sociomorphic imagery of a ‘biocracy’ to 
pinpoint the power complex of bio-industrial civilization.40 In the biocracy, life 
is fetishized as a new idol, a playground for bio-medical experts who organize 
themselves to manage the species. In a biocracy, Illich notes, policy focuses on 
re-engineering organisms, while the environment turns life-threatening due to 
the industrial production of poisons, toxic emissions, radiations, pestilence, and 
so forth. In his Risk Society, originally published in 1986, Ulrich Beck explains 
that such industrial risks, the leftovers of thermonuclear civilization, as well as 
the new risks of bioengineering, come to define bio-industrial civilization, a cata-
strophic world. Beck makes it clear that in bio-industrial civilization, no ‘respect-
able research at all’ can be conducted because bio-industrial civilization, ruled by 
biocrats, lacks a strong democratic backbone. The aim of sociology is now to 
ally with the extra-parliamentary publics of democratic civilization, with the pro-
test movements that are now compelled to cope with the risks manufactured by 
nuclear physics and the neo-Darwinian engineering sciences.41
Furthermore, Michel Foucault notes that the fetishism of life, and the policy 
concern with health, vitality, hygiene, sanity and fitness, is at the core of the bio-
political strategies of the welfare state that seeks to impose bodily discipline.42 
As a social form, life is socially constructed in power relationships, by people 
governed to fit their bodies to the health regimes constructed by the biomedical 
professions. And such regimes come into force prior to actual birth, for instance, 
via policies of prenatal screening. In this line of thought, Foucauldian sociolo-
gists like Nikolas Rose introduce sociomorphic imageries of life forms under bio-
industrial conditions: life is constructed as ‘bio-capital’ that is a new humanity 
that is debased and dwindled to a herd animal, a dwarf. Bio-capital means that 
humanity is being commodified into an investible genetic quality that can be used 
to acquire resources (including jobs and partners).43 Imagined as bio-capital, life 
becomes a key bio-political site for the management and re-engineering of hu-
man bodies in which the emergence of reflexivity at the democratic civilizational 
level of publics is repressed. Steve Fuller calls for ‘a new sociological imagination’ 
needed to uncover the power structures of bio-industrialization in which the pro-
duction of novel organisms is prioritized over the provision of adequate sustain-
ing humane environments for them.44
The relationship between sociology and bio-industrial civilization is most 
problematic because the biocracy, neo-Darwinian in its ethos, neglects the social 
environment. As Michael Burawoy puts it, the regime is ‘deeply anti-sociological 
in its ethos, hostile to the very idea of “society”’.45 Burawoy asserts that, as the 
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biocracy threatens the survival of sociology as such, the aim is no longer to trans-
form sociology, as Gouldner had tried with his reflexive sociology, or to adjust 
sociology to bio-industrial civilization as Runciman urges. The aim of sociol-
ogy is nothing less than to transform bio-industrial civilization and negate and 
transcend the neo-Darwinian microscopic focus on life forms.46 For Burawoy, the 
future of sociology is inextricably linked to the uncertain fate of democratic civi-
lization; hence, as Tocqueville had suggested, sociology must focus all its efforts 
upon equipping extra-parliamentary publics with sociological imagination and 
reflexivity. And this requires a stronger connection between sociology and the hu-
manities, the making of a renewed sociology that is akin to philosophy, classical 
studies, theology, history, literature, and in which the exceptionality of humanity, 
of the human mind, is embraced as a democratic force.
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11.4 Sociology and the Proliferation of Knowledge  
La Condition Humaine
BraM KeMpers
 Cognitive ambiguities and the creation of fields
Sociology and its companion social sciences, such as cultural anthropology and 
psychology, enjoy ambivalent relations with one another, and with sections of the 
humanities, from cultural history to the study of languages. To complicate mat-
ters more, the relations with the natural sciences are ambiguous as well and sub-
ject to debate. Intellectuals never created a clear-cut and generally accepted clas-
sification of the arts and sciences concerned with human behavior. The cognitive 
quality of literature and the visual arts never disappeared. Literary authors still 
claim to enlighten la comédie humaine, as Balzac coined the subject of his novels.
Other professionals have entered the scene and contributed their claim to the 
truth about humanity. None ever achieved a monopoly on wisdom. Theologians 
lost their position as authorities, but they still present their views in the public 
domain and attract followers and believers. Their role was contested more and 
more in European societies since the eighteenth century, yet people adhered to 
the religious truths, expressed in various systems of faith. The position of theolo-
gians was only partially and temporarily taken over by philosophers, who tended 
to focus on specific fields of knowledge and language within separate university 
disciplines. Their authority was challenged by sociologists and anthropologists, 
who formulated new claims to the truth. However, none of the new disciplines 
acquired a cognitive monopoly, neither on specialized knowledge nor general wis-
dom. Each created its own cognitive world, outside of which their authority re-
mained contested. The emancipation of the social sciences at the American and 
European universities since about 1900 was an ambiguous one, since they did 
not substitute rival interpretations of societies and individual behavior in various 
historical and geographical contexts.
To understand the dynamics of knowledge, several views, concepts and clas-
sifications have been introduced. German philosophers reflected upon the differ-
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ences between Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft, or Kulturwissenschaft, 
often phrased in the plural.1 The English novelist and physicist C.P. Snow 
coined his concept of two cultures and the scientific revolution; he was worried 
about what he saw as a gap between science and literature.2 Wolf Leppenies 
increased the number of cultures into three: science, literature and sociology. 
He linked his combination of Snow’s dichotomy with German conceptualiza-
tions to the disciplinary system as it had developed at the universities.3 Models 
of two and three cultures are not generally accepted, and rival views emphasize 
the natural sciences, like Thomas Kuhn who observed a succession of para-
digms. However, his attractive neologism remained ill-defined and appeared 
not well suited for the social sciences and the arts.4 The historical model of 
progress, whether seen as evolutionary or as revolutionary, has been applied 
to the humanities, though largely without taking sociology, literature and art 
into account.5 Various classifications have been proposed, different histories 
have been constructed; separate discourses had their own way, some of them 
as a narrative, modern or postmodern. Sociologists constructed historical and 
biographical narratives of their own.6 Sociological literature since the 1970s 
focuses on currents, perspectives and schools, taking into account its presocio-
logical predecessors.7 Many books on sociology are at the same time faithful to 
sociology as an academic discipline and eclectic in their point of view and their 
references to predisciplinary discourses.
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu introduced the concept of different 
fields, such as education, television, literature and science, each with its own 
institutions, hierarchies and values.8 He linked these fields to different forms 
of capital (economic, cultural and social) and to various attitudes, or types of 
habitus. In addition he connected distinctions people made between forms of 
art to differences in social status. The sociological concept of fields is better 
suited than that of paradigm, culture, discipline or profession to understand 
the unity and diversity in our cognitive culture. This configuration of fields in 
the humanities differs from knowledge on nature, which developed a shared 
new language: mathematics in combination with nonpoetic English. A high de-
gree of clarity has been attained in the scientific study of natural phenomena 
and the division of labor between its main disciplines. Science has substituted 
art, theology and philosophy with increasing success. Distinct from the natural 
sciences in subject, method and theory is the study of humans, which took the 
natural sciences as they developed since the seventeenth century as its model. 
Yet knowledge of human societies became divided among various fields, with-
out clear boundaries, with partial interactions and without a dominant concep-
tual framework.
611Sociology and the Proliferation of Knowledge
 Continuity and innovation in artistic research and expression
A major difference with the progress in the natural sciences concerns the authority 
of literary authors. No one who searches for knowledge of atoms turns to Lucre-
tius anymore; his poem on nature falls outside any curriculum in physics. Roman 
and Greek authors are still read by people who want to gain insights in humans. 
Since the 1820s a new genre emerged which communicated new contributions to 
understanding mankind. The novels from Stendhal to Salinger contributed to the 
knowledge of their contemporaries and to readers from later periods and other 
countries. Yet the relevant insights presented in literary works, old and modern, 
have hardly been incorporated into the publications of social scientists.
The same is true for the work of journalists, like Tom Wolfe, who devoted 
thorough research to his publications on modern art and capitalist society. Start-
ing as a journalist, he crowned his career as an artist. The views of painters 
 remained outside the scope of modern sociology, as did the work of pop singers. 
David Hockney and Jim Morrison evocatively portrayed different sections, male 
and female, gay and straight, of the same Californian society. Artists continued to 
reflect on life styles, ethics and other humanist aspects of the humanities. Success-
ful authors experimented with different genres. Starting as a scholar, they turned 
to writing historical fiction, like Umberto Eco, who claimed that he could express 
his ideas better in fictional texts than in scientific discourse.
The variety of fields dealing with cognition of human affairs is partly depend-
ent on a diversity of languages. After Latin lost its role in science, English became 
increasingly significant, yet other languages remain important in their own right, 
and problems of proper translation have never been absolutely solved. Anglo-
Saxon classifications do not perfectly match French, German, Italian and Dutch 
concepts. There may be one human condition, but there is no unified system of 
knowledge, expressed in a common language. People have to cope with a wide 
variety of scholarly, scientific, literary, linguistic and artistic traditions that claim 
partial or total understanding of the human mind. Within a proliferation of 
fields, sociology came into being, within a wider intellectual context that includes 
the humanities, literature, art, journalism, theater and music.
The older fields were continuously renewed, maintaining claims to superior 
understanding of human emotions and interactions. They also claimed a superb 
way to convey insights in shorter or longer texts, ranging from epigrams to novels. 
From a disciplinary point of view, sociologists selectively paid attention to predis-
ciplinary knowledge.9 While human societies converged into a complicated global 
network, understanding of the human condition remained divided between all 
sorts of genres, languages, paradigms, disciplines and professions.10 The first so-
ciologists had a different outcome in mind.
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 Comte, Durkheim and the ambiguous emancipation of 
sociology
In his lessons on philosophy, Auguste Comte introduced the concept of sociol-
ogy as a major new branch of science. Starting in the 1820s he developed his 
ideas in a series of abstract philosophical reflections.11 Sociology was to become 
the counterpart of the natural sciences. As such sociology would complete the 
scientific revolution, which saw the successful emancipation of astronomy, phys-
ics, chemistry and biology. In Comte’s vision, sociology embodied for human 
beings, what the natural sciences meant for men’s natural environment: a  science 
positive, or ‘positive science’. In this way, sociologie, and its adjective sociologique 
became fundamental concepts, referring to the third of Comte’s three histori-
cal stages of human understanding. His law of progress in three stages encom-
passed the first, theological, phase, a second, metaphysical, phase, and the third 
and final one: positive and scientific. In his philosophical lectures and publica-
tions Comte every now and then related these stages to the development of 
societies but these connections received little empirical or analytical attention 
in his extensive texts.
Sociology was not the only neologism coined by Comte. He also invented the 
counterpart of egoism: altruism. In his broad evolutionism Comte enjoyed some 
success, witness the sociological and historical ideas of the British philosopher 
and sociologist Herbert Spencer.12 Comte’s original philosophical thought owed 
its importance to its positive and critical reception by Spencer and others. In his 
academic career, Comte was not successful. He remained a marginal figure in the 
university system. It was up to his fellow countryman, Émile Durkheim, to be 
elected to the first chair in sociology. Late in his career, Durkheim became pro-
fessor of sociology at the Sorbonne in Paris, in 1912, the first sociological chair in 
Europe. Such a chair already existed at Chicago in the United States. In France 
the historians proved to be more successful institutionally, while sociologists also 
had to deal with other disciplines that entered the institutional arena, such as 
geography and anthropology.
Durkheim realized Comte’s program, while abandoning his philosophical 
style and his broad evolutionary perspective. Durkheim abandoned abstract 
reasoning and historical generalizations. He advocated a sociological method 
on the basis of empirical research. For him this meant to collect data, guided by 
a repertoire of theoretical concepts. His plea for sociology was sustained by the 
application of statistical analysis. Durkheim raised the question what would, 
at first sight, look as the most individual decision a human being could take; 
his answer was: to end one’s life. Embarking on an extensive analysis of data 
concerning suicide, Durkheim concluded that even that very individual deci-
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sion was determined by social factors. As part of his classification of suicides, 
he coined another neologism: anomy. A class of people committed suicide, be-
cause they lived within a society that lacked a system of norms and values. So, 
Durkheim concluded, even the most individual actions require a sociological 
explanation.13
Apart from suicide, Durkheim published about sociological methods and 
about a theme that was dealt with by specialists in political economy: the divi-
sion of labor in society.14 Another important domain he explored was religion, 
not historically like Comte, but functionally. In doing so, he was consistently 
expansionist, because most topics he analyzed already belonged to other disci-
plines. Durkheim relied on published ethnographic reports, mainly considering 
‘primitive’ Australian societies. He sought to define the essential characteristics 
and social functions of religion, its symbols and rituals. Durkheim considered 
the usage of sacred totems as collective representations that brought individu-
als together in social structures of family and clan. In this way, he conducted 
empirical research, on the basis of descriptive publications by others who had 
visited small-scale communities far from Europe. In a generalizing book on the 
elementary forms of religious life, Durkheim covered, both empirically and the-
oretically, what Comte had described in very broad terms as the first stage in the 
development of human understanding.15 While Comte saw a one-dimensional 
progress in cognition from theology to metaphysics and from there to positive 
science, Durkheim studied religious practices and representations in a sociologi-
cal way. He focused on signs, symbols, images, stories, systems, and rituals far 
from his familiar Christian and Jewish culture, to understand the social cohe-
sion brought about by priests. Through collective representations (his concept), 
priests conveyed images of society through periodic rituals that cemented social 
bonds and made them visible. Durkheim practiced a comparative study of reli-
gion in a way that was fundamentally different from Comte’s approach. As the 
one who gave a concrete adaptation of Comte’s scientific model, he could hardly 
have been more different. So ambiguities in sociology emerged in the writings 
of two French authors who were later considered to be its founding fathers. 
They embodied different intellectual traditions, with divergent links to other 
disciplinary fields: theology, philosophy, geography, ethnography, anthropology 
and history.
Émile Durkheim became crucial in the institutionalization of sociology as a 
discipline within the expanding university system of disciplines and faculties. At 
the same time, he contributed to a falling apart of the emerging social science 
under the aegis of sociology. As a sociologist, he used theoretical and empirical 
publications that belonged to the realm of ethnography, ethnology, and anthro-
pology. His articles and books were used by specialists in those fields, as well as 
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by historians writing about culture or civilization. Durkheim’s most influential 
pupil and colleague, Marcel Mauss, became primarily known as an anthropolo-
gist. His ‘Essay sur le don’ became a canonical publication in the broad field where 
the expansionist sociologists lost control.
 Interdisciplinary fusions between sociology, anthropology, 
history, and the arts
The Dutch historian Johan Huizinga crossed disciplinary borders. In 1919 he 
published a wide-ranging book on late medieval culture in France and the Low 
Countries, Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen. Huizinga focused on complex Christian 
ideas and images. His highly successful book was translated into many languages, 
in English both as The Waning of the Middle Ages and The Autumn of the Middle 
Ages. Huizinga, trained in languages, became a famous cultural historian, who 
selectively used ideas from the social sciences. Huizinga, whose ambition was 
to be a literary author, even an artist, rather than a scientist, became a canonical 
historian around the word, despite the fact that his Dutch prose was difficult to 
translate. As such, Huizinga contributed to the ambiguities in the fields of the 
arts, sciences and humanities.
In the same period this merging of ideas and genres gained an impetus due 
to the Belgian Arnold van Gennep, who published a book on rites de passage, 
or rites of passage, with which he expanded Durkheim’s theory of ritual. Van 
 Gennep provided a model for the social dynamics of coming of age in various 
societies. He focused on the so-called primitive societies where the rituals con-
cerning the transformation from child to adult appeared in a more dramatic way 
than in European societies of the twentieth century. Van Gennep’s conceptual 
model became part of general knowledge and was adopted by social scientists like 
Margaret Mead, who studied the island Samoa, and by novelists. Coming of age is 
a main theme in the small oeuvre by J.D. Salinger. His heroes Holden Caulfield, 
and Franny and Zooey Glass came of age in modern cities along America’s East 
Coast. His invented characters for his novels and stories, published in the 1950s, 
highlighting the problems adolescents face when they enter a society determined 
by new media, a lack of solidarity, and tensions between parents and children. He 
portrays modern society and its conflicts between the generations and between 
insiders and outsiders, a theme that was dealt with by sociologists. So ideas devel-
oped within the social sciences became important in renewed traditions of fiction, 
based on accurate observation and reflection. Novelists presented their insights 
not in an abstract and analytical framework but in fictional stories, performed by 
created persons and presented without footnotes, sources and bibliography.
615Sociology and the Proliferation of Knowledge
The division of labor was further complicated by the rise of cultural anthro-
pology in England and the United States. Edward Burnett Tylor published influ-
ential books on broad themes, such as culture, civilization, philosophy, religion, 
art and anthropology.16 Franz Boas, a German Jew, born in Protestant Minden, 
studied physics in Heidelberg before turning to historical geography and decid-
ing in 1882 to travel to the Canadian Arctic. He was the first to use the method 
of participant observation, which he continued in the American West, where the 
influence of white men remained limited. After several teaching jobs and projects 
at museums, in 1899, Boas became professor of anthropology at Columbia Uni-
versity in New York.17
The success of sociological and anthropological approaches soon became one 
of its main risks. Concepts, methods and theories spread quickly to other disci-
plines, genres and languages. In translation, words acquired new meanings and 
produced ambiguities. Culture and civilization enjoyed highly divergent mean-
ings in the various languages and disciplines. The rise of sociology as a scientific 
method became a complicated affair, because it flourished outside the domain 
of empirical and statistical studies. New generations of sociologists turned away 
from this scientific model and reoriented themselves on the humanities and the 
older humanist tradition, which had contributed so much to the shared knowl-
edge of texts, words, symbols and history. In Germany several authors, for whom 
the identity of sociologist was important, like Mannheim and Weber, looked for 
the older intellectual tradition of the humanities to clarify their methods and 
ideas. For some of the most original scholars in the early twentieth century, soci-
ology became a Geisteswissenschaft. When they acquired a university chair, it was 
often not in sociology. At the same time nonsociologists adopted some of their 
ideas, so the emancipating discipline lost the grasp of its own inventions and lost 
its coherence. On the one hand, sociologists claimed to embody the new, positive 
science focusing on human behavior, and on the other they had to compete with 
many disciplines and arts. Cultural anthropology was only one of several rival 
disciplines that entered the university system, alongside sociology, without any 
consistent division of labor between them.
Sociological and anthropological ideas influenced cultural historians, who 
were eclectic and flexible in their approaches as a writer and researcher. Cre-
ative fusions between history, art history, anthropology and sociology attracted 
many readers. The monumental books and articles by Jacob Burckhardt, Aby 
Warburg, Johan Huizinga, Carlo Ginzburg and Peter Burke all testify to this 
intellectual trend of transcending disciplinary boundaries. With or without 
bibliographical references in his introductions, articles and footnotes, Huizinga 
used ideas from the social sciences.18 He did so particularly in his influential 
book on the civilization, or beschaving, which flourished in the Low Countries 
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and the Duchy of Burgundy during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
Huizinga focused on religion, literature, ritual and the visual arts, within ur-
ban societies bound together by the central, though itinerant ducal court. The 
dukes  created a territorial state, rivaling for a while the King of France and the 
German  Emperor.
Huizinga, who had studied Sanskrit, became a highly influential author, 
not only in the Dutch university world, where he occupied chairs in history at 
Groningen and Leiden. His books were translated and he became part of an 
international network of scholars within the humanities and occasionally in the 
social sciences. At the same time, Huizinga became an opinion leader in matters 
of contemporary art and culture, mostly in the Netherlands. Part of his publi-
cations belonged to the genre of the essay and journalism. His native country 
remained the framework for another identity: his outspoken and self-conscious 
literary ambition, a new blurring of prose and poetry. After his death his literary 
writing style came to be considered outdated and unscientific, yet Huizinga’s 
works enjoyed several renaissances. The mixed reception of his publications and 
his choice for different modes confirms the complicated configuration of differ-
ent fields.
 Max Weber, Norbert Elias, and the re-establishment of 
sociology
Unlike Huizinga, Max Weber aimed at sociological theory and method. He came 
to be recognized as one of its founding fathers, although sociology is absent in the 
title of his books.19 Like Durkheim, Weber turned to religion as one of his fields 
of interest. He did so in a historical way and with an eye for highly complicated 
systems of belief, in particular Protestant Christendom within capitalism, which 
he linked to Protestant belief.20 This was a way to criticize the approach, devel-
oped by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who had presented religion (and art), 
as determined by the economic structures of society. Weber sought to re-evaluate 
religion as a force of its own, that facilitated the expansion of capitalism in Eu-
rope and the United States.
 In his oeuvre, Weber added history, economics, and law to sociology as it was 
introduced by Comte and established by Durkheim. Using various intellectual 
traditions, Weber gave a decisive turn to the social sciences within the humani-
ties in the German-speaking world. He occupied various chairs in different cities, 
only late in life to become professor of sociology. Methodologically, Weber turned 
away from the scientific approach and reorientated his language on philosophy 
and history.
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In the 1930s, Norbert Elias synthesized the available traditions. His magnum 
opus, published in 1939, on the civilizing process was republished in 1969.21 He 
added a dedication to his parents, Hermann Elias, who died in Breslau in 1940 
and ‘Sophie Elias, gest. Auschwitz 1941 (?)’. The second addition has an introduc-
tory chapter, written in 1968 while Elias was teaching at Leicester. In this intro-
duction, Elias seeks to explain the fundamental, paradigmatic meaning of this, 
by then, thirty-year-old book. He criticizes the dominant American sociology. 
Talcott Parsons’s theory is a-historical and opposes individual and society as two 
distinct entities. Elias distances himself from the dominant functionalist model 
of Parsons and Robert Merton. He argues for a reorientation on nineteenth-
century theories, such as those of Comte, Spencer and Marx. Unlike Comte and 
Spencer, Marx did not present himself as a sociologist; he was a journalist and a 
politician rather than a scientist, yet he was posthumously included in the canon 
of founding fathers. This was also the case with Alexis de Tocqueville, who came 
to be considered as sociologist only from the late 1950s, due to the efforts of C. 
Wright Mills, Raymond Aron, and Robert Nisbet. With his 1969 introduction, 
Elias reshaped sociology and history, a transformation of ideas that he rendered 
even more explicit in his introduction under the title: What Is Sociology?
The in memoriam to his parents – victims of one of the most uncivilized re-
gimes from human history as regards its attitude to Jewish, homosexual and other 
minorities – gives a short and dramatic clue to the social identity of the author. 
In the preface, written in 1936, Elias had been reluctant to present anything of 
his persona, apart from some of his intellectual roots, an attitude to which he 
remained faithful for the rest of his long life. The word sociology, so important 
in the 1969 introduction, only occurs once in 1939. In his preface, Elias men-
tions psychology, philology, ethnology or anthropology as no less relevant for 
his theoretical questions than sociology or the various specialized branches of 
Geschichtsfoschung. He expressed his loyalty to sociology by references to Weber’s 
analysis of the state and, as part of his acknowledgements, to Karl Mannheim, 
then established in London. There Elias had conducted most of his empirical 
research of books on rules for civilized behavior from the thirteenth to the late 
eighteenth centuries.
In his annotations, Elias illustrates his heterogeneous intellectual background. 
He starts with a quote from Oswald Spengler, like Huizinga a cultural critic with 
an outspoken ethical opinion. Apart from philosophical works, Elias pays his 
tribute to Mannheim, Herder and Voltaire, belonging to distinct intellectual and 
artistic traditions. The German translation of Huizinga’s Herfsttij serves as one 
of Elias’s sources, empirically more than theoretically. In the notes belonging to 
Part 2, he discusses Max Weber’s ‘Idealtypen’. In this way Elias addresses again the 
friction between social sciences and humanities. Another discussion concerns the 
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role of the Italian city states in the civilizing process. Elias connects this issue not 
so much to the work of Jacob Burckhardt, which was discussed in depth by Huiz-
inga. Instead, Elias links the issue of Italy to a source publication of letters by 
Venetian diplomats. He used both texts and images. Where Huizinga analyzed 
Netherlandish panel paintings, Elias analyzed German drawings in manuscripts. 
Entering the domain of art history meant still another blurring of boundaries.
Ambiguities in the disciplinary order abound, as Huizinga’s and Elias’s analy-
ses of images are hardly taken seriously by specialists in art history. In scholarly 
books about the images dealt with by Huizinga and Elias, art historians do not 
take account of their insights or criticize them. Within modern sociology, litera-
ture and the visual arts were hardly studied, and in this respect Elias remained an 
isolated scholar. Because of his broad, unconventional view of history, culture, art 
and society, Elias late in life became an example for a specific school in sociology 
and for some historians. He was marginal in postwar scientific sociology. So one 
of the most important books in sociology hardly contained references to sociol-
ogy, and enjoyed its strongest reception in a particular sociological school and in 
various sections of the humanities. In its cross-references, Elias’s iconic book on 
the civilizing process shows an open mind to a wide variety of disciplines and art 
forms, setting it apart from the a-historical and nonliterary main stream sociol-
ogy, so strongly criticized in the new introduction of 1969.
 Social scientists in search for identity, style, and audiences
Time and again, creative social scientists moved away from the models that had 
proven to be successful in astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology. They re-
turned to history, the languages and literature to collect data and to express their 
ideas. They often enjoyed their most prolific reception outside one of the inter-
nally divided disciplines. The experimental method existed only in a niche, such 
as the famous experiment in social psychology conducted by Stanley Milgram. 
In the early 1970s, Milgram aimed to test hypotheses on obedience to authority 
in an experimental setting. He owed his success both to a scholarly publication 
and a film, publicized on television. Mathematical models were developed and 
applied to data, yet they served primarily restricted issues and themes. Statistics 
were widely applied, in specialized fields rather than in sociology as a whole. 
Large scale surveys set the tone during the 1960s and 1970s, but the results were 
criticized from various angles. Scientific sociology, based on quantitative data and 
statistical analysis, became more sophisticated and less relevant to the basic social 
questions. The mathematization of knowledge affected sociology much less than 
psychology and economy.
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Critique on the primarily American paradigm went hand in hand with a 
reevaluation of Elias’s work, especially when he moved to Amsterdam. After a 
difficult career, that brought him to positions in Ghana and Bieleveld, he was ac-
knowledged as an important sociologist, first at the University of Amsterdam and 
hence at various German, Italian, English and American universities. Sociology 
and cultural anthropology became reintegrated in a renewed type of theoretically 
informed cultural history, with extensions into processual archeology, art history 
and literary studies. Sociological and anthropological concepts and methods were 
once again part of the humanities and the humanist traditions. Modern historical 
sociology interacted again with art, literature and journalism, because some of 
the most important social scientists embarked on writing and publishing in those 
domains, creatively experimenting with a wide variety of genres. This is the case 
in the oeuvre of Johan Goudsblom and Abram de Swaan, which is confirmed by 
its reception.22 Apart from a highly regarded academic reputation in sociology, 
they are known as literary authors and received literary prices.
This happened to be the case as well with some Dutch specialists in the his-
tory of Dutch literature who occasionally used ideas from the social sciences, 
like Herman Pleij and Frits van Oostrom.23 However, the artistic appraisal of 
their writings mainly concerned their publications in the Dutch language. Al-
though English became the dominant vehicle for scholarship, national languages 
remained important. One of the reasons for this borderline is the scarcity of good 
translators, another that most authors express themselves best in their native lan-
guage and attract the widest audience in their own country, in spite of the world-
wide dominance of English.
Unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities show com-
plicated, eclectic and flexible patterns which extended beyond the boundaries 
of science. Merging with the fields of literature, art and journalism occurs in a 
creative and confused way; cross over is not a marginal phenomenon; many of the 
most widely read authors do not identify themselves with a single discipline and 
maintain bonds with the arts. Novels, plays, paintings and pop songs continue to 
flourish, converging into one culture consisting of various fields.
 Enduring and renewed inspiration from the arts
Reflection on human behavior enjoyed a long history before the scientific revolu-
tion. Anachronistically, scholarly writers tend to consider these texts as prescien-
tific. From a sociological point of view, it is possible to consider the Bible, Homer 
and Shakespeare to be proto-sociology, and the nonwritten ideas as presociology. 
Before Comte and Durkheim, a geographically and historically broad spectrum 
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of texts circulated which addressed common themes. Since the making of the 
Hebrew Bible, the codification of the heroic battle of Troy, and the dialogues of 
Plato, a continuous literary tradition arose. This consisted of library invento-
ries, commentaries, constitution of texts, translations and analyses of words. The 
Greek version of the Hebrew Bible was supplemented by an extensive section on 
the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. His actions and ideas, served to portray 
Hebrew society under Roman imperial rule within a Hellenistic cultural tradi-
tion. From Augustine onward, the Latin literary tradition arose reflecting on Je-
rusalem-centered texts in continuously expanding social and linguistic contexts.
The emancipation of what became a worldwide network of faculties of the 
social sciences since the 1950s was complicated by the continuous interest in pre-
disciplinary texts, not only for reasons of style but also because their content 
remained relevant. Texts were continuously read and interpreted, far beyond the 
limits of the societies they described and the audiences they originally addressed. 
Their wisdom concerning human behavior remained functional beyond their ge-
ographical and historical contexts. Yet they were hardly included by sociologists 
in their repertoire.
While the social sciences came into being, a nonscientific approach to human 
societies was continued and renewed. Stendhal used personal experiences and 
journalistic reports for modern novels, such as Le rouge et le noir. He located his 
plot in a village near Besançon and in Paris. The social context of his invented 
characters was recognizable to his readers, then and now, in France and beyond. 
He wrote modern literature that portrayed modern individuals. Novels were 
experimental in style and in ideas; they created an experiment on paper, using 
observations and experiences from outside the literary world. Since the 1820s, 
the tradition of literature was renewed in vocabulary, themes, aspects of human 
behavior and social setting. Madame Bovary, by Gustave Flaubert, portrayed a 
social drama between Ry and Rouen, while other aspects of the provincial world 
of France were evoked by Guy de Maupassant and Alain-Fournier.
Marcel Proust described the elite society of his youth in Paris. He addressed 
the dynamics of coming of age and tensions between social groups: conserva-
tive aristocrats, intellectual Jews, and gays with divergent profiles. His title re-
fers to historical research. He added new insights to the role memory played in 
forming a personal identity and to shifting identities in different social settings. 
And Proust portrayed the social usage of concepts, such as culture and mentality. 
French novelists addressed social phenomena that scientists failed to understand. 
Large sections of the human mind and heroic response to social pressures were 
treated in the domain of literature.
Novels, journalistic articles and plays continued to be produced outside the 
era of the social sciences. They continued to be read, seen and commented upon 
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after the rise of disciplines and faculties. Many sections of society were enlight-
ened by literary authors, journalists and comedians who criticized and mocked 
professional scientists, failing to incorporate insights from other fields. Bourdieu, 
who published on Flaubert, remained an exception, as he analyzed the fields of 
literature, art, higher education, mass media and science.
Interesting aspects of Dutch society were portrayed in novels rather than sci-
entific publications. Willem Elsschot, Louis Couperus, Nescio and Multatuli in-
terpreted aspects of society that were neglected by sociologists. They highlighted 
the role of new media in private companies at Antwerp, relations between men 
and women, young and old in bourgeois society of The Hague, young marginal 
artists in Holland and Zeeland, as well as colonial society in Asia. In the Nether-
lands this tradition of realistic fiction was renewed and continued, covering more 
recent trends in social life by authors ranging from W.F. Hermans to A.F.Th. van 
der Heijden. Their style of writing and method of research was less abstract and 
less analytic than the work of contemporary social scientists, who left large sec-
tions of human emotions, sexual relations, trade, memory, dilemmas and conflicts 
uncovered.
Italian society was graphically described by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa 
and Giorgio Bassani. The aristocrat Tomasi addressed the circulation of elites, a 
theme introduced by the sociologist and aristocrat Vilfredo Pareto. He did so in 
a less analytical way, but his portrait of the disappearing Sicilian aristocracy in 
the period of the formation of the Italian state perfectly fits Pareto’s and Weber’s 
models. Tomasi combined the decline of one elite and the rise of another with 
state formation and with Veblen’s leisure class, a concept he coined in 1899. His 
historic novel, a classic in Italian literature, and appreciated all over the world, 
was published posthumously in 1958, due to Bassani, the highly esteemed chroni-
cler of social life in Ferrara in the 1930s and 1940s.
The cognitive force of fiction went far beyond Europe. This tradition of in-
venting personages and plots was renewed and expanded into ever increasing 
sections of society: Russian authors, Chinua Achebe or J.M. Coetzee, and the 
genre of the great American novel. Who wants to understand Californian soci-
ety finds more clues in the paintings by David Hockney and in the lyrics by Jim 
Morrison than in publications by scientists who left these corners of society un-
touched. In the 1960s, Hockney depicted the new Californian elite, cosmopoli-
tan and gay, with its villas, hotels, lawns, swimming pools and connections with 
the New York art world. He did so consciously, later commenting that upon his 
arrival from London he thought: this place needs its own Piranesi. The poet and 
performer Jim Morrison immortalized the same region with world famous songs 
like ‘L’America’, ‘L.A. Woman’ and ‘The End’. After riding the highway West, Jim 
Morrison introduced the black American blues and sang: ‘He took a face from 
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the ancient gallery/And he walked on down the hall’. He continued with the 
Freudian drama, modeled on the ancient tragedy of Oedipus, to conclude with: 
‘This is the end’.
 One culture, many fields
Increase in knowledge about the human mind followed a path that differed pro-
foundly from the better known and more widely appreciated increase in knowl-
edge about nature. There is no such a thing like a single, one-dimensional pro-
gress. Debates linger on, concerning methods, concepts, languages, narratives, 
falsifications and genres of presentation, many of which function next to one 
another with limited communication among the fields.
The natural sciences constituted a model for a new type of inquiry of humans 
but this scientific approach turned out to be far less successful than in chemistry 
and physics. Only particular niches saw a flourishing of experiments, statistical 
analyses and mathematical processing of data. These niches remained isolated 
and limited in scope. The scientific model failed to substitute literary approaches. 
Boundaries between disciplines changed continuously, creating unstable citation 
communities, separate catalogues and bibliographies, as well as unclear divisions 
of labor among libraries.
Next to the scientific approach of human societies, the older paradigm of the 
humanities continued to exist and along these lines new insights came into be-
ing, sometimes interacting with the scientific model. This resulted in eclectic and 
varied mixtures of disciplines that tended to transcend the boundaries of science. 
The most-quoted authors moved between literary studies, philology, art history, 
archeology, history, sociology and anthropology, as well as theater studies, cul-
tural studies and media studies.
These creative shifts from one genre to another extended into the realm of the 
arts. Works of art were studied and successful scholars choose to write fiction 
themselves. They considered themselves to be literary authors and sometimes 
even became famous authors of best sellers in the domain of literary fiction or in 
a mixture of art, the humanities and journalism.
Innovations in art and literature allowed for new genres to emerge in which 
themes were addressed that were also of interest to social scientists and those 
who adhered to the humanist tradition. This happened in modern painting, pop 
music, journalism, film and television. Sometimes artists expressed their views 
on human societies in a more impressive and evocative way than social scientist 
had done, or they observed aspects of human behavior that had escaped their 
attention.
623Sociology and the Proliferation of Knowledge
All these fields of thinking about the human race, changing, eclectic and heter-
ogeneous as they are, at first sight suggest less order and more chaos than the set-
ting of the natural sciences and their search for a unified theory of forces. How-
ever, the humanities embody a different order. The various fields converge into 
one cognitive culture concerned with human societies, global and full of niches. 
This multifield setting and the partial connectivity between the fields proved to 
be an intellectually productive way to address the complicated topic of human 
relations and their rich histories.
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11.5 Inhumanity in the Humanities
On a Rare Consensus in the Human Sciences
AbraM de Swaan
A broad and strong consensus prevails in the human sciences about the personal-
ity traits that distinguish genocidal perpetrators from other human beings: there 
are none. A small percentage of the killers, roughly the same as in society at large, 
say five percent, may indeed show psychopathologies that make them impervious 
to the suffering of others and even cause them to enjoy it. The vast majority, how-
ever, displays the same variety of traits and in roughly the same frequencies as the 
population at large. There is near unanimity among scholars, a rare exception in 
the human sciences, that nothing in their personality predisposes the perpetra-
tors to commit their deeds more than anyone else. In the very titles of their books, 
the adherents of this view announce their conclusion: the killers are ‘ordinary 
men’.1 What must be explained is ‘how ordinary people commit extraordinary evil’.
The argument follows a fixed itinerary. It begins with the psychological tests 
that were administered to the Nazi defendants at the Nuremberg trials by US 
psychologists and psychiatrists. The chiefs of the Nazi regime were rather re-
markable personalities, each in his own way. The fact that psychological tests did 
not reflect any anomaly, to my knowledge, was never seen as a shortcoming of the 
tests, but rather as evidence for the mental health of the persons tested.2 They 
were, however, found to share high scores on certain traits that were not per se 
pathological: above average intelligence, high ambition, overconfidence and an 
‘ambient’ style of problem-solving.3
 Eichmann in Jerusalem: The banalization of evil
If anything focused global attention on the Nazi crimes, it was the spectacular 
abduction of Adolf Eichmann from his hideout in Argentina and his subsequent 
trial, in the spring of 1961, before an Israeli court in Jerusalem. In most war-crime 
trials, the defendants had presented themselves as average citizens, not especial-
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ly motivated for their task, lukewarm at most in their ideological convictions, 
 career-minded, maybe, but not wildly ambitious, not much given to racial or eth-
nic hatred, nor driven by passionate loyalties to the Leader or the Party. Strong 
motivations after all, might betray a personal commitment to their murderous 
task and bring their individual responsibility to the fore.
This camouflage strategy was brought to perfection by Eichmann’s defender, 
Servatius, who may not have fooled the prosecution or the judge, but certainly in-
fluenced some of those who attended the trial, most notoriously Hannah Arendt4 
(or the Dutch writer Harry Mulisch, for that matter).5 Even at the time, it was 
well-known that Adolf Eichmann had been a fanatic Jew hunter, who knew full 
well what fate lay in store for his prey. In interviews with Willem Sassen, his SS 
acquaintance in Argentina, which were published in part in Time Weekly before 
the trial, Eichmann had said that he regretted only one thing: ‘that he had not 
caught them all’.6 Arendt mentions that Eichmann during and after the war had 
repeatedly boasted: ‘I will jump into my grave laughing, because the fact that 
I have the death of five million Jews on my conscience gives me extraordinary 
satisfaction’.7 Arendt dismisses this rather unusual confession as rodomontade (a 
boast) and adds: ‘Bragging was the vice that was Eichmann’s undoing’. But, as a 
matter of fact, Eichmann was not bragging; he was more or less accurate, and it 
was certainly not this vice that got him in trouble, but the fact that indeed he had 
been instrumental in the extermination of many millions of Jews.
Arendt and many others who reported on the trial were enthralled by the 
fashionable notion of the time that the Nazi (and the Soviet) state were mighty 
machines, manned by countless, nameless, faceless bureaucrats and soldiers who 
were no more than cogs in the apparatus, obediently and unthinkingly doing 
whatever they were told, without much conviction of their own, except for loyalty 
to the system. But, certainly in Eichmann’s case, this was an expedient masquer-
ade, set up by the defense, and it went together very well with the spirit of the 
times: ‘Befehl ist befehl’ (Orders are orders) had become the ironic mot d’ordre of 
the 1960s, implying the opposite: that people should never again hide behind 
their superiors’ commands and that they should learn to judge for themselves and 
heed their individual conscience.8
Arendt depicts Eichmann as a pompous idiot, ‘genuinely incapable of uttering 
a single sentence that was not a cliché’.9 Poking fun at his malapropisms, she ob-
served with dead precision: ‘[H]is inability to speak was closely connected with 
an inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else’.
Eichmann whose efforts to expel, deport and exterminate millions exceeded 
even the orders he received, who continued to the very last moment when even 
Himmler had changed course, who said he despised colleagues who just followed 
orders,10 was the least apt example of an average bureaucrat, of just another number 
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in the huge equation of the Nazi state.11 Eichmann was totally devoted to Hitler 
and national socialism, fanatically ambitious and without any trace of conscience or 
empathy regarding his victims even when he was directly confronted with their fate.
Were the perpetrators banal? Arendt’s thesis on the ‘banality of evil’ does not 
stand critical scrutiny, certainly not as applied to Adolf Eichmann or other Nazi 
leaders, nor for that matter, to the rank-and-file killers. Her model might, how-
ever, fit the countless minor middlemen of the Holocaust: the administrators 
in the civil registry who supplied the names of the prospective victims, the local 
police who rounded them up, the railroad employees who transported them in 
cattle trains, the local contractors who built the gas chambers and supplied the 
extermination camps. Most of them were in some sense banal.
It was Hannah Arendt’s great, albeit not unique, accomplishment that she took 
the idées reçues of her epoch, combined them with widespread though unrealistic 
notions about Adolf Eichmann, and presented these musings as profoundly in-
novative insights all her own.12 Her readers, being told with the seal of Arendt’s 
authorial and philosophical rank, that what they had been thinking all along was 
novel and profound, piously gobbled it all up.
 Milgram’s punishing experiment and its ambiguous outcomes
In the meantime, and no doubt inspired by the Eichmann trial, a series of spec-
tacular psychological experiments received rapt attention in the US and across 
the world. Stanley Milgram had invited volunteers to participate in what he pre-
sented to them as an educational experiment. They were told that they would be 
randomly assigned to the role of either teacher or student. In fact all of them were 
made teachers and the student was played by an actor, a ‘plant’. The teachers were 
expected to present him with a series of random words and administer an electri-
cal shock each time he made an error in reproducing the sequence from memory. 
The setup was presented as an experiment about the effects of punishment by 
different ‘teachers’ on memorizing by the ‘student’. As the shocks increased in 
strength, the actor playing the ‘student’ would simulate growing discomfort, and 
then signal more and more intense pain, until he fell silent. The electric shocks 
went from hardly perceptible to ‘dangerous’ at 300 and beyond, up to 450 volts. 
Or so the subjects were led to believe.
Against all expectations, also the experimenter’s, a two-thirds majority of the 
subjects went all the way and administered the highest and seemingly quite dan-
gerous jolts. They did so under the adamant insistence of the researcher that they 
continue the experiment to the very end. Most subjects protested, visibly and 
audibly torn between compassion and compliance. Nevertheless they went on to 
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obey the experimenter and shock the hapless ‘student’. However, a considerable 
proportion did not obey: from one-third to four-fifths, depending on the mise-
en-scène of the experiment. Thus, there always remained a considerable share of 
naysayers.
Apparently, the general expectation at the time had been that people would 
not obey if it went against their individual conscience. When it turned out that 
many or even most did, this finding became the overriding message from the ex-
periment. But to people who would have thought from the outset that most peo-
ple will do what they are told, Milgram finally proved that among a very sizeable 
and varying proportion of the test population, disobedience prevailed.
It is quite customary to conclude from Milgram’s results that a majority of 
people would collaborate with a real genocidal regime. But no one has drawn 
the same conclusion in the opposite direction and decided on exactly the same 
grounds that a very sizeable minority or even a majority under a genocidal re-
gime would resist. Probably, the most sensible conclusion is that the outcomes 
of laboratory experiments must not be directly applied to real-life situations, 
either way.
More pertinent for the present argument is Milgram’s finding that he could 
not find any significant difference between the compliers and the resisters. But, 
as we shall see, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
The proportions of the two categories varied considerably with the variations 
that Milgram introduced in the setup of the experiment: the proportion of refus-
ers increased when the element of authority was reduced (no lab coat; an ordinary 
room in a plain building; no experimenter present, just ‘other subjects’; the pres-
ence of other – planted – ‘teachers’ who would refuse to go along with the experi-
ment or on the contrary would comply ostentatiously); or if the element of em-
pathy was intensified (a visible ‘student’; the opportunity to hold his hand). This 
strongly suggests that the subject’s reactions in the experiment are determined by 
the balance between the opposing tendencies of compliance and empathy.
Milgram’s own filmed account of the original experiments begins with a sub-
ject who abruptly stops sending electric shocks as he hears the ‘student’ scream. 
He turns around to face the experimenter, his arms folded over his chest. When 
the experimenter asserts, ‘You have no choice’, he responds: ‘What do you mean, I 
have no choice? Of course I have a choice’.
Paradoxically, after having demonstrated that obedience to authority figures 
was much more common than many would have expected, Milgram’s followers 
concluded that personal psychology was irrelevant in explaining compliance to 
authority. Supposedly, it depended on the characteristics of the situation alone. 
But this leaves unexplained the fact that even within one and the same experi-
mental context, a sizeable proportion of subjects did go the other way.
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This was and still is a most revealing experiment. But what exactly it reveals 
is not all that clear. Did Milgram’s subjects believe in the ‘reality’ of the punish-
ment that they inflicted on the student? That is in itself hard to believe. Nobody 
in his right mind would ever accept the idea that someone, anyone, would be 
electrocuted deliberately and with forethought in the presence of certified re-
searchers in the psychology lab, on the campus of Yale University (New Haven, 
Connecticut).
Unquestionably, there is a gamelike aspect to the situation. The experiment 
must have been experienced by the ‘teacher’ subjects as a very serious game. Ap-
parently, the subjects were suspending their disbelief, like the participants in a 
serious game tend to do.
There were, moreover, some most significant ambiguities in the presentation 
of the experiment to the subjects: During the session, the experimenter would 
insist that ‘no lasting damage’ would result from the shocks.13 But the subjects sat 
in front of a machine with labels under the rightmost buttons, which explicitly 
mentioned just that: ‘danger, severe shock’.
Does the experiment show that the majority of people in real life are ready to 
electrocute someone, if a person of authority tells them to? No. Does the experi-
ment show that people can get carried away in an experimental situation and will 
do almost anything not to antagonize a person of authority, even act as if they 
were electrocuting a third person? Yes.
In other words, experiments are a kind of serious game. That somehow the 
setup of the experiment was not entirely real may not have eluded most partici-
pants.
Thomas Blass reviewed the many replications of the Milgram experiment. He 
found that some major changes in the situational setup of the experiment did not 
much affect the outcome. On the other hand, some personality traits did make 
a difference in the participants’ behavior: ‘authoritarianism’ by one measure or 
another did make a difference, as did (lack of ) ‘empathy’ and ‘trust’ in the experi-
menter. Blass proposes an ‘interactionist’ approach to the problem of obedience 
to authority, which takes into account both situational and dispositional aspects. 
But against his expectations, twenty years later this sensible position has by no 
means become predominant in the field.
Milgram himself remained rather reserved in his interpretations.14 But his 
experiment became an icon of modern self-consciousness: ‘If the situation de-
mands it, everyone is a murderer’. Fifty years later, what stands out most is the 
authority that laboratory experiments hold, most of all for scholars in the hu-
man sciences.
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 Ordinary men or ordinary Germans
The third phase in the discussion on genocidal perpetrators, after Arendt on 
Eichmann, and Milgram on obedience to authority came when students of mass 
violence began to explore the judicial documents on Nazi génocidaires. The pio-
neering and meticulous research by Christopher Browning produced the classic 
in this field: Ordinary Men. That title is followed by a subtitle: Reserve Police 
Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. The book’s message is contained 
in this juxtaposition: the mass executions of millions of Jews in Eastern Europe 
were in fact the work of ‘ordinary people’. Browning makes his case most convinc-
ingly. Most of his findings have been confirmed and some vehemently criticized 
by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen in a study of the same Battalion 101, Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust.
Both authors agree that the recruits for Police Battalion 101 were quite rep-
resentative of the German (male) population in its entirety. The men expected 
to be recruited for police duty and had no idea beforehand that they would be 
employed to round up Jewish men, women, and children, march them toward a 
killing site nearby, force them to undress, line them up on the edge of a trench 
that the male captives had been forced to dig, and mow them down with ma-
chine guns so that they would fall into the pit on top of the other bodies, dead 
or still alive. And yet, almost without exception, these ordinary German men 
complied and carried out their murderous duty, day after day, for months at a 
stretch.
Browning and Goldhagen mainly disagree whether’ the men of Battalion 101 
were ‘ordinary ‘men’, as in Browning’s title, or ordinary ‘Germans’, as in Gold-
hagen’s subtitle.
Under police interrogation in the 1960s, long after the war, most men of Bat-
talion 101 denied any particular animosity against Jews or a special commitment 
to Nazi ideals. They may well have wanted to conceal the motivations that they 
brought to their killing assignment. Browning, and even more so Goldhagen, have 
produced ample evidence of incidents of obscene and barbaric cruelty. Many men 
of Battalion 101 did not just follow the orders to kill by the thousands, according 
to schedule, but exceeded them on their own initiative. Even if later they denied 
strong anti-Semitic feelings, at the time these atrocities were committed with 
fanatic hatred and contempt of Jews. In this respect, the draftees of Battalion 101 
may have not been entirely ‘ordinary men’.
In these respects, they certainly were not unique. The German nation did pro-
duce genocidal perpetrators en masse, but it was not the only nation to do so in 
the course of the twentieth century.
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 History, biography, and immediate context
‘Situation’ and ‘disposition’ are not opposites. Dispositions are shaped by situ-
ations over time, in social processes that is. Social situations, in turn, are the 
outcome of human interactions in the course of time, sometimes on a very large 
scale, prompted in part by their dispositions.
An authoritarian and a militaristic tradition, defeat in war, political violence 
and economic crisis, coupled with an endemic anti-Semitism that became state 
ideology, did affect the Germans of those days and may have rendered many 
among them more amenable to the massive killing of human beings whom they 
had been taught to consider ‘nonhuman’. Yet, the difference with other nations 
is one of degree, and of statistical averages in a varied and changing population.
 In retrospect, the controversy between Browning and Goldhagen boils down 
to a difference of opinion about the weight to be assigned to one of these histori-
cally shaped, cultural characteristics: German anti-Semitism.
Judicial evidence tends to reinforce the impression of depersonalization in 
the perpetrators. Their personalities pale in the process. In front of their judges, 
they minimize their initiatives, convictions, emotions, ambitions and desires. 
They come to look more and more like Hannah Arendt’s version of Eichmann 
and for the same reasons he chose to present himself in that manner. What is 
often lost in this trial documentation is the individual variety in dealing with 
the genocidal situation. There was indeed a continuum of cooperation with the 
imposed project of extermination. Some men were ‘willing executioners’, volun-
teering for the Jew hunt, eager to join the roundups and the shootings and given 
to haphazard meanness (and sometimes kindness too, since unpredictable favors 
on a whim would even better display their supreme power over their victims). 
Other men limited their participation to the tasks that were explicitly demanded 
from them, without much enthusiasm, but without objection either. And, fi-
nally, there were men who tried to exploit what little room for maneuver they 
perceived in order to stay away from the roundups, forced marches and firing 
squads.
It is in these variations of comportment that differences in individual person-
alities and dispositions are revealed. But even in the rare cases that individual 
behavior within the genocidal context has been documented, it is hard to infer 
from this evidence what the individual’s dispositions were, let alone to trace these 
personality characteristics back to prior life experiences, in early childhood or 
adolescence. So far, this sort of research has not even been tried, not in the case of 
the perpetrators of the Holocaust, nor of later instances of genocide.15
A remarkable consensus across the fields of history, political science, soci-
ology and social psychology holds that genocidal perpetrators as a group are 
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not distinct in disposition from the population at large. It is the immediate 
situation that turns people of diverse background and inclination into mass 
killers.
This apparently factual conclusion has had an enormous impact on moral 
thinking about ‘contemporary men and modem society’. The vulgarization of the 
Arendt-Milgram-Browning tradition has led to the grand cliché of our times: 
potentially, all people are genocidal perpetrators, we just never were in a situation 
where that would show.
First of all, the fateful phrase: ‘If you and I had been in the same circum-
stances...’ is a counterfactual and can not be shown to be either true or false, 
since you and I were not in the same circumstances and they are extremely 
unlikely to recur. It is also counterintuitive, since people find it very hard to 
imagine themselves as mass executioners. Yet, the idea that in a certain social 
context, in a given situation, people will commit acts that they would not dream 
of otherwise, is quite plausible. Some people are more likely to do so than oth-
ers, some will resist, even at considerable risk to themselves. Others may be 
willing and even eager to do what they are told to. That does not only depend 
on the situation of the moment, but also on their prior experience and personal 
history, in one word, a term that with so many words has been declared out of 
bounds: on their personal disposition. And in other words: on their particular 
personality.
‘Under the same conditions, you or I might have done the same thing...’. I very 
much doubt if I, or most of my readers for that matter, upon being brought into 
the killing site would have started clubbing, knifing, shooting, gassing people to 
death by the thousands, for weeks and months at a stretch. It would have taken 
more than that, it would require deadly threats and ineluctable force to turn us 
into executioners.
But to make me or you into mass killers without extreme duress would re-
quire more preparation. If, for example, we had been brought up by authoritar-
ian and unfeeling parents, as church-going anti-Semitic German Lutherans or 
Catholics, had survived the trenches and the mustard gas of WWI, had lived 
through the hyperinflation and the political chaos of the Weimar Republic, if 
we had lost our jobs or our business as a result of the Great Crisis, had had to 
adapt to the Nazi tyranny under a constant bombardment of the vilest racist 
propaganda, if we found ourselves in the utterly destructive battles at the East-
ern Front, if this had been the course of our lives, then, yes, maybe then, some 
of us might have become genocidal killers. But then, you and I, we would have 
been someone else.
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What the experimenters had stumbled upon was the Rosetta Stone of genocide studies: 
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who could have answered any question without shame of the past or fear for punishment. 
However, after the presentation of a series of most enlightening thumbnail case descrip-






12.1 The Making and Persisting of Modern German 
Humanities
Balancing Acts between Autonomy and Social Relevance
VincenT Gengnagel and Julian HaMann
 Introduction
The history of the humanities shows a constant struggle for constituting and 
maintaining their particular logic in relative autonomy from social influences. 
Understanding their emergence in the nineteenth century requires a sociological 
examination of how the humanities managed to maintain academic autonomy 
while at the same time demonstrating social relevance.
The foundation for the autonomy of the modern humanities’ disciplines was 
formulated by Kant. He claimed that liberal arts constitute the very core of aca-
demic purity precisely because of their autonomy from any societal purpose. De-
claring that ‘our age is the age of criticism’,1 Kant at the same time wants critique 
to be restricted by nothing but pure reason – i.e., all knowledge has to be sub-
jected to an academically autonomous critique. He states that
the power to judge autonomously – that is, freely (according to principles 
of thought in general) – is called reason. So the philosophy faculty, because 
it must answer for the truth of the teachings it is to adopt or even allow, 
must be conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by 
the government.2
Two hundred years later, our sociological analysis of the making of the humani-
ties after Kant takes the idea of academic autonomy into account as the ideologi-
cal groundwork that helped to form a conceptual idea of a Gelehrtenrepublik still 
called ‘the humanities’. The emphasis is put on the notion of the humanities hav-
ing a self-concept in which they conceive of themselves as free.3 In order to sketch 
out two centuries of development, the narrative of an overall pattern that under-
lies this ongoing constitution of the humanities helps to structure and under-
stand the characteristics of the said process more precisely: following the claim of 
642 Vincent Gengnagel and Julian Hamann
academic purity, each discipline defends its impartiality and objectivity while at 
the same time being dependent on societal constraints. With complete purity un-
attainable, a successful construction of any discipline within the humanities has 
to develop legitimate relations with its embedding society without compromising 
its claim for autonomy and disinterestedness.4 Since societies as well as academia 
are changing, the way a discipline produces knowledge and recognition thereof 
is problematized constantly. During this ongoing process, humanities are struc-
tured by orthodox defenders and heterodox challengers competing for legitima-
cy, thus shaping the potential orthodox position for future debates in symbolic 
struggles.5 We argue that this dynamic in itself is a constitutive element in what is 
conceived as ‘free’, that is, in the academic sphere of ‘the humanities’. Applying this 
idea to history, a discipline traditionally in a state of precarious balance between 
its own academic autonomy and both societal relevance and academic relevance 
as defined by other disciplines, this paper contributes to a constructivist under-
standing of the humanities and the symbolic practices discursively establishing 
their autonomy.
With this groundwork in mind, we describe the subsequent balancing acts 
between ‘pure’ autonomy and ‘impure’ social relevance as discursive practices. 
We analyze two historical cases of emergence and contestation of orthodox-
ies within history as a German academic discipline: the orthodox positions of 
historicism (1871-1945) and historical social science (1960-1979). For both cases, 
societal influence and academic influence are assessed as two forms of social in-
fluence, while the precarious balance is illustrated by shifts in debates about 
epistemological grounds of legitimate humanistic knowledge and by transforma-
tions of the ideal-typical subject position legitimately representing autonomy: the 
professor of history.
 Objectifying partiality (1871-1945)
In the period from Germany’s unification to the end of World War II, Ger-
man historians, as humanists, orient themselves along the academic distinction 
between humanities and natural sciences, while societally being influenced by 
the ‘belated nation’s6 desire for national (or nationalistic) constructions of its 
collective identity. These influences favor balancing acts whose outcomes can 
be indicated in terms of attempts to define legitimate humanistic knowledge and 
in terms of the characteristics of the ideal-typical subject position in this period 
of time.
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 Societal and academic influences
Especially for the humanities, the relationship between state and university was 
crucial at the beginning of the nineteenth century. As state and university inter-
ests begin to coincide toward the end of the century, autonomy from the state is 
no longer seen as a pressing issue. After 1871, the demand for an interpretation 
of national identity calls for cultural leadership, a duty that is most eagerly ac-
cepted by historians who become advocates of a national ideology. Not only is 
their objective to provide canonical knowledge for civil education, but also to 
offer political orientation for Germany’s seemingly threatened political position 
in Europe.7 But crucially, historians are anxious not to jeopardize their rigorous 
stance of academic autonomy. Reluctant to get involved in party politics, they 
prefer to address issues concerning the state or the nation on an abstract level and 
derive their political contributions from historical facts.
While this reluctance is dismissed during World War I, the belief in nonpar-
tisan and disinterested interpretation of the weal of the nation and the state is 
still widespread in the Weimar Republic. Academics perceive a lack of intellec-
tual leadership, combined with a climate of massification and industrialization 
of society. Historians are searching for a way of coming to terms with a German 
past that neither witnessed a successful bourgeois revolution nor the establish-
ment of a parliamentary constitution, but instead is dominated by the Prussian 
authoritarian state and traditional elites.8 Historians deliver the interpretative 
tools to derive from this a unique German national heritage that assures identity 
while historically explaining and rationalizing Germany’s role in global politics.9
With this in mind, it is not particularly surprising that historians and their 
works did not form a noteworthy resistance against National Socialism. But even 
after 1933, when the societal influence on history is most notable, a remainder 
of autonomy is retained as the discipline is split. Openly political propaganda, 
conducted by quasi-official National Socialist historians, stays away from aca-
demic research foundations like the Ethnic German Research Societies (Volks-
deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaften) and thus contributes to maintaining au-
tonomy at least as a self-conception of the academic National Socialist research 
taking place in these very research foundations. This is not to say that university 
history does not play an important role in at least intellectually legitimizing the 
regime. On the contrary, it is its relative academic autonomy that serves as a ra-
tional supplement.10
Summing up, even if it was minimized during war time, historians maintained 
their (discipline’s) relative autonomy by translating the belated nation’s desire for 
national (or nationalistic) identity and constructions of history into a humanis-
tic logic, combining societal engagement in terms of abstract political contribu-
tions with displays of academic disinterestedness. Joined to the societal influence 
644 Vincent Gengnagel and Julian Hamann
sketched so far, an academic influence on history posed another challenge for the 
discipline’s autonomy: the last third of the nineteenth century saw notable in-
stitutional expansion and a growing self-confidence of the natural sciences, dis-
played exemplarily by Von Siemens’s (1886) and Virchow’s (1893) announcement 
of the ‘age of natural sciences’.
This development has a twofold impact on the humanities in general and on 
history in particular: On the one hand, natural sciences become competitors for 
the prerogative of interpretation of the world that was firmly in the hand of hu-
manistic disciplines like philosophy and history since the beginning of the nine-
teenth century. This becomes apparent when Max Lenz denies the ‘claim for sole 
reign’ of the natural sciences, stating ‘that the historical sciences in no way have 
to fear the competition with those of nature, neither regarding their scope nor 
their impact’.11 On the other hand, the broad success of neo-Rankean historicism 
is at least partly facilitated by the rise of natural sciences that shapes an academic 
climate legitimating the orthodoxy’s focus on objectivistic empirical research and 
elaborated methods. This is why Lenz’s defense also conveys an acknowledge-
ment of the legitimate research logic defined by the natural sciences. The back-
ground against which he claims the significance of history is, in fact, its disinter-
ested research practice being similar to that of the natural sciences: ‘We face the 
past like the natural scientist faces a plant or the history of the earth. [...] We have 
[...] little interest in a system and dogmatic values [...]. We want nothing but to 
examine and discover’.12 Against this backdrop, the academic influence on history 
exerted by the natural sciences is promise and threat at the same time.
Strategies like Lenz’s are exactly what ensures the persistence of the autonomy 
of history – and, on a broader scale, of the humanities. Representatives of the dis-
cipline, rather than subordinating themselves to the academic influences, present 
their own adapted research logic and even position it in contrast with the natural 
sciences. In this light, historicism serves as a transmitter of the influence of the 
research logic of the natural sciences into history. Historicism’s role as a balancing 
act serving the persistence of humanities and history in particular is highlighted 
in the following section.
 Balancing acts of legitimate historical knowledge and ideal-typical 
subject positions
The growing influence of the natural sciences enables historicism to shape a new 
orthodox position of legitimate humanistic knowledge. Since part of establishing a 
new orthodoxy is to challenge and overcome the former, historicists deny that the 
historiography of the Enlightenment has produced genuine historical thinking 
and degrade it to a mere preliminary stage. Many historicists do not fully reject 
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the former orthodoxy: instead, its way of interpreting and judging is seen as a 
discardable subjective residue of what now is perceived as a diversity of moral, 
religious or legal orientations. In the eyes of its main representatives, it is his-
toricism that promoted historiography to the status of a science (Wissenschaft).13 
Rediscovering Ranke,14 they define scientificity (Wissenschaftlichkeit) as source-
based empirical research using intersubjectively reliable methods. This, and the 
researcher pushing back any subjectivity when conducting his research, is to en-
sure a seemingly disinterested objectivity.15
But the recourse to Ranke, constituting legitimate humanist knowledge in the 
period investigated, means more than just striving for objectivity. It also implies 
the adoption of Ranke’s idea of a primacy of foreign affairs, perceiving historical 
events from a state perspective interested in bellicose or diplomatic relations be-
tween nation-states.16 Despite disputes about methodological as well as epistemo-
logical issues, there is a rather broad agreement on basic assumptions and axioms. 
Among them are the conviction that history is national, entrenching the newly 
found national unity and argumentatively backing up the further development of 
the empire (Reich), and the belief that history is scientific (wissenschaftlich) in an 
objective, disinterested and nonpartisan way.17 Following Ranke, historians like 
Lenz and Marcks are convinced that ‘we can only exert a genuine influence on the 
present age when we abstain from it for the time being and raise ourselves to free 
objective science [Wissenschaft]’.18
Ranke’s quote suggests that the ideal-typical subject position of the professor of 
history is that of a mediator between party political factions on the one hand, and 
the greater gain of the state or Kulturnation on the other hand.19 This does not 
raise concerns about autonomy because the subject position unites the role of a 
‘critical researcher’ who ‘has the duty to force back his subjective moods’ and of a 
‘political expert [Sachverständiger]’, whose ‘perception of the spiritual substance of 
the events will always be exercised by the subjective standpoint of the beholder’.20 
Their different (but mostly conservative) political stances notwithstanding, his-
torians look down on practical politics, although their engagement at the same 
time legitimizes political day-to-day business.21
The particular social position of the historian is related to a specific self-
perception. Firstly, the ideal-typical subject position is occupied by an especially 
homogeneous group that is reproduced through a remarkable degree of self-re-
cruitment in comparison to other professors.22 Secondly, historians do not only 
enjoy a high socio-structural status, their profession also has a high social pres-
tige ensuring ‘almost a monopoly on political resonance with the public’.23 Unsur-
prisingly, the social prestige historians enjoy in the eyes of their contemporaries 
is, thirdly, matched by their self-conception and their general habitus. The feeling 
of dominance state-centered historicist display is partially fed by their position 
646 Vincent Gengnagel and Julian Hamann
as state officials at state institutions of higher education. They see themselves 
not only as a meritocratic but also as a value elite, distinguished by certain moral 
and political norms that need to be championed and proclaimed to supervise the 
national unification.24
Recapitulating the balancing on the level of ideal-typical subject positions, it 
is striking that it is exactly the objectivity of their empirical research that en-
ables historians to take a political stance. They introduce the claim for objectiv-
ity through source-based empirical research into the humanities via historicism, 
and at the same time benefit from the scientific (wissenschaftlich) prestige of the 
orthodoxy and the social prestige of their position when engaging for the greater 
good of nation and state. In the subject position, empirical research striving for 
objectivity, political engagement striving for national unity and the public recep-
tion of these stances are heavily intertwined.
As has been illustrated up to this point, the belated nation’s demand for statist 
and national(ist) interpretations of history and the rise of the natural sciences 
exert strong influences on history. However, they are not compromising the dis-
cipline’s claim for autonomy. Firstly, historicism articulates a research logic that 
allows combining academic purity via objectivistic research with political engage-
ment. Secondly, the social position, prestige and self-conception of the historian 
allow taking a political stance not only without losing, but exactly because of his 
academic credibility.
 Reflecting partiality (1960-1979)
Conservative orientations toward the nation remain largely unchanged and 
constitute a great deal of continuity from 1945 up until the 1960s. However, in the 
1960s and 1970s, societal demands for democratization, the expansion of universi-
ties as well as a relative loss of reputation of subject positions in history change 
the conditions for humanistic practice, while the expansion of the social sciences 
provides an academic influence on the discipline.25 The two-level balancing acts 
these influences require in history are again illustrated by the indicators legitimate 
humanistic knowledge and ideal-typical subject positions.
 Societal and academic influences
The general political changes embracing (West) German society since the 1960s 
translate the topic of democratization into an academic field whose structure is 
shaped by newly founded universities and student protests. This societal influence 
on history causes an ‘unprecedented atmosphere of departure’.26
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Associated with this is the need for a discussion about purpose and relevance 
of history for a modern society, prompting a number of contributions about 
the relationship between history and society.27 The domestic climate of political 
reforms is advantageous for heterodox positions in the disciplinary discourse, 
conducing to an open controversy between conflicting heterodoxies. Novel po-
sitions developed in the course of these conflicts are deemed relevant to the 
present as they seem equipped to satisfy the demand for explanations of current 
problems.28 The effect the climate of democratization has on history becomes 
apparent in a declaration of the Association of German Historians (Verband 
der Historiker Deutschlands), calling for historiography to provide a ‘practical 
service to democracy’ by encouraging citizens to develop a critical understanding 
of the liberal-democratic constitution they are living in.29 Against the backdrop 
of political and societal changes like democratization and social opening of the 
universities, historians realize that ‘they can only push their claim of relevance 
for society if they are prepared to enter the scientific-political and socio-political 
ring’.30
Academically, the humanities are confronted with the growing influence of the 
social sciences. Similar to the way the natural sciences were acknowledged but at 
the same time opposed, historians try to integrate social-scientific methods and 
theories without losing their autonomy or even merging the discipline with the 
social sciences. The strategic pattern used in dealing with this academic influence 
on history is twofold in a way resembling the preservation of autonomy toward 
the natural sciences.
One the one hand, many historians oppose the pressure the social sciences 
are exerting. If Lenz announced in 1897 that history would not have to fear the 
competition of the natural sciences, Wehler’s argumentation about the deficiency 
of sociology and economy is reminiscent of that.31 On the other hand, the newly 
established dominance of the social sciences makes it difficult to ignore the po-
tential their theories, methodologies and methods have. Too big seems history’s 
need for a renewal during the 1960s and 1970s, too persuasive the success of the 
social sciences and too wide-ranging the overlap regarding subject matter and 
method. Hence, the second part of the strategic pattern toward this academic 
influence is to acknowledge the social sciences by interdisciplinary cooperation or 
at least inspiration. This is why many historians, more or less programmatically, 
call for a sociologization of history.32
Although German historians defend their autonomy against the social sci-
ences, they are still willingly acknowledging their legitimate influence. This bal-
ancing act becomes not least apparent in the name that is established for the new 
orthodoxy proving most suitable to deal with the influences sketched up to here: 
historical social science. While ‘social science’ is meant to symbolize the affinity 
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to systematic social sciences, the adjective ‘historical’ ‘emphasizes the aspiration 
of historical autonomy’.33
 Balancing acts of legitimate historical knowledge and ideal-typical 
subject positions
From the 1960s onwards, societal influences as well as the growing academic influ-
ence of the social sciences challenge the legitimate humanistic knowledge of both 
idealist and historicist orthodoxy. Opposed by defenders of the historicist tradi-
tion who see the danger of an ‘instrumentalization of historical knowledge in the 
political discussion’34 and try to fend off ‘a widespread and fundamental subjec-
tivistic wave that has carried away history, [...] threatening to lead to a decay of 
thinking’,35 there are heterodox attempts to provide a new foundation for objectiv-
ity.36
However, with historicism losing ground, soon enough historical social sci-
ence becomes the main program of the new orthodoxy of legitimate humanistic 
knowledge in history. In contrast to the political historiography of neo-Rankean 
historicism, it focuses on all areas of social and cultural life. Wehler, one of its 
main representatives, insists on history’s practical relevance and emancipating 
mission by characterizing the discipline as a ‘lively, political, critical social sci-
ence’.37 Unsurprisingly, the critical ambition toward overcome traditions is ‘above 
all criticism of historicism’.38 By way of example, Wehler states that ‘only a histori-
ography that is freezed in an antiquarian-esoteric self-sufficiency’, inhabiting ‘the 
ivory tower of allegedly purposeless, presuppositionless human science’ would 
deny the practical relevance of the discipline.39
Just as historicism replaced the historiography of the Enlightenment as the or-
thodox tradition, this time it is the heterodox challenge of historical social science 
that delegitimizes historicism, either by tradition criticism or by reintegrating 
those historians that were excluded as outsiders by historicism.40 While source 
critique still forms a core aspect of historical research, historicism’s assertion that 
it deducts objectivity from it is now seen as a deficient antecedent.41 The new 
orthodoxy aims to achieve objectivity through its critical intentions and the dis-
closure of its own epistemological premises, allowing for an open discourse about 
axioms and presuppositions.42
Therefore, for historical social science, ‘the principle of objectivity of histori-
cal research is in no way obsolete’.43 In Mommsen’s case, it is reconciled with his 
moderate relativism by distinguishing illegitimate partiality and legitimate value 
considerations or theoretical insights. Similarly, Kocka distinguishes between 
legitimate practical engagement and illegitimate political instrumentalization.44 
These reconciliations of objectivity and partiality – in the eyes of historicism 
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a sure sign of the discipline’s loss of purity – can be seen as a major feature of 
historical social science becoming the main approach of the new orthodoxy that 
is balanced by a decidedly critical and emancipative stance and by the pointedly 
societal involvement of its representatives.
It is not a coincidence that the success of the new orthodoxy takes place during 
the social opening of the university and the subsequent increase in recruitment 
of university personnel. The result is not only a changed age pattern of the ideal-
typical subject position,45 but also a crisis of succession:46 critically observed by es-
tablished professors, who bemoan ‘unforeseen dangers’ because of ‘personnel mal-
investment in a partially rash and politicized phase of expansion and founding’,47 
a new generation of historians can introduce heterodoxies due to the opened up 
personnel hierarchy. The crisis of succession also waters down the once distinc-
tive degree of self-recruitment. Historians still enjoy a high socio-structural sta-
tus, but as a group they are less homogeneous and less exclusively composed.48 
This is fitting with more mundane working conditions the ideal-typical subject po-
sition of the professor is facing due to rising student numbers and the subsequent 
need for vocational education.
While a good deal of the historians working in the period from 1871 to 1945 
can safely be described as conservative, the new generation, whose ‘moral pro-
fession’ is characterized as ‘political-societal pedagogy with emancipative inten-
tions’,49 is mostly left-liberal.50 Attempts at democratizing the university further 
contribute to the politicization of the subject position.51 Similar to their prede-
cessors described above, the historians of the 1960s and 1970s can still utilize 
their expertise for historical-political advice, but in contrast have to actively le-
gitimize their stance in disciplinary discourse.52 In summary, the ideal-typical 
subject position is occupied by historians mostly younger and less exclusively 
recruited than their counterparts described above. Their societal and political 
engagement is assuming critical and emancipative forms rather than nationalist 
and conservative ones, while their political stance tends to be left rather than 
conservative.
In the second period investigated, influences on history are exerted by de-
mocratization and expansive reforms and by the rise of the social sciences. But 
again, they are not compromising the discipline’s claim for autonomy. Historical 
social science not only integrates the influence of the social sciences but also al-
lows emancipative and critical societal engagement while preserving objectivity 
through an explicitly theoretical ambition and a critical-rational discourse. From 
a subject position that itself is a product of the social opening of the field, histo-
rians can claim autonomy by openly legitimizing their political engagement and 
reflecting their societal embeddedness as well as their interestedness in terms of 
contemporary politics.
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 Conclusion
In the two cases discussed above, rules of legitimate historical knowledge are dis-
cursively established, contested or altered and broadened while historians aim 
for academic purity. Accordingly, subject positions allow the bearers of legitimate 
knowledge to orient themselves toward academic and societal relevance and to-
ward the ‘pure’ academic core of their discipline at the same time. During this 
balancing act, former challenges can later become part of what is considered the 
proper discipline of history: The source critique of historicism reacts to an aca-
demic influence in order not to lose ground to the positivist natural sciences. 
Even for a discipline that is shaped by new orthodoxies, source critique still forms 
a core means to claim academic advances in historical knowledge. Societal influ-
ences such as the given form of government and its approach toward national 
history represent particular external needs that demand historical sense from 
scholars at a particular time, for example, a sense for the ideological needs of the 
belated nation (historicism) or postwar reeducation (historical social science). 
Although the social production of historical knowledge and corresponding sub-
ject positions is always subject to academic constraints and follows internal rules 
of cognition, a successful adaptation to such new societal needs establishes an 
autonomy that is always precarious. The balancing acts analyzed here involve two 
narratives or discursive strategies: the first as means of substantiating purity and 
the second as means of legitimizing societal and academic relevance.
According to the narrative of academic purity, societal and academic influenc-
es lead to history developing and broadening the concept of historical knowledge 
through an ongoing process in which more and more aspects of the discipline 
become subject to reasonable critique: initially, historicism derives abstract po-
litical stances from historical facts and rejects the knowledge produced by the 
historiography of the Enlightenment. Only an empirical stance toward history 
relying on research conducted with original sources ensures the discipline’s aca-
demic autonomy from philosophy. Hence, the kind of critique historicism makes 
possible is focused on historical sources. While source critique forms a constitu-
tive criterion of legitimate historical knowledge until today, its claim for objectiv-
ity and societal aloofness is questioned by a new generation of historians from 
the 1960s onwards.53 Adding the critique of socially constructed axioms, purity 
of historical research now also has to be criticizable in terms of social embedded-
ness of the researcher him- or herself. By including critical-rational discourse as 
means of mutual persuasion, the production of historical knowledge becomes 
more transparent, open to scrutiny and therefore more societally relevant in a 
democratic way. This way, the democratization of postwar Germany is integrated 
in the discipline by being subjected to an academic critique ensuring that the 
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societal demand will be met within the condition of scientific purity. The first 
discursive strategy depicts this balancing act as incrementally broadening the ho-
rizon of critique. While this is the narrative constituting purity as advances in 
knowledge, i.e., ‘the power to judge autonomously’ through critique of reason,54 a 
narrative of societal and academic impurity focuses on different aspects.
Analysis of the two historical cases reveals how, as a second narrative, the bal-
ancing acts do not only follow internal rules, but occur in different societal and 
academic settings. In the case of historicism, historians obediently emphasize 
statist and national (or nationalist) perspectives on foreign affairs and national 
heritage. While not involved in day-to-day politics, they are certainly committed 
to a national culture. At the same time, the influence of the natural sciences is 
absorbed and academic legitimacy is gained by a quasi-positivistic orientation 
on methods and sources. In reeducated Germany, the discipline once more finds 
an appropriate stance toward societal and academic demands. For a more demo-
cratic society, it docilely orients toward questions of civil society and educational 
tasks, while academic influences favor the emergence of theoretical and methodi-
cal imports from the social sciences. In contrast to substantiating purity, the 
second narrative is a discursive strategy paying tribute to societal and academic 
influences. As we have shown, both narratives, that of substantiating purity and 
that of legitimizing societal and academic relevance, have been balanced out un-
der certain historical circumstances.
In both cases – historicism and historical social sciences – historians take 
part in a process of relatively autonomous translation of societal and academic 
demands into the logic of their discipline. As shown in this paper, the internaliza-
tion of these challenges takes place in conflicts between orthodox stakeholders of 
the discipline and their heterodox counterparts. Such confrontational processes 
of negotiation are not conclusively solved at any given point. Instead, they are part 
of the permanent process of the humanities situating themselves within society 
and academia according to changing dominant societal and academic influences.
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12.2 Critique and Theory in the History of the 
Modern Humanities
Paul Jay
What role has poststructuralist literary, critical, and cultural theory played in 
the making of the humanities, particularly in the period between 1968 and the 
present, and what role should theory have going forward as we come to terms 
with the corporatization of higher education, with its stress on practical skills, 
vocational training, and on measuring concrete learning outcomes? Exploring 
these questions requires confronting – and linking – two key issues currently 
at the core of sometimes-fierce debates about the humanities in the West, and 
particularly in the US.
The first issue has to do with whether or not theory since 1968 has served to 
undermine the traditional coherence of a humanities education, and the second 
has to do with how humanists and their supporters respond to assertions the 
humanities have little value because they do not teach students practical skills. In 
the US in particular these two issues have gotten intertwined.
I will be arguing that since theory has always been central to the humanities it 
is a mistake to argue it has somehow undermined and marginalized them. This is 
especially the case at a time when questions are being raised about the practical 
skills humanities students acquire, for the skill of critical thinking is at the very 
heart of an education in theory. Claims that a humanities education has no practi-
cal utility are surprisingly common. Indeed, such a claim is often worn as a badge 
of prestige by humanists themselves. For example, the well-known literary critic 
and New York Times columnist Stanley Fish has insisted that the humanities
don’t do anything, if by ‘do’ is meant bring about effects in the world. And 
if they don’t bring about effects in the world they cannot be justified ex-
cept in relation to the pleasure they give to those who enjoy them. To the 
question ‘of what use are the humanities?’, the only honest answer is none 
whatsoever.1
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And Frank Donoghue, writing about the marginalization of the humanities in 
an increasingly vocation-centered university, surrenders to a dangerous fatalism. 
‘Curricula change overtime’, he notes, ‘and the humanities simply don’t have a 
place in the emergent curriculum of the twenty-first century’.2 With friends like 
this the humanities do not need any enemies.
The failure to rise to the challenge of defending the humanities in terms 
of the practical skills they teach is all too often a retreat into idealism. Worse 
still, it usually comes off as defeatist. It avoids the necessity of developing a 
pragmatic position in the face of realities that are not going to go away. Arguing 
that the humanities have gotten sidetracked by abstract, esoteric theories fails 
to recognize that theory is intimately related to critique, that critique has been 
at the center of debates about humanism since its inception, and that critique 
is demonstrably connected to the practical skill we sometimes too loosely call 
‘critical thinking’. For this reason, highlighting the role of theory as critique in 
the humanities is one of the best ways to highlight the practical utility of a hu-
manities education.
 Critical Theory and the end/ends of the humanities
Observers who complain theory has ruined the humanities argue that from 1850 
to about 1968 the humanities developed a curricular and intellectual coherence 
that was successively undermined by structuralist, deconstructive, psychoana-
lytic, queer and Marxist theory, and later by multiculturalism, feminism, and the 
rise of postcolonial and cultural studies.3 This old coherence was based largely on 
an attitude of deference to canonical texts and traditional humanist ideals. It was 
connected to what the American critic Andrew Delbanco has called a curatorial 
model of scholarship and teaching.4 According to this narrative, the primary role 
of the humanities was to preserve and explore a great tradition of humanist work 
in literature, philosophy, the fine arts, history, and religion, encouraging students, 
following Matthew Arnold’s ideal, to study with disinterest the best that has been 
thought and written.
The problem with theory, from Delbanco’s perspective, is that it abandoned 
deference and disinterest in favor of criticism, fracturing a coherence organized 
around great books and the ostensible pursuit of ‘universal truths’ at the core of 
Western humanism. The complaint about theory from this perspective is that its 
focus on difference and diversity turned our attention away from what unites us 
to what divides us. According to this narrative, difference replaced universality as 
the key principle directing the pursuit of knowledge in the humanities. Following 
this new model, the humanities turned its attention to analyzing the exclusion 
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of differences as a constitutive move in the construction of the very notion of 
a ‘common humanity’, and this attention led to an explosion of work across the 
disciplines of the humanities on the importance of particular differences related 
to things like culture, gender, race, and sexual orientation. It also led to what tra-
ditional humanists came to feel was a counterproductive critique of humanism 
itself, one that undermined the very notion of a humanities education.
Of course traditional humanists were hardly wrong in seeing theory as a threat 
to humanism, for theorists as varied as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and 
Louis Althusser (along with French feminists such as Monique Wittig, Luce Iri-
garay, and Hélène Cixous) often presented their work as announcing the end of 
humanist man. While humanism tended to see the human subject as a sovereign 
agent, language as a transparent medium for that agency, and truth as the product 
of a reason that transcended history, these theorists and their followers ques-
tioned the autonomy and agency of the subject, the transparency of language, 
the foundations of reason, and the whole idea that truth could stand outside 
history and culture as universal and foundational. The most oft-cited version of 
this idea is Foucault’s declaration near the end of The Order of Things that ‘man 
is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for hu-
man knowledge’, that ‘one can be certain that man is a recent invention [...] and 
one perhaps nearing its end’.5 Derrida’s critique of metaphysics, the questions he 
raises about the idea of presence, and his criticism of the equation between voice, 
reason, and the subject, was also framed as a frankly anti- or posthumanist ap-
proach to subjectivity. And the work of both Derrida and Foucault is consistent 
with that of Althusser, who insisted on the fundamentally anti-humanist orien-
tation of Marxism and argued that the putatively autonomous humanist subject 
was a product of ideology and language, a being not sovereign but interpellated. 
From this point of view, theory’s critique of humanism seemed to betray the very 
ideals upon which the humanities were built.6 Why? Because theory substituted 
ideological critique for disinterest, made it more difficult to explore our common 
humanity, and seemed to fracture the curricular coherence of a humanities educa-
tion by marginalizing the great works of the Western tradition in favor of inferior 
texts by formerly marginalized writers.
While there is no denying how dramatically poststructuralist theory has 
transformed the humanities, it is by no means necessary to see theory as anti-hu-
manist. Indeed, as Martin Halliwell and Andrew Mously have shown,7 humanist 
thought is too diverse a tradition to be reduced to a single line of thinking about 
human subjectivity. They question the standard narrative that contemporary crit-
ical theory constituted a ‘complete rupture’ with humanism. Instead, they argue 
that the work of thinkers like Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault, Kristeva, Lacan, 
and Lyotard, ought to be seen as developing a more nuanced, self-reflexive, and 
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‘rigorous theory’ of the human. From this point of view, contemporary critical 
theory ‘takes the human to be an open-ended and mutable process’, but this does 
not have to be seen as an anti-humanism. A ‘postfoundationalist view of the hu-
man’, suspicious of essentialist categories, is in their view an ‘ethically and politi-
cally grounded humanism’.8
I think they are right, and that it is important to recognize not simply how 
contemporary critical theory can be understood as an attempt to productively 
modify the substance of humanist thinking, but how the kind of critical think-
ing theory performs is itself central to the tradition of humanism. The danger in 
dismissing theory as anti-humanist is that it runs the risk of elevating subjects 
of knowledge (call it cultural literacy) over learning how to think critically about 
systems of thought, ideologies, and authority (what I would call critical literacy). 
One of the most significant drawbacks of this position is that it sees objects 
of knowledge and the practice of critique in either/or terms. This problem is 
exemplified by Delbanco’s distinction between curation and criticism. According 
to Delbanco, the humanities went astray when criticism overwhelmed curation, 
when theory and the critique of humanism took the place of the humanities’ 
responsibility to preserve and venerate a traditional body of knowledge (and the 
seemingly timeless authority it had). What this point of view misses, of course, 
is the reciprocal relationship between curation and criticism, for to a significant 
degree the act of curation requires criticism, and criticism is itself a form of 
curation.
A curator does not just make decisions based on quality and distinction. He 
or she is also critically and imaginatively involved in putting together objects in 
ways that produce new relations between things and new forms of knowledge. 
Humanities scholars and educators curate by being critical in this more capacious 
sense of the term. Contemporary work in the humanities is therefore curatorial 
in the best sense of the word. It both reorganizes old materials and gathers them 
together with new materials to create new perspectives on both the past and the 
present. This means theory is not a threat to the curatorial enterprise, but rather, 
is central to its intellectual and pedagogical vitality.
Because theoretical thinking has always been central in mainstream human-
ism, the distinction between preservation and critique simply does not hold up. 
Delbanco wants the great texts or art works in literature, philosophy, art history, 
or religious studies to be the primary focus of attention, but in a way that runs 
the risk of separating them off – even protecting them – from criticism. In his 
view the act of curation must always take precedence over what he takes to be the 
counterproductive practices of criticism. My point, of course, is not to argue that 
Delbanco gets it backwards – that the humanities ought to be all about criticism 
and that they ought to put curation on the back burner. My point is that the two 
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activities are interdependent. When we articulate the value of the humanities we 
need to emphasize not only the body of knowledge they preserve but also the 
value of the forms of critique they teach, and to underscore that critique is a prac-
tical skill integral to both scholarly work and critical citizenship.
 Theory, critique, and the tradition of humanism
Now, what do I mean when I invoke the word critique, and how has critique been 
central to the making of the humanities? Let me be clear: by critique I do not 
simply mean critical thinking. The phrase ‘critical thinking’ has become a terribly 
overused catch phrase in discussions of higher education, and it is often very 
loosely defined – if it is defined at all. By critique I mean the practice of system-
atically analyzing and interrogating the constitution of conceptual categories and 
the sources of their authority. Critique explores historically and conceptually the 
development of norms that regulate our personal, social, and political lives to-
gether (for that matter, it explores the historical constitution of the very ‘we’ these 
norms are supposed to protect).
It is important to stress here that there is such a thing as critique itself – separa-
ble from particular critiques of particular discourses. And critique can be taught, 
not just particular critiques, but the activity of critique per se. Indeed, this is what 
we teach when we teach critical theory. Judith Butler, writing about Foucault’s 
conception of critique, has observed that critique
will be dependent on its objects, but its objects will in turn define the very 
meaning of critique. Further, the primary task of critique is not to evalu-
ate whether its objects – social conditions, practices, forms of knowledge, 
power, and discourse – are good or bad, valued highly or demeaned, but to 
bring into relief the very framework of evaluation itself.9
This meta-level in critique, this bringing ‘into relief the very framework of evalu-
ation itself ’ is at the heart of the activity we call critique.
Critique is, in this sense, at the very heart of the humanist enterprise. It in-
volves the kind of abstract, systematic thinking we associate with Kant’s theory 
of the aesthetic, Hegel’s dialectic, Marx’s analysis of the class structure or the 
operations of ideology, Nietzsche’s idea of the death of god, or Freud’s work on 
the unconscious, or his great work, Civilization and Its Discontents. But it also in-
volves our evaluating the very frameworks of evaluation that have been employed 
to think about those critiques, including our own evaluation of those evaluations. 
Indeed, it is quite impossible to think about humanism, and thus the humani-
660 Paul Jay
ties, without thinking of the primary role that dissent and critique played in the 
development of Enlightenment thought, especially in terms of its radical pro-
posals about human liberty and agency, about the primacy and autonomy of the 
individual, and about the natural or human rights everyone is entitled to. All of 
these ideas involved a theoretical critique of the status quo. It was what human-
ism, at its very foundations, was all about. From this point of view, the criticism 
of theory’s place in the humanities makes no sense. Worse still, it seems to strike 
at the very heart of the humanist enterprise, relegating its critical vitality to the 
past. Seen this way, humanism is over, fixed, curated, and sanitized. It is worthy 
of historical study, but not something that still lives.
One thing that is particularly interesting about Butler’s discussion of Fou-
cault’s approach to critique is her focus on how he associates critique with virtue, 
the cultivation of which – along with an ethical sensibility – we like to associate 
with a humanities education. About his idea that ‘there is something in critique 
that is akin to virtue’ Foucault observes,10
virtue is most often understood either as an attribute or a practice of a sub-
ject, or indeed a quality that conditions and characterizes a certain kind of 
action or practice. It belongs to an ethics which is not fulfilled merely by 
following objectively formulated rules or laws. And virtue is not only a way 
of complying with or conforming with pre-established norms. It is, more 
radically, a critical relation to those norms.11
This critical relation to norms, Butler emphasizes, involves ‘a resistance to author-
ity’, something Butler points out Foucault saw as absolutely central to Enlighten-
ment critiques of the status quo.
Although Butler is quick to point out that most Enlightenment thinkers would 
not understand the link between critique and virtue in this kind of way, she in-
sists that ‘this resistance would not invalidate’ the link Foucault makes, for what 
he ‘seeks in the characterization of the Enlightenment is precisely what remains 
“unthought” within its own terms: hence, his is a critical history’ of critique.12 ‘In 
his view’, she concludes, ‘critique begins with questioning the demand for absolute 
obedience and subjecting every governmental obligation imposed on subjects to 
a rational and reflective evaluation’.13 Foucault’s connection between virtue and 
critique, of course, is aimed precisely at exposing these operations and therefore 
has the potential to be liberatory.
Linking theory to critique, and considering its liberatory potential in the way I 
have been sketching out, underscores a key problem with conservative criticisms 
of theory. On the one hand, the popular idea that theory has ruined the humani-
ties is often based on the quite accurate idea that theory has had a lot of critical 
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things to say about humanism. But on the other hand, that argument misses the 
fact that theory’s critique of humanism is thoroughly consistent with the central-
ity and purpose of critique in humanism itself, and that its purpose, by and large, 
has been to ensure the ideals of liberty and agency at the heart of humanism 
are extended to everyone. For this reason, contemporary theory – contemporary 
critique – ought not to be thought of as anti- or posthumanist, although as we 
have seen above, some theorists like to style it that way. In my view, such terms are 
quite counterproductive. In an age when the humanities are imperiled, it makes 
little sense to use the rhetoric of anti- or posthumanism in articulating its value. 
There is no reason why theory and its critique of humanism cannot be folded into 
a positive articulation of a twenty-first-century humanism.
Instead of seeing theory as a threat to humanism, new ways of thinking about 
the human subject, the role that language plays in constructing reality and shap-
ing meaning and value, and how gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, and 
class both shape identity and enable or circumscribe agency, ought to be seen 
as constructively rethinking and expanding traditional humanist claims about 
individuality, autonomy, liberty, and rights. In my view, contemporary forms of 
humanistic critique are, by and large, interested in helping to broaden, and diver-
sify these claims, to make the discourse of humanism more, not less legitimate. 
Although in its most radical moments, theory seemed to be announcing the end 
of man or the beginning of a posthumanist age, it has actually represented con-
structive, forward-looking dissent from the historical limits of humanism, dissent 
that sought to expand, correct, and broaden humanist ideals.
Examples abound. Although, as we have seen, Foucault’s remarks about the 
‘end of man’ have often been cited as an example of the anti-humanist orientation 
of contemporary theory, it makes more sense to see his work on the relationship 
between subjectivity, discourse, ideology, and power – along with theory’s general 
critique of the idealist human subject of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century phi-
losophy – as a contribution to refining and clarifying our humanist understand-
ing of subjectivity and agency. From this point of view, contemporary theory is all 
about insuring that the humanist guarantee of agency and rights is extended to 
everyone, not just the traditional human subject of ‘universal man’.
  Here, of course, feminist theory becomes another, crucial example of a 
critical theory that, while it might be presented as anti-humanist, is anything but. 
On the one hand, feminism dissents from humanism’s notion of ‘man’, based as it 
is on the universalizing of a version of human nature derived by, and largely based 
on, male experience, but on the other hand feminism is linked to humanism in its 
insistence that women be accorded the same set of rights and the same kind of au-
tonomy and agency associated with traditional humanism. On the critical side, of 
course, feminist theory and history help foreground the patriarchal orientation of 
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humanism. Not simply in the trivial and quite obvious sense that virtually all of 
the early thinkers and writers associated with humanism were males whose status 
as scholars and educators was predicated on all of the privileges that came with 
being male in a patriarchal system, privileges that were unavailable to women 
(who, more often than not, were treated as the property of men). The less obvious 
but perhaps even more important point is that the identity category of gender is 
altogether absent inside humanist thinking about the human. We should not see 
this simply as linguistic hair splitting, believing that the great writers of Renais-
sance, Enlightenment, or modern humanism meant to include women when they 
wrote ‘man’. Too often they did not. Humanist ‘man’ was conceptualized from the 
experience of male human beings; it is about forms of power, thought, agency and 
autonomy (not to mention access to education and therefore to the very activity of 
scholarship upon which humanism is founded) historically only accessible to men.
 However, as critical as feminism is of how humanism’s philosophy of man 
kept women disenfranchized, it is important to see contemporary feminist the-
ory as part of a struggle to expand humanism’s ideals with regard to individual 
autonomy and liberty rather than as an attempt do away with humanist ideals 
altogether. Like Marxism, feminism has had a double relationship to humanism, 
simultaneously launching a critical dissent from, and insisting on the broad legiti-
mating and application of, its central ideals about human individuality, autonomy, 
and agency. This kind of work, while often cast as post- or anti-humanist, ought 
to be understood as part of an evolving discourse within humanism about what it 
means to be human, and about what ought to be included in a humanities educa-
tion. It constitutes both a dissent from humanism, and an extension of its logic.
 Theory, critique, and critical thinking
Linking theory to critique, and critique to critical thinking, not only makes intel-
lectual and historical sense. It makes strategic sense as well. Critical thinking is 
routinely cited as the single most important practical skill the humanities teach, 
yet, as I indicated earlier, it is often invoked with little attempt to define it. Many 
of the same people who are critical of the role of theory in the humanities are the 
same people who emphasize the importance of critical thinking, which means 
they are missing the fact that critical theory courses are some of the best courses 
in critical thinking we have in higher education. Seeing critical theory as training 
in critical thinking emphasizes the general utility of such courses, but it also helps 
add substance to a concept that is often invoked but rarely defined in discussions 
about higher education. For example, The Foundation for Critical Thinking out-
lines an approach to critical thinking that links it to the kind of theoretical think-
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ing associated with structuralism, deconstruction, and other social, cultural, and 
political theories that challenge received dogmas and entrenched assumptions.14 
For example, the foundation’s mission statement declares that critical thinking 
cultivates ‘intellectual discipline [...] self-reflection and open-mindedness’, insist-
ing that it requires a break with ‘automation and fixed procedure’ and embraces 
‘radically different’ forms of ‘thinking [...] adaptable, more sensitive to divergent 
points of view’. And critical thinking is also tied explicitly to social changes under 
globalization.
The world in which we now live requires that we continually relearn, that 
we routinely rethink our decisions, that we regularly reevaluate the way 
we work and live. In short, there is a new world facing us, one in which the 
power [...] to regularly engage in self-analysis, will increasingly determine 
the quality of our work, the quality of our lives, and perhaps even our very 
survival.
This approach to critical thinking underscores its foundations in theoretical 
thinking and critique in disciplines across the humanities, but also to challeng-
ing, resisting, and rethinking those forms in the very act of using them. From this 
point of view you cannot have critical thinking without theory, for what’s being 
subjected to critical thinking here are entrenched, naturalized professionalized 
assumptions and protocols. Critical thinking involves asking challenging ques-
tions about ways of thinking and conceptualizing problems that have become 
automatic and fixed. This approach to critical thinking, which deals with received 
concepts ‘openmindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing and 
assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical consequenc-
es’, is strikingly in sync with the shorthand definition of theory Jonathan Culler 
provides. ‘The main effect of theory’, he points out, ‘is the disputing of ‘common 
sense’: common-sense views about meaning, writing, literature, experience’.15 The-
ory, from this perspective, is a form of critical thinking that in challenging old, 
naturalized orthodoxies gets us to see that what we take to be ‘common sense’ 
explanations and assumptions are in fact theories. For ‘theory’, Culler explains, 
is an ‘attempt to show that what we take for granted as “common sense” is in fact 
a historical construction, reflecting a particular theory that has come to seem so 
natural to us that we don’t even see it as a theory’.16
Theory in the humanities, then, is not a distraction from what the humanities 
ought to be doing. Theory is central to what everyone believes the humanities 
ought to be doing: teaching critical thinking. It is a way of thinking critically 
about humanism and the gap between what it advocates and who has benefited 
from what it advocates. And theory challenges students to think open-mindedly 
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in the context of divergent points of view about their core beliefs, to rethink and 
reevaluate their positions, and to entertain radically different forms of thinking 
about how meaning is produced, about the relationship between art, philosophy 
and power, and about the relationship between class, gender, race, sexual orienta-
tion, and social justice. From this point of view theory, as it challenges tradition-
ally entrenched ways of doing intellectual and historical business, is an important 
vehicle for critical thinking and is thus central to the core mission of the humani-
ties. Indeed, it is one of the most concrete examples we have of teaching critical 
thinking.
 Conclusion
To come back to the double argument I have been making, all of this means not 
only that theory ought not to be seen as a distraction from what the humani-
ties should be doing, but even more importantly, that theory ought to be seen 
as central to both the history of humanism and the range of practical skills we 
teach in the humanities. We should not allow theory to become the scapegoat for 
what critics believe is wrong with the humanities. Indeed, we need to go beyond 
defending theory and actively argue for its centrality in the traditions of human-
ism we teach, and the contemporary humanities we increasingly have to defend.
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Epilogue
Toward a History of Western Knowledges 
Sketching Together the Histories of the Humanities 
and the Natural Sciences
John V. PicksTone
In my book on Ways of Knowing: A New History of Science, Technology and Medi-
cine (2000), I showed how a model developed from the historiography of medi-
cine could be used to elucidate much wider histories. Since then I have published 
several papers refining my framework and extending its scope.1 In June 2012, after 
a lecture in Utrecht, I was asked how my method might be used for the history of 
the humanities. This paper sketches a response.2
But why should I presume that I have something to contribute to the ‘history 
of the humanities’, especially since this category has rarely been considered by 
historians in Britain? Even if we agree that there might be simple ways of map-
ping the history of humanities as part of Western knowledge more generally, why 
should work on ways of knowing in science, technology and medicine (STM) be 
one good place to start?
In this introductory section I suggest reasons why my approach might help 
with this wider remit, beginning with the openness of the method as to subject 
matter. I then discuss questions of chronology, of theory and practice, and about 
combinations of ways of knowing, across that wider range. I do not attempt to 
define the history of humanities, any more than I have delimited the history of 
STM. Rather, I follow an open-ended method which may in fact serve for most 
of the formalized knowledges of the West since the Renaissance. Later in the 
essay I test that proposition by sketching a history across that range, including 
both natural and cultural knowledge practices. Importantly, I note ways in which 
issues in the history of humanities may improve our histories of STM. Questions 
about the ultimate scope of the approach, and of what may lie beyond, I leave for 
another day!
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 Ways of knowing in STM and beyond
Though my book was called a history of science, technology and medicine, the ap-
proach was never defined by its sphere of application; indeed the book included 
some notes on social and cultural sciences. The same is true for each of my ways 
of knowing and ways of working taken individually as ‘elements’ of historical anal-
ysis. In brief, these are: reading and using meanings; describing/classifying and 
crafting; analysis (whether mathematical or substantive) and rationalization; and 
synthesis from elements. With but one partial exception, these ‘working knowl-
edges’, seem applicable to the humanities, at least if we allow that mathematical 
analysis is similar to, or a class of, formal analysis, such as used in linguistics. We 
can show this by considering in turn these four kinds of working knowledges:
(A) The applicability is especially obvious for ‘hermeneutics’, or readings for 
meaning, along with its practical correlate that I provisionally called rhetoric. As 
an aspect of the history of STM, the reading of natural objects for meaning may 
be seem debatable, but reading texts for their meanings has always been central to 
the humanities. It is, indeed, against concerns with literary texts that historians 
can best consider later readings of the book of nature.
One already begins to see how including the history of the humanities might 
enrich the whole project. Perhaps, for example, we need to enquire how natural 
philosophy worked when it was no longer on the syllabus of ‘science’ teachers; or 
how classical humanities, modern languages, academic philosophy and art con-
tinue to inform our response to the world and our self-fashioning, as well as the 
factual content of our learning?3
(B) I have used the term ‘extended natural history’ for projects that describe and/
or classify any kind of object – and that must surely include books. The choice of 
terms is difficult: I have sometime used ‘sorting’ as less associated with birds’ eggs 
and flowers. The term ‘cataloguing’ would stress the connection with bibliogra-
phy, etc., and especially in a restaurant in Greece, ‘catalogue’ would lead directly to 
the menu – and maybe to recipes, which in turn bridge nicely from classification 
to crafting. Perhaps, however, as we widen the agenda and stay with Greek, techne 
is a better term than craft – one which can cover all knowledge-based creative 
practices, including the literary or political.
It is no accident, that here and elsewhere in this discussion, we meet with Ar-
istotle, the greatest of Western systematisers and the widest in range. Perhaps re-
cent historians of technology are too ready to focus on machines; better, with Ar-
istotle, to include the biological and psychological as we consider ways of working 
that depend on knowledge of materials, tools, designs, and the needs of users.
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(C) My third primary way of knowing is ‘analysis’, meaning reduction of a com-
plex phenomenon to known elements – whether mathematical, as in planetary 
astronomy, or substantive, as in chemical analysis. Equally, and evidently, it can 
characterise work in literary studies, philology or psychoanalysis, for example. 
Here too it seems useful to distinguish formal analyses, which tend to be very 
general, e.g., questions of symmetry, and substantive analysis which is more field 
specific, e.g., the elements of the Freudian psyche.
(D) In the early papers and the book, I used ‘experimentalism’ as a fourth way of 
knowing and working, to stress the experimental creation of systems out of known 
elements, especially from the nineteenth century, whether in synthetic chemistry 
or the experimental medicine of Claude Bernard. But this usage was problematic 
because I also needed to distinguish several other kinds of experimental interven-
tions, e.g., experimental histories (a Baconian class) and experimental analysis. 
More recently I have used the term ‘synthesis’ to include both mathematical mod-
eling and novel material constructions – made from known ‘elements’, whether 
radicals in organic chemistry or, say, endocrine glands and hormones in clinical 
physiology. This aspect of the model is certainly suggestive for the humanities, 
and I have indicated elsewhere how the analysis: synthesis distinction may prove 
useful in characterising ‘modernism’ – in the arts and in STM.4
This use of ‘synthesis’ also frees ‘experiment’ to qualify the primary working 
knowledges – to indicate interventions (or maybe the open-ended) across the 
whole range of knowledge practices.
 Chronologies across the knowledge practices
Most overviews of natural sciences hinge in the mid-seventeenth century, with 
the first scientific revolution; but many historians of STM stress major changes 
in the several decades around 1800, sometimes called the second scientific revolu-
tion, though there is little systematic exploration of its structure and dynamics, 
beyond individual disciplines. If we look to other kinds of knowledge practices, 
it is this second period, say 1776-1848, which seems especially prominent and 
pregnant. Historians of technology and medicine both tend to prioritise shifts 
around 1800 – the Industrial Revolution and the Birth of the Clinic – without 
neglecting others. That has indeed been my frame for my analysis of STM gener-
ally, stressing the second scientific revolution along with the industrial and the 
clinical. It corresponds easily with the history of humanities, for most modern 
social sciences are commonly dated to the half century around 1800, as are key 
shifts in studies of language and art, along with the Kantian and Romantic revo-
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lutions in philosophy and art. If we agree that all these revolutions in knowledge 
practices are roughly coincident, then analysis of this complex mega-revolution 
and its relations with political revolutions is surely a central task for any historian 
prepared to work on that scale; and any analysis which has proved plausible for 
STM in this period would seem likely to assist that wider endeavor.
 Theory and practice in STM and cultural work
Many historians of the natural sciences now see themselves as also dealing with 
the history of technology, while historians of medicine rarely make any primary 
division between science and technology. They know the nineteenth-century sup-
position that practices stem from prior formal knowledge, but they also know, 
and can use even for later periods, the old model that ‘sciences’ were the inclusions 
of formal knowledge, as it were, in liberal practices. Perhaps across the whole 
range of what the Greeks called techne – from medicine to playwriting –we might 
try to recreate the knowledges at work, the ‘sciences’ in the arts and crafts, includ-
ing (fine) art, along with the philosophies which helped place those arts in both 
natural and cultural worlds?
Perhaps in our world as well as Aristotle’s, the sciences of languages, litera-
ture and of art might usefully be considered, in part, as technical sciences, akin 
to engineering sciences or some medical science – as studies of artifacts and/or 
modifications of nature. Thinking of technical sciences in this way may nicely 
approximate Bacon’s claim that making is the test of our natural knowledge and 
Vico’s subsequent, and perhaps consequent, claim that culture is more knowable 
than nature because it is man-made. Of course, in all such cases, the knowledge 
deployed by makers or analysts will not exhaust the properties of the artifact or 
the possibilities for improvement. It is importantly untrue that man-made objects 
are ipso facto fully understood: Victorian steam engines and novels were, and 
may remain, important objects of investigation – in natural sciences and in the 
humanities.
Here we may also note that technical sciences are often, but not always, norma-
tive. Practitioners usually want to know how they can do things better – whether 
they are doctors, engineers, orators or painters. For the sciences of culture, we 
know that normativity was crucial in the early modern period; some of them, 
e.g., art history, seem to have been relativized in the Age of Revolutions (so any 
remaining norms became local to particular artistic projects rather than general). 
These complex issues of praxis, technical science and normative need much more 
discussion than is possible in this essay; here I simply suggest that putting the 
sciences of culture (back) alongside wide views of medicine, engineering or agri-
671Epilogue
culture may bring advantages across the board. Medicine, as a well-studied and 
partly discursive art, may be especially useful as a common point of reference, not 
least because our bodies and our languages are each, in various measures, both 
inherited and created.
 Changes and combinations of knowledge practices
As noted, the kinds of ways of knowing and working which I used for analysis in 
the history of STM are reading/rhetoric, sorting/crafting, analysis/rationaliza-
tion, and synthesis. Of course, practices of each kind were not static over time. 
The work of sorting in a Renaissance museum was vastly different from that in 
a present-day text bank, but there are enough commonalities and continuities 
across time to make the category stable. Changes within each ‘way’ are a signifi-
cant part of history, but so too are new discriminations and combinations. In my 
view most knowledge projects are combinations of ‘ways’. This is hugely impor-
tant, because it allows infinite variety and subtlety of analysis, perhaps more so 
than in the historiography which uses ‘style’. Most of the work of Alistair Crom-
bie or Ian Hacking, for example, traces particular styles through history, simply 
mentioning the possibility of combinations.5 My approach is analytical rather 
than simply taxonomic – more like chemistry than botany – and thus more open-
ended in the treatment of any ‘case’ (at any level).
Certainly one can follow each kind of working knowledge, and their mixtures, 
but their interactions and ‘compoundings’ are central. For example, all syntheses 
depended, and in some sense incorporated prior analyses, which in turn involved 
prior sortings; and all projects (and their objects) have cultural and symbolic as-
pects. It follows from this last statement that projects which present ‘natural’ ob-
jects involve the cultural work of ‘naturalization’ which strips particular objects of 
their symbolical significance, for the purposes of that project. These relationships 
probably hold across the whole field of knowledge. We can, for example, read a 
book for its meaning, to check changes between editions, or to analyze sentence 
structure, and these activities are likely to have different histories. This essay will 
stress diachronic variety, interactions and compoundings across the whole range 
of knowledge – in ways which seem to link easily with the complexities of social 
history.
Again medicine is a good guide. A disease may be seen as a vital disturbance 
which doctors (and historians) can analyze into natural-historical and cultural 
components; they may see laboratory analysis added, at least after 1800; and more 
recently, say, genetic engineering. All these elaborations involve new cultural reso-
nances. But common accounts of disease may be more simply understood as ‘bio-
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graphical’ – a term which covers both cultural and natural components. Thinking 
of biography can then connect medicine with the many other cultural disciplines 
and practices which study human conditions, goals and actions; and if we wish, 
these too can be similarly deconstructed for the purposes of analysis.
In what follows, I focus first on the dialectics of naturalization, disenchant-
ment or objectification, and mention those of mathematical analysis. I look at 
the relations of reading, sorting and calculating, beginning with the early modern 
hierarchies of knowledge practices. I then focus on the decades around 1800 and 
the dynamics of analysis and rationalization, of ‘reduction’ and ‘holism’ that were 
central to the politics of patients, factories or literary analysis. Here I touch on 
the political revolutions and the roles (especially in the humanities) of new ana-
lytical disciplines which were substantive as well as mathematical. I conclude by 
sketching some late–nineteenth-century formations, and then skipping toward 
our present.
Of course, in so short a paper one can only make patchy notes, but hopefully 
in a way which will map important historical and logical relations. By standing 
far back from the disciplines we study, we may glimpse an historical overview of 
Western knowledge – one that might also be useful for students and historians 
based in other academic traditions.
 The early modern conjunctures:  
Meanings, sortings, and calculations
It is not easy to focus on reading meanings as a way of knowing, for it is to 
academics as swimming is to fish; but historical scholarship on early modern 
reading, writing and teaching comes to our aid. In a lovely summary, Anthony 
Grafton focuses on the teaching of classical texts, usually Aristotle – on the 
line-by-line presentation, the oral commentary, and the printed editions which 
left room for intertextual notes. This was the infrastructure for the high-level 
transmission of classical cosmologies – of philosophy and its various extensions 
in the professional education of theologians, physicians and lawyers whose main 
business was speaking and writing in that frame.6 This may seem a world away 
from ours, and of course, the methods and infrastructure have changed, but 
when we learn subjects new to us we usually read for the meaning, not to study 
the author; and all such learning may shape us as actors, not just as critics. Out-
side of religious education, we now are rarely taught cosmologies directly, but as 
historians we might attend more to how modern cosmologies are transmitted; 
and why some champions of the humanities continue to promote the role of 
humanities in self-creation.
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Professional education was also underpinned by the seven liberal arts, the 
quadrivium and the trivium. The former, including geometry, arithmetic, astrono-
my and music, provided mathematical literacy and an appreciation of regularities; 
we will return to them in discussing the development of mixed mathematics as 
mathematical analysis of nature and of artifacts. The latter, comprising grammar, 
logic and rhetoric, might also be said to deal in formal or substantive analysis, but 
as the basics of reading, writing, speaking and argument – the arts of discourse. 
As in all the liberal arts, the emphasis could be on the analysis of structures, or 
on norms and the improvement of practice and of character – as in renaissance 
rhetoric.
But as we have already suggested, there were other activities also ancillary to 
reading for meaning. Texts were collected and compared, catalogued and indexed; 
and so were words and quotations, along with the notes that scholars had made. 
One had to work out what was likely to be the ‘best’ text – not necessarily the 
most meaningful but the one which appeared less infected by successive copying 
errors or mistranslations. From classical libraries to modern databases, texts of 
many kinds have been assessed and prepared for use, sometimes using formal 
analyses.
It seems that the arts of bibliography, etc., were in some ways prior to the 
arts of cataloguing developed for natural and other technical objects;7 there was 
clearly a parallel, at least, between the searching out of new texts and the col-
lecting of new plants. We know that in medicine, natural history and astronomy, 
textual criticism was then the basis for increasing reference to the ‘book of na-
ture’: that corpses, for example, were used to illustrate readings of Galen, to 
ask questions about alternative readings, and then to question the veracity of 
the classical source – so that modern anatomy books were written to replace 
the classical (and to be taught and learned from, with more or less reference 
to corpses). Essentially the same story has been well-told for Dioscorides and 
botany, and for Pliny and natural history: commentaries on classical but per-
haps marginal writers gave way to texts based on collections and observations 
of specimens.8
Partly because many of the new specimens did not ‘come with culture’, would-
be botanists learned how to ‘objectify’, as anatomist learned to explore the body 
as if a new land. This naturalization and objectification is a key feature of 
Western knowledge, for objects and for texts, but in thinking across the whole 
range of Western knowledge we should always be aware that objectification is 
a process, and reversible. Birth monsters are never securely ‘naturalized’, even 
for technicians; recent Western museum displays often render ethnography as 
art, or natural history as culture; and the word-world of Google is wonderfully 
undisciplined.
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Information about bodies or plants was compiled in historia, a new genre 
which extended across most of knowledge. It could include the findings of crafts 
or systematic observation of weather, diseases or planetary motions; or legal cases 
and other historical documents.9 Historia literaria, of course, included classical 
texts and commentaries, whether they were still the foundation of didactic educa-
tion or of decreasing direct interest within ‘modern’ fields.
One can give a similar account of the relations between texts, meanings and 
quantitative analysis in astronomy. Kepler was philologist enough to be able to 
judge the quality of texts, and he could help date texts by calculating the year 
of occurrences mentioned therein. He could also debate the relative merits of 
various classical and modern models of the heavens, guided by his cosmological 
preferences.10 Comparable stories can be told about mechanics and the Archi-
medean tradition, which, of course, interacts with astronomy through Galileo 
and then crucially through Newton. Mathematical analysis, in courts and uni-
versities, grew way beyond the quadrivium into a discipline often called mixed 
mathematics.
As most scholars seem to agree, the main frame of early modern natural 
knowledge was tripartite, and perhaps that model can be extended across the 
humanities: reading meanings continued to be central in theology and various 
kinds of philosophy, but the once ancillary projects of collecting information and 
of calculating were growing strongly and encouraging new cosmologies. The ‘sci-
entific revolution’ can be read as shifts of world meanings based on extension and 
intensification of naturalization and mathematization (with some attempts to 
bridge them through experimental philosophy). In the humanities, in some coun-
tries, the new stress on plain speech downplayed renaissance rhetoric, and schol-
ars attempted to understand languages by a universalist analysis, as in music. In 
my view this triangular interplay of meanings, information and mathematics re-
mained the chief pattern of knowledge through much of the eighteenth century,11 
and these kinds of working knowledges remain important to the present. Much of 
‘management science’, for example, is made up of case histories, mathematics and 
‘philosophies’ – as it must be.
It is, however, a mistake to imagine that the scientific disciplines of the nine-
teenth century were simply specializations or elaborations of these early modern 
practices. The new sciences built on the older knowledge, and in some ways incor-
porated them, but they involved new elements specific to each new science, e.g., 
chemical elements, geological strata or the elements of deductive political econo-
my. The working knowledges of these new or reformed sciences were heterogene-
ous but predominantly analytical – both in natural sciences and technologies and 
in the disciplines related to languages and the fine arts.
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 The age of knowledge revolutions
We can begin with the history of medicine, as portrayed by Michel Foucault at the 
start of his career. Like most historians of medicine, he saw in post-Revolutionary 
Paris a new form of science, based on the analysis of bodies into tissues, each 
of which could show characteristic lesions. But if we look more closely we will 
also see the continuance of older practices, including the case histories and the 
medical philosophies; we will indeed see a variety of ‘compoundings’ according 
to the local contexts. Historiography of medicine, including the critiques aimed 
at Foucault, is thereby a useful model for the continuities, uneven development 
and contested cumulations which are crucial to a full history of any such field, 
including the cultural sciences. But that is not to deny the significance of new 
forms of knowledge and practice circa 1800 which Foucault also noted for zool-
ogy, philology and economics.12
That significance is especially clear when we know that the tissues of Bichat’s 
new general anatomy were in some ways modeled on the new chemical elements 
of Lavoisier’s chemistry. These elements, unlike those of the ancients or early 
moderns, were field-specific and accessible: chemistry was the discipline which 
analyzed the stuffs of the world in terms of chemical elements; general anatomy 
analyzed bodies as composites of tissues. I have shown elsewhere how this kind 
of intellectual project can be traced across many new physical and biological 
sciences and technologies – in several varieties of anatomy and physiology of 
animals and plants, crystallography, comparative engineering, and in the stra-
tigraphy of the new geology.13 (The range of comparability is much wider than 
Foucault supposed when he excluded the harder sciences.) The rest of this pa-
per sketches some ways in which the argument can be developed across the hu-
manities and allied practices. We begin with French and British projects which 
claimed kinship with comparative anatomy and chemistry, before moving to ‘de-
velopmental analyses’ and to the arts and sciences of the subjective. The latter 
were, of course, characteristic of German universities where the hierarchies and 
chronologies of knowledge practices were very different from those of Parisian 
museums and professional schools.
 Anatomies of societies and economies
In the early nineteenth century, the headquarters of comparative anatomy was 
the National Museum of Natural History in Paris. The dominant author was 
Cuvier who contrasted four different kinds of organism, each with a distinct 
plan; each animal was a system of interactions between organs, and each animal 
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interacted with features of its surroundings that thereby constituted its ‘envi-
ronment’. That model reordered zoology, but there were many other ways of 
analyzing biological and medical organisms, most of which could also be used on 
social organisms. (The direction of ‘influence’ here is debatable; I am not argu-
ing for the intellectual priority of biology.) Models included the Saint-Simonian 
idea of parallel functional systems, the communitarian model of similar parts 
acting in concert, the ‘economy’ of material interactions between differentiated 
parts, or the old view of a unitary soul (remade for a context in which it was no 
longer hegemonic). In my view, none of these approaches or scholarly fields can 
be fully understood in isolation from the others or from contemporary politics, 
nor should they be detached from the descriptive, practical or statistical ‘social 
sciences’, which in England at least, occupied most of the enthusiasts.14 Much 
of the more refined sociological analysis was ‘merely theoretical’; the effects in 
practice were chiefly through suggesting or legitimating particular modes of so-
cial action.15
Perhaps only in political economy did analytical reduction then gain much 
empirical traction, in interactions with other kinds of working knowledge. For 
example, most eighteenth-century economical writings could be classed as ex-
tensions of natural philosophy, natural history or mathematics, or as normative 
manuals for the management of estates; and writing of these kinds continued. 
But in England, and especially with Ricardo, one also sees increasingly abstract, 
calculative models of the economy, analyzed as the interactions of ‘elements, of 
land, labor and capital’. According to Schabas, it was then J.S. Mill who made a 
strong separation between the natural sciences of agricultural or industrial pro-
duction and the moral science of political economy.
This key move may perhaps be linked with then current general questions 
about the interrelations of the new analytical sciences. Mill was much indebted to 
Comte, the prime French theorist of the new configurations of science, who de-
scribed a hierarchy of sciences – in which each new disciplinary layer added new 
understandings specific to that layer, e.g., the biologist added understandings of 
tissues for living bodies that also showed chemical phenomena. Comte saw social 
analysis as superadded to biological (and lower) analyses for any given material 
case; in Mill’s view, political economy as a science should confine itself to ‘the 
necessities caused by social arrangements’. One may see here, across the board, 
how questions of the organization of knowledge connected with new ontologies, 
including the isolation of ‘the economy’ from nature.16
But all such economic analyses were so obviously disputable that the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, for all its stress on analytical physi-
cal sciences, preferred that would-be economists restrict themselves to the col-
lecting of data. Similar reactions to deductive analysis were common among Ger-
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man scholars who took an interest in economics and social development. They 
scorned the simplifications of the British and preferred more descriptive and his-
torical modes.17 Part of the issue here was the different philosophical underpin-
nings in the two countries, and the German focus on state rather than the civil 
society prized by the British; but the disputes also exemplify the characteristic 
tensions seen in many fields of knowledge between the ambitions of analysts and 
the caution of ‘naturalists’ and historians.
The centrality and range of this tension is nicely visible in the novels of 
George Eliot, who was closely associated both with Comteans and expo-
nents of descriptive natural history.18 My point here is not to find influences 
of natural sciences in humanities or art, but to underline how creative intel-
lects across many fields wrestled with the characteristic tensions of the age 
of analysis – between the surface appearances and the underlying agencies, 
between the taxonomies and the underlying relations, and between normative 
approaches to various arts (and their histories) versus the systematic study of 
difference. Novelists – as technologists if you like – presented their analyses 
by constructing ‘cases’ which had to be realistic, just as geologists had to recon-
cile stratigraphic analysis with the details of local land forms. I have suggested 
elsewhere how such matters may relate to important questions about  ‘objectiv-
ity’.19
We will return to studies of arts and art, especially in Germany, but can take 
here a further example from France, where mid-nineteenth-century art history 
was connected with comparative anatomy. After the Revolution, art had been 
separated from use rather literally, through the creation of museums from what 
were once parts or possessions of churches or palaces. In these new museums ‘art 
objects’ were arranged and studied historically, highlighting the classical tradi-
tion.20 But from the 1860s, lectures in art history were introduced as part of a re-
form of the École des Beaux-Arts. One of the key reformers and the first lecturer 
was Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, a specialist in historic architecture and reconstruc-
tion who was steeped in the morphology of Cuvier’s rival, Geoffroy Saint Hilaire. 
The environmental understandings of art pioneered by the positivist Hippolyte 
Taine was closely related to Cuvier’s analysis of animals in their contexts, as it 
were. In both cases, a self-consciously scientific, comparativist approach to art 
history was designed to undermine the classical, normative tradition of the École 
– at much the same time as Manet’s equally subversive explorations of different 
styles.21 Again we see how the historical study of similar problems across different 
working knowledges may allow the generalization of historiographical methods 
and resources.
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 Languages, analysis and history
Language studies, like ‘the medicine of the clinic’, zoology or art history, depended 
on collections and on the developments in the sorting/describing arts which we 
have already discussed, including source-criticism. Some language scholars re-
tained a normative commitment to the betterment of language, as some anato-
mists focused on improving the detailed knowledge of human anatomy for use in 
surgery;22 other language scholars, like comparative anatomists, concentrated on 
comparative analysis, which here again could take several forms.
Especially in Britain, where associationist models of mind had been boost-
ed by the success of new analytical sciences such as chemistry, it was fash-
ionable to focus on etymology and to analyze words as ‘compounds’ which 
tended to be abbreviated over time. Continental scholars found this approach 
conjectural and instead focused on closer structural analyses of particular 
languages, and especially Sanskrit, comparisons with which suggested new 
orderings of European languages.23 In philology, as in geology, comparisons of 
structures and functions soon opened question of historical development. In 
both cases, the forms of historical enquiry which proved secure depended on 
detailed comparative analysis based on extensive collections and careful de-
scriptions.24
But whereas zoologists and paleontologists usually found time-series of as-
cending complexity, students of language envisaged primal language as fully 
formed, and subject to various patterns of decay. Though academic philolo-
gists learned Sanskrit from followers of the British pioneer, William Jones, 
and used collections in Paris, it was in German universities that structural and 
historical studies of language thrived. That was partly because of the strength 
of the mindset called Romanticism, with its elevation of the past, but it was 
also because of the conditions of work and especially the idea of developing 
knowledge though research. Indeed, it seems clear that ‘seminars’ and coopera-
tive studies of text collections set the pattern for the laboratories and ‘research 
schools’ which became the glory of German natural sciences. More specifically 
perhaps, the model of a tree of texts with a common root may have been the 
basis for later zoological phylogenies.25 One notes here an important echo of 
the centrality of humanities in the renaissance, and a reminder that the com-
mon image of humanities disciplines following the natural sciences may be 
very misleading.
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 A new philosophy of knowing
So far in this essay, as in my book and the work of Foucault, much of the history 
has been French and British. But if one wishes to include philosophy, history, and 
the sciences of mind and culture, or even the biological sciences of development, 
then Germany must be central – so too for the fine arts and their histories. Per-
haps a brief outline may indicate how one may bridge the national traditions at 
the same time as one bridges from sciences to art.
Historians of science usually see natural philosophy declining in the nine-
teenth century, except for the substantial recrudescence of natural theology 
often regarded as a medicine for unrest in newly industrial Britain. In gen-
eral, philosophical cosmologies seem to be replaced with theories of scientific 
method – which had a history in Britain. Neither in Britain nor France was 
there much endogenous change in philosophy, which tended to remain associa-
tionist. But in German states, where philosophy became a key academic disci-
pline, a new world of knowledge was created around a new view of mind – not 
as a sorter and aggregator of sensations, but as a source of schema through 
which the world was understandable. These included principles constitutive 
of all knowledge and some constitutive of particular fields, e.g., the apprecia-
tion of biological systems as teleological, or the recognition of polarities and 
patterns in nature. It was natural to see individuals, organisms and states as 
developing – as our knowledge of them also developed – hence the centrality 
of historical approaches in all fields. Art was central because it could directly 
express the mind’s responses. This new philosophy of mind and nature restruc-
tured German disciplines, including those constructed with some reference to 
new French analyses.
Characteristically these German disciplines were gathered in faculties of phi-
losophy, by teachers who prized their new independence from the professional 
faculties, and their disciplines were presented as sciences that could be applied, 
rather than the knowledge contents of professional arts. Certainly, in some ways, 
the German approach can be seen as anti-analytical: the new legal studies, for ex-
ample, celebrated the historical development of law in opposition to French codi-
fications which were seen as intellectual conceits. Most Romantics saw ‘dissection’ 
as destructive, and instead sought unities beneath variety, as in the cell theory 
which pointed to a common mode of origin of different kinds of cells and tissues; 
or they composed particulars into larger entities which could be seen as systemic 
– e.g., the Humboldtian cosmos.26 But these views were not just an extension of 
older approaches, they were new; and if we compare these new forms of knowledge 
with natural history or with the older natural philosophies, they can be seen as an 
alternative form of modernity, one which cannot be dismissed as merely descrip-
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tive. It stressed the recurrence of simple patterns and especially the unfolding of 
underlying forms – and in that extended sense can, I think, fairly be described as 
analytical. We may thereby usefully broaden that term and its range; and we can 
begin to explore the issues by looking at German historiography.
This same concern with development which we have noted in German biology 
was evident, earlier, in the study of human history. Historiography depended, of 
course, on the developing arts of sorting and description, but also on new con-
ceptual objects, notably the nation, and on newish ‘actors’ such as the common 
(Germanic) people. Later in the nineteenth century the study of history often 
became normative as well as analytic, not just for the betterment of political skills 
or diplomacy – the universal justification of the classical humanities – but to 
improve the health and strength of the nation.27
But the new history was also analytical in other ways, related to the concern 
with ideas. To read meanings correctly was no longer a simple task: accurate read-
ing required knowing the whole system of which the text or action was a part. 
As is well-known, this view came from Vico in early-eighteenth-century Naples: 
‘understanding’ became less a matter of correspondence with nature, and more a 
question of recreating perspectives. This scientific but nonnaturalistic approach 
to ‘ideas’ grew chiefly in nineteenth-century Germany where philosophy attained 
a new centrality alongside the history of culture and of the state.
Readings, however, also depended on the empathy of historians, who needed 
to internalize the societal context and rules, adding them to their own cultural un-
derstandings and repertoires. In this respect, historians claimed similarity to art-
ists, both in registering the likely feelings of their actors and in skillfully depicting 
the reconstructed scenes and sequences.28 In as much as sciences could focus on 
ideas, there could be new introspective psychologies29; in as much as art now had 
new goals, it could be understood as a historical development characteristic of a 
new setting which was peculiarly Germanic. That outlook helped create German 
art history, especially when academics far from the major art collections could 
use that emblematic comparative device, the slide projector – or preferably two.30
 The decline of national difference and the challenge of natural 
sciences
Through the first half of the nineteenth century, analytical science and Romantic 
art were held together in Germany by a common focus on the analysis of mind 
and history, and by the fact that the many new disciplines cohabited in reformed 
universities, sharing ideologies of Bildung and research. We have seen how they 
were characterized by new analytical formations which stressed development and 
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resisted French and British reductions, as they were also related to older disci-
plinary practices and professional education. But by about 1850, the great con-
structive period of German philosophy seemed to be over; thereafter, national 
differences in method diminished, even as Germany became the leading site for 
natural, human and cultural sciences.31 Such then were the strengths of German 
universities in both philosophy of mind and experimental physiology that they 
led the world in forms of psychology in which experimental and subjective analy-
ses were variously opposed or compounded. Such psychologies were increasingly 
felt to threaten the place of philosophy and of history as the core of humanities.32
Philosophy as a discipline came in part to reflect on the successes and the 
relations of the natural sciences; in part it became analysis of past philosophical 
positions, especially German. In this latter respect it was convergent with other 
historical disciplines which countered the astonishing growth of natural sciences 
by stressing Verstehen as a method, and uniqueness as a supposed peculiarity of 
cultural systems.33 In many countries idealism continued to serve as a secular 
philosophy of societal progress (for others it could be Spencerism); thus meaning 
was preserved alongside the classificatory and calculative arts; but the frontier of 
knowledge was now made up of analytical sciences – some of which claimed to 
be distinctively cultural.
While German philosophers of history appealed to the re-creative analysis of 
ideas as distinguishing the realm of Geisteswissenchaften, roughly corresponding 
to later ‘cultural studies’, most academic promoters of history in Britain seemed 
happy to imitate the research schools of their colleagues in the natural sciences. 
Few British humanists worried publicly about the differences between academic 
sciences and arts – at least until the expansion of academic sciences after World 
War II, when some teachers of English had moved away from philology and saw 
their subject as a successor to classical humanities in upholding cultural values. 
In their case it was values evident in early modern Britain, long undermined by 
industrialization and now threatened by the pretensions of some scientists.34 The 
ensuing battle remains as the familiar question of ‘two cultures’ – an opposition 
better analyzed than assumed, as this essay may suggest. We may thus conclude 
by skipping to other present-day configurations – as seen across the two cultures.
 Coda
Perhaps the indulgent reader may have found here enough useful frames and con-
nections to mitigate the obvious charge of simplification across too wide a canvas. 
I have stressed continuities as well as reconfigurations, and the complexities with-
in disciplines as well as the relations and the connections between them. These 
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relationships between different kinds of knowledge practices operated at many 
levels – for micro-histories and macro-histories need not be different in kind. To 
analyze a small case is to reconstruct the interactions over time of differing socio-
cognitive traditions and thus to begin to see a larger picture, incorporating many 
such interactions. In such ways we can hope to work across levels and across fields 
which are usually considered separately.
In later work, deo volente, I hope to extend and deepen this sketch, and to 
bring it up to the present. But I wanted here to sketch a method and a historical 
frame which can include both the early modern triad and the nineteenth-century 
analytical additions – for humanities and social sciences/technologies as well as 
natural sciences and technologies.
Nowadays, across the world, governments and companies fund massive en-
terprises for sorting and describing – for objects, patents, texts and data; and 
for mathematical analysis. These now coexist with, and are partly reformulated 
by, new analytical sciences, as also with various forms of synthesis. All are found 
across the natural and social sciences and technologies, but also in the cultural 
sciences and humanities. They afford a huge challenge to historians, who must 
also include issues of shared meanings – of our changing relationships with the 
physical world and with each other.
We can illustrate that last point by again returning to history of medicine. 
Discursive arts and cultural meanings were central to its high-status early 
modern practice, and in some ways they remain so; discussions of how to live 
and die remain the core of our ‘philosophies’ – medical and humanistic. In 
modern medicine, at the limits of astonishing material technologies we still 
return to issues of life and death, and to sharing our readings of the world and 
ourselves. As a huge medico-biographical literature – professional and ama-
teur, printed and electronic, primary and secondary – now demonstrates, hu-
mans always need more than the technicalities; they need more than the natu-
ralized, the analyzed and the synthesized.35 That is also true, and vital, for the 
humanities.
One may here note the still-sharp barb directed a century ago at Germano-
phile modernisers of the Sorbonne. The Étude in which students had read the 
classics had become the Laboratoire de philologie française, where bibliography 
now reigned; the Sorbonne was coming to resemble a restaurant in which the 
only thing to eat was the menu!36 We need histories that will show how the whole 
range of technical knowledges were successively generated and used – but ones 
which can also widen our appreciation of other crucial forms of ‘philosophical’ 
understanding and practice, including self-creation.
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